Mucyo report - The role of France in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide

[XXPANTHAXX]

Mucyo report- Report of an independent Commission to establish the role of
France in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. This is the full report

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS i
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1
1. Creation and historical background of the Commission 1
2. How the Commission understood its terms of reference 1
3. Methodology for the collection of information 2
3.1. Sources of information in Rwanda 2
3.2. Collection of information abroad 2
3.3. Access to public documents 3
3.4. Information Processing 4
3.5. Research stages 4
INTRODUCTION TO THE REPORT 5
1. Foreign involvement in Rwanda’s conflict and in the genocide 5
1.1 Historical background 5
1.2. Recent international interventions (1990-1994) 8
1.2.1. Belgium 8
1.2.2. United States 9
1.2.3. United Nations Organisation (UNO) 10
1.2.4. An attempt at international redress? 13
1.3 Process of the recognition of the genocide 14
1.3.1 Initiatives of the United Nations Human Rights Commission 14
1.3.2 Procrastination in the recognition of the genocide in the Security Council 15
PART I: FRANCE’S INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA BEFORE THE GENOCIDE 17
1. Historical background and legal framework of cooperation between France and Rwanda 17
1.1. Aspects of the civilian cooperation 17
1.2 Elements of military cooperation 18
1.2.1 Contents of the Special Military Assistance Agreement of 1975 18
1.2.2 Amendments of the 1975 Agreement 19
1.2.3 Increased military aid effective from 1989 20
1.3. Structure of the French military intervention (October 1990 – April 1994) 22
1.3.1 Context of the October 1990 war 22
1.3.2 Description of the different elements of France’s intervention according to the official version 25
1.4 Official justification of the French intervention: building a legitimacy 30
1.4.1. Public statements during the events 31
1.4.2 Non confidential internal position 31
1.4.3 Posteriori statements 34
1.5. Criticisms of the French intervention within France and abroad 35
1.5.1. Criticisms at the time of the events 35
1.5.2 Posterior criticisms 39
ACTS FRANCE IS ACCUSED OF 41
1. Contribution to the perpetration of the war 41
1.1. Support in military intelligence and telephone tapping 41
1.2. Strategic advice and tactical support 45
1.2.1. Attending the meetings of evaluation and strategic planning 45
1.2.2. Direct participation in fighting: 1990-1993 48
2. Involvement in the training of Interahamwe militia and village vigilantes (civilian self-defence) 54
2.1. The Interahamwe 54
2.2. Early stages of the village vigilantes « civilian self-defence » 55
2.2.1. Gabiro camp 57
2.2.2. Nyakinama University Campus 64
2.2.3. Gako camp 65
2.2.4. Mukamira camp 67
2.2.5 Bigogwe camp 69
2.3. Additional information 71
2.3.1 In 1992-1993, Interahamwe committed acts of genocide 73
2.3.2. Intensification of the training of the Interahamwe in preparation of the genocide of 1994 77
3. Criminal Investigation Department 79
3.1. The action of the French gendarmes in the centre for criminal investigation and documentation (CRCD) 79
3.1.1. Training in techniques and professional ethics of Criminal Investigation 80
3.1.2. Conduct of investigation 80
3.1.3. The computerisation of the central database 83
3.1.4. Was the computerisation of the central database used for making lists of the people to be killed? 83
4. Acts of violence on roadblocks 88
4.1. Ethnic segregation and arbitrary arrests 89
4.2. Disappearance of arrested people 92
4.3. Physical intimidations and violence 94
4.4. Sexual assault and rape 95
4.5. Participation and assistance in the killings 98
4.5.1 In military camps and other places in Kigali 98
4.5.2. In the other prefectures 101
5. Acts of violence away from the roadblocks 104
5.1. Ethnically based physical or verbal violence 104
5.2. Rape and sexual assault 107
5.3 Support and assistance in perpetration of violent acts 109
6. Violent interrogation of RPF prisoners of war 110
6.1 Threats and ill treatments 110
6.2 Execution of prisoners of war 115
7. Support for a policy of mass murder 116
7.1. The Internal French Reports 122
7.2. Reports of Non-Governmental Organisations 123
7.3 Reports by the Rwandan civil society 124
7.4. UN Reports 125
7.5 The repeated perpetrations of massacres and the reinforcement of French military support 125
8. Diplomatic support for the Rwandan regime 128
8.1. Actions alongside Belgium and African States 128
8.2. Partiality in the peace talks 131
8.3. Contribution to the ethnic radicalisation of the conflict 133
8.3.1. Justification of ethnic based speech 133
8.3.2. Support to ethnic radicalism 136
8.4. Attempts to implicate western powers 138
8.5. Attempt at manipulating the UN 140
PART II: FRANCE’S INVOLVEMENT DURING THE GENOCIDE 142
I France’s involvement during the genocide, before Opération Turquoise 142
1. Official justifications of Opération Amaryllis 142
1.1. Protection of the French, European nationals, and other foreigners 142
1.2 The proclamation of the decision of non-intervention in the ongoing massacres 144
2. The facts blamed on France 145
2.1 Political support to the organizers of the genocide 145
2.1.1 Involvement in the training of the interim government 146
2.1.2 The targeted evacuations 150
3. Diplomatic support 160
3.1 Collaboration with the interim government 160
3.2 Contact with the President of the interim government 161
3.3 Protection of the interim government at the Security Council 162
3.4 Collusion with the UN Secretary General and his Representative in Rwanda 162
4. French military support during the genocide 164
4.1 Presence of French soldiers in Rwanda during the genocide 164
4.2 High level contact between FAR officers and French officers 169
4.3 Delivery of arms and ammunitions during the genocide and their use 171
4.4 Distribution of arms delivered by France to Interahamwe during the genocide. 174
II. OPÉRATION TURQUOISE 177
1.1. The decision-making process 177
1.2 Disagreement at the level of the French executive on the objectives and modalities of the intervention 179
1.3 Orders of operation, composition and progress 182
1.4. Impressive human and material means 183
1. CYANGUGU 186
1) The Opération Turquoise, shield of the FAR in Cyangugu 188
2) Collaboration between the French soldiers and the Interahamwe in the continuation of the assassinations of Tutsis 189
3) Nyarushishi displaced persons camp 201
4) Rapes 206
5) Pillaging carried out by the French soldiers and their failure to intervene in the pillaging and destruction of infrastructure by Rwandans 210
6) Inciting the populace to flee the country 213
KIBUYE 215
BISESERO 216
1) Abandonment 216
2) Refusal by Captain Marin Gillier to end the Bisesero massacres 222
3) Colonel Rosier wanted to sacrifice the Bisesero survivors 231
RUBENGERA 240
III. KIBUYE TOWN 247
GIKONGORO 249
I. Distinctiveness of Murambi camp 251
II. Acts committed by the French soldiers at Gikongoro 252
1. Delivery of Tutsi to militiamen and inciting ethnic murders 252
2. Freedom granted to militiamen to continue murdering genocide survivors 255
3. Direct involvement of French soldiers in acts of murder 259
4. Cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 264
4.2 Throwing people off board at the edge and outside Nyungwe forest 268
4.2.2 Throwing people off board at Sheke 269
4.2.3 Throwing people off board at Shaba 271
4.2.4 Throwing people off board at Rusebeya 272
4.2.5 Throwing people off board at Nyakizu 274
5. Cases of rape and sexual slavery 276
6. Insufficient distribution of food and medical care to the survivors of the genocide 287
7. Inciting people to flee the country 289
8. Looting of public property 292
PART THREE: 303
INVOLVEMENT OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AFTER THE GENOCIDE 303
1. Political support to the interim government and military support to former FAR and Interahamwe after July 1994 303
1.1 Official contacts with the interim government in exile 303
1.2 Supply of arms and covering their delivery by Turquoise 304
1.2 Restructuring, re-arming and re-training of FAR and Interahamwe 306
1.2.1 Supporting FAR and Interahamwe in Zaïre. 306
1.2.2 Training FAR and Interahamwe in Congo Brazzaville and in Central Africa 316
2. Constraints to the efforts of reconciliation in Rwanda from July 1994 319
2.1 Blocking aid funds for the improvement of the situation posterior to genocide 319
3. France as a turf for denial and revisionism of genocide 322
3.1 The revisionism and the denial of the French authorities and institutions 322
3.1.1 French Political leaders 322
3.1.2 Contamination in schools 323
3.1.3. Legal manipulation 324
3.3 Mobilization of ex-Soldiers of Turquoise 325
3.4 Support of French politicians in revisionist or denial propaganda 326
4. Obstacles to the judgment of the presumed perpetrators of the genocide 327
4.1.1 Reopening the case of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka 327
4.1.2 Other pending cases 329
5. Frustrating Judge Brigitte Raynaud’s investigation 332
6. Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) with the aim of favouring the interests of genocide suspects 334
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 336
General Conclusion 341
RECOMMENDATIONS 349







GENERAL INTRODUCTION



1. Creation and historical background of the Commission

In 2004, Cabinet adopted the draft law establishing the Independent National Commission responsible for the collection of evidence indicating the role of the French State in the preparation and implementation of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, hereinafter called “The Commission.” Its creation was made public through a communiqué on 1st August 2004. Organic Law No. 05/2005 of 14th April 2005 established the Commission and gave it a six-month mandate that could be extended by a Presidential Order.

The Cabinet proposed members of the Commission on 5th April 2006 and they were confirmed by Presidential Order No. 19/01 of 16th April 2006 which senate adopted in its session of 21st April 2006. The Order set the date on which the Commission would start its work on 16th April 2006 and the end of its mandate on 16th October 2006. The mandate was renewed twice in October 2006 and April 2007. Therefore the Commission carried out its work over a period of 18 months.

2. How the Commission understood its terms of reference

Considering the terms of reference as stated in the Organic Law establishing the Commission, especially Article 5, the general mission of the Commission was to bring out the role the French State played in the preparation and implementation of the genocide committed in Rwanda in 1994. Specifically, the Commission was required to collect and examine documents, hear testimonies and any other evidence showing the involvement of the French State in the 1994 genocide as well as its role in the period after the genocide. This was particularly in the area of politics, diplomacy, media, judiciary and military. From its inception, the Commission reflected on the content of its mission and how it would fulfill it in accordance wit the aforementioned Organic Law.

The Commission realised that the Law put emphasis on the collection of evidence and examining it without however explicitly going into investigations or research. Given the importance and sensitivity of its mandate and based on the fact that the Law stipulates that collected evidence should be examined, the Commission concluded that the purpose of its mandate was to scientifically establish the facts and analyse them. It then decided to carry out its research and investigations meticulously and only retain substantiated facts, which it deemed well founded and verifiable.




3. Methodology for the collection of information

The Commission used different methods of gathering information both in Rwanda and abroad. It consulted public and private sources, carried out field investigations, and organised both camera and public hearings of witnesses. Members of the Commission also travelled abroad to consult records and interview witnesses who were unable to come to Rwanda.

In exercising its mandate, the Commission came across several types of totally new sources of information and compared them with what was already published; evidence of former soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) who had worked with French soldiers; persons who claimed that they were direct victims of French soldiers’ acts; Rwandans and foreign observers who witnessed actions of the French soldiers in Rwanda or who were at the scenes of massacres (journalists and humanitarian workers); University research findings; expert reports; and finally various investigation reports.

3.1. Sources of information in Rwanda

The Commission obtained written documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and the Office of the President. The Commission was also able to access private archives belonging to individuals and associations. At the beginning of its work, the Commission received numerous unsolicited calls from individuals from various circles who declared their readiness to voluntarily give information either in writing or verbally. This shows the interest and the expectations of the people in the Commission.

The Commission formed teams of investigators and gave them the responsibility of examining such individuals in order to verify the relevance and seriousness of their calls, while trying at the same time to locate other potential witnesses. Thus, these preliminary investigations enabled the Commission to select witnesses for examination. Altogether, the Commission interviewed 698 persons, but selected only 66 for hearings, 53 in public and 13 in camera.

The Commission went around the country and paid special attention to the scenes of France’s civil and military intervention: institutions, in which French civilian and military personnel worked, combat zones and “Zone Turquoise”. In order to verify the alleged acts, the Commission visited these scenes several times in order to verify with witnesses the alleged acts. In trying to identify such scenes of crime, the Commission took topographical sketches and aerial pictures to verify whether indeed such witnesses were able to witness the alleged acts. Such verification was particularly necessary to reconstruct the background of the massacre that occurred at Bisesero after Lieutenant Colonel Duval’s visit.

3.2. Collection of information abroad

Members of the Commission visited the following countries, where they were differently received: Belgium, France, Germany and Tanzania.

In Belgium, owing to the duty of non-disclosure, the Commission was unable to obtain evidence or to take any statements from individuals still serving in Government or those still answerable to the Executive. The Commission was also denied access to official documents that it had requested. However, it received the cooperation of Parliamentarians and individuals who were no longer bound by the duty of non-disclosure. Some gave documentary evidence while others accepted to testify publicly in Rwanda.

In France, the Commission’s request for cooperation with authorities was turned down. However, it should be noted that at the time the request was made, diplomatic relations between the two countries had been severed.

On the other hand, members of the Commission met with several personalities in their private capacity and were able to obtain highly invaluable information. Additionally, members of the Commission were able to meet some Parliamentarians in their private capacity. Finally, they had access to archives in the Embassy of the Republic of Rwanda in Paris.

In Germany, members of the Commission were able to interview various witnesses.

In Tanzania, members of the Commission (including the Chairman) met with the following authorities of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR): the Prosecutor, the Registrar and the President of the Tribunal. They were allowed access the Tribunal’s records.

3.3. Access to public documents

The Commission, which was established thirteen years after the genocide, managed to obtain relatively well established information, notably within the framework of investigations already carried out by national, international or private authorities. These included: the Commission of Inquiry of the Belgian Senate in 1997, the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry(MIP) in France in 1998, investigations carried out by the United Nations Organisation in 1997 and the Organisation of African Unity in 2001, reports by Human rights Organisations such as African Human Rights of London and Human Rights Watch of Washington, the report of the Commission d’enquête citoyenne in France ( Citizens’ Commission of Inquiry), numerous newspaper articles and a number of other Publications.

It should be noted that work devoted specifically to the role of the French in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, was often done by French intellectuals, journalists and researchers - some of whom are of great reputation-, humanitarian workers and human rights activists. Generally, these investigation reports presented particularly damning analysis of France’s acts in Rwanda.

Undoubtedly, there are a few contrary opinions in a limited number of publications, but the vast majority of the existing publications and especially those which go into depth all tend to lead to the presumption that France had a role in the 1994 Rwanda genocide.

Without ignoring the body of information available, the commission wanted to carry out a new inquiry which would be as comprehensive as possible, giving priority to field research. Earlier work was used for contextual explanations to supplement available information that was considered still insufficient and to substantiate facts and interpretations which were particularly sensitive. It is worth noting that earlier writings are far from showing the whole scope and gravity of France’s involvement in Rwanda. The report of this Commission itself falls short of exhausting this particular issue.

3.4. Information Processing

Testimonies collect by the Commission were not of the same quality. Some lacked coherence and accuracy. For instance a number of witnesses pointed out quite correctly to the Commission that they had not kept a record of what they had seen or heard. In fact it had never occurred to them that there would ever be an inquiry into the 1994 genocide. It was therefore imperative to work within this context of blunted memories, forgetfulness, and loss of documents in some archives which had not been well kept and even in some cases, pure fabrication.

This critical assessment of sources does not mean that all the testimonies were discarded. The Commission heard from many witnesses who could well remember their experiences as well as incidents and facts they had witnessed. The constraint of lapse of time prompted the Commission to carry out further crosschecking of the evidence and facts and to carry out a careful selection of what to retain and what to discard.

3.5. Research stages

The stages of the research were as follows:

From May to July 2006, the Commission began preliminary field investigations. Members of the Commission with researcher assistants interviewed potential witnesses from different military training areas and combat zones where French soldiers were seen.

From August to October 2006, the Commission improved on the results of its preliminary investigations through more systematic interviews with selected witnesses. Thereafter, public and in-camera hearings were conducted.

From November to December 2006, a second series of hearings were conducted. A number of Rwandans and foreigners were interviewed by the Commission.

From January to March 2007, the Commission spent most of its time abroad in pursuit of its mission.

From May to July 2007, the Commission organised the last public hearings specifically for foreign witnesses.

During public hearings, interviews and desk research work continued particularly from archives.


INTRODUCTION TO THE REPORT



1. Foreign involvement in Rwanda’s conflict and in the genocide

One of the characteristics of Rwanda’s conflict and the genocide is the extent of foreign involvement. This involvement must be viewed in the context of its duration, from the colonial period until the time the genocide occurred. Foreign actors involved were Germany, Belgium, Missionaries, The League of Nations and subsequently the United Nations Organisation during the colonial period.

With regard to the period between 1990 and 1994, the main foreign actors were France, Belgium, the United Nations Organisation and the United States. The review of foreign involvement in Rwanda’s conflict and in the 1994 genocide should enable us to show the specific role of France in relation to that of the rest of the international community. This can serve as an introduction, based on the available facts and on facts gathered before the launch of this Commission.

1.1 Historical background

Whenever the question of conflicts in many African countries has arisen, the role of colonisation has always been a subject of heated debate. Rwanda’s case has been no exception.

Whereas some argue that the Belgian colonial administration was mainly responsible for the emergence of Rwanda’s conflict, coupled with the role of missionaries who were in joint administration of the country, generally the proponents of this view also tend to present the pre-colonial period as an era devoid of any serious conflicts. Others defend the colonial era and the missionary influence, arguing that the colonizers and the missionaries played a modernizing social and political role, notably by introducing democracy.

From studies carried out, it appears that before colonisation the Rwandan society experienced a serious political and social crisis. The crisis was characterized by famines that repeatedly ravaged the Rwandan population. It was also characterised by political tensions that were aggravated by increasing political control over previously autonomous lineage groups that particularly wanted to monopolise their land in peripheral regions. Also, in central Rwanda, there was a hardening of the situation of patronage relations, which was becoming more and more exploitative and less and less dependent upon trade relations. Finally, there was a serious political instability owing to the conflict at the top of the State hierarchy between a centralizing and modernizing but unstable monarch who sought the renewal of the elite of the country, and an aristocracy anxious to preserve and develop its interests in a changing social context .

In spite of these tensions, there were no conflicts of identity between Hutus and Tutsis. The Rwandan society had a multiplicity of identification levels, the most important of which was the clan. The clan grouped Hutus, Tutsis and Twas together. In addition, the region had an identification level along the so-called ethnicity groupings, which groupings shared fundamental cultural attributes such as the language, religious and social rites, as well as the process of social rise based on merit, which considered mainly bravery and hard work. Conflicts and tensions existed among all social classes, among aristocratic Tutsis just as they existed among other social classes: Tutsi, Hutu or Twa .

However, the process of ethnic identification, which was introduced by colonialists and missionaries, is well documented. Inspired by racist theories prevailing in Europe in the 19th Century, they adopted and introduced a position which turned Rwandan socio-identity groups into hierarchical races. Belgian colonial administration implemented this position through political, social and administrative mechanisms. The Belgians thus excluded all Hutus, Twas and women out of posts of responsibility, preferring to use a small group of lineages close to the royal family to control the rest, and thereby making the new system of governance particularly oppressive .

The second stage in the development of Rwanda’s ethnic conflict was during the process of decolonisation. Whereas Belgian administration and the Catholic Church had succeeded in winning the royalty of the Tutsi aristocracy by the use of force during the entire colonial period, at the beginning of 1950s part of the aristocracy started showing signs of unruliness under the influence of the emerging anti-colonialist movements, demanding the right to self-rule. The Belgian administration and the Catholic Church reacted by changing their policy and forming alliances with a rising Hutu elite against the Tutsi aristocracy.

With their racist way of thinking, Belgians did not make any distinction between their political enemy, lumping the Tutsi aristocracy and the Tutsi population together. Yet a majority of the Tutsi population shared the same living conditions as their Hutu compatriots . Also, Belgians blamed the Tutsi aristocracy for acts of injustice and abuses while it was they themselves who had put them in place. However, the aristocracy had done nothing to distance themselves from ethnic divisions and the oppressive governance for which they were accused and which they had adopted in collaborating with the colonial administration. Only King Rudahigwa, who is considered by many analysts as a reformist, is credited with attempting to address these ills.

The Belgian administration and the missionaries instigated an ethnic revolution which they got other people to implement. In so doing, they chose to support the most extremist of the Hutu revolutionary leaders, the future President Kayibanda. In turn, Kayibanda chose to ignore the difference between the “small Tutsis” and the aristocracy .

The process of deposing the monarchy and politically, socially and culturally marginalising the Tutsis was carried out through terror and massive crimes. From 1959 to 1962 – the year of independence – part of these acts were committed when Belgium was the administrative power of the country. Rwanda was a Trust Territory, under the terms of the United Nations Mandate.

In December 1963 and January 1964 in Gikongoro Prefecture, acts of genocide were committed against ordinary Tutsi peasants in blind reprisals of targeted attacks carried out by a handful of Tutsi guerrillas. The guerrillas had come from outside the country and attacked an area at tens of kilometres from Burundi, in the region of Bugesera. These massacres, genocidaire in their intention as clearly expressed by President Kayibanda, were admittedly condemned by some journalists and intellectuals, but they did not raise any reaction from the international community. Newspapers talked of genocide, and the philosopher Bertrand Russel qualified the killings as “the most horrible and most systematic massacres we have witnessed since those committed by the Nazis against the Jews”. Jean Paul Sartre and Vatican Radio had similar views, mentioning and qualifying these massacres as genocide . A Swiss volunteer, Mr Vuillemin, who was teaching at Groupe scolaire d’Astrida, resigned from his post and made a written public statement which was widely disseminated outside Rwanda, as a way of showing his opposition to the genocide, according to his own statement.

The third stage marking foreign involvement in Rwanda’s conflict is seen in the legitimisation of, and assistance to, the Habyarimana regime accorded by the international community from the end of the 1970s to the beginning of the 1990s. This regime was characterised by an official and strict policy of ethnic and regional discrimination through what it called the balancing policy. Its governance was marked by a total political and social control and a refusal to find a solution to the situation of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi refugees living mainly in the neighbouring countries. Still, it received generous development aid from many western countries and international institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, the European Community, the Catholic Church and NGOs, especially those of Catholic allegiance. None of these countries and institutions ever criticised this deeply discriminatory policy. Most of them accepted the ethnic faith of this regime which claimed to be the legitimate representative of the Hutu majority

1.2. Recent international interventions (1990-1994)

1.2.1. Belgium

In the first days of the war launched by RPF in October 1990, France, Belgium and Zaire sent contingents to Rwanda. On 5th October 1990, Belgium sent a contingent of 500 soldiers to ensure the security of its 1600 nationals living in Rwanda. It also delivered part of the ammunitions which had been ordered by Rwanda before the start of the war. However, in the light of contradictory information regarding the nature of the war, the fake attack by RPF in Kigali on 4th October 1990, the ensuing wave of arbitrary arrests and the massacres and abuses committed by FAR, Belgium quickly changed its attitude towards the regime. On 12th October, it suspended its military aid to Rwanda by cancelling particularly the second delivery of ammunitions. On 1st November 1990, Belgian soldiers were repatriated. Belgium then called for the democratisation of the regime and a negotiated solution to the armed conflict. This u-turn by Belgium dampened its relations with the leadership of Rwanda. Subsequently, Belgium’s interventions were done within a multilateral framework.

Within the group of Rwanda’s donors, Belgium played a part in bringing pressure to bear on President Habyarimana so that he may open his government to the internal opposition and opt for the process of peace. This earned Belgium the hostility of the extremist circles inside the regime who kept on reviling it regularly on radio RTLM. Belgium was also among the countries which sent observers to the Arusha peace process (July 1992 – August 1993). It supported the Arusha Peace Accords by sending 450 men and contributing equipment to strengthen UNAMIR which had 2500 soldiers. The Belgian contingent constituted thus the backbone of UNAMIR both in terms of the quality of its troops and its equipment. A few months before the genocide in February 1994, following the worsening of the security inside the country due to the multiplicity of massacres, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote a letter to the United Nations Secretary General, recommending a stronger mandate for UNAMIR.

When the news of the death of President Habyarimana was announced in the evening of 6th April 1994, Radio des Milles Collines (RTLM) spread a rumour, accusing Belgium of having shot down the presidential plane. It was in this climate that ten Belgian blue helmets were assassinated by Rwandan soldiers in Camp Kigali in the morning of 7th April. On the following day, the Belgian Government announced the withdrawal of its troops from UNAMIR, unless its mandate was expanded and the number of its soldiers boosted by non-Belgian troops. However, it appears that this decision was taken after the Government learnt that three permanent members of the Security Council had spoken against this expansion of the mandate . On 12th April, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Willy Claes, explained to the Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, that the entire UNAMIR should be suspended and withdrawn from Rwanda. On the same day, a telegram was sent by the Belgian representative at the UN announcing that “USA shares the view of the countries which contributed troops and which wish to withdraw them”.

On 13th April, Boutros Ghali wrote to the Security Council referring to his conversation with the Belgian Minister and informing them of Belgium’s withdrawal from UNAMIR. He then requested the Security Council to draw the necessary conclusions from this. The Belgian representative also wrote to the President of the Security Council, informing him about the withdrawal of the Belgian troops from UNAMIR. On the same day, the Belgian Cabinet met and recommended that efforts be intensified so that the entire mandate of UNAMIR is suspended. On 19th and 20th April 1994, the Belgian blue helmets left Rwanda. On 21st April, the Security Council passed a decision to withdraw UNAMIR, leaving a symbolic international military presence of 270 men in Rwanda.

Following the killing of its ten blue helmets and despite knowing the scale of the massacres being perpetrated, the Belgian Government decided not only to withdraw its troops – thus depriving UNAMIR of its substance – but it also carried out a very active diplomatic campaign aimed at obtaining the total withdrawal of the Mission in order to tone down its responsibility of abandoning Rwandan victims. This campaign by the main provider of troops for the total withdrawal of UNAMIR clearly made the task of those countries within the Security Council, which wanted the same thing, easy.

1.2.2. United States

Contrary to the accusations levelled by the Habyarimana regime or by French officials that the war waged by RPF was an Anglo-Saxon plot, fomented by the United States through Uganda and RPF against France’s sphere of influence, the United States was not involved in Rwanda’s conflict. There is no proof of any clandestine or official intervention of the United States. The American Deputy Under Secretary of State from April 1989 to April 1993, Herman Cohen, explained to the French Parliamentary Fact-finding Mission that Rwanda was in no way within the strategic or political sphere of interest of his country .

The United States was among the group of Rwanda’s donors who had been putting pressure on President Habyarimana about the situation of human rights, democratisation and seeking a negotiated solution to the armed conflict with RPF. The United States was also an observer in the peace negotiations between RPF and the Government of Rwanda in Arusha.

Two days before the United Nations Security Council voted on whether UN should send troops to Rwanda in order to secure the implementation of the Arusha Peace Accords, American soldiers were killed in Somalia. This was one of two factors that should explain why the United States was in favour of setting up a UNAMIR with a reduced number of soldiers and mandate. There was first the trauma caused by the failure of the UN mission in Somalia. Then, the United States owed huge arrears of contribution to the UN budget and to the peace keeping operations. It thus exerted pressure so as to get the nature of the mandate of the Arusha Peace Accords to UNAMIR amended. UNAMIR’s mission was to be limited to peace-keeping not in the whole country, but only in the capital, Kigali. Moreover, it did not have the mandate of looking for arms caches or dismantling armed groups. Its role was restricted to that of an observer .

During the genocide, the United States’ influence was felt in the Security Council in terms of encouraging that no action should be taken about the genocide. On 15th April, the day of the debate on what stance to take in relation to the massacres and to the resumption of the hostilities by the warring parties, the United States was very resolutely opposed to the continued presence of UNAMIR and proposed its immediate withdrawal and the facilitation of negotiations between RPF and the interim government which was then orchestrating the genocide .

In a press communiqué dated 22nd May, after calling on the Rwandan army and RPF to observe a ceasefire, the White House asked specifically, by name, four officers of the national army to put an end to violence. This was one of the rare attempts by the United States to put pressure on the organisers of the genocide. However, this initiative was accompanied with a call for a ceasefire and an encouragement to negotiations through diplomatic contacts. Finally, on 1st May 1994, the American authorities officially asked their employees not to use the word “genocide” because this could require the American Government to have “to do something” .

As the major world power with a very important capacity of political, military and logistic influence enabling it to be quite easily present anywhere in the world, the United States carries a big responsibility for lack of action by the international community in the Rwanda genocide, to the extent that it encouraged this stance of inaction.

1.2.3. United Nations Organisation (UNO)

UNO ordered an investigation about its action in Rwanda before and during the genocide. In its report, the Independent Commission of Inquiry concluded by denouncing the total failure of the Organisation in its peace keeping mission in Rwanda. The Commission denounced in particular the inability of the Organisation, which had a force of 2500 men, to stop or contain the massacres. The most illustrative act of this failure by default is the decision taken unanimously on 21st April 1994 by the Security Council of withdrawing the UNAMIR contingent, leaving behind a symbolic force of 270 men, at the time when the massacres were at their highest intensity.

According to the Commission, the responsibility for this failure falls on the entire system, the Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretariat, in particular the Assistant Secretary General in charge of peace keeping operations, Kofi Annan, the Security Council, UNAMIR and the Member States.

While it is true that the member countries of the Security Council and the UN showed collectively little political will to prevent stop or reduce the scale of the genocide once it was under way, the UN institutions and their leaders carry a significant part of the responsibility at every stage of this failure.

Three examples can be cited to show the significance of the UN responsibility. The first concerns the drawing-up of the mandate and the composition of the international neutral force, UNAMIR, which was supposed to ensure the implementation of the peace agreements, signed in August 1993 between RPF and the Government of Rwanda. The UN employees proposed a classical peace keeping mission based on an overly optimistic political and security analysis of the peace process. The Organisation did not take into consideration the alarming information which was easily available concerning the nature of the acts of the Government of Rwanda and its security forces.

Only one week after the signing of the Peace Accords in August 1993, at the very time of the preparation of UNAMIR, the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations on Extrajudicial Executions, Waly Bacre Ndiaye, published a report depicting a very bleak and alarming situation of human rights in Rwanda. This report showed that in the overwhelming majority of the cases, the victims of those massacres were Tutsis who were targeted only because of their ‘ethnicity’. The report explained that there was the risk of a genocide aimed at the Tutsi community. This report and other information of this nature were not taken into consideration by the department in charge of peace keeping operations. Still concerning the establishment of UNAMIR, General Dallaire, who was tasked with making proposals after an inspection visit to Rwanda, had recommended the formation of a force of 4500 men. The Secretary General decided by himself to significantly reduce the number of soldiers requested by proposing to the Security Council a force of 2548 men, and this proposal was adopted.

On 11th January 1994, General Dallaire, the head of UNAMIR, sent a telegram to the UN headquarters in which he revealed the information he had obtained, showing that the entourage of President Habyarimana was planning the extermination of Tutsis in Kigali whose names appeared on an exhaustive list. This information revealed the existence of a militia of 1700 men capable of killing 1000 Tutsis in twenty minutes. The telegram mentioned also a strategy of provoking the Belgian soldiers which would lead to the assassination of some of them in order to make the Belgian contingent withdraw and UNAMIR collapse. Finally, the message pointed out also the existence of an arms cache.

General Dallaire informed the UN headquarters that he intended to raid the arms cache in order to show UNAMIR’s resolve to thwart this plan. The Head of the Department of Peace keeping operations, the Assistant Secretary General Kofi Annan, basing himself on a restrictive interpretation of the mandate of the UN force which is still subject to debate, prohibited Dallaire from carrying out the raid on the arms cache.

He instead suggested that Dallaire and the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, should see President Habyarimana and pass on this information to him. This was done, and President Habyarimana promised to carry out an investigation. But nobody put pressure on the President to make him take any possible action. In New York, the telegram was not communicated to the Secretary General and, of course, the Security Council was not informed. According to the information received from Dallaire, the only action taken after these revelations was the acceleration of the distribution of arms to the militia.

The third example of the responsibility of the UN internal organs concerns the withdrawal of the bulk of UNAMIR. In his telegram to Dallaire and Booh-Booh on 9th April, Kofi Annan declared that it was impossible for UNAMIR to fulfil its mandate under the existing conditions. In this connection, the UN Commission of Inquiry wrote: “The instinctive reaction in the Secretariat seems to have been that of doubting the feasibility of an effective reaction of the United Nations, instead of rather examining actively the possibility of strengthening the operation in order to meet the difficulties on the ground. ”

Despite the on-going genocide which was set in motion in Kigali on 7th April under the watch of these two representatives, Booh-Booh and Dallaire, the former as well as the Secretary General insisted that this genocide was nothing but the resumption of hostilities between two warring parties who should be made to see sense and negotiate a ceasefire. The Independent Commission observed “that the minutes of the meetings held between the members of the Secretariat, including the Secretary General, and the leaders of what was called the Interim Government (which orchestrated the genocide), show that the will to install a ceasefire was given priority over the increasingly deep moral indignation which was aroused in the international community ”. It was only three weeks after the systematic killings of the Tutsi community in the whole country, which had already claimed about 20,000 lives, that the Secretary General proposed to change direction and make the cessation of massacres of civilians a priority, in his letter of 29th April 1994 to the Security Council,.

During the first three weeks of the genocide, the employees of the General Secretariat systematically failed to inform the members of the Security Council about the on-going massacres . Non-permanent members of the Security Council maintained that it was through information received from NGOs that they came to learn about the genocidaire nature of the massacres which were being perpetrated in Rwanda. During the month of April 1994, the President of the Security Council, the New Zealander Colin Keating, openly asserted later: “With better information [...] the Council might have proceeded quite differently” .

Finally, although the United Nations was facing the most serious human crisis of its history, its Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, refused to return to New York, preferring to continue with his European tour of three weeks which he had barely started, and his colleagues could not understand such a leadership failure. This offhand manner and his many serious failures during this crisis fuelled the suspicion of a deliberate will not to put too much pressure on the regime which was committing genocide since he was an ally of France. It is the same France which seems to have been his main supporter during his election to the post of United Nations Secretary General and, later, following his failure to have his mandate renewed, to that of Secretary General of La Francophonie.

The United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry concluded its report by designating the people who were responsible for the United Nations’ failure in preventing or stopping the genocide as follows: “the Secretary General, the Secretariat, the Security Council and the member State(s) of the Organisation”. The report goes on: “This international responsibility justifies that the Organisation and the Member States concerned should make unequivocal apologies to the people of Rwanda.”

1.2.4. An attempt at international redress?

Each of these three international actors, namely Belgium, United States and the Unites Nations Organisation, recognised its responsibility in terms of lack of action by the international community about the genocide while they were highly involved in the management of Rwanda’s crisis. While passing through Rwanda in March 1998, President Bill Clinton recognized the responsibility of the international community and that of his government for their passivity with regard to the genocide. During the sixth commemoration of the genocide in Kigali on 7th April 2000, Belgium, through its Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, apologized to the Rwandan people for his country’s behaviour during the genocide.

During the 10th commemoration of the genocide on 7th April 2004, an emissary of the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, who was the Head of the Peace Keeping Department during the genocide, read a message in which Kofi Annan admitted that “the international community did not live up to the situation in Rwanda” and that “this will remain a source of bitter regrets and constant grief for us”. Further to these words, these three international actors did not interfere with efforts of reconstruction and national reconciliation of the country. On the contrary, they supported them at varying degrees. New international actors, who had been allies of Rwanda prior to this, became also involved in this post-genocide reconstruction and its international dimensions.

Even though the international actors, whose action has just been reviewed, have a collective responsibility in terms of international lack of action with regard to the genocide, their responsibility cannot be analysed at the same level as the role of France. Many studies carried out prior to the Commission’s inquiry and the work of this Commission show that France’s action is fundamentally different in terms of its scale and nature.
1.3 Process of the recognition of the genocide

The establishment of facts and the recognition of the genocide of Rwandan Tutsis by the United Nations were characterised by a delay in the qualification and a refusal to act in order to put a stop to the massacres, despite the scale and abundance of available information . However, once the process of qualification was completed, the reaction of the United Nations and several involved actors tended generally towards the recognition and the acceptance of their responsibility.

1.3.1 Initiatives of the United Nations Human Rights Commission

The United Nations Human Rights Commission was active in setting in motion the process of establishing facts and qualification of the genocide, under the leadership of the High Commissioner, José Ayala Lasso, who took office on 5th April 1994 . On 14th April 1994, he wrote a memorandum to the United Nations Secretary General, suggesting that urgent measures be taken in order to prevent the worsening of the human rights situation in Rwanda . On 4th May 1994, he called for the urgent convening of a meeting of the Human Rights Commission, with a view to considering the situation in Rwanda .

On 11th and 12th May, he travelled to Rwanda and, after this mission, he proposed to the Human Rights Commission during its meeting held on 24th and 25th May the appointment of a Special Rapporteur for Rwanda responsible for studying all the aspects of the human rights situation, particularly the primary causes of and responsibility for the atrocities. The appointment was made at the end of the meeting . Pursuant to this resolution, Mr René Degni-Segui was appointed Special Rapporteur for Rwanda for an initial period of one year and given the order to travel immediately to Rwanda and report to the members of the Commission within four months.

On 28th June 1994, Mr. René Degni-Sgui submitted his first report indicating the perpetration of large scale massacres organised and carried out by Hutu militia, the victims of which were mainly Tutsis and Hutus considered moderate . The report established that “the qualification of genocide must already be recognised with regard to Tutsis” and that “it is a different case concerning the killing of Hutus ”. He concluded by highlighting the responsibility of Hutu militia and the Government of Rwanda.

1.3.2 Procrastination in the recognition of the genocide in the Security Council

The analysis of the first resolutions and official statements of the Security Council reveals some confusion between the genocide and the armed conflict which was then pitting FAR against RPF. From April 1994, these resolutions and statements insisted on the need for a ceasefire between the warring parties on one hand, irrespective of earlier reports such as the one by Bacre Waly Ndiaye which should have inspired the Security Council to quickly recognise the exact nature of the on-going massacres. On the other hand, they condemned the massacres of civilians by using legal terms which define genocide, without necessarily naming it explicitly.

On 30th April 1994, the President of the Security Council declared: “The Security Council is appalled to learn that massacres of innocent civilians are continuing in Kigali and other regions of Rwanda and that new massacres are allegedly being prepared. [...] Attacks against helpless civilians have been launched in the whole country, particularly in the areas under the control of the members or partisans of the Armed Forces of the Rwandan Interim Government. [...] The Security Council condemns all these violations of the international humanitarian law in Rwanda, in particular those committed against the civilian population, and reminds the persons who foment these acts or who participate in them that they are individually held responsible for them. In this context, the Security Council reminds them that the elimination of the members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying it completely or partially is a crime under the international law ”.

The same caution is reflected in Resolution 918 of 17th May 1994 where the Security Council does not mention the word genocide but uses once again terms which correspond to its legal definition: “Recalling in this context that killing members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying it totally or partially is a crime under the international law”. It was not until Resolution 925 of 8th June 1994 that the Security Council used the term “genocide” for the first time. In the wording of this resolution, the Council notes “with the greatest concern that acts of genocide had been committed in Rwanda” and reminds “that this was a crime under the international law”.

This recognition did not translate into any acts of immediate assistance to the victims yet there were many threatened civilians who could be saved at that time. One month later, on 1st July 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 935 by which it asked the Secretary General to urgently set up an impartial commission of experts with a wider mandate of investigation to check on the findings of the Special Rapporteur and come up with a report within four months on elements of proof concerning the serious violations of the international humanitarian law committed on the territory of Rwanda, including any possible acts of genocide.

The appointed experts submitted their report on 4th October 1994 in which they qualified the massacres of the Tutsis as “genocide” in terms of Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. The experts emphasized at the same time that they did not come across any proof indicating that Tutsi elements had committed acts with the intention of destroying the Hutu ethnic group as such in terms of the 1948 Convention on Genocide . Finally, the Commission recommended to the Secretary General to either establish an international criminal tribunal for Rwanda, or expand the jurisdiction of the international criminal tribunal for former Yugoslavia to include crimes committed in Rwanda in international law.

After considering these corroborating reports in terms of both facts and findings, the Security Council ended up by sanctioning the recognition of a genocide committed in Rwanda against the Tutsis, crimes against humanity and the violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12th August 1949. At the same time, through Resolution 955 of 8th November 1994, it decided to set up an international criminal tribunal responsible for “trying persons presumed responsible for acts of genocide and other violations of the international humanitarian law committed on the territory of Rwanda, and Rwandan citizens presumed responsible for such acts or violations of international law committed on the territory of neighbouring States between 1st January and 31st December 1994 ”.
After four years of operation, this tribunal handed down its first sentence on 2nd September 1998 against Jean-Paul Akayesu, in which the perpetration of the crime of genocide against the Tutsis was established as a judicially recognised fact. This verdict was also the first criminal conviction of an individual for genocide since the adoption of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on 9th December 1948. Concomitantly with this recognition of the genocide, some States showed the will to try criminals residing on their soil and initiated trials which culminated in criminal convictions.
Still in the context of international justice, ICTR concluded that the genocide of Rwandan Tutsis was “public knowledge” and was part of the history of humanity which did not need any proof . This was in two judgements passed on 16th June and 2nd December 2006 in the trial of three national leaders of the former President’s political party, Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement (MRND). This Commission is also of the same opinion


PART I: FRANCE’S INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA BEFORE THE GENOCIDE


1. Historical background and legal framework of cooperation between France and Rwanda

According to the observation of the Parliamentary Fact-finding Mission, cooperation between France and Rwanda started timidly and late, compared to France’s cooperation with its former colonies. It was launched by General de Gaulle following the suggestion of Jacques Foccart, on the grounds that Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi were French-speaking countries and France felt it should establish its presence in all of them. To France, Rwanda was of special interest because it could “in the years to come, contribute efficiently to the development of French influence. Due to its geographical position, it is capable of serving as a bridge between Madagascar and French-speaking Africa ”.

1.1. Aspects of the civilian cooperation

Civilian cooperation between France and Rwanda started on 20th October 1962 with the signing of the general agreement of friendship and cooperation in cultural, technical and economic fields. On 4th December 1962, three definite agreements were signed, specifying the nature of the French intervention in each of these fields. This intervention had been varying as decades went by. During the 1960s and the 70s, the French-Rwandan cooperation financed various development projects but lacked a clear political dimension compared with the former French colonies . It was not until the mid-1970s, under President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, that France defined a clear geopolitical vision based on the conviction that Americans were gaining ground in French speaking Africa and that it was necessary to strengthen the francophonie in order to fend off this competing influence .

All along the 1980s and the 1990s, cooperation between France and Rwanda was in line with this new doctrine and became increasingly significant with the presence of about a hundred French aid workers and volunteers, working mainly in the sectors of education, vocational training, culture, health, agricultural and rural development, infrastructure, transport and communication, information, upgrading Kanombe airport, as well as maintaining a French crew of the Presidential plane. All these were at a value of 60 million French francs per year. All in all, France’s financial commitments to Rwanda in development aid amounted to about 250 million French francs per year, and this included particularly budgetary aid to administration.

From the beginning of the hostilities between RPF and Rwandan Armed Forces on 1st October 1990 up to the onset of the genocide, France increased its support to Rwanda in terms of civilian and military cooperation. Between 1991 and 1993, it was one of the leading partners and granted Rwanda substantial quick-disbursing support to meet its financial needs under the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), particularly with regard to the balance of payments and budget deficit. In 1991, France granted Rwanda 70 million French francs from the French Central Fund for Economic Cooperation to finance part of its balance of payments .

In view of the financial needs resulting from the war efforts which had increased Rwanda’s budget deficit, France decided to allocate an annual direct budget support of about 100 million French francs to Rwanda to enable it to meet war related expenses, with effect from 1990 . In 1992, France allocated an additional grant of 15 million French francs to Rwanda’s National Television project. In the same year, Rwanda further received a debt relief amounting to 448.7 million French francs . From the figures available for 1993, France was the leading donor to Rwanda, and the actions of the aid workers represented 232 million French francs

We cannot end this part without mentioning the existence, besides bilateral cooperation, of another form of aid called “decentralised cooperation”, whereby French local communities maintained partnership relations with several communes and prefectures in Rwanda.

1.2 Elements of military cooperation

Military cooperation between France and Rwanda officially began on 18th July 1975 with the signing of a “Special Military Assistance Agreement” between the two states. This agreement was restricted expressly to cooperation with Rwanda’s gendarmerie and did not mention at all any possible involvement of France in Rwanda’s army as a whole. In practice, however, France’s military assistance went beyond this framework and was regularised only a posteriori.

1.2.1 Contents of the Special Military Assistance Agreement of 1975

Under the Agreement of 18th July 1975, military cooperation between France and Rwanda consisted of organising and training Rwanda’s gendarmerie along the French gendarmerie model . The Agreement provided that French soldiers shall be designated by France and proposed to Rwanda for acceptance. These soldiers shall remain under the French jurisdiction and shall serve “in French uniforms according to the traditional rules of use of their arms or service in the ranks they hold . In the fulfilment of this mission, the Agreement defined the limits by stipulating that “they may in no case be involved in the preparation or execution of warfare operations, public law and order maintenance or restoration”.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement, France met the needs of the gendarmerie in three aspects: technical assistance, training and specialisation of the personnel, and direct equipment aid. Concerning technical assistance, France provided technicians for training policemen. French soldiers who were involved in this task were posted at Ruhengeri National Police College (EGENA), at Jali Mobile Gendarmerie Training and Retraining Centre, at the Technical Service Group and in the Health Department.

Concerning training and specialisation of the Gendarmerie personnel, France offered scholarships for courses and study and information tours in French or inter-African schools sponsored by France. While in France, Rwandan gendarmes were particularly trained at the Ecole supérieure de guerre interarmées, the Ecole supérieure de la gendarmerie nationale, the Ecole d’Etat-major de la Gendarmerie nationale. With regard to direct equipment aid, France allocated a special annual budget whose size has never been revealed , for the acquisition of equipment and spare parts.

1.2.2 Amendments of the 1975 Agreement

This Agreement was amended twice, in 1983 and 1992, at key moments in the political history of Rwanda . The first request for amendment was addressed to the French authorities on 22nd March 1983 by the Government of Rwanda and was accepted on 20th April of the same year as submitted. The amended article was Article 3 of the Agreement, and it stipulated that henceforth, French soldiers “shall serve in Rwandan uniforms with the ranks they hold or, as appropriate, their equivalent within the Rwandan Armed Forces”. According to MIP, “this amendment was justified by the fact that French technical military assistants could be called upon to occupy alternating posts in the Rwandan Gendarmerie”.

