U.S. policy on undermining Black leaders, the Black community and Afrika

[Im The Truth]

U.S. policy on undermining Black leaders, the Black community and Afrika

Sundiata Acoli has been imprisoned since 1973 when, traveling the New Jersey Turnpike with two companions, Assata Shakur and Zayd Shakur, his car was ambushed by state troopers. During the shooting, Zayd was killed, a state trooper was killed and Assata and Sundiata were wounded, captured and sentenced to life in prison. Sista Assata escaped and lives in exile in Cuba. Please do read more of and about our strong warrior Brothas and Sista at www.afrikan.net/sundiata.

Sundiata is a political prisoner, a brilliant mathematician, artist and committed freedom fighter for the New Afrikan Nation. Keep your eyes and ears open for updated information on Sundiata’s most recent parole efforts, as we must answer the call and support!

Sundiata submitted the following document for Black August. It was not received at the Bay View in time for publication in August, and so, in honor of Sundiata’s legendary service in the Black Panther Party, we saved it for Black Panther History Month.

Here is National Security Council Memorandum-46, an official policy statement issued in 1978 during the Carter administration of U.S. policy on undermining Black leaders, the Black community and Afrika:

National Security Council Memorandum-46

March 17, 1978

Presidential Review Memorandum NSCM/46

To: The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence

Subject: Black Africa and the U.S. Black Movement

The President has directed that a comprehensive review be made of current developments in Black Africa from the point of view of their possible impacts on the black movement in the United States. The review should consider:

1. Long-term tendencies of social and political developments and the degree to which they are consistent with or contradict the U.S. interests.

2. Proposals for durable contacts between radical African leaders and leftist leaders of the U.S. black community.

3. Appropriate steps to be taken inside and outside the country in order to inhibit any pressure by radical African leaders and organizations on the U.S. black community for the latter to exert influence on the policy of the Administration toward Africa.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa perform this review. The review should be forwarded to the NSC Political Analysis Committee by April 20.

Signed: Zbigniew Brezinski

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General and the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa: Study Response to Presidential Security Review Memorandum NSC-46: Black Africa and the U.S. Black Movement

Objective of our policy toward Black Africa is to prevent social upheavals which could radically change the political situation throughout the area. The success or failure of our policy in the region depends on the solution of international and internal issues whose importance of the United States is on the increase.

II.A. U.S. Interests in Black Africa

A multiplicity of interests influences the U.S. attitude toward black Africa. The most important of these interests can be summarized as follows:

1. Political

If black African states assume attitudes hostile to the U.S. national interest, our policy toward the white regimes, which is a key element in our relations with the black states, may be subjected by the latter to great pressure for fundamental change. Thus the West may face a real danger of being deprived of access to the enormous raw material resources of southern Africa which are viral for our defense needs as well as losing control over the Cape sea routes by which approximately 65% of Middle Eastern oil is supplied to Western Europe.

Moreover, such a development may bring about internal political difficulties by intensifying the activity of the black movement in the United States itself.

It should also be borne in mind that black Africa is an integral part of a continent where tribal and regional discord, economic backwardness, inadequate infrastructures, drought, and famine, are constant features of the scene. In conjunction with the artificial borders imposed by the former colonial powers, guerilla warfare in Rhodesia and widespread indignation against apartheid in South Africa, the above factors provide the communist states with ample opportunities for furthering their aims. This must necessarily redound to the detriment of U.S. political interests.

2. Economic

Black Africa is increasingly becoming an outlet for U.S. exports and investment. The mineral resources of the area continue to be of great value for the normal functioning of industry in the United States and allied countries. In 1977, U.S. direct investment in black Africa totaled about $1.8 billion and exports $2.2 billion. New prospect of substantial profits would continue to develop in the countries concerned.

IV. Black Africa and the U.S. Black Movement

Apart from the above-mentioned factors adverse to U.S. strategic interests, the nationalist liberation movement in black Africa can act as a catalyst with far reaching effects on the American black community by stimulating its organizational consolidation and by inducing radical actions. Such a result would be likely as Zaire went the way of Angola and Mozambique.

An occurrence of the events of 1967-68 would do grievous harm to U.S. prestige, especially in view of the concern of the present Administration with human rights issues. Moreover, the Administration would have to take specific steps to stabilize the situation. Such steps might be misunderstood both inside and outside the United States.

In order to prevent such a trend and protect U.S. national security interests, it would appear essential to elaborate and carry out effective countermeasures.

1. Possibility of Joint Action by U.S. Black and African Nationalist Movement

In elaborating U.S. policy toward black Africa, due weight must be given to the fact that there are 25 millions American blacks whose roots are African and who consciously or subconsciously sympathize with African nationalism.

The living conditions of the black population should also be taken into account. Immense advances in the field are accompanied by a long-lasting high rate of unemployment, especially among the youth, and by poverty and dissatisfaction with government social welfare standards.

These factors taken together may provide a basis for joint actions of a concrete nature by the African nationalist movement and the U.S. black community. Basically, actions would take the form of demonstrations and public protests, but the likelihood of violence cannot be excluded. There would also be attempts to coordinate their political activity both locally and in international organizations.

Inside the United States these actions could include protest demonstrations against our policy toward South Africa accompanied by demand for boycotting corporations and banks which maintain links with that country; attempts to establish a permanent black lobby in Congress including activist leftist radical groups and black legislators; the reemergence of Pan-African ideals; resumption of protest marches recalling the days of Martin Luther King; renewal of the extremist national idea of establishing an “African Republic� on American soil. Finally, leftist radical elements of the black community could resume extremist actions in the style of the defunct Black Panther Party.

Internationally, damage could be done to the United States by coordinated activity of African states designed to condemn U.S. policy toward South Africa, and initiate discussions on the U.S. racial issue at the United Nations, where the African representation constitutes a powerful bloc with about one third of all the votes.

A menace to U.S. economic interests, though not a critical one, could be posed by a boycott by Black African states against American companies which maintain contact with South Africa and Rhodesia. If the idea of economic assistance to black Americans shared by some African regimes could be realized by their placing orders in the United States mainly with companies owned by blacks, they could gain a limited influence on the U.S. black community.

In the above context, we must envisage the possibility, however remote, that black Americans interested in African affairs may refocus their attention on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Taking into account the African descent of American blacks, it is reasonable to anticipate that their sympathies would lie with the Arabs, who are closer to them in spirit and in some case related to them by blood. Black involvement in lobbying to support the Arabs may lead to serious dissention between American blacks and Jews. The likelihood of extremist actions by either side is negligible, but the discord may bring about tension in the internal political climate of the United States.

3. Political options

In the context of long-term strategy, the United States cannot afford a radical change in the fundamentals of its African policy, which is designed for maximum protection of national security. In the present case, emphasis is laid on the importance of Black Africa for U.S. political, economic and military interests.

Give thanks to Sundiata Acoli for publicizing this important historic document, write to: Sundiata Acoli, 39794-066, P.O. Box 3000, USP Allenwood, Allenwood PA 17887.

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Notice the constant use of the phrase "Black Afrikan" that is designed to make it appear that there is such a thing as a white afrikkaner