It should be noted however, that in the French Army tradition, wearing local uniform was “a political concession and a strong military sign which should not be abused ”. This means that the proposed amendment by Rwanda in 1983 and accepted by France was in line with a strategy for the strengthening of the relations between the French and Rwandan gendarmeries. A confidential letter from the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs, reference No. 268 of 23rd November 1990, confirms the zeal showed by French officers involved in the war against RPF, which stems partly from these strengthened relations between the two armies.

“The Government of Rwanda recognises the worth of the contribution of France’s military assistance to Rwanda. It appreciates the moral, technical and tactical support that the French officers, in particular the Head of MAM, Col. Galinié and Lt Col. Canovas, have provided to their Rwandan comrades since their arrival on the Rwandan soil, especially during the war of October 1990 imposed on the people of Rwanda by attackers from outside. These officers have strengthened the friendly and brotherly relations with the officers of the Rwandan Armed Forces for the benefit of our two peoples and have earned their total trust. The army and all the people of Rwanda are happy to count on true friends and are grateful for this”.

The second amendment of the 1975 Agreement was made on 26th August 1992 following a diplomatic telegram dated 31st July 1992 from Ambassador Martres to the French authorities. In this telegram, Georges Martres pointed out that the terms of the 1975 Agreement had been amended by the existing situation on the ground. In fact, the military cooperation as provided for initially was confined to the gendarmerie, while it had been extended de facto to the whole Rwandan Armed Forces, without authorisation of this extension by any endorsement. In view of this unlawful situation, the Rwandan authorities, with the official support of Ambassador Martres, requested for the regularisation of this situation so as to align the text of the Agreement with the reality on the ground . France accepted the proposed amendment and endorsed it on 26th August 1992 as indicated above.

1.2.3 Increased military aid effective from 1989

By the end of the 1980s, France had increased its military aid to the Rwandan government. This increase corresponded with the period when the possibility of the launching of an armed conflict was no longer a secret for the Rwandan authorities. Rwanda’s secret services knew then that war was imminent and they were getting prepared accordingly .

According to a former employee of the French Cultural Centre in Kigali, Venuste Kayijamahe , shortly before October 1990, France was well informed about the preparations of war and had even devised a support strategy to the Government of Rwanda and its armed forces in case of an attack.

“On 9th November 1989, Ambassador Martres organised a party to welcome new French aid workers to which I was unexpectedly invited. I was very surprised to find many French soldiers clad in ceremonial uniforms in this party. What surprised me in Martres’ speech was that after talking about cooperation, he introduced the soldiers who were present and said: “the reason for their presence is that the country is going to be attacked by people from outside who do not love Rwanda. They will come to destroy what we have built through the development aid we provided to this country. These officers I am showing you have the duty to help Rwanda in case of an attack to ensure that this country does not fall in the hands of invaders. We will not accept that Rwanda suffers this fate”.

As the table below shows, compared to the preceding years, arms deliveries by France to Rwanda increased in 1989, one year before RPF’s attack on 1st October 1990.

Agreements of French arms exports to Rwanda by CIEEMG in millions of FF.

Year Value of arms export authorisations in millions of French francs Value of direct free-of-charge transfers of arms
1987 50 _
1988 19 _
1989 116 _
1990 191 0
1991 48 1.3
1992 122 14.9
1993 44 8.4
Sub- total 590 24.6
Grand Total 632,8

Source: French Ministry of Defence in MIP PDF, p. 179

According to the information from MIP, it was compulsory to obtain the approval of the Inter-ministerial Commission for carrying out studies for the export of warfare equipment before arms deliveries were made, be it in the case of sales by the French State or by private dealers, and it was the same with free-of-charge or expensive direct transfers taken from the stocks of the French Army. There is, however, nothing to assert if no unauthorised exports were delivered because, as we shall see further in this document, different documents show that arms deliveries by France to Rwanda during the genocide, i.e. in 1994, had a value well beyond the figures presented above.

These official figures show that arms deliveries more than doubled in 1989 and continued to increase in 1990, these being the years when the Rwandan Ministry of Defence started an unusual recruitment drive in the army and gendarmerie. This doubling of arms deliveries and the mass recruitment are strong signs which support the idea that Rwanda and France were aware of the possibility of the launching of the armed struggle by RPF and that the two countries were ready for this . The other peak was in 1992, the year in which RPF showed clearly its military superiority. Concerning the years showing a decline in arms deliveries, one may suppose that for 1991, the accumulation of the previous years was sufficient and that for 1993, it was the year of the peace negotiations (Arusha in August 1993).

1.3. Structure of the French military intervention (October 1990 – April 1994)

This part deals with the French military intervention starting from 3rd October 1990 up to the eve of the genocide on 6th April 1994. France’s action during this period has been written about by many independent researchers, but it was also one of the major topics investigated by the French Fact-finding Parliamentary Mission.

1.3.1 Context of the October 1990 war

Rwanda’s political, economic and social context at the time of the attack by RPF on 1st October 1990, which was the source of a lot of dissatisfaction, is well documented. It has been the subject of many studies . According to these studies, in the 1990s, Rwanda was characterised by a persistent institutionalised policy of ethnic and regional discrimination, a type of governance that tended towards political and social control by the single party MRND, a serious economic and social crisis, rampant corruption and political violence fuelled by murders of persons considered politically dangerous. All these elements contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of political deterioration and deep economic and social anxiety.

The external dimensions of this context are less known . This lack of knowledge enabled the Habyarimana regime and its French supporters to portray the armed struggle launched by RPF as an aggression by Uganda, an English-speaking country trying to encroach upon the French-speaking world. Succinctly, this description of the context tends to bring some clarifications concerning these external forces.

On 1st October 1990, RPF launched a large-scale attack from Uganda against the Rwandan Armed Forces, leading to the armed struggle. According to the statements issued by RPF, the aim of this struggle was to establish the rule of law in Rwanda, put an end to the institutionalised policy of ethnic and regional discrimination and enable the return of the refugees who were scattered in the Great Lakes region and around the world, some of them for thirty-five years. This attack was the culmination of several years of mobilisation of the refugees’ communities throughout the world starting from the mid 1980s: in Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Senegal, Switzerland, France, the United States or elsewhere. The Rwandan refugees’ communities got organised and started to define a protest platform calling for the end of the policy of ethnic and regional discrimination and their right to return to their country. Two trends then appeared: the first, radical, felt that the ideological regime of Hutu supremacy did not have the capacity of reforming itself and that there was therefore need to fight it politically and militarily; the second, collaborationist, recommended dialogue and the search for a humanitarian type of arrangement. Five events prompted the acceleration of the process of mobilisation and radicalisation of the refugees’ communities.

In October 1982, Rwandan refugees and the Kinyarwanda-speaking people living in Southern Uganda were hunted out by a military contingent and the youth of the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) of President Milton Obote. Rwandans were accused of collaborating with the guerrilla war launched by Yoweri Museveni, from the Hima tribe who are related to the Tutsis. According to some sources, it is claimed that more than a hundred people were killed; 35000 people tried to find refuge in the old refugee camps where they found themselves besieged; another 40000 tried to run away towards the Rwandan border. Those who managed to cross were kept inside camps on the Rwandan side of the border, but a group of between 8000 and 10000 were trapped in a strip of land forming a no man’s land between the Rwandan soldiers on one side and the UPC militants on the other . Rwanda closed its border in November 1982 . Aged refugees who could not tolerate seeing their country refusing them asylum preferred committing suicide. . Others remained in no man’s land for months, dying a slow death from infectious diseases and despair

As a result of the events of 1982-83, many Rwandan young refugees joined the ranks of Museveni’s guerrilla movement, and the small group of Rwandan refugees started an insurrection alongside him with the ultimate aim of “liberating” their own country. In January 1986, Museveni’s troops seized Kampala with some thousands of Rwandan refugees among them. Among these were the first leader of RPF, General Fred Rwigema, and the future president Paul Kagame, who occupied high posts in the victorious army.

In July 1986, with the growing pressure from the refugees’ communities who were demanding political change in Rwanda and their right to return to their country more and more insistently, the Habyarimana regime through the MNRD Central Committee rejected this claim of their returning home under the pretext that the country was overpopulated. This position was accompanied with the promise of considering in a discretionary manner requests from individuals who had the means of meeting their needs once they were allowed to return. But the preferred option was for these refugees to settle permanently abroad .

In August 1988, the collaborationist trend close to the Kigali regime organised a world congress, which was to bring together the representatives of the refugees and the Government of Rwanda to discuss the refugees’ issue. The radicals, though sceptical, decided all the same to attend so as to give dialogue a chance. The Kigali regime boycotted the meeting. At the end, the congress adopted strong resolutions demanding the right to return and ended by rallying almost all the participating communities around the radical agenda, without however mentioning explicitly the armed struggle.

Faced with growing pressure, Rwanda formed a “Special Commission on the problem of Rwandan emigrants” in February 1989, which was tasked with studying independently the solutions to be adopted on the problem of refugees, who were referred to as emigrants for this purpose. After two years spent doing nothing, the Commission proposed at its third meeting held in June 1990 that the Government should send delegates to Uganda to select candidates who would be repatriated starting from November.

Gerard Prunier maintains that this proposal may have pushed RPF to act quickly to avoid being beaten to it. But he also adds that the Government of Rwanda, faced with the growing internal political protests, chose not to negotiate the question of refugees seriously, in the hope that an armed conflict it was expecting would enable it to rally the population behind it and thwart its internal opponents . Finally, President Museveni, under the pressure of the criticisms of born and bred Ugandans who were opposed to the big number of Rwandan refugees holding civilian and military leadership positions, was forced to dismiss some of them by the end of 1989 such as General Rwigema, who was dismissed from his post of Deputy Minister of Defence.

The confrontation between the refugees’ communities and Rwanda’s secret services, which had existed since the 1960s, increased by mid-1980s. It took the form of abductions of refugees from neighbouring countries, manipulation of political groups aimed at fuelling resentments against the refugees, as was the case in Zaire for example. Later, the hostility of Rwanda’s secret services against the refugees shifted and was aimed at restricting students from these communities to getting entry into some West African countries. Blackmails were also launched against refugees working in international organisations.

In addition, with the worsening economic crisis in Africa, more particularly in Rwanda’s neighbouring countries sheltering big refugees’ communities, there were increased xenophobic tensions aimed particularly at Rwandan refugees’ communities, who were considered as having been very successful economically and sometimes being politically threatening. Ethnic attacks against Rwandans increased in secondary schools, discriminatory policies aimed at Rwandan refugees were applied in public services, but more particularly, young refugees failed to get education because of the introduction of restrictive legal or de facto quotas. The feeling among the second generation of refugees who were born in exile in all the countries of the region, with the exception of Tanzania and Uganda, from 1986, was that the future was totally closed, no matter the efforts and sacrifices they were prepared to make. In the end, the right to return to Rwanda became an imperative perspective. The armed confrontation between RPF and the Government of Rwanda in October 1990 can be explained by this entire set of causes – the radicalisation of the refugees’ communities during the second half of the 1980s, the decline of the regime of President Habyarimana, the economic crisis which hit the country very hard from 1987, the exacerbation of the policy of ethnic and regional exclusion, the rising corruption and political violence fuelled by the killing of opponents.

1.3.2 Description of the different elements of France’s intervention according to the official version

1.3.2.1 Opération Noroît

In its early days, RPF’s attack was immediately successful. It managed to seize Gabiro military camp and pushed 60 km inside the country. On 2nd October 1990, the son of President Mitterrand, Jean-Christophe, head of the African cell at Elysée, received a telephone call from President Habyarimana in the presence of the researcher Gerard Prunier. President Habyarimana was asking for France’s military intervention . According to General Maurice Schmitt , chief of staff of the French Army, President Mitterrand, who was then visiting Saudi Arabia, decided shortly before lunch on 4th October to send troops to Rwanda. This decision was taken after a brief council of defence held with his assistants who were with him.

On the same day, the first soldiers of Opération Noroît from the Central African Republic landed in Kigali. Quite strangely, although Opération Noroît was sanctioned by President Mitterrand on 4th, the mission of the operation was published the previous day on 3rd, through message 3782 from the General Staff . Another strange occurrence: a few hours after the arrival of the French troops in Kigali in the evening of 4th October 1990, the Rwandan Armed Forces simulated an attack of the city, firing in the air the whole night of 4th and 5th. The MIP report states in this connection: “Nonetheless, this staging of the imminent fall of Kigali failed to convince the French authorities to provide President Juvenal Habyarimana with all the aid in arms and ammunitions he was asking for, but the situation was deemed quite risky for French nationals to justify the dispatching of Opération Noroît on 4th October” .

There is obviously a problem in the official presentation of the sequence of events leading to the dispatching of Opération Noroît. It seems that the staging of the attack farce was done with delay . These contradictions support the assumption that the preparation of the French military intervention was done long before the attack by RPF on 1st October 1990, as suggested by the high increase in the deliveries of French arms to Rwanda in 1989 and the arrival in the same year of French soldiers to prepare the defence of the country, as we will see further in this document.

Opération Noroît had three officially declared objectives: (1) to protect the French Embassy, (2) to protect French nationals and (3) to ensure their possible evacuation. This protection was to be extended to all the Europeans and implied the control of the airport in case of evacuation. According to Admiral Lanxade, these troops were in no way to meddle in the maintenance of law and order .

Officially, these troops consisted of a tactical staff and two companies, totalling 314 soldiers. They were initially composed of the 2nd REP and the 8th RPIMA. According to Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, these two units from the 11th Parachutist Division, Combat Division, were specialised in clandestine operations . The other contingents included in Opération Noroît and the Military and Instruction Assistance Detachment (DAMI) such as the 1st RPIMA were attached to the new Special Operations Command created on 24th June 1992.

The mission of the Noroît detachment consisted particularly in the control of the area surrounding the city of Kigali through patrols and putting in place checkpoints run by French soldiers, especially on all the main roads leading into the city and to the airport. But this French military support for the protection of the city of Kigali, its surroundings and the airport was quickly found inadequate in view of the attacks by RPF, which highlighted the weakness of the Rwandan Armed Forces every time they happened. Noroît companies were asked “to adopt a discreet attitude” because we should avoid creating “the feeling that we are fighting alongside the Rwandan Armed Forces ”.

MIP tried to find out the reason why Opération Noroît was given an ad hoc command instead of remaining under the Defence Attaché and the Head of the Military Assistance Mission in Kigali. On 19th October 1990, the Chief of Staff appointed a commander, Col. Jean-Claude Thomann, who was directly answerable to the Chief of Staff . When he was interviewed by MIP, General Thomann “admitted before the Mission that this question tied in with both a problem of doctrine and a special problem related to this operation. He stated that his appointment as operation commander by the Chief of Staff had aroused a debate which he qualified as quite bitter between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the Ambassador feeling that in view of the situation, it belonged to the Defence Attaché to ensure the commandment of the operation ”.

Likewise, during the situations of crisis resulting from RPA’s attacks in June 1992 and February 1993, all the French troops in Rwanda were put under an ad hoc command, which was directly answerable to the Chief of Staff.
Analysts see in this rather a way of bypassing official channels in order to shorten the process of decision-making to execute a clandestine war . There was Lt. Col. Gilbert Canovas from 1st RPIMA who was in charge of putting in place structures that were supposed to facilitate this war. He was appointed advisor to the Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces, with the mission of strengthening their operational capacities. This appointment was initially to run from 11th October to 26th November 1990, and then for the first three months of 1991. The decision-making process brought together Lt. Col. Gilbert Canovas, Chief of Staff Admiral Lanxade – formerly Chief of Staff of President Mitterrand (April 1989 – April 1991) – General Quesnot, Special Chief of Staff of President Mitterrand (1991-1995), General Huchon who, having been the deputy of General Quesnot at Elysée since April 1991, was head of the military cooperation mission in April 1993

During his first mission as advisor at the end of 1990, Lt. Col. Canovas made the Rwandan Armed Forces adopt three strategic proposals: (1) putting in place operational sectors along the Rwanda-Uganda border of 200 km; (2) recruitment of many non-commissioned men and mobilisation of reservists, which increased the number of Rwandan Armed Forces from 11000 to 20000 between October 1990 and January 1991; (3) reduction of the period of initial training of soldiers which would be limited to the use of individual arms from the unit equipment. Finally, in order to overcome the strategic problem raised by a border “with Uganda which stretches over 200 to 250 km in the north” which facilitates infiltrations and other hit-and-run attacks , Lt. Col. Gilbert Canovas proposed “the establishment in sensitive areas of small groups in civilian clothes, disguised as peasants, so as to neutralise the rebels who are generally isolated [our emphasis]” [source?]

This advice brings to mind the subsequent formation of the civilian self-defence militia who would be used later in the mobilisation of civilians during the genocide. At the end of the mission of Lt. Col. Gilbert Canovas, a permanent advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces was appointed.

After its crushing defeat at the end of October 1990, RPF adopted a low profile and redeployed in the north of the country in the region of the volcanoes, where it got reorganised and adopted a guerrilla strategy. On 23rd January 1991, it launched a surprise attack on the town of Ruhengeri in the north and set free the main political prisoners from Ruhengeri special prison. As a result of this attack, a new stage in the French military intervention in Rwanda was set to complement Opération Noroît.

1.3.2.2 The DAMI

After the RPF offensive on Ruhengeri and in reaction to the pressing demands of President Habyarimana who passionately wanted to see France’s direct aid in the fighting, the latter decided to provide its support in the form of advice, assistance and instructions to enable the Rwandan Armed Forces to face RPF. On 15th March 1991, Ambassador Martres was asked to inform President Habyarimana of France’s decision to provide Rwanda with a Military and Instruction Assistance Detachment (DAMI). In its conclusion, the diplomatic telegram underlined: “We do not intend to announce the establishment of DAMI officially. You will tell President Juvenal Habyarimana that we would like him to do the same”. Later, the Ambassador reported that President Habyarimana had expressed “his deep satisfaction” .

Three types of DAMIs were established. Panda DAMI, which was established on 20th March 1991, was the most important. Its main duty was to train and retrain the units of the Rwandan Armed Forces engaged in operational sectors. A DAMI Gendarmerie was also established and within it, a section of the DAMI Judiciary Police was established in 1992. And to cap the operation, a third DAMI in charge of the training of the Presidential Guard was put in place. Contrary to the military advisors, DAMI soldiers lived in military camps with their recruits and operated close to the military operations terrain. On the other hand, Panda DAMI was reinforced by an artillery component in 1992 and an engineering component in 1993.

According to Lt. Col. Chollet , who was the first commander of DAMI, the mission consisted of receiving a Rwandan battalion either newly created or composed of heterogeneous soldiers from existing companies for a period of four to five weeks. It was supposed to be turned into an organised and structured army of soldiers capable of controlling its territory, so that when the Rwandan authorities went to Arusha, they would be in a balanced position in relation to RPF. During this training, the battalion commanders received tactical training and learnt how to organise their units in light of the types of arms made available to them. This training was done in class but also on the field.

When Panda DAMI arrived in March 1991, there were about fifty French technical military men in all, including DAMI staff. The increase of DAMI personnel brought the number of military forces from 80 to 100, and this increase followed closely the curve of the military evolution on the ground. The DAMI operation was strengthened in two instances following the RPF military pressure, one in the summer of 1992, the other in the autumn of the same year. On 20th June 1992, RPF managed to seize and occupy a strip of land 10 km deep from North West to North East, necessitating a vigorous reaction of French support to the Rwandan Armed Forces. To this end, the commanding officer of the 1st RPIMA, Col. Rosier, future head of the Special Operations Command, took command of the French military forces in Rwanda from June to November 1992.

Just after the widespread offensive of RPF on 8th February 1993, which brought it to about thirty kilometres from the capital Kigali, the French Army launched “Opération Chimère” from 22nd February to 28th March 1993. Col. Didier Tauzin was sent to the field with a score of officers and specialists from 1st RPIMA. He had under him all the DAMI soldiers totalling 69 men. The Chimère detachment brought thus together Panda DAMI which was already present, and the detachment which came as reinforcement with Col. Didier Tauzin. “According to the documents obtained by MIP, the objective of the detachment was to supervise indirectly an army of about 20000 men and provide it with an indirect command ”.

The French military support operation to Rwanda was not quantitatively insignificant with, according to official figures, an increase to 688 soldiers for the Noroît contingent and 100 men for the DAMIs at the time of the widespread offensive of RPF in February 1993. One analyst explained that in fact, through the game of the rotation of men, nearly 1000 French soldiers were deployed in Rwanda during part of 1993 . The deployment of French soldiers in Rwanda is distinguishable especially from the quality of the troops and the officers involved on one hand, and also by its diversity and operational locations. The troops that were deployed, be it under the Noroît contingent or the DAMIs, were elite troops, different regiments of parachutists of naval infantry, with a predilection for the 1st RPIMA or the 2nd Parachutist Foreign Regiment (REP).

While the Noroît detachment was responsible for the protection of the city of Kigali, its neighbourhood and the airport, Panda DAMI supported military operations through training and operational advice near the scene of the hostilities. Subsequently, the DAMI artillery and engineering detaches were directly involved in the fighting. Finally, on the strategic front, the French counsel of the Chief of Staff provided strategic support to the war efforts of the Rwandan Armed Forces. MIP came to the conclusion that the duty of the French counsel was “to advise discreetly the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces in all matters concerning the conduct of operations, but also in the preparation and training of forces ”.

The DAMI Gendarmerie trained the police in the maintenance of law and order and participated in intelligence collection, particularly through the DAMI Judiciary Police. We should mention that the Gendarmerie Chief of Staff had also a French advisor who was totally concealed by the official description of MIP. Finally, with every large scale offensive of RPA, the French Army sent reinforcements to Rwanda, led by the cream of the commanders of its elite units, such as Col. Rosier who was sent to combat RPA between June and November 1992. At that time, he was the commanding officer of the 1st RPIMA, and immediately after his mission in Rwanda, he was appointed to command the operations of the Special Operations Command of the French Army (COS) in June 1992.

Colonel Tauzin, commander of Opération Chimère, made a proper summary of the nature of the French military action in Rwanda, and his words raised questions from the Parliamentarians of MIP, who wrote: “The conclusion he draws from his experience, however, gives food for thought. The overall cost (financial, human, media) of this operation of indirect strategy seems extremely low compared to the results obtained and to what would have been the cost of the direct engagement against RPF ”.

The issue here seems to do with an indirect strategy of confrontation between the French Army in Rwanda and RPF. A war about which General Quesnot (Special Chief of Staff of the French President between April 1991 and September 1995), one of its principal strategists, declared: “[ ] it was a real war, total and very cruel.” And Patrick de Saint-Exupery wrote that “[the French military support went] further. Much further. France took the reins of the Rwandan Army.” Périès and Servenay added: “Unaware, the French were at war. An invisible war to their eyes, too far in the heart of Africa. A black war.”

While analysing the French military support to the Rwandan Armed Forces between 1990 and 1994, MIP points at the key question raised by this intervention:

"To carry out training operations, to provide military technical assistance in time of peace does not pose any special problems in principle. To intervene on the basis of a defence agreement or under a political commitment with a State to which another State wishes to provide support in case of an external aggression does not pose any ethical problem either. This is a classical game of alliances in the context of this or that political balance. But when the aggression cannot genuinely be established as being external, when the country which is the victim of such an aggression is itself the perpetrator or the accomplice of serious abuses against its own people in retaliation of the offensives threatening it, the situation then becomes much more complicated”.

1.4 Official justification of the French intervention: building a legitimacy

How did the French political authorities justify the military involvement of their troops in Rwanda between October 1990 and December 1993, the date of their withdrawal?

The authorities gave different explanations as the deployment of the troops progressed. The official public declarations changed according to the development of this intervention and the situation on the ground. In addition, the intervention continued to give rise to curiosity and questions, particularly from journalists.

There were also internal statements, found in correspondence within the French State apparatus, be it in diplomatic telegrams from the Embassy in Kigali, in meetings of political decision makers, or in memos of President Mitterrand’s advisors. This internal position also went through an evolution, which should be highlighted.

Finally, there were a posteriori justification statements made by individuals handling the Rwandan issue, in particular when they were asked to appear before the MIP. It is worth noting that the big part of this mystery lingers on today because none of the explanations given has been able to justify the scale and seriousness of the French involvement.

1.4.1. Public statements during the events

Like every time when France intervenes militarily in Africa, the first justification given to the public and which the latter accepts readily is the national duty of protecting its nationals living in the concerned countries.

In the first days of Opération Noroît, this protection was carried out through evacuation. Ten days after the launching of the French military intervention in Rwanda, President Mitterrand explained it as follows during a press conference: “France has dispatched two companies which facilitated the evacuation of French nationals and a number of foreigners who sought our protection. In this, we collaborated with the Belgians who did the same. That is all. These troops have no other mission than this, and once this mission is accomplished, they will of course return to France.” This message was repeated tirelessly by all the Ministers and officials when asked to justify Opération Noroît, including Prime Minister Michel Rocard and the Minister of Defence, Jean-Pierre Chevèvment.

As time passed without the withdrawal of the French troops, the justification of the intervention became more general: it was now a matter of ensuring Rwanda’s security, protecting French nationals and other expatriates so that they may remain and continue working for the development of the country. In February 1993, after two years of the French military presence in Rwanda, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, R. Dumas declared: “The presence of the French soldiers reassures the population and it is also thanks to this protection that many expatriates can continue fulfilling their mission which is essential to the economy of the country.”

It is in this way mainly that the French military intervention was publicly justified, and this intervention lasted three years.

1.4.2 Non confidential internal position

In the internal communications among politicians and diplomats in charge of handling the Rwandan issue, the justifications were quite different. At the beginning, however, during a Cabinet meeting held on 17th October 1990, President Mitterrand used the same argument of protecting French nationals: “We must protect our fellow countrymen. We should not meddle in ethnic fighting”.

However, the first significant justification of the French military intervention in its early days makes one think of the necessity of defending a President who is an ally of France and a victim of an external aggression. Three days after the launching of the war by RPF, a telegram with the subject “Situation in Rwanda” expressed concern about the fate of the regime of President Habyarimana:

“The telephone call I have just received and which is the subject of my diplomatic telegram 510 shows that President Habyarimana feels incapable of bringing the situation under control single handed. The aggression he is facing can be considered as foreign in as much as it comes from a neighbouring country ”.

The country referred to was Uganda. Those who launched the conflict were not yet identified clearly nor were the reasons of the war. In the early days, the issue of the nature of the conflict launched by RPF was of capital importance. While RPF declared that it was a Rwandan conflict motivated by internal political problems, President Habyarimana maintained categorically that it was an aggression by Uganda. The thesis of an external aggression portrayed Rwanda as a victim and justified the intervention of France as well as other countries such as Belgium and Zaire, which came to its aid. Finally, this thesis enabled President Habyarimana to evade internal political deadlocks that were denounced by both RPF and internal opposition. In his telegram dated 25th October 1990, Ambassador Martres urged the Rwandan president to put further emphasis on the external aggression argument:

“I availed myself with the opportunity to stress the need for Rwanda to highlight to the media the character of external aggression which the armed invasion from Uganda was increasingly taking on. The arms seized during the fighting are all of Russian or Chinese make, coming probably from the Ugandan Army . At the same time, the country is in the hands of a legal government. France, I told the President, will find it easy to help him if it is clearly demonstrated to the opinion of the international community that this is not a civil war ”.

Subsequently, when the international community recognised the Rwandan nature of the conflict, internal French justifications became increasingly determined by the ethnic vision of the conflict and pro-Hutu ethnic bias. This bias was justified by the fact that the Hutus represented the big majority of the country’s population. After the first attack of Ruhengeri in January 1991, which was more than three months after the beginning of the war, President Mitterrand made his views known in the following words:

“Ugandan Tutsis are coming to conquer Rwanda, this is disturbing. I suggest we make representations to Uganda. It is not in our interest to see Rwanda’s front yield. If this is a tribal war, we say nothing; if it is an aggression, we must intervene and free the French who are held by the Tutsis. [...] We should not restrict our presence. We are at the boundary of the English-speaking front. Uganda should not be allowed to do everything it wants. Museveni should be told; it is not normal that the Tutsi minority should try to impose its law to the majority” .

The ethnic and generalising fear of the Rwandan conflict and the anti-Tutsi bias came to light clearly in the personal documents of President Mitterrand which were handed to the judge who was hearing the complaint for complicity in the genocide against the French Army in July 2007 .

The geopolitical concerns of containing the influence of the United States and the English-speaking world in general as well as those related to the preservation of France’s prestige and authority in the eyes of other African presidents attached to France were also visible in internal communications. One month after the major offensive of RPF on 8th February 1993 and the dispatch of French reinforcements to Rwanda, President Mitterrand explained to his Ministers: “The other African countries are watching us, wondering whether France is going to abandon ”. But these two dimensions will be highlighted more emphatically during the justifications and revelations made a posteriori.

Once the Rwandan Armed Forces with the support of the French military intervention proved to be unable to kick RPF out over the country’s borders, especially after the important offensive of June 1992, French decision makers found peace negotiations inevitable. France assigned itself the duty of preventing the collapse of the Rwandan Armed Forces and supporting them firmly so that the Government of Rwanda was able to appear to be in a strong bargaining position during the negotiations. This is how the officials interpreted the “stabilizing” role that the French military intervention was supposed to play.

MIP quotes, without mentioning the date, a note from the Directorate of African and Malagasy Affairs expressing “the unacceptable character [...] of a military solution to the Rwandan crisis”. One can safely think that this is about a military solution in favour of RPF. In a note dated 12th May 1992, Paul Dijoud, Director of the African and Malagasy Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote: “For the sake of the balance of power in the region and in view of the negotiations, it is essential that Rwanda does not find itself in a weak military position ”. This vision was clarified by the note by Dominique de Villepin, who was then Deputy Director for African and Malagasy Affairs at Quai d’Orsay, dated 24th July 1992:

“The action of France in Rwanda is guided by a will to bring stabilisation and a concern of appeasement. It consists of a diplomatic and military component. Through the first, we have been encouraging the process of openness in Rwanda and supporting regional peace efforts and dialogue between the warring parties. [...] Through the second, which complements the first, we have dispatched soldiers to Rwanda in order to protect our nationals and strengthen our military cooperation with the Rwandan Army. If Rwanda became destabilised, this would in fact sound the death knell of the process of democratisation in a context of exacerbation of community tensions ”.

It was in this context that the French Government continued to ensure that “the best way of avoiding bloody fighting between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority” was to maintain some units of their army in Rwanda. At the same time, the massacres of Tutsi civilians orchestrated by the regime continued without having any impact on the French military support or arousing the least criticism from France.

1.4.3 Posteriori statements

Posterior statements on the motivations and justification of the French military intervention in Rwanda are found especially in the MIP report wherein public hearings of political, diplomatic and military leaders involved in the Rwandan case were made.

The aspect which most of them put forward was the stabilising, moderating and reconciling role of the French initiative. One thing that came out is that, compared with the statements made during the events, different speakers concealed the military aspect of this stabilising strategy, as they did with the moderating role played by France during the massacres which punctuated the period of the French military intervention between October 1990 to December 1993 .

In a more open manner, President Mitterrand’s geopolitical concerns of containing the American influence in Africa were clearly brought out by his officials including the Military executive assistant, Admiral Lanxade, Roland Dumas, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and even by the former Minister of Cooperation, Bernard Debré. During his testimony before MIP, Debré said that President Mitterrand “felt that the Americans, who were openly helping both Ugandans and RPF, were harbouring hegemonic intentions over this region and perhaps over Africa, and he was not wrong either. Subsequently, the role of the Americans has become increasingly clear. We also should not forget that they are the ones who have trained the Ugandan Army and RPF Army. It is also probably true that they gave them arms . Simply let it be stressed here that the American Deputy Secretary of State in charge of African Affairs at the time, Herman Cohen, who also appeared before the MIP, said that “he was astonished to hear the theory of an Anglo-Saxon plot against the interests of France which did not correspond to any reality ”.

Roland Dumas and Bernard Debré underlined also clearly the importance which President Mitterrand attached to defending the policy of French influence in Africa .

Posterior statements made by French political leaders were characterised by parsimony of revelations and little questioning of the intervention of France in Rwanda. In fact, the three types of statements mentioned earlier are not enough to explain the scale and seriousness of the French political and military engagement. One way of explaining France’s drift well before the genocide can be found when one combines two analyses: the will to have a fight with RPF which comes out in some of the justifications described in this document; the ethnic-based interpretation of the Rwandan crisis and the anti-Tutsi bias adopted by French officials, particularly President Mitterrand. In their headlong rush, the French political and military authorities allowed their ally, President Habyarimana, to repeatedly commit massacres of Tutsi civilians.

1.5. Criticisms of the French intervention within France and abroad

The official justifications put forward about the French military intervention in Rwanda did not convince everybody at the time. A number of criticisms were made from various circles by members and institutions of the French Socialist Party, and even by one Minister in President Mitterrand’s government, and some of them were acerbic. At that time, these criticisms concerned essentially the repeated concomitance between ethnic massacres schemed by the Habyarimana regime and the reinforcements of the French troops sent to support this regime.

After the genocide, criticisms were levelled especially by French journalists, researchers and human rights activists, through numerous newspaper articles and published works. Posterior criticisms were deeper, thanks to the accumulation of facts which were not known at the time of the events and, as said earlier, many of them revolved around the possibility of complicity in the genocide by the French Army.

1.5.1. Criticisms at the time of the events

Before the genocide, not many analysts and observers in France or abroad raised any public criticisms or strong protests against the French intervention in Rwanda. Sometimes, journalists in the written press published articles which raised questions, but nothing of substance. The tone and contents seemed to adapt to what was known as “the Yalta order”: the division of the world in the zones of influence and in this context, the feeling was that by its military intervention in Rwanda, France acted “normally”.

Outside France, the press sometimes asked genuine questions on the need, the reasons, the effectiveness and the consequences of the various French military interventions.




Criticisms or reservations in the French and international press

Although in France reports were quite regular in the written and audiovisual press, particularly on Radio France Internationale, the prevailing information transmitted the same ethnic cliché: atavistic hatred, ancestral resentment, a minority thirsty of seizing power in order to enslave the majority, foreign aggression, so many hackneyed themes, as already pointed out, from different personalities in charge of the French policy in Rwanda.

Most French newspapers generally reported some of the disturbing acts attributable to the Government of Rwanda such as the mass roundups in the early days of RPF attack, the cramming of crowds of innocent people at Nyamirambo stadium in October 1990, arbitrary imprisonment, cases of human rights violations or suppression of individuals, massacres of the Bagogwe or in Bugesera. But the real scope of the suppression aimed at Tutsis as a group was in a way trivialised under the excuses mentioned above (atavistic hatred, etc.).

Between 1991 and 1993 and during the whole period of negotiations in which more or less observed ceasefires and the resumption of hostilities alternated, the French press reported regularly about the development of the situation, but without really dwelling on the engagement of France and its consequences, except from time to time in Libération or L’Evénement du Jeudi. In general, therefore, the impression left was that on this precise point, the national press remained rather discreet. Le Monde was particularly considered as defending the official theories.

The other country which showed great interest in the situation prevailing in Rwanda was naturally Belgium. The Belgian press quickly distanced itself from the Habyarimana regime in particular, and from the French military intervention in general. Even though at the beginning of the war dailies in Brussels carried titles on topics which were almost close to those found in the French newspapers – “The Tutsi want to return to their country by all means” ; “The arrival of Belgian and French paratroopers reassures Kigali” ; “Tension goes down in Rwanda” ” – the analysis of the information maintained some balance by presenting different points of view – that of RPF, its representatives or its sympathisers; that of the Government of Rwanda and its supporters; and that of foreign powers which intervened to help the regime of President Habyarimana. Belgian newspapers and the public opinion started also quite early to raise serious questions as to the essence of the involvement of foreign powers in the Rwandan conflict, causing a radical change in Belgium’s policy in relation to the regime of President Habyarimana

There were other sections of the international press which wrote very harsh criticisms against France.

“Helicopters simply fly low over banana plants and land patrols of young men with shaven heads and camouflaged uniforms in broad day light as if that was their right. In the complex political game in East Africa, France has been privately heaping the responsibility on Uganda where RPF was based before launching the attack in 1990, accusing Kampala of having failed to restrain the rebels. By extension, France accuses Great Britain of having failed to put pressure on Uganda to do so. It would appear that French decision makers have not understood that the rules of the game have changed and that the old spheres of influence are not longer what they used to be .”

Criticisms by different groups or personalities

Very many warnings were issued and protests aired by different groups and individuals: personal meetings with national elected personalities (Members of Parliament, Senators), open or confidential letters to politicians, including the President of the Republic and his wife. These critical reactions came out in February 1993. In view of the repeated massacres of Tutsi civilians, an International Commission of Inquiry mandated by the International Federation of Human Rights based in Paris visited Rwanda between November 1992 and January 1993. Just after its departure, large scale massacres were committed in the north of the country. On 8th February, RPF launched a widespread offensive which broke through the lines of defence of the Rwandan Armed Forces. A few days later, France sent two companies to fight RPF.

On 23rd February 1993, the section of « Fédération des Français à l’étranger » in Burundi, which was affiliated to the Socialist Party, addressed a motion to the national leadership of the Socialist Party. This motion read as follows:

“February 1993: Ten months after, carnage is raging in Rwanda as never before. International organisations have exposed several mass graves. The militia of General Habyarimana are at it again, killing Tutsis with total impunity. (...) It thus appears that the intervention of France in Rwanda has failed to prevent massacres and restore peace in the region. Worse still, it appears today that the presence of French soldiers in this country has especially enabled Habyarimana to order the well known atrocities under the cover of international protection ”.

On the eve of the visit of the Minister for Cooperation to Rwanda on 28th February, the International Secretariat of the Socialist Party sent the following statement to Agence France Presse which was signed by Gérard Fuchs:

“I fail to understand the decision of sending additional French troops to Rwanda while human rights violations by the regime of General Habyarimana are still on the increase. I hope that our Minister for Cooperation will find in Kigali convincing reasons for a military presence which is seen today as helping a dictatorial regime in dire straits, or else he will put an end to this presence”.

A few days earlier, a French right wing party, the Parti républicain, had expressed its concern in a communiqué dated 23rd February 1993, as follows:

“ While we understand the pressing need of protecting the integrity of French nationals, the Republican Party is worried about some missions which might be seen as political which are entrusted to the French Army, and it is worried particularly of the spiral in which the French Government is locking itself in by sending more and more troops day after day. [...] The Republican Party draws the attention of the French Government to the fact that it would be detrimental to the image of France in Africa to help maintaining a regime which is undemocratic, under the excuse of the security of French nationals”.

A section of the French political class was therefore aware of the totalitarian drifts of the regime and considered the risk of France sliding into the Rwandan crisis. But it was powerless before the determination of those who decided the French policy at the time.

During the entire period of French intervention in Rwanda, all members of the Government remained discreet, even silent before the public. But this did not mean that they were in total agreement with the policy of the day as we will see later, when they were invited to testify before the Parliamentary Fact-Finding Mission. There were particularly two Ministers, the former Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, and the former Minister of Defence, Pierre Joxe: the first kept a distance, while the second was harshly critical. Concerning Pierre Joxe, he had officially taken a position right from the beginning of 1993. In a note dated 23rd February 1993, to the President of the Republic, he expressed his reservations about the French policy in Rwanda in no uncertain terms:

“I am concerned about our position in Rwanda and the role which our 690 soldiers may find themselves drawn into since, in reality, the Rwandan army is no longer fighting. [...] I do not see how RPF will give up victory which is so near and which does not certainly require a general offensive. I do not see either how we will bring Museveni back to better feelings since we do not have any significant ways of exerting pressure on him. As for Habyarimana, after sending him two additional companies following many other displays of support, he must be considering himself as one of the best protected African leaders by France. This is not the best way of bringing him to make the necessary concessions. And yet, through his political intransigence and his inability to mobilise his own army, he is largely to blame. If RPF makes some advances again, our soldiers may find themselves facing the rebels after a few hours. To me, excluding direct intervention, the only slightly strong means of pressure still available to us on him seems to be the possibility of our disengagement”.

The most remembered statement in France is certainly the one made by Jean Carbonare, a member of the International Commission of Inquiry, on his return from Rwanda. On 24th January 1993, during the 2000 hours news bulletin on one of the biggest French television stations, France 2, together with the news reader Bruno Masure, he castigated the French policy in Rwanda pathetically and very strongly.

Finally, Rwandans were not found wanting. On 16th February 1993, a group of 24 Rwandan intellectuals living in Nairobi, Kenya, wrote an open letter to François Mitterrand . Having recalled the numerous massacres committed by the regime in Kigali since October 1990, the signatories of the letter raised some issues:

“We, Rwandan intellectuals, would like to ask you some questions to which we have failed to find logical and coherent answers. How can a country like France, which is renowned as the country of human rights, continue protecting a dictatorship which kills its own people, throwing them into extreme misery against all morals? How should we understand the role of the French troops in Rwanda when we know that the successive massacres which have been committed in our country were done under the cover of the discretion of these troops?”

1.5.2 Posterior criticisms

Criticisms against the French military intervention in Rwanda which began just after the genocide were thorough. Starting from 1994, books were being published in France, accusing the latter of complicity in the genocide or of actions constituting complicity of genocide. Titles of such books included: in 1994, François-Xavier Verschave wrote Complicité de génocide? La politique de la France au Rwanda (Complicity of génocide? France’s policy in Rwanda); in the same year, Pascal Krop published, Le génocide franco-africain – Faut-il juger les Mitterrand? (The Franco-African genocide – Should Mitterrand and company be tried?); in 1997, Medhi Bâ wrote Rwanda, un génocide français (Rwanda, a French genocide); in 1998, Jean-Paul Gouteux published Un génocide secret d’État – La France et le Rwanda, 1990-1997 (A State secret genocide – France and Rwanda, 1990-1997); still in 1997, Michel Sitbon wrote Un génocide sur la conscience (A genocide on the conscience); in January 1998, Patrick de Saint-Exupéry published a series of very critical articles in Le Figaro; on 9th April 1998, Sam Kiley wrote in The Times of London “A French hand in genocide – On the role played by Paris in Rwanda”; even Le Monde published on 17th December 1998, Rwanda: comment la France s’est trompée (Rwanda – How France went wrong); in 2004, Patrick de Saint-Exupéry wrote L’inavouable, la France au Rwanda (Shameful, France in Rwanda); in 2005, the association Survie with other intellectuals and human rights activists wrote L’horreur qui nous prend au visage, l’État français et le génocide rwandais ”

After publication of a series of articles by Patrick de Saint-Exupéry in a daily newspaper which could not be suspected of being antimilitarist, namely Le Figaro, the French authorities, led by Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, decided officially to try and explain this issue. The Parliamentary Fact-finding Mission (MIP) wrote on 3 March 1998, “On military operations carried out in Rwanda by France, other countries and UN between 1990 and 1994”. In carrying out its mission, MIP tried to find satisfactory answers. Even though its general conclusion falls short with regard to the seriousness of the acts which are particularly catalogued in the annexes to its report, MIP recognised in the end that the French State made “a misjudgement”.

On the international scene, the report commissioned by the OAU on the Rwandan crisis and genocide devoted a whole chapter on the role of France in Rwanda. Those who carried out the investigation wrote that “it is impossible to understand events which happened in Rwanda during the last decade without mentioning the role of France”. They highlighted the following points: France remained the closest ally of the Government of Rwanda militarily, politically and diplomatically; France has been one of the major creditors of Rwanda and one of its major suppliers of arms; the 1983 revised military cooperation agreement which was used to justify the French military assistance at the time of RPF’s offensive had no legal basis; in supporting Rwanda in international forums, the French Government generally refuted the increasingly numerous testimonies on human rights violations committed by the Rwandan Government; the French authorities did not accept publicly that Rwanda was in a civil war in order not to compromise their intervention in favour of Habyarimana.

The OAU report pointed out that “the significance of the role of France can never be sufficiently underlined” and that its “public support strongly discouraged the radical faction of Akazu from making concessions or considering a compromise”. And it was with a lot of irony that they wrote: “President Mitterrand may make speeches on democracy and human rights, but on the ground in Kigali, the real priorities of the French Government are patent”.

“It was not possible for France not to know the prevailing situation in Rwanda, and it was therefore in full knowledge of the facts that it decided to maintain its support to the Habyarimana regime ” [mention the page of the quotation]

In the following chapters, in making its observations, the Commission refers to many facts which are today increasingly better known. Even though they were quite conversant with the above mentioned literature concerning the action of France in Rwanda, the members of the Commission were no less surprised by the seriousness of the facts revealed by their inquiry as presented in the following pages.



ACTS FRANCE IS ACCUSED OF



1. Contribution to the perpetration of the war

The Commission’s inquiry revealed that, contrary to official declarations, France’s military aid in the perpetration of the war was multifaceted and often direct, like in the case of the collection of military intelligence, strategic and operational supervision of the war, contribution in artillery or in the laying of mines by French soldiers.

1.1. Support in military intelligence and telephone tapping

Between 1990 and 1994, France’s military and political aid to Rwanda was intense and visible. However, in other respects, it was discreet and clandestine, thanks to the close collaboration between the intelligence services of the two States and to the support given by French senior officials such as Paul Dijoud. In August 1991, Paul Dijoud promised to the Government of Rwanda, “that France is going to dispatch rapidly a discreet high level mission to carry out investigations on the exact location of RPF .

Documents show that starting from the end of 1992, there was a stronger high level cooperation between the French General Directorate of External Security, DGSE, and the Rwandan Directorate of External Security . Within the framework of this cooperation, Rwanda received the support of Col. Didier Tauzin (alias Thibault), who was a former employee of DGSE and who, from 1990 to the end of 1991, was a military advisor to President Habyarimana . This cooperation was also enhanced by the very close relations between the Head of the military assistance mission in Rwanda, Col. René Galinié, and the Head of military intelligence in Rwanda, commanding gendarme, Pierre-Claver Karangwa

French journalists and witnesses saw DGSE employees in Kigali between 1991 and 1993, at the time when the French Army was intensely training and arming the Rwandan Armed Forces . A French priest residing in Kigali in 1994 testified as follows:

“Some French who were here in 1994, I would like to see them again one day. (...) Particularly one Ambassador who obviously knew what was being prepared. The genocide had been planned! It is not possible that this Ambassador, the army officers and guys from the intelligence department did not know. (...) At the time, nothing could be done in Kigali without French employees being put in the picture by one or other person, even without them working behind the scenes ”.

General Jacques Rosier who commanded DAMI and who was the commanding officer of 1st RPIMA from 1990 to 1992, admitted to the presence of DGSE officers beside the Rwandan Armed Forces, but not frequently: “The first ones who came with wiretapping equipment in 1992 did not stay long. At the time when I was there, they were technicians who had come to strengthen the wiretapping capacities of the Rwandans ”.

The active presence of French intelligence officers in Rwanda was confirmed by Augustin Iyamuremye, former Director of Rwandan Intelligence Services from 1992 to 1994. He told the Commission that “the French increased their support to the Government of Rwanda as RPF’s military pressure intensified. Much can be said about this French support during the war. France helped the Rwandan army in acquiring arms and ammunitions, training and collection of military intelligence. This latter activity was carried out by men who were working with DAMI ”

In practical terms, the collection of military intelligence for the Rwandan Armed Forces was carried out by officers from the 11th shock paratrooper’s regiment, the armed wing of DGSE, who were integrated with the staff of Noroît, as well as “members of the commando unit of the 13th regiment of dragon paratroopers (RDP)”. That should enable one “to appreciate the nature of the aid given by this country to RPF fighters ”. These officers trained and supported the Rwandan Armed Forces in the techniques of infiltration. They entered deep into the Ugandan territory behind the lines of RPF and intercepted radio communications of Ugandan and RPF regiments .

The intelligence services of the Rwandan Prime Minister reported in their Bulletin quotidien as follows:

“This morning 17 February 1993, RFI announced the findings of an investigation carried out by the French intelligence services in Uganda on the Rwandan crisis. According to this radio, these services are convinced that several Ugandan army units are behind the recent offensive of the guerrillas; they estimate that ten battalions deployed by the Rwanda Patriotic Front exceed largely the capacity of the Front since its forces are estimated at about 2500 men . In addition, the same services declared that the guerrillas are probably getting artillery support through the forest between Rwanda and Uganda”.

The French support was also through the provision of communications audio equipment to the Rwandan Army, namely two systems of radio monitoring , two TRC 195 radio direction finders, radio tactics and radio monitoring equipment , three radio monitoring equipment . According to Pierre Péan, this equipment enabled them to pick up RPF’s secret communications which were nevertheless considered as much protected:

“Other French soldiers broke through some secrets of Inkotanyi through the communications intelligence system installed on 2 March 1993, which complimented the taps provided every morning to Col. Maurin by Anatole Nsengiyumva, head of G2, the Rwandan military intelligence department. [...] The French stayed well informed of the activities of RPF through interceptions by the Rwandan Armed Forces up to the date of the assassination of the President ”.

Bernard Debré confirmed the existence of communications taps of RPF, but he said that this was done by a Ministry which he did not mention . A note by the Belgian intelligence dated 28 December 1993, contained additional information that “French advisors who remained in Rwanda after the withdrawal of Noroît [...] organised a campaign of denigrating the Belgian blue helmets (...)” and explained that two of them “put taps on the Kigali telephone exchange” more particularly “telephones in Embassies ”.

In reality, the deciphering of RPF communications was done by warrant officers Didot and Maîer, two French specialists who were training the Rwandan Armed Forces in the maintenance of the army’s radio stations and transmission techniques, including of course communications tapping. Didot and Maîer lived near CND where the RPF battalion was living, and some sources maintained that these two soldiers had chosen this place of residence in order to be able to tap better RPF communications coming from CND

French military technicians were also involved in analysing the war equipment seized from RPF during the fighting in order to help the Rwandan Army to identify them and know them better and enable the Rwandan Armed Forces to buy appropriate arms for destroying those used by RPF. French soldiers were equally involved in teaching the Rwandan Armed Forces the techniques of mining and trapping. In this connection, Col. Canovas taught them how “to make use of the terrain by laying traps at cross roads, thawed confluences and possible crossing points of the enemy”. This action was carried out “with the participation of the Noroît detachment” in the operational sectors of Byumba and Rusumo .

The other type of support offered by the French authorities to the Government of Rwanda was the perversion of military information obtained by the French Military Observers (MOF) . This event explains the nature of the conciliation efforts by France in the conflict, and yet this task required a minimum of neutrality from France.

MOF visited Rwanda and Uganda from 26 November 1991 to 10 March 1992. It was received by the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and the Minister of Defence on 28 November 1991, with Ambassador Martres in attendance. While there is nothing abnormal that representatives of a State speak in the defence of the policy practised by their government, the most astonishing thing was the bias shown on this occasion by Ambassador Martres who, instead of showing neutrality, adopted rather the language of each of the two Rwandan Ministers. Minister Bizimungu gave an account of the position of Martres as follows:

“ In the same vein, the French Ambassador to Rwanda confirmed also to his fellow countrymen that President Museveni was very cunning and that he was certainly going to try and show to the French military mission traces of his own army on the Ugandan soil to make them believe that those traces belonged to the Rwandan Armed Forces who violated his territory, or that he was going to show RPF fighters on the Ugandan soil and make the mission believe that this was the Rwandan soil that RPF had seized. Mr Georges Martres told the head of the French military observers mission that the French Ambassador to Uganda had already gone to see all these scenarios and that he was well informed of the bad faith of RPF and the complicity of Uganda in the conflict ”

Ambassador Martres continued to show his bias by violating the secrets contained in MOF inquiry reports, revealing them to the Government of Rwanda. The principle adopted when MOF was established was that its reports would in the first place be reserved for the French Government. The latter would then analyse them and, if necessary, convene a meeting of Rwanda and Uganda under the auspices of France. It was in such meetings that the findings of the investigations carried out by MOF would be communicated in order to contribute to the restoration of peace .

In the same style of secret operations, the French secret services helped the Habyarimana regime in infiltrating Hutu members of RPF to convince them to join the Presidential camp. These services undertook especially an operation for hijacking and abducting a well know Hutu opponent in Germany, Shyirambere Jean Barahinyura, who was a member of the Executive Committee of RPF and its first spokesperson in Europe in 1990. The team of specialists for this abduction operation consisted of Pierre-Yves Gilleron, former employee of the “anti terrorist cell in the President’s Office ”, his body guard Pierre Massé who also worked in the President’s Office, and his friend and associate, Pierre Péan . But the scheme was foiled thanks to the rapid intervention of the German police, the BKA of Frankfurt who had been alerted by Barahinyura himself. The French Rwandan journalist, Gaëtan Sebudandi who knew about this incident closely, told it in these words when he met the Commission in Born on 14 February 2007:

“I was told this incredible story during a private conversation with Shyirambere Jean Barahinyura himself towards the end of October or the beginning of November 1990, in Frankfurt. He told me that two French agents had come to abduct him. At that time, I did not believe him much until ten years later when I read the same story in the book by Paul Barril with real names. Their mission was to hand him to Habyarimana. In order to convince him to follow them and leave RPF, they gave him a huge documentation of DGSE on RPF, containing the well known theories of Black Khmers, and they dissuaded him from cooperating with a movement of that type”.

It is true that Shyirambere Jean Barahinyura was a very important opponent of the Habyarimana regime to the extent that the Rwandan intelligence services and the Rwandan Ambassador in France and Germany had tried to approach him and proposed him huge sums of money so that he joins the government and gives Rwanda all the copies of his book in which he denounced the scandals of the regime

1.2. Strategic advice and tactical support

1.2.1. Attending the meetings of evaluation and strategic planning

At the beginning of the war, meetings were held regularly at the headquarters of the Rwandan Army. They were attended by more than ten officers, sometimes less, including the Belgians and the French. On reading some of the minutes of these meetings , one finds that French officers were often invited to attend. They were for example invited to the two meetings held on 31 October 1990, and to those held on 2nd, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th November 1990.

Judging by their frequency, these meetings looked like true crisis meetings. They were all devoted to the evaluation of the military situation on the ground: advances or withdrawals of the “enemy forces”, i.e. RPF; the recapture of locations or towns by the “friendly forces” whose composition was not mentioned; miscellaneous problems.

Under “miscellaneous problems”, it was stated for example in the minutes of the meeting of 31 October 1990, that “the friendly forces are continuing the search operation” in the combat zones .

The frequency of these meetings dropped with the brief lull on the various fronts after RPF withdrew and the Rwandan Army seemed to have won a momentary victory at the end of November 1990. They resumed with the resumption of the hostilities in February 1991, but this time at the headquarters of the Gendarmerie, and they assumed a more pronounced strategic and operation orientation. They were regularly attended on the Rwandan side by: Col. Pierre Célestin Rwagafilita, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie and chairman of the meetings; Lt. Colonels Pontien Hakizimana, Jean Ngayinteranya, Laurent Rutayisire from G3, G1 and G2 respectively at the Gendarmerie headquarters; and Commanders Jean-Baptiste Nsanzimfura and Christophe Bizimungu; on the French side, the most frequent at different periods were Col. Galinié, Lt. Colones Canovas and Ruelle, and Major Robardey.

As an example of the topics discussed at these meetings, the discussion which Col. Galinié had on 13 February 1991, with the officers from the headquarters of the Gendarmerie and the units of the camp of Kacyiru (stronghold of the Gendarmerie) was about “the priority mission of the National Gendarmerie [which] consists in fighting the ENI , Col. Galinié is ready to provide to the National Gendarmerie technical and material assistance to strengthen the operational capacity of the Corps”

It was also stated in the minutes that:

“With the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie and the Branch Heads, he [Galinié] spoke of the problems and the difficulties the National Gendarmerie was encountering in the fulfilment of its missions of security, defence and fighting for which it is not adequately prepared due to carrying out its normal duties, and he proposed a MAM assistance to meet this challenge which cannot be understood nor tolerated by the public opinion [our emphasis]. [...] It is recommended that the defence of the city of Kigali be entrusted to the National Gendarmerie, and he undertakes to do everything possible to have this implemented efficiently if the defence plan for the capital he intends to propose is accepted. [...] This material and technical assistance will not however be restricted to Kigali city alone. It will be extended to the other camps and units”.

The themes of the meetings of the chiefs of staff attended by French officers included the psychological state of particular units and the morale of the Rwandan Army as a whole, tactics and public security. The meeting held on 5 March 1991, dwelt much on the question of the insufficient number of the forces. “In this connection, Lt. Col. Canovas stressed that this insufficiency should be compensated by concentrating the defence around collective arms, the establishment of a decentralised intervention reserve force, the use of motorised patrols and patrols on foot, as well as observation and tapping posts”

At the end of 1991, a strong delegation visited Rwanda, consisting of Admiral Lanxade, Head of delegation, General Pidance, Principal Private Secretary, Colonel Delort from the Department of External Relations, and Commissioner Dechin. The mission called on the President of the Republic and the Headquarters of the Rwandan Armed Forces where the Ministry of Defence (which, as indicated earlier, is headed by the Head of State), and explained that “the presence of Colonel Chollelt, the commander of DAMI, is desirable”

Shortly after, a letter from the Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the French Embassy in Rwanda that “with effect from 1 January 1992, Lt. Col. Chollet, Head of the Military and Training Assistance Department, will combine the duties of advisor of the President of the Republic, Commander-in-chief of the Rwandan Armed Forces, with those of advisor of the Army Chief of Staff”. As advisor of the Head of State, his duties were the organisation of the defence and the functioning of the military institution, while with the Chief of Staff, his duties were to advise him in the organisation of the Rwandan Army, the instruction and training of units and the use of the Forces .

The news about the appointment of Lt. Col. Chollet to these two posts spread very rapidly, raising a strong controversy. The Defence Attaché in Kigali tried to put this event into perspective by stating first that Chollet was to go back to France in March 1993, then by minimizing the importance and scope of a petition submitted by one of the big political organisations from the unarmed opposition, the Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR), which had issued a strong protest, calling for a “final end to colonisation”

On 3 March 1992 (which was a few weeks only after the momentary capture of the town of Ruhengeri by RPF fighters), Lt. Col. Chollet was replaced by Lt. Col. Jean-Louis Nabias at the head of DAMI, and soon after, Jean-Jacques Maurin was appointed operational deputy to the Defence Attaché, as advisor of the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army, among other duties. When he was interviewed by the Fact-finding Mission in 1998, Maurin explained “that in this capacity, he participated in the preparation of daily fighting plans and in decision-making”

Another French officer, Col. Didier Tauzin, told the Fact-finding Mission that “French soldiers had to remind the Rwandan Army High Command the most elementary methods of tactical reasoning, teaching them how to make a synthesis of information, helping them to restore the logistics chain for food supplies to the troops, to prepare and give orders, to establish maps” .

According to many witnesses who saw him on the combat scenes, Lt. Col. Canovas appears to have been involved in the field most often, or at least he was the most clearly identified. Interviewed by the Fact-finding Mission, he admitted that he had suggested “the establishment in sensitive zones of small groups dressed as civilians and disguised as peasants, in order to neutralise the generally isolated rebels” and “to make use of the terrain by setting traps at crossroads” .

The involvement of French officers in strategic, operational and tactical supervision of the Rwandan Armed Forces started with the war. In a Note Verbale to the French Ambassador to Rwanda , the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs said that he appreciated “the moral, technical and tactical support which French officers, especially the Head of MAM, Col. Galinié and Lt. Col. Ganovas, have provided to their Rwandan comrades since their arrival in Rwanda, particularly during the October 1990 war.”

Besides the Head of MAM, other French officers who acted as advisors at different periods were: Lt. Colonel Canovas for the Rwandan Army, Lt. Colonel Ruelle for the National Gendarmerie, Major Robardey for the National Gendarmerie (Judicial Police), Major Marliac for the Air Force, Major Refalo in the paratroopers units, and Capt. Caillaud at the National Gendarmerie College.

1.2.2. Direct participation in fighting: 1990-1993

The issue of French soldiers participating directly in fighting in a country with which France had no defence pact but only military cooperation agreements raises the question of the legality of such an intervention. And when one knows the criminal nature of the acts carried out by the regime being supported which moreover jeopardised the life of French citizens, the issue then takes on a moral dimension. A big number of former soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces explained that for them, the contribution in terms of strategic, operational and tactical advices as well as material support were as important as an occasional presence on the field of the French allies when they realised that the Rwandan Armed Forces were unable to contain RPF offensives.

As far as the Commission is concerned, these episodes of direct participation in fighting must be viewed in the larger scheme of the French military intervention and one should consider the complementary nature of the various components of this intervention. This direct participation in fighting was systematic at each one of the important offensives by RPF. It was seen in October 1990, in January 1991, from June to September in 1992 and in February 1993.

a) October 1990

There are strong assumptions showing that at the beginning of the war in October 1990, French pilots were flying combat helicopters which, according to French sources, must have contributed greatly to the crushing defeat of RPF. During his interview with MIP, Ambassador Martres, “pointed out that on 4th or 5th October 1990, a combat helicopter of the Rwandan Army destroyed more than ten RPF vehicles and four or five trucks carrying petrol and that, according to reports by French soldiers, this operation had been carried out by a Rwandan pilot, and that this pilot had been trained by the French. The instructor was moreover quite proud of the success of his student” .

General Varret was clearer as he explained that: “pilot instructors were on board Gazelle helicopters sent in combat zones with Rwandans and that they did not participate. Their presence was only to give instructions in shooting while flying. He further asserted that French troops did not stop RPF offensive in October 1990”.
One justifiably wonders whether the shelling of supply columns of an enemy who had attacked three days earlier and about whom it was not known whether he had anti aircraft missiles constitutes really a favourable context for dispensing instructions.

b) RPF attack on the town of Ruhengeri on 23 January 1991

After its defeat at the end of 1990, RPA got reorganised by withdrawing mainly to the volcanic region overlooking the whole northern part of the country. On 23 January 1991, RPA launched a surprise attack on the town of Ruhengeri and controlled it for a few hours before withdrawing, after freeing prisoners from Ruhengeri prison, some of whom were the main opponents of President Habyarimana. Two sections of Noroît then came to evacuate 300 persons from the town, 185 of whom were French. Ambassador Martres recalled the evacuation exercise in the following terms:

“The unit led by Col. Galinié did not go beyond the mission it had been assigned and intervened in the residential area as soon as the Rwandan paratroopers had retaken control of the town. The respect of the instructions given did not exclude some daring acts shown by the French paratroopers during the last two hours before the fall of the night. The expatriate population was in such a state of shock that it could no longer put up with another night of an armed clash”

Here again, taking into consideration the text as a whole, one may justifiably suppose that this “daring” referred to the direct engagement of French soldiers. The dispatching of a DAMI was decided after RPA’s raid.

c) Battles of Byumba: June – August 1992

The first of the two big offensives to which the French Army reacted by a heavy direct engagement was the battle of Byumba in June 1992. This was the first large scale offensive of RPF since October 1990. On 5th June, RPA occupied the town of Byumba for a few days. The Rwandan Armed Forces proved unable to respond to the offensive and through a series of infiltrations, RPA managed to seize a strip of land of about ten kilometres in the zone of Byumba, thus linking its positions in the North West and North East.

On 10 June 1992, a company of about 150 French soldiers based in Central African Republic was dispatched to Rwanda. Officially, this was meant “to prevent any threat against the foreign community”. From 11 to 16 June, a French military evaluation mission was sent to Rwanda.

Between June and October 1992, Noroît was reinforced by troops from the 8th RPIMA, DAMI was reinforced through the establishment of an artillery DAMI which came with 105 mm batteries. This artillery was composed of soldiers from the 35th RAP. From June to November, it was Col. Rosier who at that time was the commanding officer of the 1st RPIMA who took charge of the Noroît contingent and DAMI.

General James Kabarebe, currently Chief of Staff of the Rwanda Defence Forces, in an interview with David Servenay, explained how RPA had noticed the direct engagement of French soldiers in the battle of Byumba:

“Personally, the first time I had contact with the French was in 1992 in Byumba. They had brought a new 105 mm artillery battery. They were using it. It must have been a new weapon which we had never come across since 1990. This new weapon was supposed to finish off the Rwanda Patriotic Army. (...) They came directly to the Byumba frontline. They shelled us all along this frontline from Ruhengeri to Mutara. They were very near the frontline because we could hear their communications. They shelled our trenches. When the French felt that they had shelled us enough, the Rwandan Armed Forces would advance to finish off the work. But to their big surprise, when the Rwandan Armed Forces advanced, we would be waiting for them quite close to their trenches and we would fire at them from the rear at close range. Many lives were lost. Those who escaped were often wounded. They withdrew to the place where the French were waiting. And there, I remember, the radio which the French and the Rwandan Armed Forces were listening to was just beside me: they told them off... They were very harsh, calling them weak, useless. They were saying [in French]: “The Rwandan Armed Forces are weak, weak, how can you fail after such a heavy shelling?”[...] The French had invested, organised and commanded these forces; they brought this system of weapons. They have done all they could: and the Rwandan Armed Forces have failed to play their role. But the angry tone of the French commander who was speaking on the radio, this anger....showed that he felt more concerned than the Rwandans themselves. That was his business”

According to Colonel Murenzi, a former member of the Rwandan Armed Forces, it was after the RPF assault on Byumba in June 1992, when they showed their military superiority over the Rwandan Armed Forces that the French became resolutely engaged. The French advisors from the “field artillery” which was usually stationed at Kanombe camp took part in the battle of Mukarange against the RPF positions. “For the first time in the history of the Rwandan Army, we used 105 mm canons. [...] We did not have this type of weapons. […] » During the battles of Mukarange and Kivuye, these weapons helped us », added Murenzi. Concerning the battle of Byumba in 1992, the current General Rwarakabije of former Rwandan Armed Forces confirmed the evidence of Colonel Murenzi. Between June and August 1992, the French took position in the region of Rukomo on a site of Amsar Company. There, they fought with their own weapons.

The participation of the French in the various battles fought in Byumba prefecture was confirmed by an official Rwandan report. During the same Byumba battle, but this time more eastward in Mutara region, a note by the intelligence unit commander, Augustin Iyamuremye, to the Prime Minister on the development of the military situation on the front, gave clear details on the French direct military engagement:

“Our soldiers, with the support of the French firepower, liberated commune Bwisige on 19 July well before the beginning of the truce. But the enemy was still present in Mukarange, Cyumba and Kivuye communes and in Cyonyo sector of commune Kiyombe. In the course of 20th July, battles were reported in Mutara in the communes of Ngarama, Cyonyo, Kibali, Bwisige and Mukarange. In Mutara, our soldiers who were near Muhambo centre were flushed out in the afternoon of 20th July 1992 by enemy shelling. The enemy managed to take Ngoma bridge located between Muvumba and Ngarama communes, and it was feared that he could advance up to the offices of Ngarama sub prefecture, 10 km away from this bridge. The French intervention helped us to drive away the attackers on 22nd July 1992”.

Still in the east, Mwumvaneza , who is currently a Member of Parliament and was at that time a communal counsellor, tells of the circumstances in which he saw French soldiers intervene in the battle of Ngarama (seat of the commune with the same name) in July 1992. RPF and the Rwandan Armed Forces fought there for six hours. When the latter suffered heavy human losses, the French intervened to help them to recapture their position.

“These were young people who appeared to have hardly come out of their adolescence. They positioned their canons at Gituza on a football field, not far from the dispensary. There were eight canons. When the soldiers of Habyarimana had recaptured their position, the French soldiers advanced towards Kanero and once again positioned their canons at a place called Mashani, which is the trading centre of Kanero. If my memory is good, I think that there were eight canons firing in the direction of Muvumba commune”.

Nkurunziza Elias, municipal counsellor also of Muvumba commune in 1990, differentiates indirect evidence with what he can relate as an eyewitness. First of all, he had heard soldiers bragging in their conversation: “henceforth, we are going to fight Inkotanyi [RPF]. They will no longer be able to drive us away from our positions since we have the French with us” . This is how, he added, he and others had learnt that the canons that had been shelling RPF positions in 1992 in the various combat zones in Byumba prefecture were operated by the French.

d) February 1993

On 8th February 1993, RPF launched a widespread offensive from all its positions and within a few hours, it had captured a big section of the northern part of the country. They had even reached about thirty kilometres from the capital Kigali.

On 8th and 9th, France proceeded with the reinforcement of Noroît which comprised then a tactical staff (EMT), three companies of the 21st RIMA, one company of the 8th RPIMA, Chimère and Rapas detachments and a reinforced (engineering) DAMI. On 23rd February 1993, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that two additional companies of French soldiers had been dispatched “urgently” to Rwanda “to guarantee the security of French nationals and other foreigners”. These consisted of one company of the 6th battalion of marine infantry (BIMA) based in Libreville and one company of French soldiers for operational assistance (EFAO) based in Bangui, all with a total of about 240 men. Officially, the number of French soldiers rose to some 600 elite soldiers (for about 400 expatriates) .

Regarding the February 1993 battle, General Rwarakabije explained that the French engagement was even more determined than in June 1992. The advance of RPF up to the surrounding areas of Kigali, made people fear that the capital was falling. When RPF troops arrived at Tumba, the French were deployed at Ruyenzi and Shyorongi, linking up with the soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces to drive back their enemy. “The French distributed weapons and provided support firepower”.

A former corporal of the Rwandan Armed Forces explained that he had served directly under the command of French soldiers along with other French soldiers during the battle of February 1993. That he had even operated pieces of the 105 mm artillery together with the French.

“The French with us at Kirambo used 105 mm guns. They had about fifteen guns and we had been trained on how to use them. We were usually seven men operating one gun: four French and three Rwandans, including a leader called “detachment commander”. This type of equipment had been brought by the French. It was new to us. […] I was the « 15 detachment commander » and I received instructions from a French officer who, together with Colonel Serubuga , were in command of the operations. I would take notes and forward them to a French corporal who, since he was conversant with the weapon, would adjust it, then another French would open the cover and a French together with a Rwandan (called “purveyor”), would push in the shell, and lastly a fourth French would activate the shooting device. All the guns fired almost simultaneously. The fired shells dug huge holes in the ground, which is why we called them “dimba hasi” (meaning approximately: dig deep in the ground) .

François Nsengayire was transferred to Jali Gendarmerie camp at the beginning of 1993. There, he found a section of French soldiers from the 8th RPIMA and severed as an interpreter. During the RPA’s attack on 8th February 1993, its fighters came very close to the French position at Jali. He shortly described the event as follows:

“ The soldiers of the 8th RPIMA who had among them field artillery soldiers fired 105 and 122 mm mortars and took position at Shyorongi from where they started shelling the enemy positions. I was with a group of French soldiers in an area called Kimaranzara in Mbogo, in a shrub. We were acting as advance observers guiding artillery fire from Shyorongi. I was with the French acting as an interpreter. But on a hill a little further, there were RPA fighters who I suspect had seen them. These [RPF] fighters had recoilless guns. They fired three shells and three French died on the spot and two others were seriously wounded.”

On 20 February 1993, RPF soldiers declared a unilateral ceasefire while just 30 Kilometres from Kigali. From 25th February to 2nd March, opposition parties sent a delegation to meet RPF representatives. At the end of the meeting, a joint communiqué was issued, calling for a lasting ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the resumption of the Arusha negotiations.

After considerable efforts in supporting the Rwandan Army, its defeat on 8 February 1993 totally indicated the emptiness of the French support operations as evidenced from October 1990 and subsequently reinforced just after the RPF offensive from 5th June 1992.

On 19 February 1993, General Quesnot wrote to President Mitterrand informing him of France’s remaining three options in the wake of the RPA offensive on 8th February: “(1) evacuation of French nationals in the coming days if RPF maintains its intention of taking over the capital [...]; (2) immediately sending at least two companies to Kigali [...]. Even if it does not solve the substantial problem, this action would help to save time; (3) sending a more sizeable contingent to prevent the effective taking over of Kigali by RPF and enabling the Rwandan units to re-establish their positions at least along the previous cease fire line. [...] However, this would signal an almost direct involvement”

The second option was adopted and, as we saw earlier, it led to the direct involvement of French soldiers in the fighting. In light of the failure of the French support strategy to the Rwandan Armed Forces and the diplomatic pressure against RPA, France and its ally President Habyarimana were finally resigned to accept the departure of the French troops from Rwanda, to be replaced by a UN peace mission demanded by RPF as a condition for peace.

The military defeat of the Rwandan Armed Forces despite the French support certainly played an important role in the alternative choice of a genocide as a resistance strategy to political change. Given the significance of the French military engagement and assistance to the Rwandan Armed Forces, one wonders if France did not feel the defeat of the Rwandan Armed Forces as its own defeat and to what extent it might have contributed to the adoption of this genocide alternative.

2. Involvement in the training of Interahamwe militia and village vigilantes (civilian self-defence)

2.1. The Interahamwe

One of the most serious accusations levelled against France was its input in the training of Interahamwe militia who spearheaded the implementation of the genocide. Initially, this militia was a youth movement without any legal status which was affiliated to the Presidential party, MRND. It started gaining prominence just after the introduction of multi-party politics in June 1991. Very rapidly, inter-party competition became intense and violent more or less all over the country. Different political parties formed youth movements used as “shock troops” during meetings, demonstrations and rallies, intimidating supporters of rival political organisations or compelling the inhabitants in surrounding areas to come to their meetings or demonstrations. In Kigali, there was a territorial war amongst different militia for protection of zones of influence. In rural areas, militia carried out flag wars and intimidated some burgomasters (mayors) of communes and made them run away. They even appropriated land from public land for cultivation in disregard to laws and procedures.

But besides these ordinary Interahamwe, another smaller group of Interahamwe with some military training started appearing in 1992, and one of its tasks was to carry out massacres and assassinations. Massacres, killings and assassinations between March 1992 and April 1994 within Government controlled areas were wholly or partly attributed to Interahamwe.

During the genocide, in the areas of Kigali, Kigali Rural, Kibungo, Byumba, Ruhengeri, Gisenyi and parts of Cyangugu prefectures, where MRND had influence, Interahamwe and their associates largely had a hand in the genocide. Subsequently, they spread into the prefectures where MRND had lost influence following the introduction of multiparty politics such as Gitarama, Butare, Kibuye. These are prefectures which had a sizeable Tutsi population and killings had moderately started.

2.2. Early stages of the village vigilantes « civilian self-defence »

Besides the existence of well trained Interahamwe, another process of military training and arming of civilians appeared; it was called the organisation of village vigilantes (civilian self-defence). Initially, this was a paramilitary training programme for Hutus living in areas neighbouring the front line in the north east of the country. Its mission was to patrol these areas in order to prevent infiltrations of RPF fighters and to oversee Tutsi civilians living in such areas and, as we will see in this document, also to kill them at an appropriate time. After the first few weeks of the genocide, this village vigilante programme became systematic and was used as the structure through which the local administration completed the implementation of the genocide. Interahamwe were integrated in this scheme as a striking power .

At the end of April 1991, two events necessitated the involvement of civilians disguised as soldiers in the defence of the country. The first was the speech of President Habyarimana on 28th April 1991 and the second was the advice given to the Rwandan Army by a French senior officer. While in Rwanda, Lt. Col. Canovas undertook an inspection tour of all the military operational units in 1991. In Ruhengeri, in order to find a lasting solution to the insecurity of the population living south of the Volcano National Park caused by RPA infiltrations, he proposed “the creation in sensitive areas of small groups in civilian clothes disguised as peasants, in order to neutralise the generally isolated rebels” . What was recommended here was to use soldiers disguised in civilian clothes and not civilians with military training. The suggestion was therefore to use people who looked like civilians in the armed conflict.

Effective from the end of August 1991, the plan for revival and development of the village vigilante (civilian self-defence) commenced. On 25th August 1991, the security council of Ngarama sub prefecture in Byumba prefecture met in the office of Muvumba commune. On the agenda, among other things, was an item on the village vigilantes called “people’s self-defence”. The meeting was attended by the commander of Mutara operational sector, Col. Deogratias Nsabimana, who later became the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces. From the onset, Colonel Nsabimana raised the problem of lack of resources in terms of firearms and lack of Military supervision for such a programme .

In a letter to the Ministry of Defence dated 29th September 1991 on “People’s self-defence”, Colonel Deogratias Nsabimana referred to the proposals made during a meeting held at the sub prefecture of Ngarama on 26th September 1991. The proposal was about the creation of a structure of a “people’s self-defence which would trickle down to the smallest administrative unit” called ‘Nyumba kumi’ . Members had to be at least 25 years old and not more than 40, preferably married and prove to be of “good” morals, be sufficiently patriotic, sociable and courageous. These civilians were to be trained by the army. Based on 10 weapons per cell, the four communes where the programme was to be launched needed 350 weapons for Muvumba, 580 for Muhura, 530 for Ngarama and 300 for Bwisige. The minutes of the report ended by stating that “(...) the participants recognise that the needs expressed above are very high and they are aware of the small size of the national budget” .

On 7th February 1992, during the meeting for Byumba prefecture security council held in the office of Muvumba commune, attendants were informed of the progress made in regard to the issue of civilian self-defence in Mutara region after the Ministry of Defence had made available 300 weapons (without specifying the type). These weapons were distributed as follows: 76 for Muvumba commune, 40 for Kivuye commune, 40 for Kiyombe commune and 24 for Cyumba commune. About Muvumba commune, a group of 250 persons chosen from its inhabitants at the discretion of the burgomaster and his communal council in charge of security were sent for training at Gabiro from 29th January to 5th February 1992, to learn how to operate firearms

It appears that the French Military Attaché in Kigali, Colonel Cussac, was closely following this issue. MIP published an extract from a diplomatic telex dated 22nd January 1992, in which he explained in detail the above scheme of distributing arms to civilians. He mentioned the areas to be covered, the selection criterion for members and confirmed the number of weapons as 300. He also explained that majority of these weapons were MAS 36 and expressed his concern on the risks of drifts in such a project .

Before the genocide, it was not easy for one to draw a line of distinction between village vigilantes/civilian self-defence and members of the Interahamwe. Individuals who received military training under the scheme of village vigilantes/ civilian self-defence used to refer to themselves – and were described by others – as Interahamwe. In both cases, it appears that the task assigned was to fight the Tutsi enemy, starting with Tutsi civilians in their vicinity. However, a distinction should be made between Interahamwe “shock groups” who essentially were physically fit young men, peasants or town dwellers without any specific professional employment, who could go for training far from their areas of residence and in the end be deployed elsewhere in other parts of the country, and Interahamwe who were given local training , including a number of few civil servants who could not easily be differentiated from members of the village vigilantes/“civilian self-defence”.

Finally, there were two types of accusations levelled against French soldiers in the training of Interahamwe. The first series of accusations maintain that French soldiers really trained these militia, but they exempt them partly on the ground that they did not know that they were training civilians, that in the training camps, it would not been easy to distinguish the civilians from the military recruits . The other type of accusation maintains that French soldiers knew that the civilians they were training belonged to the Interahamwe movement .

The evidence involving French soldiers in the training of Interahamwe covers different training camps from Gabiro camp to Nyakinama University, Mukamira camp, Bigogwe camp and Gako camp. The only training which was linked to the village vigilante/“civilian self-defence” scheme was that of the inhabitants of Muvumba commune and the one carried out at Nyakinama University. Elsewhere, witnesses simply mentioned the training of Interahamwe.

2.2.1. Gabiro camp

Gabiro camp was located in the eastern part of the country in a savannah region which is almost desert. It is adjoined to Akagera National Park.

a) Village vigilantes/Self-defence in Muvumba

Despite reservations of Colonel Cussac expressed in his message of 22nd January 1992, concerning the training of civilians in the village vigilante/“self-defence” scheme , various testimonies maintain that French soldiers were involved in the initiation of the programme for residents of Muvumba commune and that the training was carried out at Gabiro camp.

Mumvaneza was at the time a communal counsellor in charge of one of the sectors of Muvumba commune which had launched the village vigilante/civilian self-defence scheme. He had his first contact with French soldiers in the office of the Muvumba commune during a meeting of all the communal counsellors in charge of the sectors. French soldiers had come to see burgomaster Rwabukombe Onesphore .

“When I saw them, I did not know that they were Frenchmen. I saw white men in military uniforms who were strolling at the communal office. They were four. Three of them had smeared their faces with some black material. This could have been shoe polish or charcoal. Only one of them did not have his face smeared. That was their chief, and I later on learnt that his name was Captain Jacques. I was told so by Lt. Kadali, a friend of mine who often spoke to him.

I found them in the communal office chatting with the burgomaster. I wanted to enter the office but was told that the burgomaster had visitors. We had come for a meeting of all the counsellors. I waited. When they finished their discussion, they came out and left. There was that white man Captain Jacques, commander Ntirikina who was based at Gabiro, and Colonel Rwabukwisi.

After their departure, we had our weekly meeting of counsellors held every Friday. The burgomaster told us that those French and Rwandan soldiers wanted to train the inhabitants in self-defence in order to fight the threat of infiltrations by Inkotanyi in the countryside, because these people were distributing weapons to their Tutsi relatives for killing the population. That it was therefore necessary to adopt a strategy of training the inhabitants in the use of weapons so that they may defend themselves when it becomes necessary to kill these people, be they accomplices or Inkotanyi. We took note of this and the burgomaster told us that he had been offered 252 places for the entire population of Muvumba. These places were divided among the communal counsellors. I was given 16, one of which was personally mine. A week later, we gave reports on the groups of people who would go for training, each counsellor presenting his own list. We left for Gabiro in several buses, and each counsellor had a list of his men.

We found Frenchmen at Gabiro. They were not more than four; they hid and had their faces covered. They did not want to be seen by the civilians. But for us counsellors, it happened that we sometimes went into the office of the commander, or when we were discussing with high ranking soldiers such as lieutenants or chief sergeants, they told us that those were our white friends who had come to help us. We stayed there for one month or one month and a half. (...) Those white men and the captain often came to see us at about 1000 hours. Our instructors were supposed to know French, but I did not speak French myself. At times, Captain Jacques came with burgomaster Gatete, and at other times with Ntirikina or Rwabukwisi, and so on”.

On how the training was organised, the former counsellor explained that they slept in tents near Gabiro camp and that in the morning; they would go to a valley about 5 km away. They would leave on foot very early in the morning with other people. They would reach the training venue at about 0900 or 1000 hours, and would practise shooting until around 1400 hours. They would then go back to the camp for lunch. At around 1600 hours, they would attend “theoretical” classes. These lectures were given most of the time by Commander Ntirikina who was in charge of them.

“[They explained to us that] the weapons you have been trained to operate are to be used to fight Inkotanyi. Inkotanyi like to hide, they like to go behind the lines of our soldiers and infiltrate the countryside, in your own sectors. They hide weapons in the homes of their Tutsi relatives. With those weapons which we are going to give you, you must fight these Tutsis who live in the countryside. If you hear that these Inyenzi have brought weapons to the population, there is no other solution but to shoot at these peasants or kill them; they do not outnumber you”.

The counsellor explained that in his administrative constituency, there were 21 Tutsi out of 7900 inhabitants in his sector.

During theoretical classes, “the French would pass by briefly from time to time. Lt. Kadali would act as an interpreter because the Frenchmen did not understand Kinyarwanda. In the field, they would come to see if our shots went to the target. They would take a white sheet of paper, draw a circle inside which we had to shoot. When one shot accurately inside the target, the spot would be marked with a cassava ball so that it is not confused with the next or the preceding shot.”

The witness then explained that in fact, they did not sleep in the real camp, but their tents were pitched outside, very near the camp. He also explained that in their group, they were only civilians and that it was not possible to confuse them with the soldiers because they were dressed in civilian clothes.

When asked about the role of the French soldiers in the request to the burgomaster of Muvumba to provide civilians to train, the counsellor replied:

“[The burgomaster] told us that these white men supported us in the war we were fighting and that they wanted us to help them...the food we ate while at Gabiro, it was them who gave it to us [...] I am saying that it was the French who gave us food because we were asked to state precisely the maximum number of people which should not be exceeded. [The burgomaster had told us] Bring a small number of people because these white men told us that if we exceed the number, food will not be enough. You should come with the number of people agreed upon, do not exceed”.

The counsellor of Karama commune in Muvumba commune, Elias Nkurunziza , who was examined at Nyagatare prison by the Commission, confirmed the presence of French soldiers at the time of requesting local leaders for people to train in the use of firearms. He was referring to the same episode as the one mentioned by the preceding witness, the meeting of counsellors in the office of Muvumba commune.

“In 1992, we were called to go to the commune and told to bring strong young men who were going to be taught how to use weapons. Not all sectors were selected for this scheme. In regard to my sector, I was asked to provide 50 people. […] We arrived at the commune at 0900 hours. The burgomaster had a meeting with the soldiers first. Colonel Muvunyi was among them. There was also a French soldier who had come in a Suzuki Jeep with two other white soldiers who had smeared their faces with shoe polish. [..] On the agreed day, we met at the communal office. We went into buses which had been hired by Castar Nsabimana. We first went to Nyagatare and then to Gabiro where we stayed for ten days. We spent the nights at Gabiro. In the morning, we would be given sorghum porridge and would then go to a place called Rwangingo. There was an airstrip which was no longer in use; this is where we were taught to use guns.

Munyandinda Sylvestre was a farm instructor living in Muvumba commune, which was then governed by burgomaster Onesphore Rwabukombe. The counsellor of the sector where Munyandinda Sylvestre, Kayijamahe Domitien lived was called to the communal office for a meeting in which sector counsellors were asked to make a list of men of good reputation who were to go for training in how to use weapons. Around June 1992, Munyandinda Sylvestre was called to go to the commune. Eight to ten people had been called from each commune. Together, they were all more than a hundred who were to go to Gabiro to be trained in use of weapons. They went by bus. When they reached Gabiro, political parties representatives opposed the training because they did not want civilians to be trained in how to handle weapons. After three days of negotiations, an understanding was reached and the training started. Two Rwandan non commissioned officers were introduced to them, and they were told that these would be their instructors. They lived near Gabiro camp, but they received their training about seven kilometres away from the camp, at a place called Rwangingo. Munyandinda Sylvestre explained how he met French soldiers at Gabiro:

“In the evening, [Rwandan] high ranking soldiers would come to see how the day had been, how things were, and on other days, these high ranking officers would be with our instructors, asking them whether we were responding well to the training. Our instructors would tell them that things were not going well, that they had been given incapable recruits. [...] Sometimes, these high ranking officers would come with two white men and sometimes with people who were neither whites nor Rwandans. [...] There were people who looked black and used to come with the white men [...]. They were stout in build. There was one Whiteman who came often with high ranking officers to see how the situation was. [...] When they came, they discussed with our instructors. There was one young man who was said to be the best shooter. The instructors introduced him to the white men. They wanted to know whether he had been a soldier; he denied and said that he just did it like that, naturally”.

There was thus a long incubation period during which a number of Rwandan military and political leaders saw the need to put in place a “civilian self-defence” scheme but it could not be implemented because of lack of resources. According to different testimonies heard by the Commission, French soldiers played a decisive role in translating this idea into practice. They contributed to its launching through logistical support, provision of food, and in training civilians in shooting skills, as well as through discreet monitoring of the programme. In its early stages, the aim of the village vigilantes/“civilian self-defence” programme was to carry out patrols in zones near the military operations in order to thwart infiltration attempts by RPF fighters, but later, there emerged a scheme of massacres.

b) Training Interahamwe

Another witness, Jean-Baptiste Dushimimana , was a full time Interahamwe who was trained towards the end of 1993, with the assistance of French soldiers. He explained that at the time, some MRND leaders living in areas of Gatenga, Kicukiro commune, started to contact young men belonging to this party. They told them that even if they were part of the MRND youth groups which participated in the demonstrations and meetings, this role had been overtaken by events considering the period to which the country was heading with the imminent arrival of RPF representatives in the Government. That is how Jean-Baptiste had received paramilitary training. He was first trained in a building called Technoserve located in a residential area close to the city centre of Kigali. But since the training was being done in the open, peoples’ attention made it necessary to shift and we were subsequently moved to Felicien Kabuga’s building located in Muhima residential area. Even there, rumours started circulating, and we were moved again to Kimihurura, in the house of General Ndindiriyimana, near Kigali night club.

In Kimihurura, those who trained them told them that they should be strong enough to fight the enemy by learning how to use weapons because peace negotiations would yield nothing, and that in any case, they will have to fight the enemy who was becoming increasingly strong every day. At that time, they were asked to give their full personal particulars in order to be sure about their origin. Young people with blood relations with Tutsis or Hutus from Nduga (the centre and south of the country) were sent away. Others were told that they were being taken to Gabiro to be taught how to use weapons and that this should be kept absolutely confidential. Jean-Baptiste Dushimimana and his comrades boarded buses and were driven to Gabiro.

“On our arrival, we were received by guards, who told us that they worked for the Rwanda Tourism and National Parks Office (ORTPN) and that they were going to train us as park wardens. [...] The uniforms we wore had been given to us by the French through ORTPN so that junior soldiers or any of us don’t understand the source because at that time, UNAMIR had started checking. [...] Another thing, during the “cross” training which we called “petit matinal”, French soldiers would drive in a jeep along with us so that if one of us felt too tired, they would take him back to the camp. [...] In fact, the programme was well established because when we arrived there, we replaced other young men who too had come from the city of Kigali, but from Muhima residential area. We found Frenchmen there. They wore military uniforms. In Kigali, we knew French soldiers; there was no way we could be mistaken about them, because they had unique uniforms. [...] It was not possible to confuse us with new military recruits. In that camp, there were three distinct groups of people being trained: Burundian Hutus, soldiers who were to go to the frontline to fight, and MRND Interahamwe whose mission was to protect their party leaders in a new government that was about to be formed”.

On their return to town, Jean-Baptiste Dushimimana and his group were assigned different duties according to their shooting skills. Jean-Baptiste Dushimimana was given the task of protecting a close relative of President Habyarimana, Séraphin Twahirwa, who was the leader of Interahamwe in Kigali city. Shortly before the genocide, his group was given weapons, grenades and even vehicles.

Jean-Baptiste Dushimimana did not remember the exact dates of this training at Gabiro where French soldiers were involved. He however gave some temporal landmarks such as the arrival of RPF in Kigali in view of forming the broad based transitional government and the early stages of the UNAMIR’s presence. In this way, it is possible to place the date of his training at between 8th October 1993 – arrival date for General Dallaire in Rwanda as UNAMIR commander and 15th December 1993, the departure date of the French soldiers from Noroît contingent.

Nsabimana Hassan was in the same group of Interahamwe as Jean-Baptiste Dushimimana. He said that he had been trained at Gabiro by Rwandan and French soldiers. He was taught how to assemble and dismantle a gun and how to shoot. In the mornings, they would run from Gabiro to Kabarore. During the shooting exercises, the French soldiers gave them marks. They would draw a man’s figure and show them where they should aim. Marks were given according to the part of the body shot at. Nsabimana Hassan explained that French soldiers brought them food in a helicopter with Colonel Nkundiye. After one month and a half of training, they were sent back to their respective residential areas. Like the preceding witness, he was among Interahamwe who were put at the disposal of President Habyarimana’s relative, Séraphin Twahirwa.

Mulindankiko Marine was also a member of the same group of Interahamwe as the two preceding witnesses, who were under the orders of Séraphin Twahirwa. He explained that he had been trained in the building belonging to Kabuga in Kigali and at Gabiro camp. At Gabiro, they were under warrant officer Matabaro and two French soldiers. “During the shooting sessions, French soldiers gave us marks. They taught us how to use GP revolvers. We would shoot at a helmet hung on a stick. During the morning running exercises, they would come with us”.

Ngarambe Pierre Célestin was an Interahamwe who was trained for two weeks at Gabiro camp towards the end of 1993, with the assistance of French soldiers.

“When we arrived at Gabiro camp, we were introduced to Colonel Nkundiye who was the camp commander. We were shown instructors. The French would come with Ngirumpatse Mathieu in a helicopter. The French brought us ammunitions because we were not using those from the camp. They taught us to shoot at targets. They would draw a human head at which we would shoot. At other times, it would be the drawing of a cross. The French would give us marks and prizes according to our performance. They would give us alcohol. Depending on the marks obtained, we were promised a bottle of banana beer. We would train in the morning and in the afternoon, the French and Mathieu Ngirumpatse would give us lessons. They would tell us that what was important was to know well who the enemy was, that the enemy was the Tutsi. They would tell us that something was going to happen and that when that time comes, we should start by killing our Tutsi neighbours. When we heard the word kill, some of us started deserting”.

Ndindabahizi Emmanuel was a soldier in a company called Huye by the end of 1992. In that year, this company was based in Mutara region. Its members were stationed in the high mountains near Uganda. As for the French, they stayed at Gabiro. These were members of DAMI, who gave us training, taught fighting without arms and military regulations.

“I took part in these training courses. What I noticed was that they recruited young men trained by the French, among others. But when they were through with the training, they went back home. Their training seemed like military training, but they were taught mainly to use traditional weapons. They had clubs, and they learnt how to throw a knife. The training lasted between two to three months, after which they went back home. To tell the truth, we did not know why they were being trained, sometimes we thought that they would join the army but at the end of the training, they went back home still dressed in civilian clothes”.

Ndindabahizi explained that although his unit was staying far from Gabiro camp, he was able to see everything because their company’s office was inside Gabiro camp where he used to go regularly, either escorting the vehicle which brought supplies, or to have a bath because there was no water in the mountains. In his free time, he used to come there with others for a rest. When he was in the camp, he saw training sessions conducted by French soldiers for civilians, particularly during morning running exercises called “petit matinal”.

Ndindabahizi knew a person called Muyisere Christophe, who was trained at Gabiro camp by French soldiers. He lived in the former Taba commune. After his training as Interahamwe, he went to train Interahamwe in his commune. During one training session, he was shot and lost his leg.

“There were other people who were trained by French soldiers whose names I did not know butwhom I had become familiar with while at Gabiro. We thought they would become soldiers. But later, I saw them during the war [during the genocide] at check points in Nyamirambo, [a residential area of Kigali] and we greeted one another. Subsequently, I saw them again at check points, but this time they carried weapons”.

Kaburame Jean Damascène was a corporal in the second Muvumba battalion based at Gabiro camp in 1992. The witness maintained that in that camp, he saw French soldiers from DAMI train Interahamwe. At the end of the training, they would give clothes and arms. These Interahamwe had to fight the enemy, and they were told that the enemy was the Tutsi in general. The French soldiers trained them essentially in dismantling and reassembling guns and in shooting. “I saw this with my own eyes; how the French trained Interahamwe and then gave them weapons. When the instructors left, Interahamwe came to tell us that we had to fight the enemy”.

2.2.2. Nyakinama University Campus

DAMI soldiers started living at Nyakinama University on 29th March 1991 . Colonel Ndamage Martin maintained that he had seen more than forty DAMI soldiers staying at Nyakinama University under the command of Colonel Chollet .

Simugomwa Fidèle’s evidence mainly touched the region of Kibuye where he comes from. Simugomwa Fidèle mentioned the fact that when he was working at Nyakinama University, he personally saw French soldiers training civilians in 1991. He also explained that this was done under the civilian self-defence programme .

Bisengimana Elisée , a Member of Parliament told the Commission that between 1990 and 1991, he was a student at the National University of Rwanda, part of which had been moved to Nyakinama in Ruhengeri prefecture. A section of the University premises was occupied by French soldiers who trained Rwandan soldiers. This training took place in the football field of the campus as well as in the classrooms. Because of this, the students followed closely the training activities given by the French soldiers. The Rwandan soldiers who were being trained were all dressed in uniforms. But besides these soldiers in uniform, we could see people dressed in civilian clothes being trained from the football field. These people did not stay long and were quickly replaced by other groups in civilian clothes. The students were told that these were new recruits, but Bisengimana had the impression that these were peasants from the surrounding areas who were trained in a rudimentary manner.

Bisengimana explained also that French soldiers attended the meetings with local authorities. Nyakimana University was not too far from the communal office. These meetings were regularly held and involved some prefectural and communal authorities, civilians including University professors and students, and all of them were Hutus close to MRND. French soldiers too attended. Bisengimana related these meetings to the unhealthy climate which started to appear at the University. Hutu students originating from the north of the country started forming groups which were claiming that they did not want Tutsis and Hutus originating from Nduga (centre and south of the country) to attend the University. In 1991, the climate of hostility became so oppressive that all Tutsi and Hutu students from the centre and south of the country escaped on foot at night. Bisengimana felt that French soldiers were partly responsible for the development of these ethnic and regionalised tensions because they attended those meetings. On the night of the flight of the students, they did nothing to calm things down.

Ndabakenga Gérard whom we have already mentioned in a previous testimony, was also a student at Nyakinama University between 1991 and 1993. During the summer holidays of 1992, French soldiers came and occupied University dormitories. He found them there when he came back from holidays to prepare for September examinations. The students lived in blocs A, B and C, and the French soldiers occupied bloc D.

« The civilians who were trained on the University football field in broad daylight were peasants who were taught the use of weapons or other military practices, like taking somebody with hands tied behind his back or how to kill…And when the peasants had finished learning how to dismantle and reassemble a gun and taking people with hands tied, they went directly to the field to practise what they had just been taught. There was a firing range in a place called Muko. We used to hear gun shots. [...] We knew some among the recruits…Fungaroho, one Mihati and another called Makamba. [...] Makamba worked at the University and he was in charge of the photcopying machine. You understand that I knew him well. Mihati ran a bar not far from the campus. This is where we used to go if we did not want to drink from the University canteen. The young Fungaroho worked in Mihati’s bar. That is why we knew them because we used to meet them during those drinking sprees. [...] We could tell from the clothes who was a soldier and who was not. Soldiers wore uniforms while civilians wore folded up trousers, and this showed that they were civilians”.

2.2.3. Gako camp

According to MIP, Gako camp was the training venue for Rwandan soldiers by DAMI soldiers . It is in Bugesera region, south of the city of Kigali. During the first week of March 1992, Gako was the scene of one of the biggest massacres in the period preceding the genocide proper. Interahamwe who were trained locally and professional Interahamwe from Kigali were among those who carried out these massacres. A number of witnesses maintained that French soldiers living in Gako camp trained also Interahamwe militia.

Second Lieutenant Tuyisenge Jean de Dieu who was also an official of the central intelligence services was sent to Gako camp to teach for a week during the last week of June 1993.

“The French played a very important role because they were among those who trained the people who were sent to kill. There was a group called ‘TURIHOSE’ [meaning we are everywhere] composed of Interahamwe and impuzamigambi. Impuzamigambi were CDR youth. This was the group which those who were not ethnically mixed could join, a group which had been trained to carry out special actions. [... ] At that time, the French were training the members of ‘TURIHOSE’ at Kibugabuga. What I am saying is that I saw them, even if I do not recall their names. There was a Frenchman who was working with a second lieutenant called Toussaint who was one of CRAP leaders. [...] I knew him well. We had been at school together”.

Munyaneza Bernard became a soldier in 1992. Although he was Tutsi, he had managed to join the army. After the formation of the transitional government in 1992 headed by the opposition, a number of soldiers were recruited from the centre and the south of the country without discrimination. Munyaneza was taken to Bugesera on 23rd June 1992 where he spent three months:

“In Bugesera, at Kibugabuga, we were taught how to shoot. There, we found French soldiers who were training Interahamwe. In July, these Interahamwe and the French soldiers went to kill people in Kanzenze; they killed many Tutsis. After they had left, the local people continued killing. Soldiers from Gako went to stop the massacres and came back with spears, clubs, machetes and billhooks. When the French left with Interahamwe, I saw them because in order to go from Kibugabuga to Kanzenze, one had to pass by Gako camp, and we did not live inside the camp. We slept outside the camp in tents pitched in the bush. I had a cousin called Nkurunziza Stanislas who was a corporal, and he lived in Gako. He came often to discuss with me. He would tell me that Tutsis were going to disappear because the French were training Interahamwe in Bigogwe, Nyungwe and Gabiro”.

Murejuru Claude lived in Bugesera and often went to water his cows near Gako camp:

“You see, Interahamwe from Bicumbi and Bugesera were trained in Ruyenzi. They were trained by the French and Rwandan soldiers. These things were known by everybody and did not require much investigation. They trained them in groups of 10, with three French soldiers. I never went to the place where the training was done because I could not. But they used to pass in front of me. In addition, I had a neighbour, a young man called Kayinamura, who participated in the training. [...] They trained during the day and went home in the evening. Most of them were young men aged between 18 and 25, and men who were still strong, about 30 or 35 years old. I saw them often. They stopped training in 1993.”

Seromba Pierre Célestin lived in Bugesera. He was jailed in Gako camp in February 1992 like many Tutsis in the region, allegedly because he was an accomplice of RPF. Outside the camp, he saw French soldiers train Interahamwe. Since he was made to go and fetch water and do the cleaning, he often went out. Moreover, French soldiers interrogated him. According to him, French soldiers trained young men from three communes: Ngenda, Kanzenze and Gashora.

2.2.4. Mukamira camp

Nturanyenabo Jean-Paul joined the army in 1989 and finished his training in the Butare Non-Commissioned Officers College in 1991. In February 1992, he was transferred to Mukamira camp in Ruhengeri prefecture. While there, French instructors from DAMI trained him in the use of 81 and 105 mm mortars.

“There was another DAMI company responsible for training civilians. These civilians were taught how to behave with peasants, how to use light weapons, how to strangle somebody, how to fight without weapons, and many other things such as the use of knives, machetes and other traditional weapons. I had the opportunity of knowing some of those civilians. There was a certain Mabuye who worked with Bralirwa .You can find him in Gisenyi. There was also another civilian whose name I do not remember. We called him Perusi. You can find him in Ruhengeri, he is notoriously known for the acts he committed during the genocide and by which he distinguished himself. There was a man called Nisengwe Orose, I knew him. Another was called Muhimana Jean Damascène, we came from the same commune. I saw these people. We, we were in our section where we were trained in the use of the arms I have just mentioned, but I used to go and visit them. They told me that they had come within the framework of political parties. These were young men who were being trained to form the group ‘TURIHOSE’. They were being trained to defend themselves. They were taught that the enemy was the Tutsis living inside the country and that when time came; they had to know how to fight. At the end of their training, they finished before us, they were sent back to their respective communes. After the crash of the President’s plane, they were the ones who manned check points armed with machetes, firearms, knives. Time had come to fight the Tutsis and they started cutting them to pieces. It is for this reason that we saw civilians who were employed by companies like Bralirwa or elsewhere immediately take up firearms. People were wondering where these people had learnt to use such weapons, but they had been taught this well before”.

Ntuyenabo explained that in Mukamira camp, soldiers and civilians were trained quite separately, but these civilians were so sufficiently near that the soldiers were able to recognise them during their respective training.

Nisengwe Orose confirmed having met the witness mentioned above during his training as Interahamwe in Mukamira camp. He was a peasant who played in the football team of his commune, Kayove. Important personalities came to his commune to see the local authorities. At the end of their meeting, an announcement was made, asking strong young men to register themselves to go and learn how to use firearms in order to defend the country. Candidates were selected at the sector level.

Nisengwe was recruited by the counsellor of his sector, Ngirumpatse Louis. Selected young men started learning the use of weapons in commune Kayove at Bugabo stadium. Arms had been brought by Nsengiyumva Anatole. The trainees were then driven to Gisenyi military camp in town, and then to Umuganda stadium. They were very many: six hundred young men, according to Nisengwe, who came from more or less all over Gisenyi prefecture, and they continued learning the use of weapons. After that, they were sent to different areas of the country to continue their training as Interahamwe.

Nisengwe was sent to Mukamira camp in March 1992 where he met French soldiers who supervised their training. Their training in shooting continued, but they also learnt fighting without weapons, killing without being seen, using a knife. They were taught ideological lessons from which they were made to understand that Tutsis were enemies of Hutus. At the end of the training at Mukamira, he was given a ‘TURIHOSE’ card, and the group was then sent again to Umuganda stadium in Gisenyi town. There, they were divided in smaller groups, some of them were sent to Kigali, others like Nisengwe returned to their respective communes where they set up check points during the genocide.

Muhimana Jean Damascène was a peasant. In 1993, he and other young men from different areas in the region were trained under the direct supervision of French soldiers. He arrived at Mukamira camp in August or September 1993. The training took three to four weeks. He was with about 200 other young men who appeared to have been selected because of their build and their physical strength. Most of them were dressed in civilian clothes; others had either an old pair of trousers or a military jacket which they had obtained by their own means. All of them had to become Interahamwe. They were accommodated in the camp.

Since they were many, they formed smaller groups, platoons of about 30 men. Each platoon had a Rwandan instructor from the Rwandan Armed Forces. His instructor was called Habyarimana, a corporal. In the morning, Rwandan instructors started by going to get instructions in the office of a French captain. These French soldiers gave out weapons to theses instructors every morning. There were three other French soldiers whose role was to supervise the Rwandan instructors.

The French captain was in command of the training of soldiers and civilians. Muhimana explained that this French captain monitored closely the training of his group. His class learnt how to use a Kalashnikov, an R4 gun and a 60mm mortar. They were taught also how to fight without weapons. In the evening after the meal, they would go into a big hangar where they were given lessons, particularly on the history of the country, by a Rwandan sergeant. He taught them what was “the Tutsi ideology” and their cruelty. In the evening, French soldiers would pass to see them in the hangar during study, or when they were practising traditional dances for pastime.

On completion of their training in Mukamira camp, they were given a card on which was written « TURIHOSE ». They were then sent to Gisenyi camp where they continued their training at Umuganda stadium.

“TURIHOSE » was a group of elite Interahamwe, men who had been well trained and who were mainly from Gisenyi prefecture, birth place of President Habyarimana. To be admitted to this group, a genealogical investigation was carried out first to ensure that the candidate had no Tutsi blood.

The second part of the history of this « TURIHOSE » group with French soldiers during the genocide will be expanded later in this document.

2.2.5 Bigogwe camp

Bigogwe military camp housed the commando training centre. It was in the north of the country, in a region where lived Tutsis whose name Bagogwe was derived from the name of this region. This Tutsi population was victim of many waves of massacres between October 1990 and January 1993 before the genocide. Members of DAMI carried out training activities in this region.

Nsekanabo Twayibu , a former Interahamwe, maintained that he was trained by French soldiers in Bigogwe and Nyakinama camps:

“We were recruited in 1992 while we were attending political meetings. Some of us were sent to Bigogwe military camp. We were told that we were going to become soldiers. We were trained for two days by instructor Minani and Corporal Jeff, both of them Rwandans. They told us that it was not them who would train us but French soldiers. In fact on the second day, eight Frenchmen came. They called the man who was in command of the camp, sergeant major Gatsimbanyi. I do not know where he lives today. They discussed in French. They started by dividing us in groups and told us then to go to bed. We woke up a 0300 hours, and it is from then that we started being trained by the French. Among the things we were taught, there were: killing a big number of people in a little time without using weapons, the use of a thin rope, a knife, and a bayonet. When they were training us, they had their faces smeared with something resembling shoe polish so that it was not possible to know that they were whites. We then went into the forest which was across Bigogwe camp to learn how to shoot. We were a group of 200 young men from different communes of Gisenyi. There were eight Frenchmen. At the end of our training, we were sent to our communes of origin and were asked to go and train young men in our communes. Then in 1993, we went to Nyakinama University campus. We were about 1000 young men. Our training took two months. During all this time, the French who were training us would ask us insistently whether there were any Tutsis among us. They would ask our Rwandan instructors who in turn would ask us the question. They told us that we were “CRAP”, I would say, a group of killers, trained to kill without weapons. In Nyakibanda, they told that the people we were fighting were Tutsis who wanted to introduce the English language in Rwanda. They asked us if we would accept it and we would say no. They said that we should fight them. At the end of our training, they asked us if we knew who the enemy was and we all answered that we did. They told us that those who knew who the enemy was should stand aside, and they gave us a dagger and a grenade. But these were given only to those who were members of the “CRAP” group. They told us that we should find the enemy and that he was living with us. We boarded ONATRACOM buses which took us to where we had come from. This was around 2100 hours, one evening in 1993. We in turn trained Interahamwe and CDR”.

Mbarushimana Juma was also a former Interahamwe. He explained that when he and others went to Bigogwe camp, they were a group of about fifty young men. They were trained for a period of 15 days by Captain Bizumuremyi, assisted by two French soldiers.

Ntirenganya Adbumalk was a motorcycle taxi driver in Gisenyi town. He first received a paramilitary training at Umuganda stadium in Gisenyi town. He was then sent to Bigogwe camp where he too was trained by instructor Captain Bizumuremyi and a French soldier called Francisco: “We were taught how to find the enemy; we were told that the enemy was the Tutsi. They told us to locate the enemy so that when the war started, we would be able to identify him”.

Nshogozabahizi Emmanuel was a peasant. After the introduction of multiparty politics, he joined MRND and later became Interahamwe. He received military training in Bigogwe camp by the French. His group was taught how to fight without weapons and the history of Rwanda. They were taught who the enemy was, who had attacked the country from Uganda, and his accomplices. His training lasted three months, after which he and his comrades were sent to Mukamira camp where they were taught the use of heavy weapons, but without going deep. After the training, they went back home.

Bigogwe camp housed a Belgian military contingent who trained Rwandan paratroopers. One Belgian soldier who exceptionally did not want his name revealed, told the Commission that he had personally seen French soldiers train civilians in Bigogwe camp . The French had also an arms store which, according to the witness, were distributed to soldiers and Interahamwe who carried out massacres of Tutsis near the Mudende Adventist University.

Finally, the president of Interahamwe in Giticyinyoni sector on the gates of Kigali when one comes from the north and the south of the country, Joseph Setiba , told the Commission that at one time, there was a mass mobilisation of Interahamwe who were to be sent for training. A meeting had been organised at the seat of MRND by Mutsinzi, the permanent coordinator of Interahamwe. He had invited all the section presidents in order to set a training schedule for the best Interahamwe of Kigali. They were asked to make a list of the most able and most trustworthy so that they may be sent for training. Three sessions were to be organised for rank Interahamwe and a last session for sector presidents. One class was sent to Gabiro camp and, according to Setiba, it is possible it had from 700 to 800 Interahamwe. Another of about 250 men was sent to Bigogwe camp. Training in these two camps lasted more than two months. Among the Interahamwe he had sent from his sector, some came back before the end of the training. Those who had been sent to Gabiro as well as those sent to Bigogwe said that white men dressed in civilian clothes used to come to the field to supervise the training.

All the witnesses, except one, who were former Interahamwe or members of the civilian defence force who maintained that they were trained by French soldiers, and whose names have been mentioned here, have pleaded guilty for their part in the 1994 genocide. For the record, we should indicate that among these, some Interahamwe from Gisenyi prefecture met also French soldiers during the genocide in special circumstances which will be explained later in the document.
2.3. Additional information

Some witnesses indentified French instructors as soldiers from DAMI. All the military camps in which these soldiers worked as identified by the Fact-finding Mission were places where Interahamwe were trained by French soldiers .

Witnesses who were examined by the Commission explained clearly that there was no possible confusion between Interahamwe militia in training and possible recruits of the Rwandan Armed Forces, for the simple reason that the former were always dressed in civilian clothes and the latter always in military uniform. In the training camps, the two were clearly separate in terms of space and were not given the same type of training. This was indicated by Thiery Prungnaud, gendarme and member of the elite corps of GIGN who, in 1992, was in Rwanda training the security response team of the Presidential Guard within the framework of the French military cooperation. Below is an extract of his interview with the French journalist, Laure de Vulpain on the public radio, France Culture.

Extract of Thierry Prungnaud’s interview by Laure de Vulpain on France Culture on 22nd April 2005


[…]
Thierry Prungnaud: There were also training sessions of civilian mercenaries during the training sessions which I conducted with my trainees, where I saw French soldiers train Rwandan civilian militia in shooting. Well, this was done several times, but the only time I saw them, there were perhaps about thirty militia being trained in shooting in Akagera park.

Laure de Vulpain: This was quite an isolated place…

Thierry Prungnaud: Exactly, yes, this was even prohibited. It was a place which was out of bounds for soldiers and tourists

Laure de Vulpain: You are categorical; the French were training militia in 1992?

Thierry Prungnaud: Yes, I am categorical!

Laure de Vulpain: You saw them with your own eyes, and you do not have any other proof?

Thierry Prungnaud: No, I saw them, that is all. I can’t say more.

Laure de Vulpain: Were the militia already in existence at that time?

Thierry Prungnaud: Apparently, yes, since these were civilians who had been trained.
Therefore, these were bound to be the militia. The soldiers were all in fatigues. These were civilians.

Laure de Vulpain: Those French soldiers, who were they? From which branch of the armed services?

Thierry Prungnaud: I think from 1st RPIMA since this was the unit which was there. It was therefore they who trained them. [...]




While refuting that French soldiers trained Interahamwe, Colonel Etienne Joubert, head of DAMI-Panda from 23rd December 1992 to 18th May 1993, ruled out too the presence of new Rwandan Armed Forces recruits in Gabiro camp. “All the Rwandans who went through this camp were therefore soldiers who had already been trained or, one would say, who were specialists, and in no way were they recruits among whom militia could have “discreetly” sneaked into. In Gabiro, DAMI men did not train but exclusively upgraded Rwandan Armed Forces soldiers ”.

Without revealing the identity of Interahamwe’s instructors, the preliminary report of the UN Experts Commission on the violations of international laws, including acts of genocide in Rwanda, confirmed in paragraph 51, that Interahamwe were trained in Gabiro camp. “Subsequently, a training camp for Hutu militia (Interahamwe) was set up in Mutara. Each training took three days and included indoctrination of 300 men in ethnic hatred against the Tutsi minority. The training sessions included also learning the methods of mass massacres ”.

Finally, the implication of French soldiers in the training of Interahamwe and the existence of death squads which prevailed at that time were revealed for the first time by a reformed leader of Interahamwe called Janvier Africa in the following words:

« At the beginning of 1992, we carried out our first massacre. We were about 70 men who were sent to Ruhengeri to kill Tutsis of the Bagogwe clan. We killed nearly 10 000 people in one month from our base in Mukamira military camp. French soldiers taught us how to capture our victims and tie them. This was done at one base in the centre of Kigali. This is where we tortured people and where the French military authorities had their headquarters... [...] In that camp, I saw the French teach Interahamwe how to throw a knife and assemble guns. We were trained by the French – one French commander – during several weeks in a row, four months of training in total between February 1991 and January 1992 .

Janvier Africa was jailed. Augustin Iyamuremye, former head of intelligence in the Prime Minister’s office from June 1992 to April 1994 and at that time member of PSD opposition party, told the Commission how French soldiers working in the Criminal Investigation and Documentation Centre prevented him from interrogating Janvier Africa. At the time when Iyamuremye was appointed to the intelligence services, the question of the death squads was the main topic in the press. When he wanted to interview Janvier Africa who was in jail in Kigali central prison, he contacted an official in the Ministry of Justice who was working in that prison called Justin Niyongira. On the agreed day, Mr Iyamuremye went to the prison where he was told by his friend Niyongira that the French gendarmes had just taken Janvier Africa away. He felt that that was not due to unforessen chance: “This shows that those French who were working in the Criminal Investigation and Documentation Centre were very much informed and that they monitored what we were doing and that, if necessary, they would not hesitate to prevent it ”.

2.3.1 In 1992-1993, Interahamwe committed acts of genocide

Testimonies received show the systematic character of Interahamwe training by French soldiers between the beginning of 1992 and end of 1993. On one hand, this training comprised of different methods of killing using bullets, knives and traditional weapons and even bare hands. On the other hand, they included ideological methods of identifying ethnic Tutsis and particularly civilian Tutsis. “In time, it’s the armed militia especially those of MRND who took on the main role on the scene as executioners. That is how there were collective killings like assassinations of individuals.”

From these massacres in Bugesera, during the first week of March 1992, about 300 deaths were registered and Interahamwe played the biggest role. During the months of April, May and June, the Belgian Ambassador Swinnen sent a cable to Brussels in which he identified 3 principle groups of killers in Bugesera constituting:

“A commando unit recruited from among the students of the National School of Gendarmerie in Ruhengeri, who had been trained for this purpose (…); an "Interahamwe” militia group recruited from outside Bugesera, who had been trained for weeks in various military camps; another bigger group of "Interahamwe” from the MRND recruited locally, given the task of plundering, arson and acting as guides. The presence of this group made it possible to bring about confusion and make the unwary observer think that some kind of riot was going on.”

The Belgian lawyer Eric Gillet, a member of the Brussels bar and the executive committee of the FIDH, in a hearing before the French Parliamentary Inquiry (MIP) “gave details of the methods used at the time of the massacres in Bugesera in March 1992. They served as a precursor to the genocide of 1994 ‘because it was obvious four months before their outbreak that the victims had been identified beforehand, justification given for the killings, attacks against individuals, distribution of propaganda leaflets, use of radio to announce false threats from Tutsis to murder Hutus.’ M. Eric Gillet also stressed that, then as in 1994, ‘the representatives of local government (burgomasters and préfets), the army and the gendarmerie as well as Interahamwe militia from the MRND youth groups under the supervision of the party’ participated in the massacres.”

At the time, the ambassador of France, George Martres publicly denied the massacres had taken place and dismissed them as "rumours". He had also refused to join the diplomatic representatives of the OECD countries in a delegation to president Habyarimana to express their concern regarding the new wave of violence. Later, before the French Parliamentary Inquiry (MIP) ambassador Martres admitted that a member of the embassy who had gone up country to check on the situation confirmed that the massacres had taken place. On the same occasion, “he acknowledged that he might have referred to the massacres as “rumours” “at a time before they were confirmed.”

In his diplomatic telegram of 9th March 1992 entitled "The events in Bugesera", the French ambassador presented the facts as a spontaneous attack by Hutu peasants against Tutsi peasants, whose animosity had been revived by the propaganda of PL Party which was attracting many Tutsis. In a second telegram on 11th March, he explained that “the interethnic troubles in Bugesera” could not be contained by the overwhelmed local authorities “with hardly any authority over the people”. The purpose of this telegram was especially intended to explain the killing, the day before, of an Italian nun working in the area, by a Rwandan gendarme. “Whether she was a victim of misunderstanding according to the official version or of premeditated murder as rumour had it, the nun concerned was known for her firm stand against the highly controversial burgomaster of the commune. In addition, her statements on RFI had been rather embarrassing and undoubtedly unwelcome.”

In her telephone interview with RFI, Antonia Locatelli had tried in vain to denounce organised massacres, which contradicted the official version of spontaneous violence by local people. Ambassador Martres, undoubtedly trying to tone down the indignation caused by his attitude of direct support to the authorities, ended his telegram by proposing that a symbolic humanitarian gesture should be made to the survivors of the massacres by quick distribution of food, drugs and blankets by the soldiers of Opération Noroît.

But how could the French embassy in Kigali, whose staff were closely following all the main political events in Rwanda, be completely unaware of what was going on, while at the same time it was well-known that there were French officers working with the Criminal Investigation Department?

On 22nd November 1992, Leon Mugesera, a long time faithful follower of President Habyarimana, made an inflammatory speech in which “he urged the Interahamwe to kill Tutsis and political opponents. The following day, the surrounding communes of Giciye, Kayove, Kibilira and others were flaring up again.” These killings, which went on until the end of January 1993, were actually carried out mainly by the Interahamwe, and took at least 137 lives. A summary report from the Intelligence service in the Office of the President indicates that police investigators from CRCD in Kigali went there to help the gendarmes in the investigations. This confirms the statements of the witness gendarme, who worked with the French in the CRCD, asserting to the Commission that French gendarmes went to the north to inquire into the killings towards the end of 1993.

These two waves of killings, the one in Bugesera at the beginning of March 1992, and that targeting the Bagogwe Tutsis in the north between the end of November 1992 and the end of January 1993, took place at the time French soldiers were training Interahamwe. In March 1993, the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry raised the question whether the killings from October 1990 to January 1993 can legally be described as genocide. Noting that the figures cited in the report for the number of people killed could be challenged by some lawyers as being lower than the legal threshold required, the International Commission of Inquiry concluded that “whatever the legal arguments, the reality was tragically identical to genocide. (…)” Five months later, in August 1993, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission, Waly Bacre Ndiaye, analysed the same events and confirmed that the description of genocide as stipulated by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide could be applied to the cases studied.

Extract from the Special Rapporteur’s report of the UN Humans Rights Commission, Mission to Rwanda from 8th to 17th April 1993

78. The question whether the massacres described above may be termed genocide has been often raised. It is not for the Special Rapporteur to pass judgment at this stage, but an initial reply may be put forward. Rwanda acceded to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in April 1975. Article II of the Convention reads:
“In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intention to destroy , in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, such as:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group ;”(…)

79. The cases of inter-communal violence brought to the Special Rapporteur’s attention indicate very clearly that the victims of the attacks, Tutsis in the overwhelming majority of cases, have been targeted solely because of their membership of a certain ethnic group, and for no other objective reason. Article II, paragraphs (a) and (b), might therefore be considered to apply to these cases.

Source: Blue Book, document 20.


Through the press, the reports of human rights organisations and investigations carried out by the French gendarmes working within the CRCD, the French Army was perfectly well informed that the Interahamwe it had trained were guilty of massacres and killings which, in 1993, could be described as acts of genocide.




2.3.2. Intensification of the training of the Interahamwe in preparation of the genocide of 1994

Towards the end of 1993, the training of the Interahamwe was intensified, with the participation of French soldiers. It should be remembered that they did not officially leave the country until 15th December 1993.

Not only was the training intensified, but it also focussed on providing further training to hard-core Interahamwe, particularly in the camps of Mukamira, Bigogwe and Gabiro. The witness Nsekanabo Twayibu, after training in the Bigogwe camp in 1993, received further training at the university campus of Nyakinama. The Interahamwe Jean Damascène Muhimana, after receiving three months training, got further training from the French in September 1993. As Jean-Baptiste Dushimimana, a hard-core Interahamwe, explained above, he had learnt that, at the end of 1993, when his group from Gatenga Sector in Kicukiro District (Kigali City), was training at the Gabiro camp, another group of Interahamwe from Muhima Sector in Kigali had just completed its training. The Interahamwe leader, Joseph SETIBA, told the Commission that by the end of 1993, about 1,000 Interahamwe had been trained in Gabiro and Bigogwe, with the participation of French soldiers. General Dallaire estimated that there were at least 3,000 Interahamwe in Kigali City at the beginning of 1994. The historian René Lemarchand estimated at 30,000 the number of Interahamwe in the whole country during the genocide .

The rise in power of the Interahamwe movement, in numbers, "skills" and aggressiveness at the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994, is regarded as one of the factors indicating the process of planning the genocide of April-July 1994. In a hearing by the Belgian Senate, the former public prosecutor, François-Xavier Nsanzuwera, explained that: "From January 1994, everyone felt that the war was going to resume because the Interahamwe movement was becoming increasingly more powerful. (…)”. Again, within the context of the Belgian senate inquiry, René Degni-Segui, former Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission and author of the first preliminary report officially describing as genocide the massacres which began in April 1994, said his report had found four indicators showing the genocide had been planned. The second indicator reads as follows: "- the distribution of weapons from arms depots; moreover, the Interahamwe militia were trained;”

This intensification of the training of militia with the participation of French soldiers took place between January 1993 and March 1994, at the time when extremist circles imported 581.000 machetes, double the quantity imported in previous years. The main importer was Félicien Kabuga, who is considered to have been the financial sponsor of the genocide. He is currently sought after by the ICTR.

With regard to events at the end of 1993, the humans rights activist, Alison des Forges, told the Belgian senators: "Between August and the end of 1993, the Interahamwe bought a lot of machetes in Kigali. A businessman and big financier of the extremist RTLM radio sponsored the importation of 25 tons of machetes. It is thus clear that there was already a plan to start the war again, this time targeting civilians.”

What should be retained as the truth?

From February 1992 French soldiers, probably elements of the DAMI, participated in the launch of the "civil defence" program whose purpose was to train a civilian militia with the objectives of preparing them to kill Tutsi civilians in their locality. At the same time, they also started training fulltime Interahamwe, especially the members of the elite group "TURIHOSE". The training of the Interahamwe with the active participation of French soldiers was systematic. It was carried out in all the military camps where the elements of the DAMI worked, and it seems to have been continuous from the beginning of 1992 until the end of 1993, the time the French troops left Rwanda.

This training had two components: 1) the first consisted of training in various methods of killing, with firearms, bayonets or knives and without weapons; 2) the second consisted of indoctrinating the militia to ethnic hatred and psychologically preparing them to kill Tutsi civilians in their neighbourhoods. The testimonies collected by the Commission could not determine clearly whether the French soldiers responsible for training the militia were informed of the ideological content of the training. Some witnesses assert they were, but there is no irrefutable evidence. Taking into consideration the number of groups trained in the five main places mentioned above, it can be realised that the French soldiers took part in the training of thousands of Interahamwe.

From February 1992, the Interahamwe played a dominant role in the massacres, killings and murders perpetrated in the country, particularly in Bugesera at the beginning of March 1992, and in the north of the country from the end of November 1992 to the end of January 1993. These massacres were described, in March 1993 and August 1993, as acts of genocide by various human rights organisations. In spite of that, the French soldiers continued to train the militia and took part in the intensification of their training towards the end of 1993. It appears therefore that this intensification in the training of Interahamwe is one of the factors in the preparations of the genocide of April-July 1994.

The French soldiers share some responsibility in the killings and massacres described as acts of genocide committed by the Interahamwe between March 1992 and December 1993. They supported the Interahamwe institution in full knowledge of what it stood for in terms of logistics, training, and supportive follow-up. The nature of the training, the type of trainees as well as the continuation of the training in spite of repeated massacres committed by these Interahamwe show that they were not unaware of how the training they provided was being put to use. It can therefore be objectively concluded that the French soldiers have a share of responsibility in the preparation of the 1994 genocide since they contributed to the intensification of the training of the Interahamwe who were the spearhead. Finally, it can be objectively concluded that the French soldiers have a share of responsibility in the massacres committed during the genocide itself since a number of the Interahamwe had been trained by them.

This is all the more convincing since the nature of the acts committed during the genocide is not basically different from those committed in Bugesera and the north of the country between March 1992 and January 1993, at the time when the French Army was continuing to train the Interahamwe. There was not, at the time, any direct evidence to prove that the French soldiers knew that the training they were giving the Interahamwe, in particular after the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreements of the 4th August 1993, was intended for committing the genocide that began in April 1994. At the end of 1993, while the French soldiers were taking part in the intensification of the training of the Interahamwe whose numbers were then in thousands, one has the right to wonder about the reasons for such intensification. The question is all the more disconcerting since the French military authorities knew the nature of these Interahamwe militia. What type of combat or war did the French then think they were training them for?

3. Criminal Investigation Department

3.1. The action of the French gendarmes in the centre for criminal investigation and documentation (CRCD)

French military aid extended to the criminal documentation and Research centre for criminal investigation and documentation, the gendarmerie department responsible for criminal investigations (CRCD). French military co-operation had deployed 4 instructors in this institution and put Lieutenant Colonel Robardey, in charge of this unit, which had already been operating in Rwanda since September 1990. The French instructors took control of the institution and protected the criminal acts of the regime through misinformation or silence, whether the acts were ethnic massacres or some acts of terrorism. The final question is whether they computerised the central database without knowing that it would be used to index the Tutsis and political opponents?

This institution, commonly known under the name of "criminology", but whose official designation before the arrival of the French instructors was "central database", had a very bad reputation. Routinely, even before the political and military crisis of October 1990, its agents used torture during interrogation of the people arrested. The day after the sham attack on Kigali City, on the night of 4th to 5th October 1990, many people were arrested and there were a lot of persistent rumours that they were tortured in this institution.

The CRCD consisted of about thirty Rwandan gendarmes. Its task was to carry out investigations into serious criminal activities and keep records of people arrested, suspected or wanted.

In June 1992, at the request of the Minister for Defence, James Gasana, and with the support of the French ambassador Martens, it was decided that a DAMI (Département d’Assistance Militaire et Instruction) be created in the Criminal Investigation Department (DAMI-PJ). Initially, it was for fighting against terrorism and armed robbery because of the many attacks perpetrated at the time, evidenced by explosion of mines and grenades in public places.

The setting up of the DAMI-PJ in June 1992 followed closely the creation of political parties in opposition to the transitional government led by a Prime Minister from the MDR party. One of the tasks that the new government had given itself was to abolish the practice of torture, especially within "criminology". The start of French technical aid to this institution was to correspond with abandonment of the practice of torture. The department was renamed Centre for Criminal Investigation and Documentation (Centre de Recherche Criminelle et de Documentation, CRCD). It would seem that this was done on the initiative of the French counterpart.

In June 1992, the Minister for Defence informed the Prime Minister of the arrival of four French co-operants gendarmes, come to set up a “Criminal Research Unit". The newcomers were: Major Colliere, the Regimental Sergeant Major Nicolas, the Regimental Sergeant Major Colle and regimental sergeant major Salvy. These four gendarmes were placed under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Michel Robardey, technical adviser in charge of judicial police issues at the Rwandan gendarmerie headquarters. Robardey had been working since the second half of 1990 and left officially in 1993. The four newly arrived gendarmes had an office in the buildings of the CRCD.

Officially, the four French instructors were to carry out three types of activities: training their gendarmes colleagues in the techniques of judicial police work and professional ethics, carrying out investigations on terrorist attacks, as well as the computerisation of the central database.

3.1.1. Training in techniques and professional ethics of Criminal Investigation

According to reports probably written by the French instructors, various courses were offered, like the professional ethics of the gendarme, observations and findings, hearings, arrests and questioning, the right to use arms, etc. Written procedure manuals were produced and training in criminal procedures was given to Rwandan prosecution officers.

3.1.2. Conduct of investigation

The French instructors did not confine themselves to instruction of their Rwandan colleagues. They replaced them by taking the dominant share in the various criminal investigations: criminal acts, attacks using anti-personnel mines or grenades, murders and massacres. This was to such an extent that informed observers like General Rwarakabije, former G3 at the gendarmerie headquarters, or Senator Augustin Iyamuremye, who was at the time head of the Intelligence service in The Prime Minister’s Office between June 1992 and April 1994, told the Commission that the French instructors were in fact directing the CRCD.

According to a gendarme who was trained and worked closely with them, the French gendarmes made an active and systematic collection of information. They very often went in the field and set up significant networks of informers in various Rwandan circles. As they did not have a family or housing equipped for cooking, these gendarmes would often get themselves invited to dine with Rwandan families, even relatively modest ones, but in general well placed in various networks: government officials, journalists, soldiers etc.... Thus, during the third wave of massacres of the Bagogwe in the prefecture of Gisenyi, between the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993, they had gone in the field to carry out investigations. In general, in the event of attacks, they quickly got to the scene.

An incident involving the French instructors was widely talked about in February 1993 and could have cost a Rwandan his life. French soldiers had their photograph taken, manning artillery pieces in the bush. The photographs seemed to show that they were activating mortars. These soldiers gave the negative to "Photolab" studio in Kigali to develop them. A few days later, the newspaper "Le Flambeau", which constantly criticised the regime, published the photographs stressing that they were proof of direct participation of French soldiers in the fighting. A few days later, a Rwandan lieutenant from the CRCD came looking for the people who worked at the "Photolab" in order to take them for questioning, but not before inquiring about their ethnic origin. Thus, Japhet Rudasingwa and Anne Marie Byukusenge were taken along to the CRCD.

After questioning Byukusenge for 30 minutes, it was Rudasingwa’s turn to enter the office of major Colliere. The major asked him whether he could speak French and he answered in the affirmative. After checking the ethnic origin indicated on the identity card, Colliere took him by the throat and shook him violently, took out his gun and hit him on the temple, ordering him to say the truth because, he said, it was a serious issue involving the president of the Republic and France. Rudasingwa swore by all the gods that he did not have anything to do with the publication of the photographs. He was taken to the cells of the nearby gendarmerie station in Muhima, where he spent a day and a night. His fellow prisoners, after hearing the reasons for his arrest told him that he was among those who were going to be taken away at dawn, without further specific explanation.

Among his fellow prisoners, there was a young man called Rasta who had lived in Burundi. Very early in the morning, Rasta was taken away by the gendarmes. The fellow prisoners of Rudasingwa then told him that he had better make his plight known to the opposition parties, or else he would leave like Rasta without any hope of return. During the morning, a representative of the international Red Cross, alerted by his friends outside, came personally to check on what had happened to him. In the following days, opposition newspapers wrote about the matter and the intervention of the Red Cross. Rudasingwa was released soon thereafter and he stressed that he owed his life to the intervention of the Red Cross.

Within the same context, major Colliere went to the offices of "Le Flambeau" newspaper with four other French soldiers, heavily armed. The journalists, who, for security reasons, always worked with the main door locked, did not let them in at once. They first called the RPF members of the Neutral Military Observer Group of the Organisation of African Unity who were in town. Once inside the office, major Colliere began to threaten the editor of the newspaper, Adrien Rangira, but the officers of the RPF arrived soon and the French soldiers had to withdraw.

With regard to the investigations of terrorist attacks, according to the former head of the intelligence service in The Prime Minister’s Office, Senator Augustin Iyamuremye, the French gendarmes of the CRCD systematically sought to put the blame on the RPF. They wrote a report analyzing the various acts of terrorism perpetrated between February 1991 and May 1993. Of the 53 cases recorded and analysed, only two indicated that “the suspected people were Tutsis living outside the country.” Nevertheless, this led the writers of the report to conclude that "evidence points categorically at the RPF as the sponsor of these attacks.”

On 14th September 1992, under the aegis of the Prime Minister, it was decided that an ad hoc committee formed by the National Security Council be set up. This committee included the head of the intelligence service in the Prime Minister’s Office, Augustin Iyamuremye, the Prosecutor General at the Kigali Court of Appeal, Mr. Alphonse Marie Nkubito, as well as Major Venant Hategekimana from the Directorate of External Security at the Ministry of Defence. At the end of its work concerning the terrorist attacks, the Committee arrived at a conclusion different from that of the French. Referring to the report of the French gendarmes at the CRCD, it concluded that its investigations had not been able to identify with certainty the perpetrators of the attacks and their motives.

When the intelligence services in the Prime Minister’s Office called upon the CRCD for identification of the traces of explosives, grenades or mines, the French gendarmes put hindrances to this request for collaboration, treating those who made it as partisans of the RPF. Moreover, when the French of the CRCD arrived first on the scene of attacks, they removed all the signs of evidence. On the other hand, in cases where the intelligence service in the Prime Minister’s Office had evidence indicating that an act had been carried out by government security forces, the French gendarmes preferred to accuse the RPF.

Senator Iyamuremye reported before the Commission of a case in the prefecture of Gikongoro, where people called upon his services in connection with gendarmes who had given mines to peasants in order to trap Minister Nzamurambaho, the head of the opposition party, PSD. Agents in his service went to Gikongoro, and, thanks to their informers, succeeded in defusing the mines in question. They brought them back to Kigali, and took them to the CRCD for identification. The French gendarmes never made a reply to their request. The peasant who had revealed the plot was imprisoned in Butare. The gendarme accused of being the instigator took him out of prison and made him disappear.

A gendarme who worked with the French instructors confirmed the above incident. He reported that at a checkpoint on the road from the prefecture of Byumba, a soldier, native of Gisenyi and cousin to one of the big personalities in the regime, was arrested with ten antipersonnel mines in his possession. He was coming from the war front and was on leave, going to Kigali. The gendarmes arrested him and took him to CRCD. His arrival at the CRCD offices caused some commotion and the gendarmes rushed to the office where he was to see Major Colliere, who soon arrived and sent them all away, chiding them. After that, he was locked up in conversation with the soldier in question, obviously making it a point to stop the other gendarmes from dealing with the matter.

3.1.3. The computerisation of the central database

Various data banks of the CRCD existed in the form of hardbound cards. In his letter to the Prime Minister on 27th June 1992, the Minister for Defence, James Gasana, announced the setting up of the research unit, stating that computerisation of the CRCD was among the tasks of the French instructors.

As soon as this unit was created, the French gendarmes computerised the various files of the CRCD. The files created included a file on all people who had ever been arrested and questioned by any gendarmerie unit in the country. Another file was on all wanted people and those to be put under surveillance (PRAS), and another for stolen property as well as one on informers. They also created other data files: people who had ever been prosecuted for narcotics offences, stolen vehicles, arms and ammunition hidden or stolen by deserters. The French gendarmes proposed that a radio station and a direct telephone line be installed near the computers so that the gendarmes could consult any file by radio or telephone and receive a response in good time. They also proposed a 24-hour service to receive and respond to requests at any time.

3.1.4. Was the computerisation of the central database used for making lists of the people to be killed?

The strategic importance attached to computerising the files of the CRCD, particularly the file of wanted people and those to be put under surveillance (PRAS), can be seen through the following exchange of letters.

In an undated note to the chief of staff of the national gendarmerie, Colonel Augustin Ndidiliyimana, Lieutenant Colonel Michel Robardey wrote:
`
“I have the honour to bring to your attention the project to computerise the files of wanted people and those to be put under surveillance (PRAS.) It was developed by the military assistance and instruction unit at the CRCD, in accordance with your directives transmitted by note in reference. This computer file is from now on operational and the personnel likely to use it have been trained. It will now be possible to gain time by quick access to information without having to go laboriously through a filing system of carton cards whose usefulness is not always assured. It allows direct and operational radio exchanges with all the units in the field so that queries receive an immediate answer. All it needs to be put into operation is your approval.”

To this note, Colonel Ndidiliyimana replied by letter on 28th October 1992 with the title “Computerisation of the file of wanted people”. The letter continued:

“With reference to the letter of 14th October 1992 of Lt-Col. Robardey informing me that the Computer file is operational and awaiting my approval to start using it, I hereby give my assent. 2/I ask nevertheless that the personnel of the judicial police and detachments exploit this tool to the maximum.”


TThe time before April 1994 was characterised by systematic suspicion of Tutsis and the opposition, ethnic massacres and political killings. This led, during the first days of the genocide, to the use of pre-established hit lists of political opponents and prominent Tutsis and their families. There is reason to wonder whether the computerised lists at the CRCD were not put to such use. General Jean Varret, head of the military co-operation mission from October 1990 to April 1993, provided the beginning of an answer. It should be recalled that this mission was under the supervision of the Ministry of Co-operation which was in charge of technical military assistants (ATM) and personnel of the military technical assistance teams (DAMI). It is General Varret, therefore, who had initiated DAMI-PJ in the CRCD.

He explained to the parliamentary Inquiry that after the offensive of February 1993, he had heard rumours according to which the DAMI-Panda had exceeded its training mission. General Varret stated that at a meeting in Kigali, he had reminded the DAMI that he was “determined to take disciplinary action against any acts that exceeded the strict definition of the mission”. Soon after, his minister, having bean cheated by other people, “had informed him that his instructions had been erroneous and that he had been relieved of the command of the DAMI.”

With regard to the actions of the French instructors in the CRCD, it is worthwhile to quote an extract of the exchange between General Varret and the MP Bernard Cazeneuve during his hearing before the Parliamentary Inquiry.

Extract from the hearing of General Varret before MIP


General Jean Varret recalled that (…) after various killings, the gendarmerie, with the support of the ambassador, had asked for the training of judicial police officers (OPJ), in order to be able to carry out effectively investigations within the country. He specified that he had sent only two gendarmes because he had realised that these investigations were used to track down Tutsis, those Colonel Rwagafirita [the predecessor of Ndindiliyimana at the post of chief of staff of the gendarmerie] called “the fifth column”. This training activity thus failed.

Mr. Bernard Cazeneuve wondered whether it was to be understood that the wish of the Rwanda government to train judicial police officers was in fact motivated by the desire to put Tutsis on file.

General Jean Varret confirmed that it was actually what he thought, and that it made him slow down co-operation with the Rwandan gendarmerie, which was kept at a superficial level.



The statements of General Varret are not exactly true on two points: first, DAMI-PJ did not have 2 French gendarmes but 4, without counting Lieutenant colonel Robardey. Secondly, collaboration between DAMI-PJ and the CRCD was not superficial, and the computerisation of the database went on well. As General Varret had already been sidelined with regard to instructions to be given to the DAMI, perhaps the head of the assistance mission and military attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Galinié, and Lieutenant-Colonel Robardey, had decided that it was not good to give him an update on the issue.

The interest the chief of staff, Ndindiriyimana, had for the computerisation of the file of wanted people and those to be put under surveillance must be considered in the light of his lack of interest in the file of people with a criminal record. If account is taken of the feeling expressed by General Varret regarding the purpose of this project, one must wonder whether this project controlled by the French gendarmes did not contribute to the production of lists of people to be killed, which constituted one of the main factors in preparing the genocide. The possibility that the CRCD file was used for compiling those lists cannot be excluded. This file, fed with information from all the units of the gendarmerie, involved tens of thousands of operatives whose organisation was conceived to build a central database. Its computerisation was of great operational importance. The combination of these two factors could not be found in other Rwandan institutions at that time.

On the other hand, what was certain was the advantage that the presence of the French gendarmes within CRCD offered to the French side in gathering information. The two privileged witnesses referred to above agree that these gendarmes were very well informed. A Rwandan gendarme who worked with them explained to the Commission that these French gendarmes wrote daily reports that were sent outside of CRCD. The former head of intelligence services in the Prime Minister’s Office corroborated this information, which had been reported to him by a gendarme informer.

The existence of this facility makes it possible to conclude in a convincing way that between June 1992 and the end of 1993; French authorities were at least well informed on what was happening in the country. They must also have been especially well informed on ethnic massacres orchestrated by government agents, such as those at the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993 in the north of the country, the terrorist attacks and the political assassinations. Instead of using the information collected by the instructors of DAMI-PJ to restrain the criminal actions of the Rwandan regime, the French used it to protect the regime and propagate misinformation. Finally, the French gendarmes contributed willingly to the production of a computerised list of political and ethnic suspects who would be massacred during the genocide.

4. Acts of violence on roadblocks

With the outbreak of war on 1st October 1990, Rwanda government declared a state of siege and took several measures restricting the exercise of public freedoms. Some of these measures were very repressive while others could be seen as being security measures. On the main road axes leading to the capital and in the main towns of prefectures, roadblocks were set up with the aim of seeking out possible infiltrators or accomplices of the RPF. The Commission collected a number of testimonies showing the humiliation and violence undergone by Tutsis at these roadblocks, sometimes committed directly by the French, more often by Rwandans in full view or knowledge of the French. Some people arrested at roadblocks manned by the French were reported missing; others were taken to military camps and killed. The alleged acts were mainly committed during the period 1990-1993.

4.1. Ethnic segregation and arbitrary arrests

Dr. Jean-Hervé Bradol, former head of programmes at Médecins sans Frontières – France (Doctors without Borders) stated before MIP that he had been “particularly shocked by French soldiers taking up police functions in the country, especially at road checkpoints at the northern exit of Kigali ". He saw these soldiers “either carrying out checks themselves, or observing from their sentry post their Rwandan colleagues doing it".

Major General Paul Rwarakabije reported that the French manned a roadblock at the entry to the gendarmerie camp at Mount Jali. The camp served as a barracks for gendarmes trained by the French. At this roadblock, Tutsis could not pass without being insulted or molested:

“In 1993, the French soldiers had a position at Mount Jali in the gendarmerie camp for the Mobile Intervention Group, which they trained in road security techniques. I remember holding in my hands a report by the camp commander on the screening and arrests carried out at this roadblock by French soldiers. It was in 1993, at the time of the capture of Ruhengeri. The report pointed out that if someone was a Hutu, they let him pass, and when it was a Tutsi, they kept him, abused and insulted him in such humiliating terms: “you stupid Tutsi, cockroach!'”, etc. Tutsis underwent very tight questioning there. I even think that the Rwandan gendarmes sometimes beat them up.”

On several occasions, MP Elisé Bisengimana saw the French checking identity cards on roadblocks and retaining Tutsis for questioning: “What was visible is that when one was Hutu, they let him pass without a problem, and if he was Tutsi, he was retained at the spot and had to give further explanations”. Yvonne Mutimura supported this, saying that when she was passing the roadblock at Shyorongi with her sister they were arrested by French soldiers who made ethnic, aggressive and insulting remarks: They told us: “Show us your papers”. One of us asked: “But why are you checking us? This is none of your business; it is a Rwandan matter and no concern of the French.” They answered: “Ladies, we are sorry, but we must check you to see who the enemy is”. Again, one of us asked them: “When you see our cards, how do you tell who the enemy is?” They said: “We know very well that Tutsis are the enemies.”

Other witnesses added that people belonging to the Hutu ethnic group who looked like Tutsis could not easily cross the roadblocks manned by French soldiers. Such was the case of Ambassador Amri Sued Ismaïl, at that time Director General in charge of State Protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who witnessed on several occasions the physical and verbal assault meted out to Tutsis by French soldiers who manned the roadblocks between Kigali and Ruhengeri:

"I went to Ruhengeri almost every week with my wife. More than once, I was stopped by French soldiers at the roadblock in Shyorongi. When they saw my wife, one of them asked his colleague who had taken her identity card: “Is she a Hutu or a Tutsi?” Before even looking at her identity card, the other answered: "It is obvious that she is a Tutsi!”
They did this so often that I cannot tell you exactly the number of times that I lived through it. I also witnessed a scene where they had made people sit on the ground at a roadblock they controlled in Nyirangarama. They were insulting them enthusiastically".

Such misfortunes did not spare expatriates who transported Tutsis in their vehicles. Michel Campion testified thus:

“One day, I gave a ride to a Tutsi student. On arriving at the bridge over the Nyabarongo River, he was checked by a French soldier who asked him for his identity card. When the soldier discovered that he was Tutsi, he told him: “Get out of the car and go sit with your brothers over there at the edge of the road.” There were approximately twelve boys and girls, apparently Tutsis, who had been detained by the French soldiers. I stepped in and told these soldiers: "Listen, really I do not understand your position; it is not for you to do that. The Rwandan gendarmes should carry out these checks. Where do you believe yourselves to be? Is this a French overseas territory?” I said: "You are in an independent state and you come to screen citizens in their own country?” I added: “I will not move from here, and this boy will not leave this vehicle. I asked them to call the officer in charge. They brought a second lieutenant who, after listening to my protest told me that was not my business. I answered him that it was my business because I had a passenger they wanted to get out of my car. In the end, the second lieutenant told me: "Liisten, go on, just leave…!”

At some roadblocks, the French were alone, while at others, they worked with Rwandan gendarmes or soldiers. The crossing of the roadblocks theoretically required not only a valid identity card, but also a movement permit from the burgomaster of the commune of origin. Legally, this permit was supposed to be delivered to any Rwandan citizen, without ethnic distinction. In fact, some burgomasters refused to deliver this document to Tutsis, which resulted in confining them to their homes, without the possibility of exercising their right to travel.

The examination of the official reports of arrests after October 1990 shows that people were arrested without charge or evidence to support the alleged charges. As an example, of the 80 people arrested and held at the brigade of Nyamirambo between the 1st and the 18th of October 1990, 31 were held on identity card issues, 20 for complicity with the enemy with the charge: “Denounced by the public”; 13 did not have any charges. One practically found the same reasons in most files presented by the brigades of Gikondo and Nyarugenge.

At the entry to Kigali, the main roadblocks manned by the French were placed at Shyorongi, Giticyinyoni, Nyabarongo Bridge, Nyabugogo, Kabuye, Karuruma, Nyacyonga, Kabuga, Remera and Kanombe. If the geographical location of each one of these places is considered, it can be seen that the roadblocks at Shyorongi and Giticyinyoni were for controlling the people who came from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. That on the Nyabarongo Bridge controlled people coming from Cyangugu, Gikongoro, Butare, Gitarama and Kibuye; those at Nyacyonga, Nyabugogo, Kabuye and Karuruma controlled people coming from Byumba; those of Kabuga and Remera (Giporoso) aimed at controlling the people coming from Umutara and Kibungo.

All the entry points to the capital were therefore closely supervised. Within Kigali City, witnesses said that the French manned roadblocks in Kiyovu (residential area), Kanombe airport and Gikondo in the direction of Rebero, where meetings of MRND executives and those close to the regime were frequently held. French soldiers kept the roadblock to ensure the security of these dignitaries.

One Setiba, a former leader of the Interahamwe in the prefecture of Kigali rural, confirmed to the Commission that some Tutsis, who were screened and arrested at the roadblocks manned jointly by French and Rwandan soldiers and militia, were taken to an unknown destination. The witness was involved in taking away some people from the roadblock in Shyorongi. He lived in this sector and as a head of the local militia; he was frequently at this roadblock. He stated that the French were very active in the screening of civilians who would later be taken to an unknown destination: “The French manned a roadblock located at Shyorongi, in Kanyinya sector. They asked for identity cards from all passengers. Those who were recognised as Tutsis were taken to tents for questioning. Afterwards, they were taken to Kigali and onwards to a destination I do not know”

Cyprien Katarega, an ex-militiaman imprisoned for genocide at the central prison in Kigali, gave an identical account in connection with what occurred at the roadblock in Shyorongi at the same period:

"In 1992, I gave a lift to two people, who were known to my boss. On arrival at Shyorongi in Kanyinya sector, there was a roadblock manned by four Rwandan gendarmes and two French soldiers. They stopped us and asked for our identity cards. They said they suspected my two passengers of being accomplices of the RPF (Inkotanyi). They chided me for having taken them in my vehicle. A Rwandan gendarme and a French soldier led us to the communal office in Shyorongi and put us in the detention room. Towards 1500 hrs, they released me. When I arrived at Rushashi at my place of work, I reported the incident to my head. He went at once to the commune of Shyorongi to see what had happened to them. The two people had disappeared and those who had arrested them were not willing to tell him where they had been taken ".

Charles Bugirimfura, former Para-commando in Kanombe from 1982 to 1994 reintegrated in the Rwandan Defence Forces until his demobilisation in 2002, testified before the Commission that he knew of people arrested on other roadblocks where there were French soldiers. Bugirimfura worked with the French at the roadblocks in his capacity as a soldier:

“When the Tutsis we detained at the roadblocks reached a significant number, the French and Rwandan soldiers made them climb into military vehicles and took them to the regional stadium in Nyamirambo. I took part in this kind of operation in October and November 1990. I do not know what happened to those people because, after handing them over, I immediately went back to the roadblocks for another load. One day, we arrested Tutsi girls. The French and Rwandan soldiers decided to take them away to their camp at Kanombe. I did not get to know what happened to these girls afterwards.”

During the screening carried out at roadblocks, even when they presented all the required papers, Tutsis had difficulty in crossing the roadblocks without getting arrested, insulted or beaten up. This must be what made the special correspondent of Le Monde newspaper note that there seemed to be “an offence of identity” whereby people who carried an identity card with the mention Tutsi were more suspect than those whose identity was Hutu or Twa.

4.2. Disappearance of arrested people

Various testimonies reported that the French soldiers had an important role in checking identity cards at roadblocks, an activity often accompanied by acts of violence and even of disappearances. Because of the difficulty in proving cases of disappearance, the Commission retained only testimonies of witnesses who were relatives, friends or who had any other kind of relationship that put them in a position to say that after screening and detention at the roadblocks, such and such a person was never seen again by family, close relatives, friends and acquaintances.

In the Rwandan context with strong social bonds, it would be almost impossible for people to disappear without trace for the rest of their life. It is, therefore, more likely that the people who were arrested at roadblocks and were never seen again by their families can be considered as having disappeared. Testimonies collected show various cases of disappearance in the years 1990-1993.

Vital Mucanda claims to have lost his close relatives on two roadblocks manned by French soldiers, one in Shyorongi, the other near Rulindo at a place called “Ku Bashinwa” [Chinese Place] on the Kigali-Ruhengeri road:

“The French had a roadblock at Kanyinya (Shyorongi), another in Rulindo (Chinese Place). When they found a Tutsi, they detained him/her. A good example is that of my two cousins Ngangure Gaëtan and Uwibambe Dative, and my aunt Mukasine Immaculée. Together, we were on our way from Bugesera, to visit relatives in the North. Mukasine and Uwibambe were arrested and held by the French at Kanyinya, while Ngangure was arrested and held in Rulindo, ‘Ku Bashinwa’ (Chinese Place). We never saw them again. I survived those French soldiers only because I had a card showing I was a member of the Interahamwe.”

Similar testimonies exist for other roadblocks too. Emmanuel Nshogozabahizi, a former member of the PSD party, who later joined the Interahamwe militia in 1993, told the Commission that he lost his first cousin, a Tutsi, who had been arrested at a roadblock manned by the French in Mukamira on the Ruhengeri-Gisenyi road:

“In 1992, I was in a minibus on the way from Kigali with my cousin Mudenge Jean-Baptiste who worked with the Brewery at Kicukiro. On arriving at Mukamira, towards 19h00, the French stopped the minibus and asked us for our identity cards. Noting that my cousin was Tutsi, they made him get off and detained him. I have not seen him ever since. Yet I had immediately started searching for him, and my membership to the Interahamwe enabled me to go anywhere, which means that if he had stayed alive, I would certainly have found him. I have never known his fate”

The active participation of the French in the screening of Tutsis and the supposed accomplices of the RPF at the roadblocks, followed by disappearances, is also underlined by the former head of intelligence services in the Prime Minister’s Office, Senator Augustin Iyamuremye. He stated before the Commission: “At the roadblocks, the people who were caught without their identity cards and were described as Inkotanyi, disappeared. The French and Rwandan soldiers collaborated in this kind of operation. At Giticyinyoni, they worked together. I do not think they let go anybody they arrested under the charge of being an Inkotanyi.”



4.3. Physical intimidations and violence

In addition to screening, detention and transportation of detainees to known or unknown destinations, several testimonies revealed that at the roadblocks there were often acts of intimidation, harassment, physical violence, ill treatment and torture of civilians, mainly Tutsis.

Bernard Munyaneza, a former soldier of the FAR from1992 to 1994 and of RDF [ Rwandan Defence Forces] from 1994 to 2002, reported to the Commission having seen French soldiers checking identity cards and committing acts of violence against Tutsis at two roadblocks, one in Kisenga, near Rushaki (ex-prefecture of Byumba), the other in Shyorongi. “The French carried out unworthy acts. I knew an old lady who lived in Rulindo. In February 1993, she came across French soldiers. When they discovered that she was Tutsi, they kicked her so much so that she no longer could walk.”

Emmanuel Nkuliyingoma worked in Gisenyi after being transferred from Kigali. In 1992, he was detained and underwent ill treatment by French and Rwandan soldiers for three days at the Shyorongi roadblock. He also saw a Tutsi girl, named Brigitte Umulisa, who underwent the same treatment at the same roadblock:

“French soldiers and Rwandan gendarmes asked us for our identity cards. They noticed that I had two residence permits, one for Kigali and another for Gisenyi. They held me, saying that this was proof that I was an Inyenzi. They started to torture me. First, they placed beer bottle tops on the ground and forced me to lie down on them, on my belly, and to put my two elbows on the bottle tops. They then gave me blows. Afterwards, they made me get up and ordered us (me and Brigitte) to dig a large hole. When we finished, they forced us to lie down and put our arms in the hole. They refilled the hole to our elbows. We spent three nights there in that position, and they beat us as often and as hard as they pleased.”

Marcel Karangwa, a resident of Rugarika in Kamonyi District, was a victim of assault at the Nyabarongo roadblock, and reported it as follows:

“On October 15, 1990, I went to Kigali. On arriving at the Nyabarongo roadblock, I found French and Zaïrian soldiers who were stopping vehicles. After checking my identity card and discovering that I was Tutsi, the French made me get off the vehicle with my luggage. They gave me kicks all over my body, but the blow that hurt me the most was that which they gave me in the lower belly. I was also wounded at the knee. Then, they subjected me to a long interrogation requiring to know the reasons for my journey to Kigali. They prevented me from continuing and forced me to go back to Gitarama. They kept all my belongings, including my identity papers. There were three Frenchmen and two Zaïrians.”

Twayibu Nsekanabo, an ex-Interahamwe militiaman imprisoned in Gisenyi for genocide, reported a scene of violence at the roadblock in Shyorongi:

“In 1993, I was in a minibus which was going to Kigali. In Shyorongi, the French stopped us and asked us for our identity papers. French and Rwandan soldiers were doing the checking together. A Rwandan gendarme found among us a young man who had an identity card marked Tutsi and showed it to the French. One of them took the young man to their tents on the lower side of the road. We then heard screams which made us think that he was undergoing violent beating. We left without him reappearing.”

4.4. Sexual assault and rape

Testimonies from various sources give a report of physical assault and rape undergone by Tutsi girls arrested at the roadblocks, in particular at those set up around the capital.

Emmanuel Nkuliyingoma stated that he was sexually abused by French soldiers at the Shyorongi roadblock. He was forced to have sexual intercourse with a girl they had just raped. Both had been arrested at the roadblock:

“The French stripped us. They then took along the girl in their tent. On her return, she was crying and told me that they had raped her in turns. The following day, they obliged her to lie down and ordered me to have sexual intercourse with her. Sometime later, they made me lie down in my turn and forced the girl to go on top of me.”

Herman Afrika, a former Interahamwe imprisoned in Kigali for genocide, explained that he was in Kigali in 1990 and saw French soldiers engaged in acts of physical assault and rape of girls detained at the roadblocks they controlled:

“During the war in 1990, the French were guarding Kanombe airport. These French soldiers used to beat up Tutsis whom Rwandans brought to them after rounding them up during searches for accomplices of the RPF. They took the pretty girls and raped them in their tents. The screening was primarily carried out at two roadblocks that they controlled in Kigali. One was in Remera, at a place called Giporoso and the other was at a place called Cumi Na Kabiri (12 Kilometres).”

Yvonne Mutimura testified to having seen French soldiers in a drunken state engaged in collective rape in public:

“The Nyacyonga roadblock in Kabuye was the most scandalous; sometimes French soldiers were more than ten, drinking beer. They were drunk all the time. And when they were drunk, they were engaged in raping […] there were girls who were raped by the French soldiers. I saw that in Kabuye, Kacyiru, (approximately 6 km from Kigali airport and next to Hotel Chez Lando, whose owner was once a Minister for Social Affairs […] One evening, on my way home from there with friends, we saw French soldiers raping girls on the road. The girls were screaming. The soldiers were in uniform and no one could do anything about it. The Rwandan soldiers could not be called upon to help because they were allies of the French”

Lucien Nibaseke also gave an account of rapes committed by the French in the following terms:

“The French had a place at Giheka cya Batsinda, near Kagugu on the outskirts of Kigali. They had built their tents in the wood belonging to my paternal uncle, Kagoyire Philibert. They gave money to the Interahamwe who brought them beautiful Tutsi girls by force, whom they raped. Among the girls raped like that, I can remember those from Mi’s household in Batsinda, who were stopped and raped on their return from Sunday mass at Kabuye. They were caught by Interahamwe in this forest, who delivered them to the French soldiers. The French took them to their tents and raped them. They came back in tears, and people who were around were mocking them.”

Jean de Dieu Tuyisenge, a former gendarme warrant officer in the FAR and ex intelligence agent of the Habyarimana regime testified to having seen French soldiers raping a girl called Julienne whom they had detained at the Giticyinyoni roadblock:

“The French detained her after discovering that she was Tutsi. I was there. They led her to a disused garage near the roadblock. Sometime after, they returned with her. She was weeping. Finally, I learnt from her friends that the French soldiers had raped her. She was then taken to the detention centre by a gendarmerie vehicle. I do not know what followed.”

Wellars Kayiranga told the Commission of a rape case committed by French soldiers on a young girl of 10 or 11 years:

“In 1992, the French had four roadblocks on the Kigali-Byumba road. One of them was in Karuruma near REDEMI next to the home of Rurindababisha John. The French raped there a very young girl whose father was Ruzindaza Jean-Baptiste. They raped her in turns until her legs could no longer return to their normal position. The young girl was a primary school pupil in fourth grade. Her father was head of a garage at the Kabuye sugar refinery.”

Justin Rutareka, a resident of Kinyinya, also gave an account of acts of rape by French soldiers:

“I remember seeing French soldiers setting up camp near the sugar factory in Kabuye on 25/01/1993. These soldiers raped the girls inside the tents where they lived. I personally know three girls who were victims of these acts: Mukak, Muka and Mukam. I still remember that Mukak was even, one day violently beaten up by a French soldier. I learned that the reason for this violence was the fact that her rapist had contracted a sexually transmitted disease. That day, I met her in the trading centre weeping and she told me what had happened to her.”

Bela Mu, another resident of Kinyinya, was sexually assaulted by French soldiers stationed at Nyacyonga in 1993. When she was giving her testimony to the Commission, her memories seemed to put her in a state of both anger and anguish:

"I lived near a place where the French had set up their tents. One of them had completely taken me as his wife against my will. He did to me as he pleased. He raped me whenever he wanted. Sometimes he penetrated me; sometimes he subjected me to acts of fellatio or sodomy. Sometimes he took me to his comrades in their tents where they kept me for days without letting me go out. Whoever wanted forced me to sleep with him. They should come and see the state they put me in. They did so much evil to me. I will never forget that. Could you imagine forced fellatio? It was the first time that I went through that and I still get shivers when I think of it. You have not done well to remind me of it.”

During her testimony, Bela Mu told the Commission that the French raped other girls and that they worked with Interahamwe who brought the girls to them:

“I am not the only one who was raped by French soldiers at that time. There were others who suffered the same fate as me, but many are now dead. I remember one of them who was my neighbour. She was called Mukak. She had become like their wife. The French used to send an Interahamwe by the name of Muriro to look for girls for them. Muriro brought the girls by force. He was a very fearsome Interahamwe and he killed many people during the genocide. He is today in prison.”

She added that the French took stimulants to make the act last: “In the evening, a little before forcing me to have sexual intercourse, these French swallowed products which transformed them enormously. They became very energetic, as if doped and hardly ever reached orgasm. Once, they contaminated me with a disease and gave me drugs. When I took them, I became almost blind; It is only recently that I recovered the will to go on living.”

The rape committed by French soldiers at the same place and the same time are recounted by another witness, Béa Muk who reported them as follows:

"In 1993, the French soldiers had set up their tents in the wood of my brother-in-law, Kagoyire Philbert. They caught the girls in broad daylight and took them to their tents. I have friends who were raped in this way. One of them was called Mukak, the other was Ha, and finally Muka. Unfortunately, they were killed during the genocide, except Mukak who died a few years after the genocide. These French soldiers collaborated with Interahamwe such as Nsabimana and Simpunga; it is these two who brought girls to the soldiers, to be raped. The first one is in prison for genocide and the other one died.”
4.5. Participation and assistance in the killings

The Commission sought to know some more about some people arrested on the roadblocks and some who were reported missing. It appears that these people were led to various places: in military camps of Kanombe, Kigali, Gako, Bigogwe, Mukamira and Gabiro; others still were taken to the various gendarmerie brigade posts for interrogation followed by imprisonment; others were brought in the cellars of the criminology department directed by the French or to the central Intelligence Service based at the presidency of the Republic. According to information provided by the senator, Augustin Iyamuremye, and by Jean de Dieu Tuyisenge, they were tortured there under the orders of Captain Simbikangwa Pascal. At these various places of detention, the arrested people often underwent interrogation under cruel and degrading conditions, sometimes followed by killings committed by Rwandans within sight of the French. The French were also directly involved in killings of civilians.
4.5.1 In military camps and other places in Kigali

In most of the military camps where acts of violence were committed, the French advisers and instructors were present supervising and training Rwandan soldiers within the framework of military co-operation. In 1993, in the gendarmerie camp at Jali, French instructors who trained the anti-riot unit of the gendarmerie took part in night operations of hunting for Tutsis and, according to witnesses, killed people caught in these raids, accusing them of being accomplices of RPF. François Nsengayire, former gendarme, having lived in this military camp, attests to having been eyewitness of this type of acts committed by the French:

"I lived with the French at Jali from 1993 until our escape from Rwanda in July 1994. Among the French was an adjutant called Philippe and another regimental sergeant major called Roy. They were our instructors. After the RPF attack on Ruhengeri in February 1993, a French unit of the 8th RPIMA arrived in Rwanda as reinforcement and had its positions near the primary school of Jali. I was assigned to them as their interpreter. Their mission was to teach the Rwandan soldiers the techniques of fighting infiltration and the methods of identification and pointing out of unwanted people. The object of this training was due to the fact that RPF, which was not far from Kigali, had to be identified and the people who entered town located so as to identify possible infiltrators into the capital. The practical part of this training was done on the inhabitants of Jali and Rubingo who were accustomed to going to the market of Kigali at dawn to sell their goods. The French arrested these people and sorted out Tutsis, following the instructions given to them by colonel Ndindiriyimana according to which, to recognise Tutsis, it was necessary to refer to their size, which is in general slim. The Frenchman who directed this unit was a black who was called Bob, a borrowed name because the French never revealed their true names to us. They had set up a roadblock near the camp. They checked all the passers-by. They held those who were identified in a makeshift shelter. After that, they executed them and transported the corpses towards a place I do not know."

François Nsengayire also attests to having been witness to killing by the French of a group of twelve Tutsis, to avenge three of their colleagues who died in the engagements against RPA in February 1993. Ten of them were taken out from among the displaced persons who were in Mbogo, while two others were caught near Jali:

“When RPA took ETO Tumba and Rulindo, we left in reinforcement with the French. We were with a unit of field artillery of the 8th RPIMA who used canons of 105 mm and 122 mm. These were positioned in Shyorongi at a place called Kanyinya, and I was with the French in an advance party and we were in the eucalyptus woods at Mbogo near the home of Kimaranzara. We fired on the ETO Tumba to dislodge RPA. There was violent exchange of fire. Three French soldiers were mortally wounded. Two others were seriously wounded. Their comrades were very angry. On arrival in Mbogo trading centre, they found war displaced people who had taken shelter in a school. They entered and took ten Tutsis. They brought them to Jali. On arrival there, near the football field, they took two other Tutsis and put them with the other group. They entered the camp and discussed with a Rwandan captain named Bizumuremyi who was very cruel. They told him that they had lost three of their comrades; they had also caught some of the Inkotanyi who had infiltrated among war displaced people. Bizumuremyi and the French took these people to their headquarters and shot them. I do not know exactly where they put the corpses, but I believe that they went to bury them in the military camp at Kanombe. Out of curiosity, I asked them where they had taken the bodies and they replied that it was none of my business ".

The Commission endeavoured to check the consistency of this testimony but was not able to find witnesses confirming or nullifying the statements of Nsengayire François.

Murders of Tutsi civilians were also reported in the military camp of Kanombe. They were committed by Rwandan soldiers in the presence of French instructors who were providing training to the various units in this big barracks.

Vianney Mudahunga, a former Para commando from 1987 to 1994 and member of CRAP, testified that "during the time from 1991 to 1992, many civilians suspected of being Inkotanyi were taken to the Kanombe Camp by soldiers. They were locked up in the dungeon of the camp and subjected to interrogation. They underwent a lot of maltreatment; some were killed, others disappeare ".

Charles Bugirimfura, a former soldier in Kanombe, also testified about people who were killed and buried in a common grave in Kanombe camp after having been arrested at roadblocks, particularly that of Nyacyonga, where he worked with the French: “The Rwandan soldiers, in complicity with the French, suspected any Tutsi to provide information or funds to RPF. Between 1991 and 1993, the French were involved in large-scale detention of Tutsis. Among those who were detained, some were killed. Some were buried in a mass grave inside the military camp at Kanombe ".

The witness gave the names of two victims; one was killed directly by the French at Kanombe and the other was killed while they watched, after his arrest in his residence:

“I remember a Rwandan ex-captain named Karanganwa, native of Runyinya, who had been wrongfully dismissed from the army. He was arrested at a roadblock near the airport, and then killed at the military camp of Kanombe, by the French with the help of a Rwandan adjutant called Gasutamo. I also know a certain Munyakayanza who was arrested at his place in the Kanombe area. He was also brought to our military camp and killed by Rwandan Para commandos, in the presence of the French without them doing anything. He was buried in the same wood. In short, there were many people killed in this way; I cannot remember all the cases ".

A different witness, Tatien Sibomana, a former Para commando from 1976 to 1994, confirmed the murder of Munyakayanza by the people cited by his ex-comrade, Charles Bugirimfura. He added that he, too, remembered the murder of an agronomist whose name he could not remember, but who worked in the military camp of Kanombe as a civilian. In addition to the cases cited, Tatien Sibomana testified that between 1990 and 1994, many unidentified civilians who were killed in Kanombe camp at the place appointed as ‘the ammunition dump’ and that the French instructors who lived in this camp knew that these murders were committed by soldiers they trained. Charles Bugirimfura specified that these killings were committed by Para commandos of the CRAP unit, created, supervised and trained by the French. Samuel Kayombya, a former member of the CRAP, confirmed these facts before the Commission by testifying that between 1991 and 1993, civilians were brought to the Kanombe camp, killed and buried in the wood located in this camp.

These testimonies are essentially corroborated by investigations carried out by Amnesty International in 1991, by the international Commission of enquiry of 1993 and Rwandan human rights associations. Amnesty International indicated it had "information concerning the death of several former prisoners shortly after their release at the end of February 1991." It specified that "two people who had been arrested in the aftermath of the October 1990 attack and then released on February 27th, 1991, had been re-arrested by members of the national gendarmerie at Kanombe Military Camp, shortly after their release. One was Munyakazi Jean, a driver at the military camp at Kanombe (…) and Niyonzima Apollinaire, an agronomist. These two people were killed thereafter by those who had arrested them and buried clandestinely in the firing range of Kanombe military camp ".

These killings and murders continued for the period 1992-1993. Indeed, the international Commission of Inquiry noted in January 1993 that: "Some people had been arrested by soldiers and at least a score of them were killed. It is known from a sure source that corpses were dumped by soldiers at the Kigali General Hospital. [… ] Eight bodies were buried in a mass grave on Saturday February 13th, 1993, and eleven others on Monday February 15th, 1993, at the cemetery of Nyamirambo in Kigali. Other bodies were buried in the military camps of Kigali".

In February of the same year, five major Rwandan human rights associations denounced these killings of civilians by soldiers:

“Our Associations have learned that the so-called rebels are taken to Camp Kigali, tortured, then killed by the soldiers […] and thereafter dumped at the mortuary of the Kigali General Hospital before being buried by prisoners in mass graves in the cemetery of Nyamirambo. It is soldiers who dump them at the hospital and go away, without explaining the circumstances of their death ".
4.5.2. In the other prefectures

Cases of killing people arrested at roadblocks, in which the French were involved in one way or another, were not were not restricted to Kigali. They were reported also in the prefectures of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Byumba and Kigali rural, especially in places near military positions, or in military camps where French instructors lived.

Information from several sources gave the military camp in Byumba the reputation of being a death camp. According to the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (ICE) of 1993, a group of eighteen people was brought there by the burgomaster of Murambi, Jean-Baptiste Gatete, and none of them left the camp alive. Major Pierre Ngira who commanded the military zone of Byumba from 1983 to 1991 admitted to the ICE “that he personally ordered that these people be put in a hole which had been dug in the military camp for construction of public toilets ".

Various people confirmed that French soldiers controlled a roadblock at the entry of the Byumba military camp and that Tutsis arrested there were taken inside the camp where they were held, then killed. The Commission could not establish with certainty whether the French soldiers themselves carried out these killings or stood by while they were taking place.

Apollinaire Nsengiyumva, a former prosecutor in Byumba from 1990 to 1991, testified before the Commission that he had carried out arrests of Tutsis on the orders of the Byumba prefecture authorities and intelligence service, but was unaware of the lot reserved for them. The former prosecutor does not dismiss any assumption, including that of the killings, but justifies the uncertainty of his testimony by the fact that he was only one small link in a chain and, according to him, did not have any control on the final fate of the people that he arrested. A similar account was given by Jean-Marie Vianney Mugemana, the Minister of Interior Affairs at the time these events took place. However, he told the Commission he did not know anything about killings committed directly by the French in Byumba.

Other witnesses remember, however, what happened in Byumba, as Anaclet Butera, one of the prominent Tutsis, who was arrested in early October 1990 by prosecutor Nsengiyumva. He testified before the Commission that he spent nearly two months in detention under extremely hard conditions, and that throughout his detention, he saw soldiers coming to screen people on lists after which they took them to the military camp of Byumba where they killed them.

Jean Damascène Kaburame, ex-FAR from 1990-1994, claims to have seen French soldiers manning a roadblock in the centre of Ngarama trading centre:

“In 1990, I was a soldier in the 2nd battalion Muvumba. The French installed a roadblock in Ngarama trading centre. We controlled this roadblock with them. They checked the identity cards of all passengers. When they saw the name Tutsi, the person was put aside, and when the number of arrests became large, they were put on army trucks and taken, inter alia, to the Byumba military camp

This testimony is corroborated by that of Twagirayezu, another inhabitant of Byumba, who claims to have been a witness of checks and arrests carried out by French soldiers at a roadblock they had placed near the office of the prosecutor in Byumba, at the entry of the military camp, shortly after the attack and capture of the town by the RPF: "The French were stationed there with Rwandan soldiers. They asked us to produce our employment and identity cards. Tutsis were detained there, and then taken to the Byumba military camp. I do not know what happened to them, but I think that they were killed because their close relatives never saw them again ”.

Identity checks on the roadblocks followed by detention and killing, also took place in the military camp of Gako, Bugesera, in 1992, at a time when Tutsis in the area were victims of massacres. Jean-Claude Murejuru testified that he narrowly escaped death at a roadblock controlled by French soldiers. To earn a living, he used to sell milk, which made him frequent the communes of Kanzenze, Ngenda and Gashora, which formed the sub-district of Kanazi in Bugesera. On arrival near the Gako camp on the path where civilians usually passed, French soldiers who controlled the roadblock arrested him and handed him over to the Rwandan soldiers for the only reason that he was Tutsi. He would have been killed and was only saved by a Rwandan soldier who recognised him and organised his escape:

"A Rwandan soldier and a French soldier controlled the roadblock at Gako. The Rwandan was used as interpreter to the French. This latter asked me for my identity card. When he saw that I was Tutsi, he exclaimed `Tutsi'! Immediately, the Rwandan soldier asked me to show my card for participation in compulsory Community work ` Umuganda ', as well as a receipt showing my contribution in support of FAR. The French soldier read the documents. When he saw the mention "Umuganda", he misinterpreted it to mean "Umugande " and at once ordered that I be taken to the dungeon inside the military camp. I implored the Rwandan soldier to explain the difference between the two words to the French one because I was innocent, but he ignored me. Near the dungeon, I came across a Rwandan soldier named Alphonse Ngenzamaguru, who was a childhood friend. He approached me and I explained my problem to him. He told me that he was going to help me, but that I was to have patience. I was locked up in the dungeon. Many civilians had bee locked up there for a few days. They told me that each day; the soldiers came to take away those who were to be killed. Towards 1630 hrs, I was able escape the fate reserved for the others. [……. ] When I again saw Alphonse Ngenzamaguru at his place a few days later during his leave, he told me that I had been lucky because all my fellow prisoners were killed after my escape. I would like to stress that at this roadblock in Gako, it was the French soldiers who stopped and questioned civilians, and decided on their detention. Rwandan soldiers intervened only when the arrested person did not speak French. The French sorted people by looking at the faces initially, then their identity cards. They put them in Indian file and selected those to be detained on the basis of these criteria”

Another testimony threw some light on the degree of participation of the French in the crimes committed at the roadblocks. Immaculée Cattier, whose maiden name was Mpinganzima, had been imprisoned in Gisenyi at the outbreak of war in October 1990, and had just been released,. Having nowhere to go, she sought shelter with Canadian missionaries who proposed to accompany her to Kigali. On arrival at Ruhengeri, she was stopped at a roadblock manned by the French who delivered Tutsis to the Interahamwe militia:

"(…) some of the soldiers there were French and they also asked for identity cards from Rwandans. The cards indicated the ethnic identity of the holders. Tutsis were made to get out of the vehicles and the French soldiers handed them over to the militia who cut them with machetes and threw them in a ditch at the edge of the asphalted main road. [… ] I saw a Tutsi who had been made to leave a car a little further on from ours. After checking his identity card, a French soldier and a Rwandan officer delivered him to the militia who immediately began, in front of these cars, to strike him with their machetes and all kinds of weapons that they had, like Ntampongano (clubs), and threw him into the ditch afterwards. When I saw that, I looked in the drain and saw some bodies there lying still, without a sound ". (…)

5. Acts of violence away from the roadblocks

The testimonies collected by the Commission show that the roadblocks were not the only places where the French soldiers committed acts of violence. In their everyday life, civilians suffered physical and sexual assault from French soldiers, in public and in private, and these acts often targeted Tutsis because of their ethnic origin. Often, the French military hierarchy was informed and consistently acted to protect the soldiers involved. There are many instances illustrating these facts.
5.1. Ethnically based physical or verbal violence

Various acts of violence committed by French soldiers were reported to the Commission in various areas of the country. Silas Ndagijimana was a direct victim of a brutal assault committed by French soldiers, near Pfunda tea factory. This was during the persecution of the Bagogwe in Gaseke commune. The latter had taken refuge in the neighbouring commune of Kayove after the massacre against them in the aftermath of the attack on Ruhengeri by RPF in January 1991. The burgomaster sent them to the prefecture office in Gisenyi. On the road opposite the tea factory, they met Rwandan and French soldiers going to Ruhengeri to give support to FAR who were trying to take back the town from RPF. The Rwandans and the French made them get out of the vehicle and violently beat them. Silas Ndagijimana testified as follows:

“A young boy was ordered out of the vehicle by the French. A French soldier caught him by the arm and gave him a kick in the low belly. This blow caused gave him health problems that he never recovered from. He urinated blood and pus and later died. Another young person was struck on the head by a French soldier with the butt of a rifle. Since then, the victim has suffered from permanent mental disorder. He is sick for the rest of his life. As for me, a French soldier gave me three bayonet blows on the thigh. Here are the scars. ".

Again in Gisenyi, in the Kanama commune at a place called Mahoko, the witness Jean-Baptiste Nzitabakuze saw French soldiers present at the killing of a civilian by militia who were accusing him of being an Inkotanyi:

"I saw French soldiers at Kanama at the market of Mahoko. Hutu peasants brought a Tutsi civilian they had caught in Gishwati. The French asked what happened and got the explanation that that the peasants had caught a Tutsi suspect. They filmed the scene. Suddenly, somebody took a club and struck the person on the head. Another poured gasoline on the victim and set him on fire. He burnt to death in front of everyone. The French filmed the whole scene and went away. There were also Rwandan gendarmes present. It was the burgomaster of Kanama, named Marius, who came later to make arrangements for his burial ".

Gerard Ndabakenga, a former student at the national University of Rwanda, at Nyakinama campus, testified to acts of racism, ethnic segregation and violence committed by French soldiers during their stay on this campus:

"I saw the French at Nyakinama in 1992. As lectures had been suspended due to holidays and the war, we were only a few students staying in the campus halls of residence. The French were lodged in ‘Home D’ . We lived next to them and could see what they were doing, whether it was day or night. They trained the Interahamwe in the football field. When they were lined up in the corridor of their hall, we could see them. [… ] The French got along well with the war displaced people: the Bakiga from Byumba and Ruhengeri, who were regarded as the only pure Hutus, treating the others as Banyanduga They had taught the French to distinguish Hutu from Tutsi according to morphological criteria. [… ] A certain familiarity had been established between these ‘pure’ Hutus and the French soldiers, to the extent that sometimes the soldiers bought drinks for the students. Among the students, one who had a nose or teeth considered characteristic of Tutsis was not allowed to sit near them. The French said such a student was ‘an enemy of the country’, while the Hutu students would try to assure them that ‘he is not an enemy he is a true citizen’. [… ] Before the war, the students were all in an association called ``Assemblée Générale des Etudiants de l’Université du Rwanda’ (AGEUNR). However, between 1992 and1993, they split into two camps: the Bakiga and Hutus known as pure because they could be traced by history or relationship to the former Parmehutu party , and the remaining Hutus’ claim to this quality was disputable or doubtful. Those of the first group, financially supported by the prefecture authorities and the French, broke away from the other students. [… ] One evening, after receiving our monthly allowance, we went to have a good time at the campus canteen. Then, in a drunken state, two French soldiers arrived one of whom was a sergeant, with a FAR captain from Ruhengeri, the businessman Gaston, also of Ruhengeri, and the burgomaster [mayor] of Nyakinama. The French sergeant walked around the canteen while saying: ‘this campus shelters many enemies of the country. Why?’ He was addressing the question to the burgomaster. The latter answered: ‘they have been able to infiltrate because they certainly corrupted the civil servants who grant bursaries’. […] This dialogue between the French sergeant and the burgomaster, in front of the Rwandan captain, threw the room into disorder. Tempers were heated up and the soldiers insisted that Tutsi students go out, saying they did not want to share anything with ‘cockroaches’. They ordered the barman to stop serving the enemies of the country. When some students tried to protest, the French sergeant drew his revolver and shot into the canteen ceiling. At the first shot, most of us left running. They stayed alone. "

Michel Campion, the owner of Ibis hotel in Butare, witnessed a clash between French soldiers and Tutsi students from the National University of Rwanda in 1992, during which the soldiers violently beat up the students and damaged hotel furniture:

"In 1992, there was a rather active military presence in Butare at the army cadet academy in which there were between 100 and 120 permanently stationed French soldiers who were there to intensify the training of soldiers who were going to war. And I can give you the actual number of those people because they ate regularly at Ibis Hotel. One day, a brawl erupted in the establishment. The Tutsi students had been very upset by this French military presence that permanently occupied the outdoor tables; they were no longer able to come and have a glass of beer with ease.

One day, there was an American who gave them a little encouragement to confront the French soldiers and a scuffle erupted. It was so violent that they practically turned the entire out door café up side down […] I walked out to try and calm the people down, but imagine a situation where100 muscular soldiers are pounding students! I overheard one of them literally say: Finally, one will be rid of the Tutsis. In fact, the poor fellows, I found them lying in the garden. Some had broken arms; others had taken blows to the head. It had lasted five to ten minutes. The soldiers then got into their trucks and returned to their army cadet academy. I never again considered them as my customers ".

In his testimony, Michel Campion stated that the following day the French defence attaché came with their Ambassador to investigate the incident. They paid for all the damage and insistently urged the owner not to divulge the information.

Michel Campion’s testimony was confirmed by two official documents, one was a Rwandan intelligence report, the other a record of the minutes of a Butare Prefecture security committee meeting. The first document contains interrogations regarding the real motives of the French military presence in Butare. The document specifies that the local administrative authorities were not aware of this presence and implicitly reveals the strategy of French persons responsible for this cover-up.

Another witness named Yves Rurangirwa reported to the Commission that he was victim to insults and death threats from French soldiers claiming that a Tutsi was not permitted to frequent an establishment like “Kigali Night” which belonged to Jean-Pierre Habyarimana, the son of the president.

Acts of this nature had reached such a point that, in February 1993, a Rwandan newspaper did not hesitate to use the headline: “Interahamwe z'Abafaransa zikwiye kwamaganwa [the French Interahamwe should be condemned]".

5.2. Rape and sexual assault

Various testimonies acknowledged repeated incidents of the involvement of French soldiers in acts of rape and violent sexual assault towards Rwandan girls and women and that these violent acts often targeted specifically Tutsis. In one of these cases the violent acts led to the death of the victim. On the night of 6th February 1993, a young Tutsi girl named Jeanne Mukarusine, aged 20 years at the time, was sexually assaulted very violently by French soldiers of Opération Noroît who were guarding Kanombe airport.

The French soldiers caught the girl leaving a nightclub, «Kigali Night” which belonged to the son of the former Rwandan President. They demanded that she leave with them and she refused. The French soldiers then forced her into their car and began striking her and tearing her clothes off using bonnets. They violently inserted their fingers and a knife into her genitals then smeared the blood that flowed from her genitals on her face.

When they reached Remera Guest House, which belonged to Murindahabi where she was staying, the French soldiers threw her out on to the ground, naked and in critical condition. The police, led by Lieutenant Mugabo of Remera police station, were alerted by a security guard of the neighbouring house and came to investigate the incident. They then took the bleeding victim to Kigali Central Hospital where she was admitted for an entire week. The medical examination revealed a severe wound as deep as her uterus as well as several other body lesions.

Before her discharge from the hospital, Lieutenant Mugabo along with French military officers approached her and explained to her that they did not wish this matter to become public in Kigali. They then offered her five hundred thousand Rwandan Francs and ordered her to remain silent about what she had endured and to leave Kigali and return to her native village in Mugusa (Butare). She was not to make any complaint or reveal the incident to journalists or human rights associations. Lieutenant Mugabo extracted a statement from her and she was given the money and ordered to leave Kigali immediately. The girl returned to her home village on 14th of February 1993.

Investigations conducted by the Commission revealed that Jeanne Mukarusine finally died in Butare of the wounds she had sustained and the damage to her genital organs. Her death was reported to the Commission by a witness named Daphrose Mukarwego, the spouse of Mulindahabi, the owner of the Guest House in which the victim was living:

“Our night watchman told me that on the morning of the incident, Jeanne had suffered a violent assault by French soldiers stationed at Kanombe airport and that she had ended up in Kigali Central Hospital. He explained to me that the soldiers were drunk and very violent. I asked one of the victim’s friends named Daria to go and inform her family. She left and returned with the victim’s brother. The police and the French threatened them and offered them money to remain silent and return to their village. They had no choice but to accept in the interest of self-preservation. A few days after her return, Jeanne died of her wounds.”

Gerard Ndabakenga, whose testimony has already been partly cited above, stated that he witnessed French soldiers raping two Tutsi students. According to his words the soldiers were staying at Nyakinama University campus in 1992 and their daily activity consisted in giving Hutu Power militia firearms training. During evenings and on their days off, they shared beer with extremist Hutu students in the university canteen and even with Ruhengeri authorities who were known to be the radicals of the regime. They refused to associate with Tutsis or even Hutus from the Southern or the central parts and they raped two Tutsi students within the campus compound.

“Two Tutsi students named Ber and Y, who originated from Kibuye were there for their supplementary exams and were raped by French soldiers inside the campus. They were betrayed to these French soldiers by Hutu extremist students, originating from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri in collusion with others from Byumba who were referred to as `war displaced'. The two girls were headed to the restaurant and passed through the corridor in front of the rooms of the French soldiers. This was the only possible exit they had. The French soldiers surrounded them and forced them into their rooms. We could hear them cry but no one among us could dare go to their rescue. It was Muramutsa, my friend and a friend of Yvonne, who revealed to us that Yvonne had confided to her about these rapes. She told him the French soldiers had terrorized and threatened them with violence if they mounted any resistance” .

5.3 Support and assistance in perpetration of violent acts

From 1990, French soldiers assisted in the perpetration of violent acts carried out by Rwandan militia against Rwandan civilians or watched without intervening. A Belgian journalist, Jean - Pierre Martin, was witness to this:

"It was in November of 1990 when I first met the French soldiers. What surprised me most was in addition to the brutality used in suppressing the minority of the population. The French army was not only complacent but even participative. On three occasions, I witnessed French soldiers stand by as raids and assault were being mounted on Rwandan citizens. That was at the roundabout next to the military head quarters, it also occurred near Chez Lando, and at the large roundabout at the centre of Kigali. These brutalities toward Rwandan citizens and these raids on people who were being mounted onto jeeps or trucks all happened in the presence of French soldiers"

Jean-Pierre Martin specified that the minority group of which he spoke were Tutsi civilians, and that the French soldiers did not only watch passively, but seemed to be directly participating in the organisation and implementation of these violent acts:

"One got the clear impression that it was the French who organized the entire operation that made the laws and controlled the operations where these raids were carried out in Kigali. I remember two cases in which two people were beaten with the rifle butt of a FAR soldier right beside French soldiers. One simply had to question the attitude of these soldiers who were obviously not reacting".

In the same report, Jean-Pierre Martin continued, saying: "I also have images in my memory that I will never forget, in one particular incident, there was a pregnant woman who was being torn apart 100 m in front of me. There was a jeep with two French soldiers who were laughing, just 50 m away from where this was happening. It was two Belgian soldiers passing who went to disperse the killers ".

Jean de Dieu Rucamayida, who was formerly in charge of the branch of the French Cultural Centre in Ruhengeri, was arrested on October 2, 1990. He was held and accused of being an RPF spy. In Ruhengeri, he was interrogated by Lt-Colonel Jean-Marie Vianney Nzapfakumunsi who was the head of the national police academy, and Captain Michel Caillaud, a French instructor at the same academy. Rucamayida reported to the Commission that he was tortured by these two officers:

I was taken into Nzapfakumunsi’s office, who was with Captain Caillaud. He wanted to recover the keys to the Cultural Centre and I refused to give them up to him. Nzapfakumunsi gave the order to a Rwandan corporal to bind my hands to the chair and handcuff me. Captain Caillaud then started brutality interrogating me about my supposed connections with RPF. When he was not satisfied with my answers, he gestured to Nzapfakumunsi who in turn ordered the Rwandan corporal to strike me. The corporal obeyed their orders and struck me hard on the chest and shoulders ".

Since his escape from Rwanda in 1994, Lt-Colonel Nzapfakumunsi lives in exile in France where he has the benefits of political asylum despite attempts by French human rights organisations that alerted the French Office for the protection of refugees and stateless people (ORPFA) in 1997, regarding the criminal past of this former police officer.

6. Violent interrogation of RPF prisoners of war

Several testimonies received by the Commission pointed out that RPF Prisoners of war were subjected to interrogation with torture, ill treatments and execution, especially at Kigali military camps. Some executions were carried out in the presence and with the participation of the French; others were carried out in their absence but witnesses state that the French were aware of their existence and seemed to condone them. Bodies of executed victims were often driven to Kanombe Military Camp to be buried there.

6.1 Threats and ill treatments

Former RPF prisoners of war reported that interrogations carried out by French soldiers were often associated with threats, verbal harassment and physical violence. Sometimes, these threats and violent acts were carried out against soldiers who were still minors who deserved a special treatment adapted to their age. Francis Bazimya was 14 years old at the time he was captured on the frontline at the end of 1990 in Nyakayaga, and then held at Kigali military camp and at the central prison. He was interrogated with intimidation by Lt-Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, the head of FAR military intelligence in the presence of a French soldier:

"Nsengiyumva interrogated me in his office regarding the number of RPF soldiers, the types of weapons we used, names and ranks of our military officers, etc. There was a French officer present during this interrogation. Nsengiyumva insulted me calling me a little cockroach and intimidated me so as to provide him with answers regarding the organisation of the RPF. When they were not satisfied with my answer even when it was true, Nsengiyumva ordered his bodyguards to strike me, and they did. The French soldier was watching without reacting ".

Pelagie Mutibagirwa, aged 20 at the time of her capture, also went through an identical experience to that of Francis Bazimya. She was captured in Gabiro at the end of 1990 and was driven to Kigali camp where she was interrogated by Rwandan and white soldiers:

"During my detention at Kigali Camp, I was beaten with sticks and rifle butts along with my fellow-prisoners until some of them, whom I met again later, had become crippled. I spent over one week there. My interrogation was carried out by a Rwandan officer with a white soldier in uniform by his side. The Rwandan soldier interrogated me and translated to the white soldier what I said. They exchanged words between them after which the Rwandan soldier resumed his questions or made me repeat what I had just said. Before starting my interrogation, they intimidated me by threatening me with death if I did not tell them the whole truth. When I did not give the answer they wished to hear about the RPF, or when I remained silent to think, they insulted me ".

Jean-Paul Gasore, an RPA mechanical engineer, was captured on the frontline on 28th November, 1990 at Nyawera, in the former district of Rukara while manning a reconnaissance position. After his capture, he was driven to Akagera hotel, then to the military headquarters of FAR in Kigali camp. He was interrogated on several occasions by Lt-Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, the head of military intelligence alongside French officers:

"The very first time I saw French soldiers was at the banks of Lake Ihema after my capture. The Rwandan and French soldiers interrogated me there, then at Akagera hotel. The second day, I was transferred to the military headquarters of the Rwandan army and handed over to Lt-Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva. He sat beside a French officer and a Rwandan gendarme with the rank of Commander. They interrogated me about the number of RPF soldiers, their sources of funds, their operational capacity, the types of weapons they used, particularly anti-aircraft weapons, the origin of these weapons, the types of communication equipment, the names and ranks of highranking officers, the sources of logistic and food supplies, etc. I refused to answer these questions. Nsengiyumva then ordered the Rwandan soldiers to strike me. They bound my arms behind my back then they violently hit me with clubs and sticks. They alternated the blows with electrocution with wires attached to various parts of my body to make me suffer. The French officer observed what occurred while discussing with Nsengiyumva ".

Jean-Paul Gasore stated to the Commission that his interrogation by the French continued for one week at Kigali camp then at the central prison where he was held until July 17th, 1992. In prison, the same French officer came to conduct further interrogations along with a Rwandan lady gendarme who was an interpreter. For one week two other French soldiers in uniform came one after the other to conduct interrogations while carefully taking notes. In January 1991, when RPF took over Ruhengeri, a French officer returned to the prison to question Gasore: “he asked me very precise questions about the type of military training of RPA troops and the locations where they received training in guerrilla warfare”. After getting exhausted by these repeated interrogations, Gasore took advantage of an opportunity involving CICR workers who were passing through the prison and he made his complaints to them. The head warden informed the French about it and they did not return any more.

Paul Rugenera, who was the supervising head of Kigali central prison at the time of the alleged incident, acknowledged having seen four French soldiers in 1991 conducting interrogation of RPF prisoners of war, including Gasore, in the office of the head warden. Paul Rugenera stressed that these prisoners were in a delicate state of health particularly due to serious wounds suffered since their capture and that they received no medical care from the prison authorities. The French did not seem concerned with it, they were more interested in the information they sought to obtain.

Ananie Habimana, another former RPF prisoner of war, stated that she was interrogated by French and Rwandan soldiers and suffered violent acts: "I was captured in February of 1991 and was driven to the district office of Kinigi. Rwandan soldiers were stationed there with the French. White soldiers photographed and interrogated me. Colonels Ndindiriyimana and Nsengiyumva took part in it. They asked me questions regarding the positions of our troops, our organisation, the types and the origin of our weapons, etc. I was then transferred to Ruhengeri central prison, where I was beaten ".

After one day of incarceration in Ruhengeri prison, the witness was transferred to Kigali camp, where the interrogation continued with the participation of the French:

"The white soldiers spoke with the Rwandan soldiers and decided to send me to Kigali. They forced me to lie in the back of a pick-up and put two 50Kg bags filled with potatoes over me. At Mukungwa bridge, they stopped and the soldiers told the curious peasants who were watching that I was an inyenzi and gave an old lady a stick to strike me with. She struck me hard and drew blood. I arrived at Kigali Camp on the 18th, still bound at the hands and feet. I spent the night there. The following day, Ndindiriyimana and Nsengiyumva arrived and interrogated me. After about one week, two French soldiers in uniform also came to interrogate me. They asked me questions about my personal history, the place I was captured, the real reasons why the RPF had began an armed struggle, the origin of our weapons and ammunition supplies, the types of weapons and vehicles we used, etc. They interrogated me in the presence of a Rwandan translator. After one week, the same French soldiers returned. They brought a weapon with them and asked me whether RPF had this type of weapon. I swore that RPF had no such weapon and that it rather had to be a weapon of FAR. They told me I lied and that they would forcefully make me admit that RPF possessed the weapon ".

The Commission also interviewed Rwandan witnesses and expatriates who had information about interrogation of RPF prisoners of war. The commission gathered accounts from former FAR soldiers who explained the severity of the ill treatments suffered by these prisoners. Jean-Paul Nturanyenabo, formally a second lieutenant in FAR from 1989 to 1994, trained at Bigogwe as an instructor by the French in April 1991, stated that he witnessed and participated in acts of torture in the operational sector of Ruhengeri:

"We captured RPF soldiers at Butaro, toward the end of 1991. We drove them to Mubona camp. The French photographed them and we locked them up in a cell at the camp. We then presented them to Colonel Bizimungu who interrogated them along with some French soldiers who were stationed at the camp or others from Mukamira ".

The witness continued to explain that the RPF prisoners of war were presented to Colonel Augustin Bizimungu and the French soldiers after a torture session inflicted upon them by the ex-FAR soldiers who had captured them on the frontline and the guards of the military camp who had received these prisoners: " Often, before presenting them to Bizimungu, we had fun practicing violent acts on them". In response to the question regarding whether the French were aware or had reason to believe that the prisoners of war were being subjected to acts of torture, the witness responded categorically:

"Of course the French were aware of our actions. They were screaming as we tortured them and their cell was not far away from the office where Bizimungu worked with the French. Besides, when we brought them for interrogation, the French and Rwandan soldiers who questioned them could obviously see the degradation of their physical state. They received violent beatings. In most cases their injuries were visible to the naked eye.”

In order to clarify the nature of the torture inflicted on prisoners of war, Nturanyenabo gave the following precise details:

"I remember an RPF corporal who refused to speak during the interrogation conducted by Bizimungu and a French officer. Bizimungu was very irritated and ordered us to deprive him of food until he agreed to speak. Four days elapsed and he still had not spoken a single word despite the deprivation of food. He was clearly in a state of physical weakness. The French officer and Bizimungu had the soldier brought from his cell and tried to question him but with no success".

As for the manner of interrogation and the exact role of the French, the witness added that: “it is Bizimungu who translated the answers of the prisoners of war to the French who in turn communicated questions for him to ask". So as to force them to speak "they were forced to endure various ill treatments and acts of torture like denying them access to toilets, keeping them in the cold because the weather was very cold in Ruhengeri, preventing them from washing their clothes, striking hands and feet… the French were aware of all that.”

These various testimonies of Rwandans are corroborated by Lawyer Eric Gillet, who carried out a mission of work in Rwanda from 12th to August 20th, 1991 within the framework of the "Project of legal aid with the Rwandan political prisoners". He collected information attesting to the participation of the French in the interrogation of RPF prisoners. The most important testimony that it reported is that of "Major " Jean Bosco Nyiligira, who announces that RPF prisoners had been questioned continuously for several days during the first week of August 1991, by French military officers in uniform. These interrogations had initially proceeded within the Rwandan Army Headquarters in the Kigali camp, then in administrative pavilions of the central prison of Kigali.

Lawyer Gillet gave a testimony about Nyiligira in which he said: "I met Nyiligira Jean Bosco at Kigali central prison on Monday August 19th […] He was interrogated in March [1991] by the prosecutor, then again by several French officers two weeks before our conversation. He was visibly very unhappy. The interrogations were prolonged in three two-hour sessions, conducted over three days.”

Jean Bosco Nyiligira revealed that he was imprisoned along with 17 other RPF members in Kigali central prison, and that they were all interrogated in the same way by French officers. During his investigations, Eric Gillet managed to gather other testimonies corroborating Nyiligira’s account: “the participation of French officers in interrogation was later confirmed to me by a university student in Kigali who saw them himself while visiting the convicts on a Friday in January. He told me the interrogation site was guarded by French soldiers. All the RPF prisoners were questioned in this manner.”

Nyiligira and several of his companions endured interrogation in a very delicate state of health; they had untreated wounds that they had sustained during their capture.

Documents analysed by the Commission indicate that senior French Army executives present in Rwanda received regular feedback from their Rwandan counterparts about results of these interrogations. A document of the Rwandan military headquarters of October 30th, 1990 indicating the minutes of a meeting chaired by Colonel Serubuga, head of the joint military headquarters of FAR, in which three French officers took part, Cdt Caille, Cdt Refalo and Capt. Rodriguez, pointed out that results of an interrogation of an RPF prisoner of war had been delivered to them. The same type of information was delivered to the French in a meeting held on 1st November, 1990, held at the military headquarters conference room and chaired by Lt-Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva. Two French officers participated, Capt. Rodriguez and Second Lt. Jacquemin. It is stated in this document that "the G2 EM AR informed the participants of the existing situation in the combat zone based on information provided by our forces on the frontline as well as by captured prisoners ".

6.2 Execution of prisoners of war

RPF prisoners of war were executed by Rwandan soldiers in view and with the knowledge of the French, and in one specific case, the French soldiers directly took part in the execution of prisoners.

Francis Bazimya described an execution process in which the French took part:

"One day, the soldiers who were guarding us took four prisoners around 1000 hrs. They dressed them in military uniform and began to strike them violently. We watched the scene through small holes that were in the walls of our cell. Throughout this gruesome scene, four French soldiers assisted in the process. They were in uniform, with pistols and bayonets on the belts of their trousers. They surrounded the area in which the torture was being committed and supervised what was happening. One of the victims tried to flee but a French soldier caught him and handed him back to the Rwandan soldiers. They intensified the beating until the boy fell to the ground and could no longer rise up at all. The scene lasted a long time. They kept striking them then resting under a nearby shade where they could watch their victims after which they resumed their work. The last victim died at around 1300 hrs. The killers performed their acts with a form of sadism that I found quite rare. For example, I saw one soldier trampling a victim who was in agony saying: `` poor cockroach, lets see if you will resurrect ! ".

Jean-Paul Gasore, a fellow prisoner of Francis Bazimya, confirms the account of Bizimana while giving a more general description about the level of knowledge the French soldiers had, regarding these executions:

"RPF soldiers were executed at Kigali camp, in the place called `Guard corps '. Some were killed during the day while others were killed at night; we watched this through holes in the wall of our cell, and we heard their cries. The French witnessed the execution of a group of prisoners killed during the day. Often some prisoners were killed by the Rwandan soldiers after the French had left. Army trucks transported their bodies to Kanombe camp around 0600 hrs in the morning. I believe the French were aware of this. Since they took part in our interrogations and in registering in the military intelligence files, how is it that in the morning after they returned to Kigali camp they could no longer find some of us, but they did not ask anything? Couldn’t these French soldiers see that there were some prisoners missing among us? ”

Pelagie Mutibagirwa also reported the beatings she suffered during her period of captivity:

"I was beaten violently but luckily I survived. Some of my fellow prisoners were killed. They used to take some of us and leave others; I am not aware of their reasons for this. The French soldiers who came to see us had to be aware of what was happening. They came so frequently to Kigali camp that they could possibly not know what their Rwandan counterparts were doing ".

Ananie Habimana added:

"Where I was held at Kigali camp, people accused of wanting to join RPF were killed. I am not saying that it was the French who killed them directly, but they knew about it. I remember one case of a young boy who was killed on the day devoted to FAR. He belonged to a group of young people who had been arrested in Kibungo prefecture. I learned that they were killed in Kanombe. These acts were committed regularly at Kigali military camp. The soldiers killed people, then put them in sacs and transported them in trucks to a destination that I did not know. I later on learned that they were buried in a pit at Kanombe military camp ".

Jean-Paul Nturanyenabo reported the execution of prisoners of war at Mubona camp in Ruhengeri:

"Certain RPF soldiers imprisoned in Ruhengeri who had been interrogated by the French were killed by Lt Niyonsenga Pascal in full view of everyone. Neither the French nor Bizimungu bothered to inquire about the reason for these killings. Their silence leads me to believe that they were not bothered but certainly aware and even condoned the acts of Lt Niyonsenga. "

7. Support for a policy of mass murder

Towards the end of the 1980s, and especially after the start of the war, the regime’s criminal inclinations were as clear as day, they were marked by massacres that were instigated by high government officials over the radio. Reports that originated from French diplomats stationed in Rwanda, the Rwandan civil society and international non-governmental organisations, pointed out with ample clarity to the regime’s criminal nature and worries about its genocidaire inclinations.

Between 1990 and at the onset of the genocide of Tutsis in April 1994, many massacres occurred at various locations in Rwanda, often with the complicity of the authorities and the army: Kibilira (October 1990), Bigogwe (February 1991), Bugesera (March 1992), Kibuye (August 1992), Shyorongi (December 1992), Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Kibuye (December-January 1993), Mbogo (March 1993) and in many other areas of the country. Documents of the old Rwandan administration regarding these massacres consulted by the Commission showed that the Rwandan authorities estimated the count of human victims and amount of property damage caused by these massacres, which clearly proves that they were not unaware of the perpetration of these acts.

A document of the Minister of Internal affairs and Community Development of 17/07/1991 relating to the massacres committed in the prefectures of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Byumba and Kibungo between January and June of 1991, stated the count of victims: 1481 dead, 302 disabled, 633 widowed and 2274 orphaned. Another document of 6th July 1991 relating to a massacre in Bigogwe in 1991 in the prefectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi indicated a record of 286 people killed in Ruhengeri prefecture and 86 people killed in Gisenyi. They included the names of the victims, their villages, sectors and districts of residence.

The repeated massacres were condemned in many internal and international reports, including the reports of French diplomats and their defence attaché based in Kigali. However, the attitude that prevailed in Paris was one of silence regarding the genocide ideology of the Rwandan regime on one hand, and the serious human rights abuses that were being committed on the other. Whenever the French authorities issued statements regarding the subject of these massacres, they either minimised their severity, or defended the regime that was orchestrating them. The following table illustrates a summery of the extent of these massacres committed between October 1990 and January 1994.





















Tableau 1: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED IN RWANDA BETWEEN OCTOBER 1990 AND JANUARY 1994

Events Facts Date Place Presumed perpetrators Source




Massacres in Mutara and Byumba regions
in October 1990 300 Tutsi civilians killed, men, women and children
October 1990 Mutara region FAR, militia Amnesty International (A.I.) Report, May 1992
18 Tutsi civilians brought from Murambi by Gatete

7th October 1990 Byumba military camp FAR International Commission of Inquiry, (ICE) p.57
150 RPF prisoners of war October - November 1990 Commune Ryabega
(Byumba) FAR ICE, p.61
Between 500 and 1000 civilians from the Hima clan

8th October 1990 Mutara
(Byumba) FAR ICE, p.62



Massacres of Bagogwe in October 1990 352 civilians killed, 345 Tutsis and 7 Hutus
October 1990 Commune Kibirira
(Gisenyi) Local authorities, militia SRS Ngororero II
20 Tutsi civilians killed
October 1990 Cummune Satinsyi
(Gisenyi) Local authorities, militia SRS Ngororero II
120 Tutsi civilians killed
October 1990 Commune Kibirira
(Gisenyi) Local authorities, militia, government agents ICE, p.21
160 Tutsi civilians killed

October 1990 Ngororero Sub-district
(Gisenyi) FAR and Militia, with encouragement from local authorities AI Doc. I








Massacre of Bagogwe, end of January to February 1991 14 Tutsi civilians killed, members of 4 families 23rd January 1991 Commune Kanama
(Gisenyi) Securiry forces and local militia AI Doc. I
Between 500 and 1000 Tutsi civilians killed, men, women and children of the Bagogwe 23rd January – mid-February 1991 Commune Kinigi
(Ruhengeri) Local authorities, FRA and armed vigilantes AI Letter to Nsanzimana
2 Tutsi brothers killed, with their 2 uncles 25th January1991 – 2 February 1991 Commune headquarters, Busogo
(Ruhengeri) Local government officials and FAR AI Letter to Nsanzimana
30 Tutsi civilians killed 23rd January – mid-February 1991 Commune Nkuli
(Ruhengeri) Militia and forest guards of the Volcanoes National Park AI Letter to Nsanzimana
14 Tutsi civilians killed, members of one family 4th February 1991 Kanama, Buzizi Sector, Kibuye village Soldiers from Gisenyi military camp AI Letter to Nsanzimana
370 Tutsi civilians killed January – March 1991 Kibirira, Gisenyi Local authorities, FAR, Hutu militia IMBAGA newspaper
372 Tutsi civilians killed January – July 1991 Prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri Not specified Rwandan Ministry of Internal Affairs (Document dated 6 July1991)
Compilation of a list of victims of massacres in northern and eastern regions, January – June 1991 1481 civilians killed January – June 1991 Prefectures of Byumba, Kibungo, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi Not specified Rwandan Ministry of Internal Affairs (Document dated 17/07/1991)
.

Massacres in Bugesera, March 1992 52 persons killed Between 5th and 17th March 1992 Kanzenze Not specified MININTER
64 persons killed Between 5th and 17th March 1992 Gashora
(Kigali rural) Not specified Idem
36 persons killed Between 5th and 17th March 1992 Ngenda
(Kigali rural) Not specified Idem
62 persons killed March – May 1992 Kanzenze Militia Kigali Prefecture Commission
84 persons killed March - May 1992 Gashora Militia Kigali Commission
36 persons killed March - May 1992 Ngenda Militia Kigali Commission
300 Tutsi civilians killed, men, women and children Beginning of March 1992 Commune Kanzenze (Kigali rural) FAR, Militia AI Letter to Nsanzimana
300 persons of Tutsi origin killed March 1992 Bugesera Local authorities, FAR, Militia Rwanda Rushya Newspaper
Massacres in Kibuye, July – August 1992 85 persons killed July - August 1992 Commune Gishyita and Rwamatamu
(Kibuye) Local authorities, FAR, Militia ADL
Massacre of Bagogwe, end of 1992, beginning of 1993 137 persons killed on the basis of their ethnic origin End 1992 – beginning 1993 Gisenyi Prefecture (Communes not specified) Local authorities, FAR, Militia SRS Gisenyi


130 Tutsi civilians killed January – February 1993 Satinsyi (74)
Ramba (55)
Kibirira (1)
Gisenyi Prefecture Local authorities, militia SRS Ngororero II
Compilation of the number of victims 1481 civilians killed January – June 1991 Prefectures of Byumba, Kibungo, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi Unspecified Rwandan Ministry of Internal Affairs (Document dated 17/07/1991)
Compilation of the number of victims 2000 Tutsis killed 1st October 1990 to mid-mars 1993 Gisenyi, Bugesera, Ruhengeri, Byumba Local authorities, FAR, militia ICE, p.48
Compilation of the number of victims 2300 civilians killed October 1990 – end of 1993 Various communes in Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Kibuye, Kigali, Byumba, Kibungo Local authorities, FAR, militia Amnesty International


.



According to local and international human rights associations, UN institutions and the press, these massacres were not spontaneous but rather a political and security strategy of the regime. Information about these massacres spread very quickly. In addition, the local and international opinion, more particularly the diplomatic community in Kigali, was well informed about it. The possibility of genocide against the Tutsi minority was mentioned quite early, and more specifically in internal French diplomatic telegrams and reports. Knowledge of the possibility of a genocide was illustrated in the first reports published in 1990 and increased during the entire period preceding the ultimate genocide of April - July 1994.

7.1. The Internal French Reports

During the first days of the conflict in October 1990, the Defence attaché stationed in Kigali, Colonel Jacques Galinié, sent several messages to his superiors in France, requesting increased military support for the Rwandan army , but also mentioning the possibility of a genocide against Tutsis.

In a telegram of October 15, 1990, Colonel Galinié wrote: “Certain Tutsis (…) are of the opinion that there is reason to expect the occurrence of a genocide if the European forces (French and Belgian) are withdrawn too early and do not prevent it simply by their presence.” Other military dispatches protected by defence confidentiality that were accessed by Patrick De Saint-Exupéry show that France knew about the risk of mass massacres against Tutsis that occurred in October 1990. The first of these messages announced that “Despite the uncertainties and due to nervousness, repression was going on in Kigali. Very many suspects were arrested, imprisoned, interrogated and sometimes shot. The population that was now at risk of food shortages readily denounced the victims. Aggravation of this hunting could escalate into a slaughter.”

The second dispatch pointed out that “Hutu peasants mobilized by the single party intensified their search for Tutsi suspects in the hills. Massacres were mentioned in the Kibirira area [sic!], twenty kilometres North-West of Gitarama. The already mentioned risk of generalised confrontation could therefore become a reality.” The last dispatch reported that “there was a possibility of serious violence against internal Tutsi populations that would either be spontaneous or directly encouraged by most radical of the regime who were playing their end game.”

The correspondence of Ambassador Martres gives a similar account and also mentions the risk of genocide. In a letter of October 15th, 1990, sent to the Foreign Minister and to the Chief of Staff, particularly President Mitterrand, George Martens wrote that: "the Rwandan population of Tutsi origin believes that the military campaign had failed on the psychological front. They still counted on a military victory, thanks to the support in men and resources from the Diaspora. The military victory, even partial, would enable them to escape the genocide". George Martres confirmed this information before the MIP by declaring that in 1990, "the genocide was already foreseeable by this period (…). Certain Hutus even had the audacity to insinuate it. Colonel Serubuga, Assistant Head of the military of the Rwandan army had been delighted by the RPF attack, which would be used to justify the massacre of Tutsis. The Tutsis were constantly fearful about genocide.”

7.2. Reports of Non-Governmental Organisations

In May 1992, Amnesty International made an assessment of the human rights situation between 1990 and 1992. It stated that "representatives of the Rwandan government as well as members of the security forces belonging to the Hutu ethnic majority continue to condone and to commit human rights violations directed primarily against the Tutsi minority with impunity.” Among the most serious cases, Amnesty reported “the extra-judicial execution of 1000 Tutsis; the generalized application of torture and other forms of ill treatment suffered by prisoners; tens of disappearances; and the imprisonment of over 8000 people among whom most were political prisoners and the majority of imprisonments had no indictment or process.”

In March 1993, an international Commission of enquiry into human rights violations in Rwanda since 1st October, 1990, consisting of four non-governmental human rights organisations, conducted field enquiries on the ground from 7th to 21st January 1993. It published its report on 7th March, 1993, that drafted the assessment of human rights violations in Rwanda and revealed the mechanisms of a system of massacre of civilians based on ethnicity. It pointed out the implication of the highest government authorities in the preparation and implementation of these massacres and emphasized the existing risk of a genocide against Tutsis. Among the implicated persons, the Commission named President Habyarimana and his spouse, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Jean Marie Vianney Mugemana, the Minister of Labour, Joseph Nzirorera, Colonel Elie Sagatwa and the Mayor of Ruhengeri, Charles Nzabagerageza.

This report was widely publicised by the media, and several governments used it to draw conclusions about their relations with Rwanda. In the evening of 28th January, 1993, Jean Carbonare, head of the Commission, was invited by a reporter named Bruno Masure to France 2 television news upon his return from Rwanda and he broke into tears on live television condemning “the magnitude and systematisation of the massacres of civilians” which had nothing to do with “ethnic conflicts” but rather involved “an organized policy” in which “the level of power implicated in this genocide, this crime against humanity was strikingly high – we emphasise these words.” The inquiry of Jean Carbonare was marked by images of a mass grave of human bones found by the investigators in Mutura (Gisenyi) and Kinigi (Ruhengeri).

Jean Carbonare was received in Rwanda by Ambassador Martres to whom he gave a detailed description of the gravity of the facts uncovered by the Commission he had headed. After that discussion Martres addressed a letter to Bruno Delaye which illustrated that he was well aware of the gravity of human rights violations that prevailed in Rwanda, without expressing any desire to force the Rwandan regime to put an end to it:

"Mr Carbonare […] informed me of the results obtained so far by this mission […] They collected an impressive amount of information on the massacres that occurred since the beginning of the war in October 1990 and more particularly on those of Bagogwe (a group of ethnic Tutsis) after the attack on Ruhengeri in January 1991. Regarding the facts, the report […] only adds horror to the already known horror. […] The massacres were instigated by President Habyarimana himself during a meeting with his close collaborators. […] During this meeting, the operation was planned with the order to proceed to a systematic genocide, if necessary by using the pretext of the military campaign and by implicating the local population in the killings with the obvious purpose of rendering them more determined in the fight against the enemy ethnic group ".

7.3 Reports by the Rwandan civil society

On February 24th, 1993, five major Rwandan human rights associations wrote a letter to President François Mitterrand reporting an “Ongoing cycle of violence in the country” organized under the orders of “death squads” composed of “about fifteen people, with important positions and with close ties to the President” from "his party, the MRND ". In their report of the situation, these associations specified that the criminals perceived "the reinforcement of the French contingent as support for their partisan cause".

They were indignant at the fact that the report of the International Commission of inquiry of 1993 had triggered no consideration among the French authorities, and found it “surprising at the very least that French officials considered the testimony of Jean Carbonare on France 2 to be an exaggeration ". They concluded their letter by asking President Mitterrand not to continue supporting a “shameless villain of a fighter", and "to use all the possible means […] to thwart the bloodthirsty regime of President Habyarimana, executed by his organising group of death squads, members of his party, MRND, and its ally, CDR [… ].”

An identical alarm was also expressed by the main Rwandan opposition political parties in a “Letter to the President of the Republic regarding the security problem” of May 24, 1993, with copies sent to all the diplomatic missions and consulates stationed in Kigali. In this correspondence, the party signatories condemned the increasing political assassinations and “other wretched crimes that shamed Rwanda before all other Nations and plunged the Rwandan people into desolation and despair” in which the Rwandan regime was implicated.

[XXPANTHAXX]

7.4. UN Reports

During this same period, reports from international organisations and those from UNAMIR corroborated the facts revealed in other reports and affirmed with no ambiguity that the regime was implicated in the organisation of the massacres. In addition, a special reporter of the human rights Commission, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, conducted a mission in Rwanda in April 1993 to disclose human rights violations in the country.

In his report, he stated that the aforementioned violations were especially carried out by the militia and squads organized by the MRND and CDR parties, often trained by the local authorities and by members of the army or gendarmerie. As already mentioned above, the report clearly indicated the massacres in question

7.5 The repeated perpetrations of massacres and the reinforcement of French military support

Despite the grave extent of the massacres towards the Tutsi minority perpetrated between October 1990 and March 1993 and the fear of an actual genocide mentioned by various observers, including French officials, France still continued to provide unconditional military support to the regime that orchestrated them, in particular by increasing its supply of weapons and ammunition, and by providing reinforcements of troops each time the Rwandan army failed to contain offensives of the RPA. It is illustrated in the following graph.
































In order to analyse these two graphs, one can begin with the specific tasks of the two army contingents. There was first the offensive intention of the DAMI reinforcements that came to support combat capacity of FAR and, in at least two cases, fought side by side with them in June 1992 and February 1993. Then, Noroît contingents came to support and control strategic positions like Kigali city and the airport.

The numbers of Noroît were increased with each significant offensive of the RPF then stabilised or decreased when the offensives ended. On the other hand, the numbers of Noroît were affected by the occurrence of massacres.

The numbers of DAMI were constantly increased almost over the entire period. They increased each time there was an RPF offensive and did not decrease. There was an exception at the end of 1992 when there was a decrease in their numbers. But it should be noted that this decrease was not caused by the massacres of Gisenyi in December 1992 because they had began before. Moreover, there was no documentary evidence indicating that there was a decrease in the number of DAMI troops due to massacres. Generally speaking, there was an increase in the numbers of DAMI troops over the entire period despite the massacres.

However, there was an evident change in dynamics regarding the relation between the massacres and the RPA offences. Whereas the first two great massacre incidents (October 1990 and January-March 1991) closely followed two significant RPA offences, the other two great massacre incidents (Bugesera in March 1992 and Gisenyi in December 92-March 1993) occurred in the absence of any RPA offences.

There were four repeated co-occurrences between French reinforcements and military intervention and the massacres that occurred just before, during or just after massacres expressing French military support that was in no way influenced by these mass crimes. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the repetition of the massacres was not completely independent of this military support that was renewed regardless of the massacres. Regarding this relation between military reinforcements, the massacres and its consequences before the genocide, Gerard Prunier wrote that: “This blind engagement would have catastrophic consequences because, as the situation worsened, the Rwandan government would believe that, no matter what they did [it is not we who underline], they could always count on the French. And nothing contradicted this.” It would not be unlikely to believe that by underlining “no matter what it did”, Prunier was referring to April-July 1994 genocide.

8. Diplomatic support for the Rwandan regime

In the course of the disputed context of the French military intervention in Rwanda and because of the nature of the Habyarimana regime and the internal war launched by RPF, France had to accompany its intervention with vigorous diplomatic action. They did, throughout the three years that their intervention lasted. In the bilateral regional African and international scene, they did not hesitate to represent Rwanda so as to defend it. The main strategy of this French diplomatic action was to give the impression that they were seeking a negotiated resolution to the crisis even as a mediator between the Rwandan warring parties while secretly supporting its ally, Habyarimana. The French diplomacy was mainly directed toward four axes: a Belgian and an African axis at the beginning of the war, when France believed that it alone could manage to convince that axis; a Western alliance when the conflict proved to be complex, an axis centred on the Arusha negotiations and other peace talks; and finally, an international axis when it became obvious that the UN was the last resort.

8.1. Actions alongside Belgium and African States

At the very beginning of the war, the French believed that they were able to coordinate their action with Belgium presuming that this would be judicious so as to ensure the success of its diplomacy in favour of Rwanda. The intention was to initiate “preliminary contact with Belgium so that our attitude is not perceived as an affront or an aim to oust Brussels.” But they underestimated the complexity of the coalition that Belgium had built with most of the government as well as the general awareness that the Belgians attached towards events that occurred in their former colonies. The Belgian intervention of October 1990 in favor of the Habyarimana regime under the context of massacres and other serious human rights violations caused protests in Belgium.

The debate occurred in Belgium, hardly one month after the landing deployment of the Belgian troops on Rwandan soil, and pushed the government to make the decision to withdraw them by 1st November 1990. This reversal was embarrassing for France.

Faced with the risk of insulation, especially if Belgium pushed for a discussion regarding this issue within the European Community, the president’s advisor, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, proposed that they shift the attention of the matter towards the regional countries. “It would perhaps be necessary to organise a mission headed by Mr. Pelletier in the regional countries (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda) in order to express our support for the initiation of regional dialogue to allow us to reach ‘an African’ resolution to the conflict. President Museveni is already petitioning for it as well as Rwanda”

"In any event,” added Claude Arnaud, French Ambassador responsible for the mission to the president of the Republic, “it is through regional dialogue (and not the twelve the Belgians seem to have opted for) that the Rwandan problem will be resolved. Tanzania is less involved than Uganda, Burundi, or Zaire and would undoubtedly be the most reasonable mediator given that the Secretary-General of the OAU is himself Tanzanian.”

It was for this reason that from the 6th to the 9th of November 1990, the Minister for Co-operation and Development, Jacques Pelletier, headed a mission in the regional countries in which Jean-Christophe Mitterrand participated, an adviser of the President of the Republic. This approach of meetings between the regional Heads of State (who were functioning in the context of the OAU) and French diplomats organised a regional conference focused on the refugee problem, planned for the 7th to the 15th of February 1991. The regional countries (Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire) were most concerned because they hosted the largest majority of Rwandan refugees.

In a letter addressed to the minister of State for Foreign Affairs, it was proposed that France should ensure that the European Community puts pressure on the various regional Heads of State such that each one is delegated with a particular task to contribute to the success of the conference on Rwandan refugees.

In preparation of this conference, Paul Dijoud and General Huchon went to the region and to Rwanda where they met President Habyarimana on 19th July, 1991. The trip of the French emissary to Rwanda was followed by a meeting organized on 14th August, 1991 in Paris between the Rwandan and Ugandan Foreign Affairs Ministers with Paul Dijoud and Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, who also received Paul Kagame on 21st September, 1991 as a representative of the RPF. These meetings were the subject of a report delivered to the Ambassadors of France to Uganda and Rwanda.

The French mediators had agreed that RPF could no longer be shielded off if they were to clear the controversy surrounding French policy in Rwanda but RPF remained convinced that they still represented President Habyarimana. First of all there was the incident in which the French, through Mrs. Catherine Boivineau, refused to receive Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe, the RPF chairperson in the delegation under the pretext that he belonged to the Habyarimana government before going into exile and rallying with the RPF. Kanyarengwe was a Hutu from the north like Habyarimana and the attitude of the French was interpreted to be in alliance with the principals of Habyarimana who preferred ethnic polarization between Hutus and Tutsis.

In order to tackle the refugee problem, Paul Dijoud proposed that the world must come together to solve it, but the French diplomats adopted the course of the Rwandan authorities and sought to dissuade RPF from pursuing political claims, but rather to accept a “humane” return to the country. Addressing representatives of RPF he said “how can RPF change from a military movement into a civilian organisation? It would be necessary to find civilian occupations for RPF soldiers because their integration into the Rwandan army would pose a difficult problem." Then he continued to say, “can places be found for you in the interim government? There are three things that prevent the Rwandan authorities from doing that: i) the Rwandan people are against you; ii) the opposition parties are against you; iii) and it is not in your interest to get integrated because you would be a minority and your resolutions would never be adopted.”

It was in this light that Paul Dijoud suggested that Rwandan passports be distributed to refugees in order to “show them his determination to solve their problems and restore their confidence in the Government.”

During all of 1991 and part of the following year, it was France that oversaw the diplomatic process surrounding the Rwandan conflict. During this period, they also exercised control over the Uganda Rwandan borders to assess the degree of Uganda’s involvement in the conflict; this role was carried out by the “French Observers Mission” (MOF) which was mentioned above.

8.2. Partiality in the peace talks

During the various phases of the conflict and the reconciliation efforts between the parties, France wanted to play the role of either direct mediation between the Rwandan government and RPF or take part in the negotiations as an observer like the other African and Western countries especially as part of the Arusha peace talks. In these two roles, they were supposed to show impartiality. To the contrary they instead used this opportunity to extend their unconditional support to the Habyarimana regime.

In an account given by minister Casimir Bizimungu to president Habyarimana relating to the process of a tripartite meeting between Rwanda, Uganda and the RPF that had taken place in Paris under the auspices of France on 14th August, 1991 revealed that before the aforementioned meeting, Paul Dijoud held a secret meeting with minister Bizimungu and “conceded to him that France which is considered to be a friend and ally of Rwanda in the war must also contribute to the stability of its diplomatic position”

Minister Bizimungu stated that during this meeting, Paul Dijoud: “said to the Inkotanyi that the French military presence in Rwanda would not allow for their military victory [RPF]. He made it clear to them that their military escapade was doomed to fail. While accepting the fact that the Inkotanyi were capable of doing damage, he still ruled out the possibility that they would seize power in Kigali. […] France explained to them that they obviously could not win the elections since they were a small minority […]. And that they must consequently agree to be ordinary citizens.”

As soon as the meeting was concluded, Paul Dijoud secretly met again with minister Bizimungu to offer him a guarantee of French support in the war Rwanda was engaged in against the RPF. In his own words, Minister Bizimungu stated that: “Mr Dijoud wished to meet me after the departure of the Ugandan delegation to reassure me of the unconditional French support to Rwanda.” In concluding his report, Minister Bizimungu said that he was “persuaded of the determination of France that was considered a friend and ally. Mr Dijoud had offered reassurance of France’s availability to support us to effectively face this aggression […]. My meeting with Mr Dijoud also convinced me that France […] was behind us.”

The role played by France in these reconciliation initiatives was also evident through the violent and aggressive behaviour expressed by French officials toward RPF leaders. In January 1992, France invited an RPF delegation to Paris for a meeting with representatives of the Rwandan government. The delegation included the military head of RPF, at the time, Paul Kagame, his adviser Emmanuel Ndahiro, and other RPF leaders, Patrick Mazimpaka, Jacques Bihozagara and Aloysie Inyumba.

The day before this meeting, the RPF delegation was subjected to an intimidation attempt. They were accommodated at the Hilton hotel when they realised at some point that Emmanuel Ndahiro was missing. They looked for him in vain until dawn when a police patrol arrived accompanying him in handcuffs. The police officers ransacked and rummaged through the rooms of the members of the delegation, then arrested Paul Kagame and Emmanuel Ndahiro and placed them in police custody in a Paris jail from 0700 to 1800 hrs.

After the French side offered their apologies, the delegation was received by various persons, in particular Paul Dijoud, then Jean-Christophe Mitterrand and Catherine Boivineau in charge of human rights and humanitarian affaires. During their discussion, Paul Dijoud endeavoured to make it clear to the RPF delegation that they were to give up their armed struggle and political ambitions.

In response to the resolve of the RPF delegation, Paul Dijoud was irritated and mentioned the following words: "if you do not end this war, if you continue and seize power in the country, you will not find your brothers and your families, because they will all have been massacred.”

On another occasion in a meeting between the Rwandan government and RPF organized in Paris from the 23rd to 25th of October 1991, Paul Dijoud, who had returned from Kigali where he had been received by President Habyarimana, made remarks that RPF understood to be an expression of partiality from the French government:

“A movement such as the RPF can hold negotiations with the Government, but you must keep in mind that you are not on equal footing, since the Rwandan government exists; it is legally recognized internationally and exercises all the responsibilities of a government. You on the other hand are not a state. [… ] You must give up this spirit of revenge: that is no longer practiced in modern world where all problems are resolved through democracy. [… ] When a Government agrees to hold talks with a movement such as yours, it is proof that it practises democracy. [… ] The issue here is not to determine whether Mr. Habyarimana is good or bad. You must recognize that he is the head of State and it is necessary to negotiate with him; and that the war will lead you nowhere, it is causing problems for Uganda and is ruining your country” .(source?)

8.3. Contribution to the ethnic radicalisation of the conflict

As mentioned in earlier parts of the text, we saw that the French military and political actions in Rwanda were characterized by systematic hostility towards Tutsis, and that in the most serious cases it involved the training of Interahamwe militia mobilised for the killing of Tutsis, the killing of Tutsis committed by the French soldiers themselves or the great tolerance toward the policy of massacres of civilian Tutsis. The question posed by the Commission was to clarify whether these were overflows or errors originating from the fight against the politico-military RPF movement or if it was about adoption of the ethnic and racist point of view of the Habyarimana regime that had obviously opted for an ethnic war.

8.3.1. Justification of ethnic based speech

The recordings of various declarations and standpoints of French political and military leaders between October 1990 and December 1993 and even after the events indicate a primarily ethnic character of the conflict.

From the beginning of the war, Ambassador Martres described the conflict through an ethnic point of view:

“The worsening of military engagement on the ground shows […] that the war is radicalised and that the ideological and clan differences have been erased by the traditional opposition between the two ethnic groups of Rwanda: on one side there are the Tutsis who seek to recover the power they lost 30 years ago through armed force, and on the other side are the Hutus who fight to preserve their freedom. The Tutsis in the interior secretly wish for this armed struggle to succeed but they realise that in the event of failure, it would only have succeeded in delaying the distant hope of a day when Rwanda will experience harmony between the races. In this context, one must admit that the Western media continues to be manipulated by a Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Diaspora with proof of the fact that all the official anti-government statements addressed to this embassy from various countries are signed by the members of this ethnic group.”

He described the conflict as primarily consisting of a confrontation on one side comprising Tutsis outside, RPF soldiers, the refugees and Tutsis of the interior. However, for the latter, he had to make a presumption that “deep in their heart” they wished for the victory of the RPF though none of them had confessed it to him. On the other hand, he put all the Hutus in the same political camp based on ethnicity. By doing this, he completely ignored the rising challenge to the regime among some Hutu circles.

This black and white perception could be attributed to the shock effect caused by the RPF attack on October 1st 1990. Although this perception only lasted the very first days, thereafter, president Habyarimana took advantage of the occasion to imprison not only known Tutsis but also Hutus who opposed him. Thus, more than thirty-three intellectuals of mainly Hutu ethnicity who had written an open letter to president Habyarimana in September 1990 to assert political pluralism were victims to this wave of random arrests. In addition, many Hutus who were regarded as guilty of moderation by the regime and those originating from different regions from that of the president’s clan were also victims to that blind repression. From that moment, while taking account of the ethnic dimension of the conflict, many analysts were also able to discern a fundamentally political problem. It was for this reason that all the actions of the political opposition were mainly focused on effecting the introduction of the multiparty system in the months that followed. In fact, the political or ethnic perception of the conflict constituted one of the major political stakes in the conflict, and France, by adopting the ethnic point of view, took sides with the camp of President Habyarimana who had refused the change.

However, that simple ethnic point of view was likely to endorse the theory of a war that was of a primarily internal nature between groups of the same country. Nevertheless, according to the standpoint of the regime, as pointed out in a letter by the French political and military leaders, which interpreted the conflict as an external Ugandan aggression before anything else. The aggressors were not simply presented as Rwandan Tutsis but rather as representatives of a trans-regional Tutsi-Hima ethnic group. Four months after the onset of the conflict, shortly after the RPF offensive on Ruhengeri, Ambassador Martres gave an account of a discussion he had had with President Habyarimana during which the latter explained to him about the complexity of the conflict:

“I admit that on one hand the problem was mostly dominated by its ethnic considerations since almost all the aggressors belong to a Tutsi-Hima group of the Great Lakes region in which President Museveni is. I realised that it mainly resulted from the conquest of power by the Hutu majority in 1959 that was called into question by a rival ethnic group that is a minority in Rwanda but powerful in the region.”

The justification of the ethnic speech of the political leaders was based on the fact that Tutsis were a very small minority as expressed here by the Minister for Cooperation from May 1988 to May 1991, Jacques Pelletier. “In 1988, when I arrived at Monsieur Avenue, Rwanda was not a priority of the Ministry; its reputation was rather good. It had a peasant-president who had been in power for fifteen years. He was from the Hutu ethnic group that was a large majority of over 80%, the country was said to be a little like the Switzerland of Africa […]."

Hubert Vedrine, the former secretary-general of the Elysée, who was in direct collaboration with President Mitterrand, raised the same idea before the Mission of Information: "President Habyarimana had managed to alleviate the Hutu/Tutsi problem, and had a good reputation in the international community. There was no question of letting a government of this kind be overthrown by a minority faction supported by a neighbouring country. That would have awakened old antagonisms and led to new massacres.”

However, this ethnic-based democracy was challenged by a large part of the Rwandan political community, particularly by members of Hutu opposition parties who refused to accept that President Habyarimana was the "legitimate representative of the Hutus" and instead criticised the politics and the governance of the country. This led to “an ethnic clarification”, especially on account of the efforts of the French political and diplomatic leaders in creating the "Hutu power" coalition.

Based on this ethnic democratisation, the French political leaders had a "racial essentialism" inherited from 19th century anthropology and history of the races that considered two groups of the same population that had lived under the same economic, social, cultural and political conditions for centuries as fundamentally different. This essentialism was expressed through many Declarations. It was very clearly asserted by Robert Galley, another former minister of Co-operation (1976-81) and who, for a period, was the chairperson of "Parliament Franco-Rwandan friendship group" which was influential in the France-Rwandan relations during the 1990-1993 period:

"In this country, there is an aristocracy and slaves. There has been a regime of this kind in Rwanda for centuries. This Tutsi aristocracy left many souvenirs among the Rwandan population. The German colonialists found it convenient, when they arrived, to consolidate the Tutsi administration over the Hutus. It was the same for the Belgians when they took over the mandate. Until the beginning of the 1960s, Tutsi administration dominated the country with the image of the feudal power that reigned in Europe during the year 1,000. During 1962, a referendum took place in Rwanda. It involved one huge Hutu majority that became aware of their potential. The Tutsis then left for Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi. A movement of immigrants was created, which led to the creation of the RPF. This also presented the opportunity of a minority of intelligent people with great potential to establish a Diaspora in the United States, Belgium and in Canada. These networks were the source of considerable contributions in funds that were used to finance the RPF later."

Further down, Robert Galley concludes his judgment thus: “The success of the Tutsis in the United States, in Europe and in Rwanda shows that they are a people of extreme intelligence and pride. They are good and disciplined warriors who have nothing in common with the hordes of the poor Bantu. I do not mean to say that there were no suitable people in the Rwandan army (or even in the Zaïrian army during the Kolwezi event, but they were a precious few). But the quality of Bantu soldiers was no match for the Tutsi soldiers who came from abroad. I might have overstressed a little. I realise that all this business requires more restrained terms.”

This essentialist vision was expressed once again before MIP by Paul Dijoud, who considered himself directly in charge of the Rwandan situation: “The failure to obtain peace can ultimately be attributed to the RPF, a movement predominantly comprising Tutsis, an intelligent and ambitious Nilotic people inhabiting deep Africa.”

8.3.2. Support to ethnic radicalism

The French political leaders and diplomatic representatives not only adopted the anti-Tutsi ethnic hostility of the Habyarimana regime, they even sought to worsen it. It was with this intention that they offered their support to the very extremist party, the Coalition for the defence of the republic (CDR) on one hand, and on the other hand, they encouraged the Hutu political opposition forces to join president Habyarimana and form a coalition to carry out the ethnic war led by the regime.

The CDR was created in March 1992. It was a “Radical and racist Hutu party, [That] was at the right-hand side of the MRND, that it accused as well as the regime of their supposed “softness” towards the RPF and its democratic ibyitso (accomplices)" From its beginnings, the CDR advocated for a total ethnic war whose target would be all Tutsis and the Hutu opposition, traitors to the Hutu cause, according to them. The CDR militia “impuzamugambi.” were along side the Interahamwe, at the forefront of the genocide.

On August 20th 1992, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, leader and ideologist of the CDR sent a petition to François Mitterrand thanking France for its political and military contribution to Rwanda. President Mitterrand delegated Bruno Delaye with the task of offering a response in which he expressed the president’s satisfaction in Jean Bosco Barayagwiza in these terms: “the President of the Republic, Mr. François MITTERRAND, took interest in your open letter of 20th August 1992 accompanied with 700 signatures of Rwandan citizens, in which you thank France for her support in the democratic process underway in Rwanda and the French Army for its co-operation with the Rwandan army. The President asked me to convey his thanks to you as I am doing presently.”

Due to the extremist position of the CDR, the RPF had refused to accept its participation in the power sharing protocol for the future broad based transition government that was to result from the peace accords. This refusal was particularly justified by the fact that its declared political program and its asserted schemes did not allow the CDR to be considered as compliant with the protocol relating to the rule of law signed on 18th August 1992 between the Rwandan Government and the RPF, stipulating in article 8 that “both parties resolutely reject and commit themselves to fight against: - political ideologies based on ethnicity, region of origin, religion and intolerance that substitute national interests with ethnic, regional, religious or personal interests.”

After the inauguration of the multi-party system in June 1991, the internal opposition succeeded in persuading president Habyarimana to head the transition government, under Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye of the MDR. The priorities of this government, formed in April 1992, included engagement of peace negotiations with the RPF. On the negotiation table in Arusha, the positions of the internal opposition were often closer to those supported by the RPF than those supported by the presidential party. The extremist Hutus condemned the standpoint of the political opposition as weakening their ethnic group. This state of affairs irritated the French political and diplomatic leaders who were completely allied with president Habyarimana’s positions.

After the setbacks encountered by the FAR during the generalized offensive of the RPF of 8th February 1993, that forced France to renew strong military intervention, the latter seemed to opt for ethnic radicalisation of the conflict. Three weeks after this offensive, the French Minister of Co-operation and the Development, Marcel Debarge went to Kigali on the 28th of February 1993 to push the opposition political parties to “make a common front” with president Habyarimana against the RPF. A note of Dominique Pin to President Mitterrand relating to the course of this visit said this: “After the clear and severe warnings from Mr. Debarge (urgency to arrive at political compromise and present a united front against the RPF in near future (…), the President and the opposition have agreed to collaborate and define a common position that will be defended by the Prime Minister during his meeting with the Head of the RPF in Dar-es -Salaam on 3rd March; a meeting that could allow for the resumption of the Arusha negotiations [ emphasis not ours].”

In a more anecdotal note, witnesses reported facts that demonstrated the hostility towards Tutsis among French political and diplomatic hierarchies. The “Common front” demanded by Mr. Debarge, was instituted against the Tutsis by all French diplomatic representatives in Rwanda.

Ambassador, Amri Sued explained that he had known well the two French ambassadors to Rwanda during the period under question, George Martres and Jean-Michel Marlaud, and that he noticed the same attitude in both of them.

“I was often invited to official and private ceremonies and regularly sat next to Martens or Marlaud during the meal. One could never finish the meal before the discussions turned back to the subject of the Tutsis as people to be excluded, as bad people. They often said these things. Marlaud painted a more savage anti-Tutsis hatred picture than Martens, and it was said that he came from the DGSE, a French security service. Old Martens was more discrete, more diplomatic. But he too, did not hide the fact that the Tutsi were "bad", a term he used with ease. They expressed their hostility toward the Tutsis openly and publicly, with no restraint even while some Tutsis were present like my former colleague, old Gashumba.”

A former worker in the French embassy in Rwanda who preferred anonymity revealed to the Commission the existence of segregation practices within the local personnel that was expressed by favouritism of Hutus over Tutsis. This discrimination began to be implemented at the end of 1991 after the press publication of an official correspondence from the French embassy stated that Lt Col. Chollet had been appointed advisor of the Rwandan army head of staff, Lt. Colonel Serubuga, with very wide attributions in the command of the army. The French embassy suspected its Tutsi employees to have been behind the leak of the document and started to harass them to cause them to resign.

These statements could lead to the conclusion that the French political leaders who were in charge of managing the Rwandan situation had largely adopted ethnic hostility targeting the Tutsis generally. Therefore, as we have seen, the French representatives supported the ethnic war of the Habyarimana regime against the Tutsis, albeit at arm’s length, by largely sharing its ideological principles.

8.4. Attempts to implicate western powers

After having strongly increased its military engagement between June and October 1992, France also attempted to implicate its European counterparts in the Rwandan conflict but with little success.

Due to this fact, French diplomacy became more active and offensive in 1993. They were mainly aiming to obtain strong support from the Western powers. On 15th January 1993, President Mitterrand addressed a letter to President Bill Clinton reporting the concern for preservation of stability in Rwanda by promoting negotiations between the warring parties whose solution would be the holding of free elections in the near future. The main objective of the correspondence was to mobilise funds. The French president announced a contribution of up to 10 million FF from his country and expressed the wish that other countries join the effort. On 19th January, another letter of the same content as that addressed to Clinton was sent to Chancellor Kohl, to Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, to Adolf Ogi, President of the Swiss Confederation and to Jean-Luc Dehaene, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Belgium.

In fact, Germany and the United States, like France, had the position of observers at the negotiations that were underway in Arusha since the middle of 1992. These negotiations were led by a transition government that circumstances had forced president Habyarimana to set up. However, the Prime Minister of this government and president Habyarimana did not share the same political standpoint, while the RPF army was manifesting a significant increase in might, since June 1992, and particularly during the time of its general offensive of February.

On 9th February 1993, France announced that it was sending 150 additional troops and on February 12th Bruno Delaye and the director of African Affairs at the Quay d’ Orsay, Jean-Marc De La Sablière, left for Kigali and Kampala. Upon return from this mission, Bruno Delaye gave a report on the position and differences in opinion between the president and his Prime Minister, and explained that the differences between the two men reflected “the cleavage between Hutus of the North and Hutus of the South” Further down in the note, he explained the negative consequences of this situation: “it offers pretext for the RPF which does not cease making points on the military and political level in addition to the military support of Uganda, the Belgian sympathy for Tutsis, an excellent propaganda system that focuses on the heinous crimes committed by the extremist Hutus and the generous complicity of the Anglo-Saxon world.”

The note of Bruno Delaye described a distressing situation for France and proposed a more determined engagement at the side of the Kigali regime:

“the situation remains extremely delicate for us: Our indirect strategy of support to the Rwandan armed forces has come to a limit. (We should accelerate the supplies of ammunitions and materials). Their degree of motivation is too imbalanced (due to the differences between Hutus of the North and Hutus of the South) to calmly consider stabilisation of their military forces. In the event that the frontline is penetrated, we would have no choice but to evacuate Kigali (the official mission of our two infantry companies is to protect expatriates), unless we actually engaged in the war. Our international isolation (The Belgians, English and Americans do not like Habyarimana) must lead us to put even greater effort on the diplomatic offensive [underlined in the text ] in order to gather the diplomatic support needed to implement the results –theoretically – obtained by this mission to Kigali and Kampala. This effort was engaged at the Quay of Orsay.”

February 19th 1993, General Quesnot also addressed President Mitterrand in a note summarizing the discussion that he held with the Rwandan president and confirmed the essential elements of B. Delaye’s analysis. In this note, he explained that following the RPF offensive of the RPF of 8th February, 1993, France had three options:1) "evacuation of nationals in the coming days if the RPF maintains its intention to seize the capital [… ]; 2) the immediate deployment of at least two infantry companies in Kigali [… ] This action would not solve the basic problems but would help buy time;
3) Deployment of a more significant army contingent to prevent the RPF from seizing Kigali and to make the available Rwandan units to at least resume their positions at the former cease-fire line. [… ] However, this would effectively mean direct implication.”

According to another note of Dominique Pin and General Quesnot summarising the restricted session of the Security Council meeting on Rwanda on February 24th 1993, direct or indirect involvement could not be taken for granted. “This option is technically possible, but it can be considered only if we have irrefutable evidence of direct Ugandan military intervention, which is currently not the case.” This observation gives reason to believe that the various inspections conducted by the French Mission of Observers (MOF) was not able to establish any indisputable proof of a direct invasion or aggression from Uganda in the various reports and declarations of French officials.

Given the very restricted room for decisive French military action for diplomatic reasons, the Rwandan government was obliged to request the UN to deploy observers along the border between Uganda and Rwanda.

8.5. Attempt at manipulating the UN

The idea of using the UN to cover the French military intervention in Rwanda dates back to February-March 1993, a few weeks after the offensive of the RPF and significant strengthening of the French military intervention. At the beginning of March 1993, President Mitterrand recommended that the matter be put before the UN. “This issue should be tabled at the UN. It is unbelievable that a country should attack another and get away with it; we do not have to tolerate this kind of thing. It is urgent to make the UN react.”

President Mitterrand knew he could count on the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, to obtain a UN endorsement of` French military intervention in Rwanda because he owed much to France and Rwanda : “The decision of Boutros Ghali is urgent: if our soldiers are transformed into UN troops, it will change the picture. But we should not go it alone. We could take part in a UN force with a thousand men. It is necessary to inform Mérimée [French ambassador to the UN] in time and make haste to set up the system. If there is no response from the United Nations a new closed session will be required.”

On 5th March 1993, France proposed a draft Resolution in the UN for the deployment of a joint UN-OAU force to supervise a demilitarised zone. On 12th March 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 812 as a result of the French proposal. In another note ,General Quesnot specified what France expected from this resolution:

“At the diplomatic level, the priority will be given to the putting in place of UN observers on the Rwanda-Uganda border (point 3 of Resolution 812 of the Security Council) in order to reduce Uganda’s military support to the RPF forces. A French delegation has gone today to New York to prepare the setting up of this observer force.”

The UN force for cease-fire observation and the control of the Rwanda-Uganda border was eventually set up, but it largely escaped the control of France and its command was entrusted to the Canadian General Dallaire.

The French position started to become problematic, if not faltering. In fact, in 1993, the political and military situation developed considerably against France’s principal ally, president Habyarimana. He could no longer exercise the absolute power he had before the war : The show of military force by the RPF and the gain in influence of the unarmed opposition inside the country forced him to accept the setting up of a transitional government. As noted by various French officials, the head of this transitional government, Dismas Nsengiyaremye, was on a political line quite different from that of the President. It was the Ministers in the Nsengiyaremye government, especially the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who conducted all the negotiations at that time – especially with effect from 10th August, 1992 –which led to the signature of agreements on the rule of law, power sharing among all the political forces, and peace.

The peace agreement, which was thought to be decisive, was signed on 4th August 1993 in Arusha between President Habyarimana and the Rwanda Patriotic Front, recommending the setting up of a more inclusive broad based transitional government and the deployment of a UN peace keeping force. However, the RPF made the withdrawal of French troops from Rwanda a precondition for signing the peace agreement; it was also firmly opposed to the inclusion of French soldiers in the future UN Mission in Rwanda, supposed to guarantee the implementation of the Arusha Peace Accords. With the departure of the main body of French troops from Rwanda on 15th December 1993, it meant in fact the removal of the whole military, political and diplomatic machinery that had supported President Habyarimana in his policy of ethnic massacres and refusal of change. In this context, President Habyarimana and his entourage, who had not given up their policy of refusal, had to find a way of continuing the war by other means, in other words, by genocide.













PART II: FRANCE’S INVOLVEMENT DURING THE GENOCIDE


I France’s involvement during the genocide, before Opération Turquoise

On the evening of 6th April 1994, around 20.30 hrs, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down while landing at Kanombe (Kigali) airport. It was on its way back from Dar-es-Salaam where the president had gone for an ultimate summit devoted to the Rwandan crisis. Among the plane’s occupants, none survived. From that very evening, the soldiers of the presidential guard, the paratroopers’ battalion and the reconnaissance as well as the Interahamwe militia erected barriers on all main roads and in several districts of the capital, and the killings began. The following day, in the course of the day, the country learnt that the Prime Minister of the transitional government and many of her ministers had been assassinated, and massacres spread throughout the country, targeting mainly Tutsis, but also Hutu opponents. Thus, the predicted genocide began. It is in this context that France decided once again to send a military contingent to Rwanda. This military intervention that lasted from 9th to 12th April 1994 was given the code name Opération Amaryllis.

1. Official justifications of Opération Amaryllis

The main justification given for the operation was the evacuation of French nationals and other foreigners. The operation took place as the campaign of massacres of Tutsis became more and more systematic in Kigali and spread very quickly to the interior of the country, but France decided officially and publicly not to do anything to stop the massacres.

1.1. Protection of the French, European nationals, and other foreigners

The decision to evacuate French and other expatriates living in Rwanda was not taken immediately after the assassination of President Habyarimana, on the 6th of April when nor on the following day the campaign of massacres started in Kigali, and not even before the afternoon of 8th April. Political and military leaders analysed the situation first, in order to be able to react at the opportune moment. By so doing, they gave priority to reinforcing FAR’s capacity to get the upper hand in the war with the RPF.

On 7th April, Bruno Delaye observed in the minutes of a meeting of the “crisis cell” set up in the Elysée: “For the time being our nationals are not threatened and no evacuation is planned.”

General Quesnot was of the same opinion: “For the time being, French nationals (450 in Kigali) don’t seem to be threatened. Some isolated families have been sheltered near the Embassy.” President Mitterrand’s special chief of staff seems to prioritise the theory according to which “the Rwandan armed forces are capable of holding the town by containing the RPF battalion of eight hundred men and some infiltrated elements”, without however, excluding the fact that the Rwandan army may be “incapable of holding the north of the country from where a new RPF offensive could come with strong logistic support from Uganda”.

In spite of the decision not to evacuate immediately, preparatory measures were taken, including the setting up of plans to protect and evacuate French and Belgian nationals in collaboration with the Belgian battalion working within the UNAMIR. Furthermore, two battalions and a health unit were put on alert in Bangui, Libreville and Ndjamena. Considering the history of the French action in Rwanda, the attitude of wait and see advocated by the various French officials was accompanied by the wish not to put France in the limelight. “Matignon and the Quai d’Orsay would like, in this new Rwandan crisis which risks being more murderous, France not to be on the front line and limit our action to interventions at the UN so that the United nations mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) may fulfil its security mission in Kigali (which it has not actually done to-date)”.

The decision to evacuate was taken when on the 8th, towards 1900 hours, Ambassador Malraux informed the Quai d’Orsay that “the security (of) foreigners was under threat and justified their evacuation.” This request was made due to the news of the assassination of the French gendarme, Didot and his wife. The death of his colleague, Mayer, would be known later. These French gendarmes secretly listened to communications. Ambassador Marlaud thought that they were assassinated by the RPF, but a number of facts contradict this assertion.

The simple evacuation of the French nationals and foreigners was not the only planned option. A rift arose between the Office of the President of the Republic and the government consisting of the opposition of the right during this period of cohabitation. “[The special chief of staff of President Mitterrand, General Quesnot] Refusing to resign himself to the new “massacres and counter massacres,”, he recommended a more ambitious intervention by the French army so as to protect and evacuate the foreign community, stabilise the FAR, restore order in Kigali, and come between the belligerents in such a way as to stop the offensive of the Rwanda Patriotic Front.” The option of direct support to the FAR is quickly turned down especially by Prime Minister E. Balladur and to a certain extent the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Juppé. It was not necessary to plunge back “into the Rwandan mess” nor “interfere in Rwandan political game”.

The operation was to be restricted to the evacuation of French nationals and foreigners have well have the closed relative of President Habyarimana, goal have we will see later one, it also supplied FAR with ammunitions and left behind it soldiers to continues supporting FAR involved in the genocide. Finally, in spite of France’s significant capacity to influence the army and the political leaders organising the systematic massacre of the Tutsi population, and the presence of a sizeable armed force for five days at the beginning of the genocide, France chose not to intervene while the massacres were going on.

1.2 The proclamation of the decision of non-intervention in the ongoing massacres

On 10th April, Opération Amaryllis consisted of 464 elite soldiers, the collaboration between the French troops and the FAR was excellent. The French instructors of the FAR elite units most involved in the killings were still present in Kigali. The French Ambassador encouraged the strong man at the time, Colonel Bagosora, to take control of the situation. Ambassador Marlaud gave shelter to most politicians of the Habyarimana regime, but also to a big number of those who belonged to the new interim government, the formation of which he was consulted on. This shows the decisive influence, which France had over the politico-military process at the very beginning of the genocide and over the men who organized it. Moreover, France decided to do absolutely nothing to halt the massacres.

At no time, according to facts or retrospectively, did Ambassador Marlaud mention any positive influence that France had on the politico-military process at the very beginning of the genocide and on the people who organized it.

With regard to military intervention, the failure to act when faced with the massacres is laid down in the order of Opération Amaryllis from 8th April 1994, which stipulates that: “the French detachment will adopt a discreet attitude and neutral behaviour towards the Rwandan factions”. Ministers Alain Juppé and Michel Roussin who undertook to explain the reasons behind Opération Amaryllis stated unambiguously France’s refusal to try to stop the massacres. On 11th April Michel Roussin explained the limits of the French intervention: “For France, it is not a question of intervening militarily in Rwanda. It is clear that our mission is of a humanitarian nature whose aim is to repatriate our nationals and their families”. On the same day, Alain Juppé was more explicit in his rejection of an intervention directed at stopping the massacres: “Can France keep order in the whole world? Does she have the means and responsibility to stop, on the whole planet, people from killing each other?”

This refusal by the right-wing government to intervene to stop the massacres in progress can easily be explained by the wish to distance itself from Mitterrand’s management of the Rwandan problem, but it is also based on an ethnic and tribal view of Africa in general and of Rwanda in particular. Thus, in private, Prime Minister Balladur may have said: “They have always killed each other like that! Why do you want it to stop?”
On the part of the French Presidency, we observed, through General Quesnot, the proposal of an armed action to stop the massacres is coupled with a French military support to ensure the FAR’s victory over the RPF. This option is shared by Colonel Bach, head of the Amaryllis specialized detachment, who thinks that it was still possible to reverse the military situation and avoid the FAR defeat, moreover involved in the massacres. “There was no sign at that time of an imminent RPF victory; the FAR were fighting back effectively […]. Indeed, it would have required very few things (some French military advisers) to witness a reversal of the situation. June 1992 and June 1993 could have been “re-enacted” in April 1994” .

On the 13th of April, that is to say a week after the beginning of the massacres, when they had reached a level of exceptional intensity and the interim government’s role as organizer of these massacres was well known, President Mitterrand was worried of the latter’s fate: “It would be surprising if Habyarimana’s government did not find a safe place where it can hold on for some time”. Under those conditions it is not surprising that France did not try in any way to stop the massacres during Operation Amaryllis.

2. The facts blamed on France

2.1 Political support to the organizers of the genocide

After Habyarimana’s death and the start of the genocide, France offered political support to the interim government in order to facilitate its acceptance by other States and international organisations. This support manifested itself especially in the political advices given to the leaders of the massacres during the formation of the interim government, the privileged evacuation of Hutu extremists and the abandonment of the Tutsi employees of the international organisations in Rwanda. The French forces deployed in Rwanda in April 1994 did not try to check the murderous fury of the soldiers and militia who massacred civilians in front of their eyes.

2.1.1 Involvement in the training of the interim government

From the morning of 7th April 1994, many dignitaries of the Habyarimana regime among whom there were partisans of the extermination of Tutsis gathered in the French embassy where they were accommodated with their families. There were about a hundred Rwandans, remembers Joseph Ngarambe, who arrived there on 10th April. As the table below shows, those who gathered there had, at first sight, few reasons to fear for their security, because they were part of the very close circle of the Presidential party and the Hutu power in most cases. Most of them played an active role in the genocide and are today being pursued by the judiciary, either on trial at the ICTR or sentenced by this jurisdiction, or targeted by complaints at international jurisdictions of other States:

Name and surname Post previously
occupied Post during the genocide Political affiliation Current legal status
Justin Mugenzi Minister of Commerce Minister of Commerce PL power On trial at the ICTR
Pauline Nyiramasubuko Minister in charge of family affairs Minister in charge of family affairs MRND On trial at the ICTR
Ferdinand Nahimana Director of ORINFOR Director of RTLM MRND Sentenced to life imprisonment by the ICTR
Augustin Ngirabatware Minister of Planning Minister of Planning MRND On the run, wanted by the ICTR
Félicien Kabuga Business man Business man MRND Wanted by the ICTR
André Ntagerura Minister of transport Minister of transport MRND Tried and acquitted by the ICTR
Daniel Mbangura Minister of Higher Education Minister of Higher Education MRND Whereabouts unknown
Gaspard Ruhumuliza Minister of Environment PDC power Lives in Switzerland
Casmir Bizimungu Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of Foreign Affairs MRND On trial at the ICTR
Callixte Nzabonimana Minister of Youth Minister of Youth MRND On the run, wanted by the ICTR
Jérôme Bicamumpaka Lawyer Minister of Foreign Affairs MDR power On trial at the ICTR
Séraphin Rwabukumba Business man Business man MRND Subject to a complaint in Belgium
Joseph Nzirorera Minister of Public Works Secretary General of MRND MRND On trial at the ICTR
Mathieu Ngirumpatse National Chairman of MRND Chairman of MRND MRND On trial at the ICTR
Prosper Mugiraneza Minister of Public Service Minister of Public Service MDR power On trial at the ICTR
George Ruggiu RTLM moderator Member of Hutu power Pleaded guilty and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment by the ICTR
Protais Zigiranyirazo Prefect of Ruhengeri MRND On trial at the ICTR
Eliézer Niyitegeka Minister of Information MDR power Sentenced to life imprisonment by the ICTR
Straton Nsabumukunzi Minister of Agriculture PSD power Whereabouts unknown
Silvestre Nsanzimana Ex-Prime Minister MRND Died in exile in Belgium
Pasteur Musabe Director of BACAR Director of BACAR, shareholder of RTLM MRND Died in Cameroon

During their stay at the French embassy in Kigali, they contributed in forming the ministerial cabinet of the so-called interim government that organized and supervised the execution of the genocide. A number of these personalities who took refuge in the French embassy would be part of the interim government as can be seen on this table. Colonel Bagosora was in charge of the formation of the interim government, with the collaboration of the leaders of the “power” parties or the power factions of the opposition parties. A cousin to President Habyarimana’s wife, Bagosora received his training at the War College in Paris, where he obtained a certificate of higher military studies. He was successively deputy commander of the Kigali Higher Military Academy and commander of the important Kanombe military camp, from 1988 to 1992, in which the French officers and instructors were operating, before his appointment to the post of Director of Cabinet in the Ministry of Defence in 1992. He was retired from the army on 23rd September 1993, but continued to exercise his functions of Director of cabinet until his departure from Rwanda in July 1994. He is one of the main organizers of the civil self-defence programme during which distributions of arms were carried out to civilian Hutus who had undergone military training, sometimes provided by French soldiers. According to Filip Reyntjens, it is Bagosora who gave the orders, from the Ministry of defence, of massacres to the Presidential Guard, the reconnaissance battalion and the paratrooper battalion with which he had a direct and private radio connection. This was in the night of 6th to 7th April 1994, between 0200 hrs and 0700 hrs in the morning. Today he is on trial at the ICTR as organizer of the genocide.

The French ambassador, Jean-Philippe Marlaud, got personally involved, at Bagosora’s side, in the formation of the interim government, to the extent of suggesting some people who could be called upon to be part of it. Since 7th April, according to Ambassador Marlaud’s declarations at the MIP, who was in the company of Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin, he had “approached Colonel Bagosora, the Director of Cabinet in the Ministry of defence, while the latter was on a trip in Cameroon. He had told him that it was necessary to resume control of the situation and that the Rwandan armed forces needed to cooperate with UNAMIR, but that warning did not prove useful and the situation continued to deteriorate.”

Colonel Bagosora’s radically anti-Tutsi tendencies and against moderate opposition political parties were common knowledge. Thus, in June 1992, when the new coalition government led by the former opposition removed from office the former chiefs of staff of the army and the gendarmerie because of their extremist political positions, President Habyarimana had tried to have Bagosora appointed to the post of chief of staff of the FAR, but the parties of the former opposition refused by virtue of his extremist political orientations. It is the very same Bagosora who, after participating in part of the negotiations of the Arusha Agreement had, on the 8 January 1993, “openly expressed his opposition to the concessions made by the government representative, Boniface Ngulinzira, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the extent of leaving the negotiations. Colonel Bagosora left Arusha and declared that he was returning to Rwanda to prepare the Apocalypse”. This declaration, widely relayed in the Rwandan press, was very shocking at the time.

The adjustment that constituted Ambassador Marlaud and Colonel Maurin’s approach to ask Bagosora to take “control of the situation” is well expressed by the former Prime Minister of the interim government, Jean Kambanda, during his interrogation of the 26 September 1997 by two ICTR investigators. To the question of knowing if Colonel Bagosora had encountered any opposition from the highest military officers to his intention of taking control of the military crisis committee that was constituted during the meeting of 7th April at the army headquarters, Kambanda replied: “– Jean Kambanda: Yes to his project of taking over power […] And he was rather advised to ask for the opinion of the French ambassador.”

The support given by Ambassador Marlaud to the one who is today considered as the main organizer of the genocide and the protection given to the most radically extremist members of the Hutu power who took refuge in the embassy differs strongly from the way the French diplomat treated the case of the Prime Minister in office, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. She represented the legitimate political authority as the head of government. She was, at the legal level, the person authorized to secure the vacancy of power. But she had perhaps the disadvantage, in the eyes of the French ambassador, of being opposed to the Hutu power. Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana had intervened on the morning of 7th April on RFI by launching a very strong call for peace and the stop of violence. When she tried to go to the studios of the national radio, the FAR prevented her from reaching Radio Rwanda to send a message to the nation. By that radio broadcast intervention on the morning of 7th April, when several opposition personalities had already been assassinated, France knew that the Rwandan Prime Minister was alive and in danger of death. Yet, between the Prime Minister’s residence and the French embassy, there was a distance not exceeding 500 m! She was executed very near her home between 11.00 a.m. and 12.00 noon. She could have been saved if the French ambassador had wanted it.

Interviewed by the MIP, Marlaud in fact acknowledged having held meetings with political officials who constituted the interim government:

“The morning of 8th April had been marked by […] the arrival of several ministers at the Embassy. They then held a meeting during which they fixed three thrusts: to replace the dead or disappeared ministers or officials, try to take once again control of the Presidential guard in order to stop the massacres, and finally to reaffirm their commitment to the Arusha Agreement. However, they refused to appoint Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu Prime Minister in the place of Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana”.

Concluding on Marlaud’s hearing, the MIP wrote: “Towards 2000 hours [8th April], the embassy was informed of the appointment of the President of the Republic and an interim Government. The composition of this government was apparently in accordance with the Arusha Agreement since it provided for the allocation of the portfolios between political parties”.

Ambassador Marlaud distorts the truth. Because the interim government brought together only representatives of the member parties of the Hutu power delegation as well as dissident Hutu power factions of the opposition parties. This Hutu Power coalition was, since the end of the year 1993, radically against the Arusha Agreement and advocated the massacre of Tutsis and Hutu political officials and Tutsis loyal to the Arusha peace process. The formation of the interim government, an essential stage in the achievement of the genocidaire programme, had required first of all the assassination of the political leaders opposed to the Hutu power coalition, among them the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who, according to the constitution, was supposed to assume power, by virtue of the disappearance of the Head of State. Some rare non-Hutu power political leaders had managed to hide. Thus, the formation of the interim government is a clear manifestation of the blow against the Arusha Agreement and the political stage necessary for the commission of the genocide. After contributing to its formation, Ambassador Marlaud tried to recognize the government that organized the genocide, four years later.

After the formation of this government, Ambassador Marlaud worked on getting diplomatic support for it from European partners. During the afternoon of 8th April, he telephoned his Belgian counterpart, Johan Swinnen, and gave him a list of the chosen ministers and requested him to give his support, by giving the reason that the government had been put in place to prevent a military coup d’état. According to F. Reyntjens, quoted by Linda Melvern , the Belgian ambassador “reacts with reservation,” by thinking that “the tendency is too much ‘power’. He expresses the point of view that such a government seems least concerned with the real political requirements. Marlaud says that he is satisfied. Especially since he thinks that the formation of a government will make it possible to prevent the coup d’état that he fears”.

We can ask ourselves about the reasons that led ambassador Marlaud to isolate General Marcel Gatsinzi, the army chief of staff who represented the lawful military authority. Why France collaborated with Bagosora, retired from the army and well known for his extremist positions, by leaving aside the chief of staff in charge of national security issues and maintenance of order, who had been appointed since 6th in the evening by his peers of the army.

2.1.2 The targeted evacuations

Some days after the triggering off of the genocide, France deployed Opération Amaryllis in Rwanda, with the official mission of evacuating French nationals and foreigners. Thus, Amaryllis evacuated the French and other Westerners, sometimes with their dogs, but abandoned hundreds of thousands of Rwandans in danger of certain death, including Tutsi employees of the embassy and other French services established in Rwanda. She left behind officials of non-European international organisations who had taken refuge at the UNAMIR at the official technical school de Kicukiro, but was concerned with evacuating as a matter of priority the most virulent Hutu extremists.

a) Protection of Hutu power extremists

The main Rwandan people evacuated by France were those close to power, with priority given to the late president’s widow, Agathe Kanziga, first of all on board a Transall of the French army to Bangui with twelve members of her family, in particular her brother Protais Zigiranyirazo, her sister Catherine Mukamusoni, her first cousin Séraphin Rwabukumba and Alphonse Ntilivamunda, President Habyarimana’s son-in-law. At that time, Agathe Kanziga and those other people, with the exception of Catherine Mukamusoni, are known for being extremists who, from 1992, organized around a group of killers consisting of civilians and soldiers, called “Zero network” or “Madam’s clan” which coordinated the massacres and political assassinations during the years preceding the genocide. Mrs. Habyarimana’s criminal role was recognized by the Commission for refugees’ appeal in its decision of dismissal of 15th February 2007, which states as follows:

“The result of the preliminary investigation is that […] it is possible to establish the existence of a first circle of power […] called akazu, in which the predominant role played by the claimant was conspicuous; that this first circle of the akazu included people coming mostly from the interested person’s province of origin and that of her late husband, that the hard core of the same circle consisted of Mrs. Agathe KANZIGA Habyarimana’s widow, her brother Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO, her first cousin Séraphin RWABUKUMBA and her cousin, Colonel Elie SAGATWA, and that this “small akazu” held the real power since the 1973 coup d’état especially in the appointment of leaders, soldiers and magistrates to the main posts as well as in redistributing state property, which favoured members of the akazu from the provinces of the north-west of Rwanda, from where came these members; that is why the claimant, without having an official post, exercised a de facto authority on the affairs of state; that she had necessarily found herself at the heart of the regime that had become guilty of the crimes perpetrated between 1973 and 1994, especially assassinations of political opponents after the 1973 coup d’état and the planning of the Rwandan genocide that took place, in its greatest proportion, between 6th April and 17th July 1994”.

President Habyarimana’s widow did not at all hide her commitment in favour of the ongoing massacres in Rwanda. François Mitterand’s declaration during an audience granted to a delegation of Doctors without Borders, on 14th June 1994, shows it quite well: “She is possessed, if she could, she would continue calling for massacres on French radios. She is very difficult to control”.

The role played by Agathe Kanziga in the policy of massacres was common knowledge and French decision makers knew it. From these documents from the French President’s Office it is obvious that the evacuation of the Rwandan presidential family and other dignitaries of the Rwandan regime was explicitly organized by the French President. A note from Bruno Delaye shows “President Habyarimana’s family. It is for the time being under protection of the Presidential guard. If it wishes, it will be received at our ambassador’s residence, in accordance with your instructions”. Another note from General Quesnot specifies: “The situation led to recommending strongly to our nationals to leave the country. The first plane with about forty French people on board and, in accordance with your instructions, twelve members of President Habyarimana’s close family left Kigali on Saturday late afternoon”.

Agathe Kanziga and her close relatives arrived in France on 17th April 1994 and settled first of all in a hotel in Paris at the expense of the French Government, then moved to a family flat, with France meeting all the expenses for the suite of furniture. They were received by the representatives of the Quai d’Orsay who allocated to them a subsistence allowance charged on a special account for urgent actions in favour of Rwandan refugees. Interrogated on the merits of that favour, the Minister of Cooperation, Michel Roussin rose up against those who criticized him: “We had good relations with a lawfully elected president and we picked up his family which requested for our assistance”. He added: “It is strange, to say the least, to blame France for acting that way: other countries deemed it appropriate to abandon the leaders with whom they had normal relations until then. Doing the same would have condemned them to death. Our traditions are different.”

Interviewed by the MIP, Alain Juppé denied the reality of the selective nature of the evacuations: “Those decisions to evacuate were taken on the spot between the French embassy, and our ambassador who was on the ground, Mr. Marlaud, and the officers of Amaryllis according to what was feasible in the town that had fallen prey to massacres and where many areas were totally inaccessible. The detail might seem insignificant but the telephone had been disconnected. We were able to evacuate the people who were at the embassy and in the assembly areas – and I say it here until I get proof to the contrary – whether they were French, foreigners of all nationalities, the Hutu or Tutsi Rwandans. The embassy staff were saved irrespective of their origin. And I find it extremely serious to affirm without concrete proof that there might have been screening at the French embassy between Hutus and Tutsis at the time of evacuation. I would like to affirm the contrary – on the basis of the information I have – provided that those who support this argument support it with proof. But I would like to say that it is really extremely serious when people assert things of this nature.”

It is proper to clarify that the telephone was disconnected in Kigali during the Operation Amaryllis. During this period, the Tutsi former employees of French institutions used it and communicated with their French employers, as we shall see further down. The country’s main telephone exchange was removed from the Hôtel des Mille Collines and was under surveillance of the French soldiers. It allowed exchanges between Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin and the FAR headquarters , and it is on this same exchange, on 2nd May 1994, that Bruno Delaye talked to the boss of the FAR, General Bizimungu, to stop him from executing the refugees in that hotel. Finally, during Amaryllis, French troops could go wherever they pleased, almost everywhere in Kigali, except the small area occupied by the RPF battalion stationed inside Parliament and its surroundings by virtue of the Arusha Agreement.

b) Screening and abandonment of people in mortal danger

During Amaryllis, Rwandans who worked in French institutions in Rwanda were all abandoned. Michel Cuingnet, head of the French civilian cooperation mission in Rwanda in 1994, remembers that “the local staff of the cooperation Mission, most of them Tutsis, were practically all massacred, some of them under his eyes; with regard to the other staff of the different French diplomatic services, considering the events and the distance between the buildings, he doesn’t know if they were able to be evacuated.” Venuste Kayijamahe and Charles Rubagumya, at the time employees of the French Cultural Centre in Kigali, affirm effectively having contacted Michel Cuingnet and other French officials to be saved and they each received no answer.

Venuste Kayijamahe testifies:

“In February 1994, I had been threatened with death by the militia at my home in Gikondo and I had moved to the French cultural centre. I had put my five children in families in town. On 6th April in the morning, the director of the Centre, Anne Cros, called me and asked me to find accommodation outside. As soon as the massacres started in the night of 6th to 7th, I tried to reach the areas where my children were. I asked Anne for help on phone on 8th April. She replied that she could not do anything for me, that there were not enough French soldiers, that they had left since Noroît and that those who were there were too busy. She hung up. In the afternoon, Anne Cros came to the Centre escorted by a dozen French soldiers to pack dossiers. I begged her to authorize those soldiers to accompany me so that I could go to retrieve my children who were not far from the Centre. She replied that she could not do anything about it. I called the French embassy several times to ask for help. As soon as I said that it was Venuste, the agent hung up. I was blamed for having accorded interviews to the RFI to describe my predicament. On 9th April in the afternoon, I received a telephone call from Michel Cuingnet by surprise, who told me that he was sending me 57 soldiers. He told me to warn the guards so that they could open the doors quickly because the soldiers would not stay long. I asked Michel Cuingnet to help me to go and retrieve my children. He told me to discuss with them when they were there and he hung up. After their arrival at the Centre, I talked to the superior with a rank of major and made my request. He replied that he would not evacuate Rwandans. I told him that M. Cuingnet had authorized me to go and retrieve my children. The soldier told me that he didn’t give a damn about me, and that in any case, they would not evacuate Rwandans. On the 11th of April, a French soldier told me that they were about to go. I beseeched him once again to take us either to France, or to another country, or to the CND, or to the UNAMIR. He told me that it was the Embassy that decided everything, that he had no order to evacuate us. On 12th April, they went and left us behind.”

Charles Rubagumya reports the same experience:

“On 7th April, I called the French Cultural Centre to ask for help. On the line I had one of my immediate bosses who replied that I had to manage on my own. During the following days, I called several times without being listened to. On 11th April, I bribed a Rwandan soldier who accompanied me to the Cultural Centre. It was guarded by several French soldiers. I showed them my service card and I entered. Inside, I met Venuste Kayijamahe. There was also one of his friends, three other workers and a woman accompanied by her children whom I had pretended was my family. They were all Tutsis. The French told us that they were going away the following day and that they would not carry us with them, that our evacuation was not part of their mandate. It was unthinkable for us. The following day, they packed their luggage without telling us anything. One of my colleagues contacted the wife of Ambassador Marlaud to ask her to intervene for us. She replied that the French were not evacuating Rwandans. Immediately, the French soldiers took their vehicles and took away all their foodstuffs without leaving anything behind for us. I threw myself in one of their convoys. They threw me on the ground. We begged a group of them who at least accepted to drop us at the St. Expery School where the Belgian nationals were gathered. We remained there. When the Belgian soldiers came to evacuate their nationals, they took all those who were there, without any distinction. They took us to Nairobi and I managed to get a visa and I went to Europe.”

Apart from abandoning the local Tutsi personnel, Amaryllis refused to evacuate Rwandans who had married foreigners, those who cohabited with the French or with Europeans of other nationalities. Nor did Amaryllis evacuate Rwandan defenders of human rights who had requested them, such as the prosecutor François Nsanzuwera, and political opposition personalities like the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boniface Ngulinzira, hated by the champions of Hutu power for his main role on the peace negotiations, whereas he begged the French soldiers at ETO on 11th April.

Colette Braeckman, who was there, mentions the French soldiers’ complaisant attitude in these terms. “I witnessed some harrowing scenes at the Kanombe airport where the French left behind Tutsi partners of expatriates who begged them to take them along with them. Unlike the Belgians who managed to ex-filtrate some Tutsis in a small number, the French embarked only on expatriates. They separated mixed couples.” A journalist of the daily Le Monde also present remembers the case of a Russian woman married to a Tutsi who was forced to abandon her husband, the French soldiers allowing her in extremis the only right to take her three half-caste children.

Some Rwandans managed to slip into lorries carrying the expatriates, but at the airport, the French soldiers carried out screening on the basis of the pre-established lists. They turned back those who were rejected, and handed them over de facto to the Rwandan soldiers and militia who had erected roadblocks at the entry to the airport who massacred them there and then. Jean Loup Denblyden, a reserve colonel who participated in the Silver Back operation as a Belgian liaison officer with the French detachment affirms: “during Amaryllis, French soldiers screened the Tutsis before the Kanombe airport and pushed them back towards the roadblocks”. There was a screening and the people who were rejected, were pushed back to the roadblock. The French said to those who were rejected: we are not taking you, and pushed them back towards the roadblock which was exactly at the entry to the present parking”.

On realizing the seriousness of the facts, Mr. Denblyden informed the French military officers and UNAMIR, and received as an answer not to interfere with issues that didn’t concern Belgians:

“I climbed the stairs where Colonel Poncet was, who commanded the Opération Amaryllis, and told him my problem. He shrugged his shoulders, Colonel Morin who was from UNAMIR and was beside him asked me not to interfere. I immediately contacted General Romeo and the operation officer […] I told them my problem as I thought it was my duty to do so […] A French non-commissioned officer intervened by telling me that Belgians were not concerned, and that it was a French problem. It was on the third day of Amaryllis”. Finally, M. Denblyden noticed that people had been killed near that roadblock: “I climbed above the airport on the platform, and I went to see if from above where I was I could see the roadblock, and there I saw bodies strewn at the right side of the airport, lower down.”

Jean-Pierre Martin, a Belgian journalist, reports that French soldiers took pleasure in watching the massacres of civilians near Kanombe Airport:

“It is true that in 1994 I saw images that remain in my memory and that I would never forget especially that pregnant woman that they disembowelled a 100 m in front of me and there was a jeep and two French soldiers who were laughing. Who were laughing 50 m from where it was happening. And finally it is the two Belgian soldiers with whom we were that routed the Interahamwe or the killers. (…) It was at the exit from the airport when you turn to the road that leads to town, once you have passed the depression and you climb towards the stadium, it happened there. I was in the depression, moving from a jeep of Belgian soldiers which came to my rescue because they were afraid; and we witnessed that scene where a pregnant woman was disembowelled, and between me, the jeep of Belgian soldiers and that killing, there was a jeep of French soldiers busy laughing, who didn’t move, who watched the scene as if it was in a cinema.”

The perpetration of massacres at Kanombe Airport in front of the complacent French soldiers was also narrated by the France 2 special envoy, Philippe Boisserie, who reported it in the televised news of 11th April 1994 at 1300hrs:

“I was at the airport producing a topic, and late morning, a Canadian female colleague (…) came back in a state of shock, because effectively, what had happened was what I narrated in sequence: at the time when the French convoy was coming back, there was a massacre that took place under my eyes. We therefore decided to shoot on the spot. We knew that was not far from the airport, but we were all the same taking a risk. We asked to be allowed to go there and a car, always driven by the French soldiers, escorted us. We were able to see that there had been a massacre. It was a daily affair and it happened under the eyes of French soldiers without any reaction on their part.”

Colette Braeckman remembers also that French soldiers displayed an indifferent attitude towards the massacres:

“During all those days, it was very dangerous for Belgians to move freely in Kigali. I only made one trip to town with Belgian soldiers who were going to look for expatriates. From a lorry in which we were, I saw the scene of Kigali town, bodies that were strewn on the streets, lorries of the refuse department that were passing by and picking up corpses and remains. Some journalist colleagues who were accompanying the French soldiers told me that the latter did not engage in soul-searching. They all had helmets with music, and when they arrived at roadblocks where people were being killed, they increased the volume of the music so as not to hear the shouts of the people who were massacred under their eyes. Afterwards, they would ask that they open the way and would pass very quickly to pick expatriates”.

According to statements made to journalists by a French soldier who sought anonymity, the order not to stop massacres was given by Admiral Lanxade and/or General Christian Quesnot: “Before going to Rwanda, I passed by to take orders from Lanxade, then instructions at the EMP (special Headquarters of the president of the Republic)” Jacques Morel thinks that these words came from Colonel Henri Poncet who commanded the Amaryllis in as much as, in his capacity of leader of the operation, he was the most likely to receive those orders at such a high hierarchy level. But as we saw above, it was an assumed political decision.

c) Rescue of the Saint Agathe orphanage and of the leader of the killers of Masaka

The second selective evacuation carried out by the French in April 1994 concerns the St. Agathe in the area of Masaka, near Kigali. This institution sponsored by the spouse of the head of state, was run by the Saint Vincent Palotti Sisters and had the specialty of receiving orphans of the FAR soldiers killed in combat. The superior of the orphanage, Sister Edita, from Poland, was given the responsibility to find adoptive families in Europe, especially France. She was evacuated by the French and did not want to return to Rwanda after 1994.

According to various testimonies, at the St. Agathe orphanage there was ethnic discrimination against the Tutsi or Hutu personnel that distanced themselves from extremism. The children who were living there in April 1994 and about thirty adults called “accompanying adults” were evacuated by the French on 10th April 1994, the Tutsi staff that worked there and the members of their families were selected then killed on the orders of Paul Kanyamihigo who was a driver at the orphanage. Coming from Gisenyi, Kanyamihigo was an active member of the CDR, notoriously known at Masaka, and immediately after the fall of the plane, he directed attacks against the Tutsis. He and his family were evacuated by the French, as well as the family of a CDR extremist, Justin Twiringiyimana who was a watchman at the orphanage. It is Kanyamihigo who showed to the French the people to evacuate or leave behind on the basis of a pre-established list according to ethnic criteria. Testimonies emphasize Paul Kanyamihigo’s extremism, his participation in the persecution of the Tutsi staff of the orphanage since October 1990, his collaboration with the intelligence services of the Presidency, his involvement in the massacre of the Tutsis since 7th April. At the time of evacuation, Paul Kanyamihigo collaborated closely with French officials in the scanning of people to be evacuated according to a pre-established or indications provided by the latter or by officials of the orphanage, especially the director, Sister Editha. Witnesses affirm also that people were proposed by Kanyamihigo himself, and all of them were CDR extremists.

Upon their arrival in Paris, the people evacuated from the orphanage were first of all accommodated at the reception centre for asylum seekers of Créteil in the region of Paris, then taken to Olivet in the south of Orléans where, for two and a half years, they were accommodated in a property put at their disposal by the general Council of Loiret. Thereafter, they were entrusted to reception families by the Children’s Directorate. Since then, Rwanda tried to bring them back, a group of children were repatriated, and another one was adopted by French families , without a possibility of finding them again.

Even if we cannot blame France for having evacuated orphans at that particularly troubled time, the political and social context surrounding that orphanage did not make it a priority. Since that orphanage had sent a number of children for adoption in France, it was known by the French embassy’s services. There were other orphanages in Kigali and the rest of Rwanda, some run by religious people. The choice to have children adopted in the orphanage belonging to Agathe Habyarimana, essentially sheltering orphans of soldiers, was certainly unknown to the political and social Hutu power sphere of influence in which he worked. Since the list of evacuations had been prepared personally by ambassador Marlaud, the choice of this orphanage falls in direct line with the ambassador’s political options. The politically and, in the final analysis, ethnically discriminatory nature becomes clearer when you consider the fate of the orphanage of Marc Vaiter whose number of children were directly threatened.

The second question arising from the evacuation of the Agathe Habyarimana orphanage concerns the number of accompanying adults, which seems to have been higher than that of the employees of the orphanage. According to André Guichaoua, France evacuated “94 children from the St. Agathe orphanage, […], accompanied by 34 people”. Observers think that heir number was reviewed upwards by those who carried out the evacuation, so as to be able to infiltrate the people close to the regime with the intention of putting them out of danger, in the prospect of bringing them back to power after hopefully neutralizing the RPF.

Indeed, the inquiry carried out on the ground by the journalists of the of the broadcast “The Right to know” in 1995 showed that the number of people at the orphanage was not more than twenty people, a figure confirmed at the Commission by witnesses Emmanuel Hategekimana, Esperance Mukakarangwa, Alphonse Ntamuhanga and Yacine Musenge, all of them residents of Masaka.

Other testimonies specify that in general the French hid the identity of the people embarked in their planes, and this may confirm the hypothesis of hiding the identity of some Rwandans whom they were evacuating. According to journalist Jean-Pierre Martin, a witness of the progress of the Amaryllis, « It was not allowed to film the people who were boarding the French planes, and generally it was rather done in the evenings. » In view of the agreement of the stories in relation to the number of workers at the orphanage, and considering the indications showing that the number of adults evacuated was bigger than that of the people who were working in the orphanage, we cannot rule out the possibility that the French evacuated, with full knowledge of the facts, people who did not belong to the staff of the orphanage, for one reason or another.

d) Abandonment of the Marc Vaiter orphanage

Whereas they went ahead with the evacuation of the Agatha Kanziga orphanage, the French soldiers refused the same help to the forty children of another orphanage that was under the care of a French citizen, Marc Vaiter. That orphanage was situated in the centre of Kigali town, as opposed to Masaka situated at about twenty kilometres from the capital. Moreover, the Marc Vaiter orphanage was situated in an area exposed to exchanges of fire and to attacks by militias. Most of the children under the care of Marc Vaiter were orphans of AIDS whom he had recovered from the Kigali Hospital Centre. He also accommodated children threatened with genocide, whom people of goodwill entrusted to him.

The facts took place on 11th April 1994. Two French soldiers accompanied by Dr. Jean-Marie Milleliri, a military doctor who worked in Kigali at the AIDS Project financed by the French cooperation, came to the orphanage and spoke to Marc Vaiter telling him that they were coming to repatriate him. Marc Vaiter demanded to go with the children. They refused and preferred to go away. The person concerned narrated the incident like this: “Milleliri spoke to me first: Marc, we must go. Order from the French embassy. We have come to fetch you. […] Milleliri explains to me France and Belgium sent troops, to organize the evacuation of expatriates. No time to waste. We must leave as soon as possible. […] I must find the means to take the children. […] Most of them are Tutsis, that is to say victims targeted for killings. They must be able to come with me. Milleliri tosses his head, upset: we don’t have the necessary transport”.




3. Diplomatic support

The diplomatic support provided by France during the formation of the interim government doubled with the diplomatic support whose aim was to restore the latter’s image and facilitate its acceptance at the UN. The personalities involved in perpetration of the killings, under President Theodore Sindikubwabo’s leadership, remained in contact with government and with General Quesnot.

3.1 Collaboration with the interim government

France was the only country to collaborate with the interim government, although the latter’s role in the organisation and perpetration of the genocide was well established. On 27th April 1994, that is to say three weeks after the triggering of the genocide, two emissaries of that government, Jerome Bicamumpaka and Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, were received in Paris at the Elysee and Matignon, whereas the United States and Belgium had refused them visas. They held discussions with high ranking French leaders, notably the Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Alain Juppe and Bruno Delaye, head of the African desk in the Office of the President of the Republic . Barayagwiza, at the time director of political and administration affairs in the Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a radical Hutu extremist, a member of the leadership committee of the CDR and a founding member the RTLM, the instrument of genocide propaganda. As for Jerome Bicamumpaka, he was a member of MDR power, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the interim government. He was an extremist who would not hesitate to air remarks full of hatred against Tutsis at the Security Council to justify perpetration of the genocide. During their stay in Paris, Bicamumpaka and Barayagwiza went to the Rwandan embassy in France, dismissed Ambassador Jean-Marie Ndagijimana whom they blamed for not belonging to Hutu power, and changed the locks of the doors of the embassy to deny him access. They replaced him with the Chargé d’Affaires, Martin Ukobizaba, considered as more of an extremist than Ambassador Ndagijimana.

According to organisations for the defence of human rights, the reason given by the French authorities for receiving the two envoys of the interim government with full honours was that it was necessary to “remain in contact with all the parties in the conflict”, and to finally declare that it was a question of a “private visit”.
Interviewed by Daniel Jacoby, president of FIDH, on the merits of meeting with that delegation, Bruno Delaye answered him that “it was better to talk to them rather than not” and added later on: “With Africa it is not possible not to soil your hands . It seems therefore that “at that precise time, the French authorities knew perfectly well with whom they were doing business.’’ and that they were ready to give them and the interim government political support through such visits. In July 1994, Edouard Balladour denied the truth of those visits by declaring: “We received none of those people in France.”

3.2 Contact with the President of the interim government

On 4th May 1994, General Quesnot granted a telephone interview to the head of the genocide government, Théodore Sindikubwabo, during which the latter thanked his French counterpart, François Mitterrand, for all that he “did for Rwanda and the reception that was accorded in Paris to the delegation led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs ”. The day after the capture of the Kanombe military camp by the RPF, on 21st May 1994, President Sindikubwabo resumed contact with France by addressing a letter to François Mitterrand in which he expressed to him the “feelings of gratitude for the moral, diplomatic and material support that he offered to the Rwandan regime “since 1990 to-date’ He did not mention the ongoing genocide, merely talking about the ‘inter-ethnic massacres” whose only culprit would be the RPF and whose “military advances are likely to rekindle the fire and plunge the country back into a more serious crisis than the previous one”. The letter ended on a specific request to President Mitterrand to “provide once again” to the interim government “both material and diplomatic support” without which ‘our aggressors are likely to accomplish their plans which are well known to you”

On receiving this letter, General Quesnot immediately wrote an accompanying note forwarding Théodore Sindikubwabo’s request to President Mitterrand in which he wrote that “the attainment of power in the region by a minority whose intentions and organisation are not without analogy to the system of the Khmer Rouge is a token of regional instability whose consequences were not anticipated by those, including France, whose complicity and complacency are obvious .”

It is proper to recall that Mr. Sindikubwabo, with whom General Quesnot enjoyed close relationships during the genocide, was not only the leader of a government of killers, but he was also the instigator of the genocide in his native prefecture of Butare. He is also the one who, on 19th April 1994, even when the region was calm, went to the scene, removed the only Tutsi Préfet in Rwanda, Jean Baptiste Habyarimana, from his office and had him killed, and incited the Hutu population to start the “work”, in other words to massacre the Tutsis, and Hutus who still dared oppose the accomplishment of the genocide.



3.3 Protection of the interim government at the Security Council

During the genocide, the French authorities were haunted by the fear that “if the RPF gets a military victory on the ground”, it will want “to impose the minority law of the Tutsi clan ." In order to block this enemy that the RPF was, France worked in such a way as to promote inaction at the Security Council in the face of the genocide. The French diplomatic support was seen most strongly on the 21st of April 1994, during the debates on the vote of resolution 921 meant to describe legally the ongoing massacres. The French Ambassador did a lot of lobbying with the Member States of the Council to oppose the Security Council’s use of the expression “genocide” to refer to the killings that the Tutsis were being subjected to. In the terms of the final solution, the Security Council followed the opinion of the French representative and confined itself on deploring a situation of “violence” and of “senseless carnage” without pointing out neither the perpetrators nor the genocide nature of the ongoing massacres.

An internal note in relation to a discussion that took place on 2nd May 1994 between President Mitterrand and his Minister of Defence, François Léotard, states specifically: “At the United Nations, France had to oppose a partisan condemnation of the only actions committed by the Government forces ”. In other words, a month after the beginning of the genocide, France put this crime on an equal footing with the so-called reprehensible acts committed by the RPF combatants. In short, during the months of April-May until 16th June 1994, the date on which France requested for an intervention mandate in Rwanda with the powers assigned by chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, she pursued her UN diplomacy by insisting on the ceasefire before stopping the massacres and used the word “genocide” only when she wanted to begin Turquoise. And even on that occasion, the French Ambassador made it known that it is “Rwanda’s population” as a whole that was the victim of the genocide and the Tutsis targeted as an ethnic group was not mentioned . In this respect, she did not act differently from the other members of the Security Council, with the only difference that this attitude of passiveness was, partly, the fruit of France’s work behind the scenes.

However, we cannot explain France’s diplomatic game at the Security Council without taking into consideration the attitude and manipulations orchestrated by Boutros-Ghali as we saw in the general introduction in the part related to the action of the international community.

3.4 Collusion with the UN Secretary General and his Representative in Rwanda

Boutros-Ghali’s action of protecting the interim government during the genocide can be explained for two reasons: his sympathy for the interim government heir to the Habyarimana regime or his alliance with France. Boutros-Boutros Ghali enjoyed close relationships with the Habyarimana regime, he intervened on two occasions so that his country, Egypt, authorize sales of arms to Rwanda. This intercession was especially carried out on 16th October 1990 at the end of an interview between Boutros-Boutros Ghali and the Rwandan Ambassador in Egypt, Célestin Kabanda, which culminated in an agreement of the sale of arms to the tune of 23 million US dollars.
An identical intervention took place in December 1990 in which Rwanda received from Egypt a sale of arms to the tune of 5.889 million US dollars, whereas the authorized Egyptian institutions had refused the sale because of the situation of war. A letter from the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the attention of President Habyarimana narrates Boutros-Boutros Ghali active role in these terms: “Our Ambassador praises the personal intervention of Minister Boutros-Boutros Ghali with his Defence colleague for the realization of our recent request to the Egyptian Government and in connection with the acquisition of the military equipment that enabled us to face up to the war imposed on us since October 1990 by the assailants from Uganda. That is why I have just sent a messenger [sic] to thank Minister Boutros-Boutros Ghali for his everlasting support.

However, it seems difficult to explain the protective attitude of Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary General, by loyalty to the friendship that once bound him to Rwanda. It seems more likely that that attitude was rather dictated by the allegiance binding him to France to which he owed his appointment to the leadership of the UN.

In the conduct of her pro-Rwanda diplomacy, France could rely also on Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, the special representative of the UN Secretary General in Rwanda. A former Minister of Foreign Affairs and ex-Ambassador in Paris, France, Booh-Booh was very close to the French and well disposed towards Habyarimana’s close circle . As he admits it himself, his appointment as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Rwanda was an agreed affair between the Cameroonian President, Paul Biya, and Boutros Ghali. During his stay in Rwanda, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh showed affinities with the Hutu extremist parties and often received advice from the French Ambassador Jean-Michel Marlaud .

In the discharge of his mission, Booh-Booh and his political adviser, Mamadou Kane, both distrusted General Dallaire, they displayed real hostility towards him and their attitude was characterized by the dispatch of reports that painted a false picture of the reality on the ground and clearly contradicted those of General Dallaire. Those reports were used to Rwanda’s benefit by France, which intensified in vain efforts to get Dallaire’s dismissal, especially by forwarding a request to that effect to the Canadian government.

In his reports to the UN, Dallaire often makes us understand that the UNAMIR’s direct intervention was necessary to protect the civilian populations, whereas Booh-Booh never mentioned that possibility and preferred to insist on the priority of a ceasefire, while exonerating the interim government from its liabilities in the ongoing massacres, and this was also France’s position. The submission of Booh-Booh’s reports to the Security Council and the concealment of Dallaire’s have already been mentioned in the general introduction as well as the effects of the combined action of these two men, namely the false presentation at the Security Council level of the reality of the genocide on the ground, and the overwhelming observation by the President of the Security Council during the month of April 1994, the New Zealander Colin Keating who did not hesitate to affirm later on that with better information, the Council would have acted in a noticeably different manner.

4. French military support during the genocide

A number of testimonies and official French declarations allow us to say that French military support was continuous from October 1990, during the entire period of the genocide until July 1994, the date of its official stop. This support during the genocide manifested itself in direct contacts between the highest-ranking Rwandan military leaders with their French counterparts, in the continuous presence of French soldiers beside the FAR and in the large supplies of arms but especially ammunitions.

4.1 Presence of French soldiers in Rwanda during the genocide

Before tackling the genocide period itself, it is necessary to mention the contradictions with regard to the number of technical military Assistants left behind in Rwanda after the official departure of the French troops on 15th December 1993. The MIP, in its report, shows that only 24 French AMT remained in Rwanda . But on 30th May 1994, Michel Roussin, then Minister of Cooperation, acknowledges on RFI that there were between 40 and 70 remaining.

Many testimonies mention the return of a number of French soldiers previously based in Rwanda towards the month of February 1994 or their continued presence, whereas they were supposed to have left. The Belgian journalist, Colette Braeckman, spent several weeks at a stretch between the beginning of 1994 and the end of March. She stated to the Commission that during that stay several people, Rwandans as well as expatriates, asserted to her that they had recognized French soldiers who were supposed to have left in December 1993, dressed in civilian clothes. When they were questioned, some of those soldiers explained that they had come back to Rwanda on a short mission. Colonel Walter Balis, a UNAMIR liaison officer, also heard by the Commission, reported that “the UNAMIR intelligence unit led by Captain Claysse indicated the presence of French soldiers dressed in civilian clothes who had returned to Rwanda after December 1993. Personally, I met one of them at the Meridien hotel.” During his two day stay at the UN headquarters in New York, on the 28th and 29th of March 1994, General Dallaire learns that France tried to have him replaced at the head of the UNAMIR because, it would seem, she had not liked the references that he had made in his reports on the presence of French officers within the Presidential Guard, then strongly associated with Interahamwe. Yet, according to MIP, in August 1992, France had brought to an end the presence of French instructors in that unit, by virtue of the accusations of its involvement in the “killings”

Finally, at the time of the attack on the Presidential plane and the triggering of the genocide, on 6th April 1994, French officers were at the heart of FAR’s military unit and seemed to enjoy the trust of the latter during those troubled times. Referring to the possibility according to which French soldiers may have been aware of the preparations of the genocide, General Dallaire explains that “The French supervised the units of the Rwandan army like the Presidential Guard and were present in the headquarters. They were well informed there was something afoot that could lead to wide scale massacres .

Lieutenant Colonel Maurin at the time was adviser to FAR’s Chief of Staff, while Damy, the colonel in the gendarmerie, was adviser to the Chief of the gendarmerie, General Augustin Ndindiriyimana . The three main units of FAR involved in the triggering of the massacres of political leaders and the genocide are the Presidential Guard, the paratrooper’s battalion and reconnaissance battalion. On 6th April these units were in radio link – in parallel network – with Colonel Bagosora presumed to be the architect of the genocide. It might be through this secret chain of command that “the lighting” of the “killing machine” may have been made. The paratrooper and reconnaissance battalions were based in Kanombe Camp adjacent to the presidential residence. In that same camp lived Captain de Saint Quentin as well as four French non-commissioned officers with their families. De Saint Quentin was technical adviser of the paratrooper battalion and instructor of the airborne troops. Whereas UNAMIR had been forbidden access to the place of the crash of the presidential plane, de Saint Quentin and two non-commissioned officers arrived at the scene some minutes after the fall of the plane.

Officially, French military presence in Rwanda came to an end with the departure of the last units that had come to carry out Opération Amaryllis of evacuating the French and foreigners from 9th to 14th April 1994. In the framework of this operation, a COS detachment was kept in Kigali and put under the command of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Among the points listing his mission, we read “to lead any aerial support operation”, “ex-filtrate himself if necessary”. The MIP comments on this initiative are as follows:

“On the basis of this personalized address and considering the situation that didn’t stop deteriorating, Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin would decide the repatriation of the entire COS detachment and the last AMT on 14th April. However, if that had not been the case, we would have legitimately questioned the principle of keeping the COS in Kigali, whereas we no longer had a diplomatic representation. Especially, it is proper to wonder about the mission consisting in directing any aerial operation for which you don’t see whom it would have benefited, if not the FAR.”

This information makes us realize that a direct military support to FAR was considered by the Chief of Staff of the French army, on 12th April, that is to say six days after the beginning of the massacres of the Tutsis, when the latter had reached their cruising speed and taken on a systematic character. Various reports show that the French army remained present during the entire period of the genocide. The monthly “Raids” wrote that if almost all the French paratroopers had re-embarked on 14th April, “only some units of the special forces would have stayed ‘in small numbers’ to account for the events to the headquarters of the land forces .”

General Laforge, commander of Opération Turquoise, confirmed this presence of the French soldiers in Kigali during the period preceding the deployment of the said operation. Deploring the poverty of the intelligence that the Opération Turquoise had at its disposal, he states: “This proves that there were not many people in Rwanda. Apart from those who were locked up in Kigali – but these did not know much and they did not have the right to go for a drive right or left – all the people knew nothing and that was a big problem. ”

Rwandans met French soldiers during the genocide. A major of the gendarmerie narrates that he was in charge of the Kacyiru camp and the buildings housing the ministries in the same area. At that time, he was facing units of the RPA camped on the opposite hill, at Gacuririo. It is the location of those units, just opposite his forces, that enabled him to ascertain that his meetings with the French soldiers took place after 14th April, the date of their official departure.

“At one time, I received two men who were obviously French, accompanied by a Rwandan soldier. Although they were in civilian clothes, they were undeniably soldiers, by virtue of their gait. I was in the building housing the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the fourth floor. They told me that they had been sent by the commander in chief of the gendarmerie and they asked me to show them through the window our positions and those of the Inkotanyi. I showed them and they looked with binoculars. I had showed them an Inkotanyi’s machine gun on the opposite hill, and they asked me if it was not possible to reach them with Milan missiles. After that they went away.”

Deputy Emmanuel Mwumvaneza narrates the circumstances under which he met French soldiers in the east of the country once again, while he was preparing to cross the Tanzanian border intending to seek refuge in that country. He explains that he saw those soldiers during the genocide and before Opération Turquoise.

“Frenchmen, I saw some again in Kiyanza in the prefecture of Kibungo when we were heading towards Tanzania. […] They were busy sensitising Habyarimana’s soldiers (the FAR); they were telling them: the war is over, let’s go! We are going to leave, leave your arms! Don’t be afraid and wait for other arms. We will try to reorganize ourselves and it won’t be long before you come back. Don’t worry! And if you have a problem of clothing, come to an agreement with your brothers so that they lend you theirs and try no to be noticed.”

Apart from this discrete and exceptional presence of French soldiers in Kigali and the east of the country, that is to say in the areas about to fall under the control of the RPF, farther to the west, the region conquered last by the RPA where the FAR had deployed a longer resistance, people point to a presence of a different nature. Some testimonies indicate that French soldiers participated in battles against RPA, much before Opération Turquoise.

Patrick de Saint-Exupery reported a testimony according to which “The French are fighting beside the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) in the region of Butare during mid-May.” Interrogated, a French soldier did not deny the allegation: “It is possible. They are perhaps mercenaries. ” This presence of French soldiers fighting beside the FAR in the region of Butare was also mentioned by Jacques Collet, a Belgian photo-journalist of Rwandan origin. Mr. Collet stayed several times in Rwanda during the genocide. After a first trip to Rwanda, he had gone back to Belgium and wanted to return but by passing through Burundi and joining RPF and going with them to the region of Butare. In Belgium, while he was planning his new stay in Rwanda with a French colleague, the latter, also a journalist, had good contacts in the French army. According to Jacques Collet “he rang a French officer who strictly advised him against coming to Rwanda and more so to Butare because there are still French troops who are fighting beside FAR and they are hard-pressed because the RPF is advancing quite fast but they absolutely don’t want people to know that the French are there. Therefore, you, as journalists, will be their first targets. You will get killed as soon as they see you, with artillery if need be.”

The Commission was able to get in touch with Collet’s French colleague, who confirmed all in all the latter’s remarks.

Jean-Paul Nturanyenabo who was a sergeant in FAR explained to the Commission that a DAMI unit stationed at Mukamira had not left in December 1993 and had stayed until the RPA overran the town of Ruhengeri.

“In 1994, some French soldiers remained at Mukamira, but clandestinely. They were almost 4 platoons. […] Towards May, they brought their heavy weapons to the frontline of Maya in Nkumba commune of Ruhengeri prefecture. There were 120 and 105 canons but only 105 canons were used. It is on a small football ground of Maya that the French operated those weapons to shoot on the RPF positions found in Parc National des Volcans. Afterwards, those weapons were kept at the military camp and the French returned to Mukamira. […] Before the capture of Ruhengeri [15th July 1994], those French soldiers based at Mukamira camp went to settle in the Gisenyi military camp with their heavy weaponry.”

The settlement of Opération Turquoise in the town of Gisenyi, where the interim government was established, and its incursion into the Mukamira camp, are reported by different sources. Human Rights watch writes:

“(…) a detachment of 200 elite soldiers entered Rwanda through the north-east at Gisenyi and started carrying out reconnaissance in the region. (…) they established camps in Gisenyi, ready to protect the town that housed the genocide government. Then the troops moved towards the east, at about 25 kilometres, to Mukamira, a military camp where the French had already trained Rwandan soldiers. They were next to Bigogwe, where Barril was supposed to carry out his training programme, and was in a good position to advance on Ruhengeri, at about twenty kilometres, which was besieged by the RPF.”

An official document quoted by MIP confirms the incursion by Opération Turquoise up to Mukamira: “On 30th June, General Germanos sent a directive for the 1st July 1994 to the Commander of the Turquoise forces, which specifies to the French forces that they must continue the reconnaissance missions with the aim of showing their presence: - to the north, by keeping the present deployment up to Mukamira; (…)”

Colonel Rosier, commander of the COS detachment of Opération Turquoise, in his end of mission report indicates in a very concise way that between 24th and 30th June, “still alone in the area, the detachment carried out some extraction missions in the region of Gisenyi.”

Olivier Lanotte, who seemed to have good French military sources, made the following comment on this COS incursion towards the Mukamira camp. He began by referring to the Rosier report. He wrote:

“However, this report does not give any precision on the identity of the people evacuated by the French army on that occasion. We cannot find any more details in the press that didn’t cover the ongoing operations in the region of Gisenyi-Mukamira-Ruhengeri. As for the report of the information Mission, the latter is totally silent on the breakthrough by the Special Forces up to the Mukamira military camp. When you know the care with which France tried to ‘give media coverage to’ her humanitarian operations in favour of Tutsi survivors, especially at Nyarushishi and at Bisesero, it is most unlikely that these people ex-filtered by the COS in the region of Gisenyi-Mukamira-Ruhengeri, a stronghold of the Habyarimana regime, were Tutsi survivors or simple missionaries. Especially since ‘all the ex-filtered people who had disembarked from the helicopters of the COS in Goma were Whites.’”

We could add here that Mukamira camp is located between the town of Ruhengeri and that of Gisenyi, which is situated at the extreme west of the country, at the border with Zaïre. This means that the region surrounding the town of Ruhengeri constituted a strategic bolt that prevented the RPF troops from advancing on Mukamira or Gisenyi. And it is only on 15th July that the town of Ruhengeri fell into RPF hands. In fact, simple individuals, French, Rwandans or other allies of the government troops did not need any special extraction mission, because the entire region was until then firmly under the control of FAR. The distances are not long, going to the West, that is to say to the Zaïrean border, following the tarmac road from Ruhengeri to the Mukamira camp there are 20 kilometres, between the Mukamira camp and the town of Gisenyi, situated at the border with Zaïre, there are only 40 kilometres. It is certain that the COS extraction mission of Mukamira camp rather concerned the French heavy weapons, especially the 105 mm mortars as is shown in Jean-Paul Nturanyenabo’s testimony. These heavy weapons that could be located by the RPF troops overhanging the region were more delicate to remove, they could have been the target of attack. Those mortars were brought by Colonel Rosier in June 1992, but always remained under guard of the French soldiers.

4.2 High level contact between FAR officers and French officers

FAR commanders kept contact with French officers in charge of the Rwandan dossier. Among those that were finally revealed to the public, the most emblematic was that of General Huchon with Lieutenant-Colonel Rwabalinda. On 9th May 1994, General Huchon received Lieutenant-Colonel Ephrem Rwabalinda, adviser of the FAR Chief of Staff, from 03 pm to 05 pm, who went on a working mission of five days to Paris. In his mission report, Rwabalinda mentioned among “the priorities” tackled by him and his interlocutor:

“- the support of Rwanda by France at the level of international policy;
the physical presence of the French soldiers in Rwanda […] for assistance in the framework of cooperation;
the indirect use of regular or non-regular troops; […]”

In the remaining part of his report, Rwabalinda indicates that General Huchon had undertaken to supply 105 mm ammunitions, ammunitions for individual weapons, as well as transmission equipment to facilitate the secret communications between him and General Bizimungu, commander in chief of FAR:

“A secure telephone line enabling General Bizimungu and General HUCHON to talk without being heard (cryptophony) by a third party was brought to Kigali. Seventeen small sets with 7 frequencies were also sent to facilitate communication between the units of Kigali town. They are waiting for shipping at Ostende. It is urgent to prepare an area under FAR control where the landing operations can be done in total security. The Kanombe runway was found convenient on condition of filling up the possible holes and ward off the spies moving around the airport.”

Rwabalinda returned to Kigali equipped with a satellite telephone meant to serve the Chief of Staff of FAR for his travel in the field.

In his report, Rwabalinda added that France was ready to continue her support to FAR, but Huchon advised Rwanda to carry out a lot of international sensitisation work to improve its image to foreigners and make the RPF responsible for the massacres:

“(…) General HUCHON clearly made me understand that the French soldiers had their hands and legs tied to make any intervention in our favour because of the opinion of the media that only the RPF seems to be in charge of. If nothing is done to restore the country’s image abroad, Rwanda’s military and political leaders will be held responsible for the massacres committed in Rwanda. He talked about this issue several times.”

This advice given by General Huchon to Ephrem Rwabalinda was taken seriously by the Rwandan host, since in the conclusions of his mission report, he noted: “To be more careful about the country’s image abroad constitutes one of the priorities NOT TO BE lost sight of. The communication equipment that I bring should help us get out of isolation vis-à-vis foreigners.” And he revealed that France was already in the process of giving support to the interim government and its armed forces: “the military house of cooperation is preparing acts of assistance in our favour”.

Rwabalinda’s report is dated 16th May in Gitarama where the interim government was, at the time. On 18th May, RTLM, the voice of Habimana Kantano, informed his listeners of the resumption of French aid as well as the advice for discretion in the massacres:

“Good news for Rwandans. News is really getting good. France has started helping us again, with an additional important assistance, with promises to increase it. Only that, for this good news to continue reaching us, they request us that there should be no more human corpses visible on the road, and also that there should be no people killing others while others watch laughing without reporting them to the authorities.”

There are grounds to beleive that the information of the resumption of French military support came from Rwabalinda and that the message requesting to hide the killings constituted the implementation of the advice given by General Huchon to the latter.

4.3 Delivery of arms and ammunitions during the genocide and their use

According to several sources of information, some of which are official, France supplied arms to the Government of Rwanda on several occasions while the latter committed genocide. Since the act has been widely documented, in this part we try to present the main facts reported by several available sources in a synthetic way. Here we propose to document the issue further by tackling the use that was made of those arms through the testimony of a group of Interahamwe who offloaded them from French planes at Goma airport, accompanied them to Rwanda and had some delivered to them.

Deliveries of arms by France during the genocide violated international and French embargoes. So, the deliveries of arms were prohibited by the Arusha Agreement signed on 4th August 1993 as well as by the agreement on the arms free zone established in Kigali town and in the vicinity, signed under the auspices of the United Nations on 22nd December 1993. Finally, on 17th May 1994, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 918 which decreed an arms embargo to Rwanda. The same text instituted a committee charged by the aforementioned Council with the responsibility to supervise observation of that embargo by States.

During his hearing at the MIP, the former French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur revealed that on 8th April 1994 his government decided “not to supply arms to Rwanda, under any form”. On one hand, there is no trace of that decision, on the other, a number of official declarations allow us to question its effective implementation. Thus, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Alain Juppé, during the same hearing explained that that measure “had been confirmed on 2nd April by CIEEMG, and on 5th May by the Prime Minister’s office, in accordance with the decision of the restricted committee of 3rd May 1994”.

The same Alain Juppé, during an interview with Philippe Birberson, then President of Doctors without Borders, France, in response to a question on arms delivery replied, on 12th June 1994: “listen, all that is very confused, as a matter of fact there were agreements of cooperation and defence with the government, there are perhaps remainders but with regard to services, I can tell you that since the end of May there certainly has been no more arms delivery to the Habyarimana regime”. But at the same time, he said while looking at the other side of Seine, therefore towards the Elysée: “but what may happen there, I don’t know”.

In his inquiry published in January 1998, Patrick de Saint-Exupéry reported the remarks of a high ranking officer who declared to him that “he had given the order to interrupt arms supplies before the beginning of Opération Turquoise” that started on 23rd June 1994.

Finally, President Mitterrand made it known that the deliveries of arms by France continued during the genocide. Interrogated by Bernard Debré, he seems to have replied: “You think,” he said “that the world woke up on 7th April, in the morning, saying: Today, the genocide begins? This notion of genocide became obvious only several weeks after 6th April 1994.”

The first information that mentioned deliveries of arms to the government by France appears at the very beginning of the genocide during Opération Amaryllis that came to evacuate French nationals and foreigners. The Belgian Colonel Luc Marshal, commander of the Kigali sector in the UNAMIR framework, who was the source of this information and confirmed it to the newspaper Le Monde in the following terms:

“On 8th [April 1994], we were informed, he assures, that French planes landed the following day towards 6 o’clock. In fact, they came at 03:45 am. Obviously, there was coordination between the French and the Rwandans. The vehicles that were obstructing the runway were withdrawn during the night. I, personally, wasn’t at the airport, but I had observers of fifteen different nationalities. They were soldiers, and they knew what they were saying. Some were definite: boxes of ammunitions – probably 5 tons – were offloaded from a plane and transported by vehicles of the Rwandan army to its Kanombe camp that served as support to the Presidential guard.”

Then, the information mentioning the supply of arms by France during the genocide focuses on the airport of Goma, a small Zairian town situated at least five kilometres from the Rwandan border. Here is the main information relating to the problem:

Philippe Jehanne, former secret services agent in the office of the Minister of Cooperation, declared on 19th May 1994 to Gérard Prunier: “We deliver ammunitions to FAR passing through Goma. But of course we shall deny it, if you quote me in the press.”

“In May, more than a month after the start of the massacres and even as 10,000 people had been killed in Gisenyi [very near Goma], the French let land an arms cargo in Goma in Zaïre. Whereas the smell of corpses heaped in a mass grave overwhelmed the airport, the arms intended for the murderers were heaped up on the runway. The French Consul in Goma said that he was not in a position to intervene: it involved the application of a private contract, entered before the interdiction of arms sales to Rwanda.”

On 31st May 1994, the newspaper L’Humanité mentioned a letter of 25th May from the Rwandan Embassy in Cairo to the Rwandan Minister of Defence, Augustin Bizimana, that announces arms deliveries to FAR by France via Zaïre to whom they are falsely addressed.

On 4th June 1994, Stephen Smith reports that a Boeing 707 delivered arms paid for by France at the Goma airport, on five occasions.

“Finally, since the beginning of the Rwandan tragedy, Goma airport was the rear base of the government of the neighbouring country, Rwanda. It is here that the genocide perpetrators were supplied with arms in particular, until ten days ago. Since the defeat of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) in Kigali, on Sunday 22nd May, “the special flights” to Goma indeed stopped. Previously, on five occasions, a Boeing 707 with registration numbers carefully erased had landed three times during the day and during the night. Its cargo: “every time some 18 tons of arms and ammunitions, ‘of Serbian origin’, according to some people, in cases marked ‘Bulgaria’, according to others. At least once, witnesses affirm having identified South African pilots. In spite of the proliferation of details and contradictory versions, all the sources on the ground – including well-placed French expatriates – express their ‘certainty’ that those arms deliveries were ‘paid for by France’. Nobody is in a position to support this assertion with material evidence.”

A letter of 16th June 1994 from the Continent indicated that: “On 21st June 1994 […] A few days earlier, Colonel Dominique Bon, the military attaché at the French Embassy in Kinshasa, more or less acknowledged that the arms deliveries to ex-FAR did not stop and that they passed through Goma airport, and it is particularly embarrassing since the airport was supposed to be used for humanitarian intervention.”

The Human Rights Watch organisation that carried out an inquiry on the arms deliveries to the genocide forces also interviewed the French Consul in Goma, Jean-Claude Urbano, who repeated to him the same information. Human Rights Watch recalls at the same time that any export of arms from France had to receive Government endorsement.

During the genocide, General Huchon received Lieutenant-Colonel Cyprien Kayumba on several occasions at the military cooperation Mission and the latter stayed 27 days in Paris “to try and accelerate the arms and ammunitions supplies to the Rwandan army”. Kayumba held the functions of chief of logistics in the Rwandan Ministry of Defence and was particularly in charge of arms and ammunitions purchase. He was a member of the crisis committee constituted by Bagosora on 7th April 1994. From the Rwandan Embassy, Kayumba carried out negotiations on transfer and purchase of arms to supply FAR. In July 1994, Kayumba prepared a report of his mission in France that he forwarded to his superiors, through the Rwandan Embassy in Paris, in which he mentioned six arms deliveries to the tune of 5, 454, 395 US dollars, organised thanks to two companies, DLY-Invest (France) and Mil-Tec (Great Britain) between 19th April and 18th July 1994. After the FAR defeat, Kayumba is suspected of having embezzled money, and in his letter of explanation addressed to Théodore Sindikubwabo, he revealed that he had made, during the genocide from Paris, “6 plane loads, that is to say 240 tons of ammunition”.

Finally, the documents found in the Mugunga refugee camp after the flight of the Rwandan refugees due to the attack on the camp by the new Rwandan government troops challenge two French para-public companies in their orders of arms; these companies, SOFREMAS and Luchaire, may have delivered arms to FAR during the genocide and after the embargo decreed by the Security Council.

4.4 Distribution of arms delivered by France to Interahamwe during the genocide.

A group of former elite Interahamwe belonging to the Turihose group, who had told us how its members had been trained by the French in the Ruhengeri and Gisenyi camps, was requested to unload deliveries of arms of French origin. Those former Interahamwe, who all admitted having participated in the genocide, explained not only that they offloaded arms supplied by France, but witnessed part of their distribution. They received some of those arms and used them to kill Tutsis.

Jean Paul Nturanyenabo affirms that in 1994 he saw French soldiers some time before arms arrived from Goma.

“The commander of the Ruhengeri operational sector, Colonel Marcel Bivunabagabo, went to Gisenyi to receive French soldiers. I went with him as leader of the team in charge of their protection. […] They (the French) arrived in Gisenyi towards 16 hrs and went to Umuganda stadium. It was in May. The military officers went to Méridieen Izuba. Two days later, the young militia who were undergoing training at the stadium were requisitioned to go to Goma and unload arms and ammunitions from the plane, which had transported the French soldiers. Afterwards, they carried the arms and ammunitions to the Gisenyi military camp and began distributing them. They were distributed by Lt. Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva in collaboration with the French and other officers. They distributed them at the Umuganda stadium and at the MRND palace (in Gisenyi town). It is the latter, distributed at the MRND palace, which were used at the last battle of Mburabuturo [a wooded hill in Kigali where there were fierce battles between the RPA and the Interahamwe], others went to Bisesero [in the prefecture of Kibuye]. After this distribution, the burgomasters came for the arms and distributed them to the youth whom they had trained in the communes. In my area, I went there; there was a place where they were trained at Mashyuza, near Bralirwa on a little ground.”

Jean Damascène Uzabakiriho narrates the circumstances under which he went to Goma to unload the arms.

“Just after President Habyarimana’s death in 1994, Cpt Bizumuremyi and Lt Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumwa held a meeting at the Gisenyi military camp in the company of French soldiers. They said that Tutsis had attained their objective and that they were capable of worse, given the fact that they had managed to kill the President. They also said that we were going to receive arms and that friendly countries had accepted to deliver to us arms. That is why, a few days later, they put us in 4 lorries and took us to Goma airport to unload the arms and ammunitions from the plane piloted by French soldiers. After unloading, we took them to the military camp of Gisenyi. They started distributing them. Some were given to the leaders of the MRND political party and to the civilians who had just received military training at the Umuganda stadium. At that time, Edouard Karemera requested for reinforcement to Kibuye and they chose from the Interahamwe who were at Gisenyi military camp. Major Nubaha also received arms and distributed them at Kibilira [Kibilira commune in Gisenyi prefecture]. French soldiers were present during the distribution of arms. The arms were Kalachnikov Para that launches grenades.”

Orosse Nisengwe is a former Interahamwe; he took part in the Kibuye and Gisenyi battles. He recounts that he was heading for Gisenyi with a group of Interahamwe, on board a bus, when they received new instructions that told them that the battle had not ended and that they should not be discouraged.

“Lt Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, Préfet Charles Zirimwabagabo, Lt Habimana alias Chuk Norris and St Célestin told us not to be discouraged, that we were going to bring arms supplied by the French soldiers. They made us climb into the buses and military lorries. When we arrived at Goma airport, we found there 3 planes, belonging to the French soldiers, full of cases on which were drawn hoes, whereas as a matter of fact there were arms and grenades. […] Then the arms were distributed at the Gisenyi camp, at the Umuganda stadium, in Kayove commune and in several other communes. Me, I was sent to my commune with other young men to provide security there. When they were giving us those arms at the Gisenyi camp, the French soldiers were present. We used them to hunt the enemy who were the Tutsis in the communes.”
Emmanuel Nshogozabahizi who was an Interahamwe at the time accuses the French of distributing arms in the country, which were used during the genocide.

“What I accuse the French of is that they took part in the training of Interahamwe who committed crimes in Rwanda. I say this because I am one of those who received the training. I also accuse them of distributing arms in the country, which arms were used during the genocide. I am one of those who went to unload them in Goma. It was in May 1994. It is those same arms that we took to Kigali to fight at Mburabuturo. […] We crossed the border towards 03:30 am in the morning. The bus in which I was went towards Méridien Hotel of Gisenyi. There were Interahamwe who were attending military training at the Umuganda stadium. They are the ones who received hose arms. Those that were at the Méridien, who were fewer, were distributed to the people from Nyamyumba and a small part of Kayove.”

Those three former Interahamwe had previously been trained with French participation between 1992 and 1993.

The presence of French soldiers during the genocide besides FAR involved in the extermination work is clearly established, going to the extent of participating in battles, in the Butare region, or in a more substantial manner, in defence of the regime’s northern stronghold by providing FAR with heavy artillery service. According to information received there is every indication that this French military participation, besides FAR, when all is said and done reduced, did not have a determining impact on the conduct of the war by FAR or even in the execution of the genocide. On the other hand it enabled the French military and political leaders to have a thorough knowledge of what was happening on the ground and especially from the very first days of the genocide.

With regard to deliveries of arms and ammunitions, the information collected mentions, simultaneously, dozens of tons of deliveries of French origin. This quantity of arms and ammunitions certainly played an important role in the military reinforcement of FAR and the policy of the interim government, both of them deeply involved in the genocide. The argument that might try to minimise the role of FAR in the genocide cannot be defended. It is falsely in keeping with main studies of the genocide which, on the contrary, credits them with a major role in the planning, organisation and execution of the genocide. It is denied also by the trials and sentences of FAR officers by the ICTR, of whom the most important, like Colonel Bagosora, are accused of being the masterminds of the genocide. Since the French political and military decision makers had, as we have just seen above, agents deployed in different parts of the country during the entire period of the genocide, they were among the best informed people on the nature of the genocide, the army’s involvement and the importance of the assistance in arms and ammunitions for the continuation of the genocide. The proof is that once the FAR were defeated, the genocide came to an end.

Finally, if there ever was any doubt about the role of delivering arms and ammunitions by France during the genocide to the second important group involved in the execution of the genocide, namely the Interahamwe, the testimony narrated here by a former Interahamwe removes it. The arms delivered by France were distributed to them and they used them to kill the Tutsis in the framework of the genocide.

[XXPANTHAXX]

II. OPÉRATION TURQUOISE

1.1. The decision-making process

The decision to launch Opération Turquoise was the culmination of different pressures exerted on the French executive. These pressures were of different nature and various origins. Among the latter were the continuation of the massacres and their effect on the French public opinion, which, at the same time, began to discover the support given by the French Government to the regime that organised those massacres; that of the international press, of the African President clients of France, and that of the new post-apartheid South Africa. But, the most decisive pressure was the perspective of a total defeat of FAR, allies of the French. Finally, that decision was also taken in a context of political cohabitation in France between a socialist President and a Prime Minister of the right as well as a Minister of Foreign Affairs, also of the right wing, and ambitious.

In the preceding part, we saw how France’s support to the interim government and FAR, which were busy committing a total genocide, never failed from 7th April 1994, date of its beginning. At one time, some French officials began to recognise the reality of the genocide, like Alain Juppé, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who acknowledged it on 16th May 1994, followed by a close ally of Mitterrand, Bernard Kouchner, who, on 18th May 1994 on the TFI television chain, affirms: “it is genocide”. But these concessions made at the recognition of the genocide did not in any way influence France’s support to the genocide regime. It is therefore quite logical that on 10th June 1994, Alain Juppé, while answering journalists who asked him if France intended to intervene in Rwanda, declared: “What would we go to do there? One thousand five hundred men would not manage to stop the massacres, especially since one of the parties, the RPF, rejects us”.

The same day, 10th June 1994, several French media consistently reported the massacres of Tutsi children accommodated in a Kigali orphanage run by Father Blanchard, a French citizen. The emotion was at its highest on 11th June, when Father Blanchard, talking on telephone from Kigali, was quoted in all the big television broadcasts of 08 O’clock on the big French channels. On 13th June, the Rwandan tragedy was at the centre of the concerns of an OAU summit that was held in Tunis.

In the meantime, back from Kigali, on 14th June, Father Blanchard, addressed a press conference covered by all the big French radio and television chains. He described the atrocities that the Interahamwe militia subjected to the children of his orphanage. It is at that time that President F. Mitterrand confided in Edouard Balladur and Alain Juppé: “We must by all means do something; I entirely face up to my responsibilities”

MSF considered that “the France of Human Rights bears an overwhelming responsibility in the shameful events taking place in Rwanda since 6th April.” It recalls that Rwanda’s tragedy was “a systematic and planned extermination of opponents of a faction supported and armed by France” and raises crucial questions: “How can one beleive that France doesn’t have any means with her protégés [the self-proclaimed government] to stop those massacres?”

African pressures were also exerted on France and especially on President Mitterrand, the main decision-maker of his country’s African policy.

“(…) other pressures from the “domain” call on the French authorities not to stand by idly. The quick progress of the rebel troops increasingly worried the African heads of State who don’t particularly like the perspective of seeing France allow a rebellion, moreover Anglophone, accede to power by force. They don’t miss the opportunity to let it be known and exert pressure on the Elysée and the Quai dÓrsay so that France respects her principles and “security commitments”; in other words, so that the French army may intervene, like in October 1990 and February 1993, to restore calm and stop the RPF from acceding to power.”

In a diametrically opposed direction, from the official point of view, the South African President, Nelson Mandela, exalted by the progress and the result of the elections which, two months earlier, had buried the apartheid era he declared in a speech pronounced during the OAU summit in Tunis, on 13th June 1994: “The situation in Rwanda is a shame for the whole of Africa, (…) Everything must change; we must assert our will for change by taking action.” According to Gérard Prunier, this declaration may have had a powerful effect on President Mitterrand who may have seen the threat of an English speaking country intervene in France’s African ‘domain’ , and the moral lesson, that a South African intervention decided by Mandela would have represented, would certainly have been a humiliation hard to accept.

The international community’s lack of action also created an intake of air. After the evacuation, on 21st April 1994, of the greater part of the UN peace keeping forces present in Rwanda, the Security Council, by its resolution 918 voted on 17th May 1994, decided to send UNAMIR II and increase its men to 5,500. But the implementation process dragged on. Only Ghana, Ethiopia, Senegal and Zimbabwe proposed a total of 3,200 men, out of the 5,500 required, without equipment and logistic means.

Finally, the RPF’s quick advance on the ground constituted another pressure, certainly decisive. As we shall see preparations for a French military intervention seemed to have started since the beginning of May, on 9th May 1994, Lieutenant-Colonel Rwabalinda held a working meeting with General Huchon. But as revealed by Alison Des Forges, FAR’s military situation, in the mid June, deteriorated rapidly, assuming, for any party that might have wanted to prevent their collapse, a character of extreme urgency. After the failure of FAR’s counter offensive at the beginning of June, on the 13th of the same month, the latter lost the town of Gitarama located at the centre of the country, allowing new RPF advances in the western part of the country.

On 14th June 1994, the decision of a military intervention for humanitarian reasons was taken in the cabinet and was to be under the French flag outside the UNAMIR II.

1.2 Disagreement at the level of the French executive on the objectives and modalities of the intervention

A war of re-conquest in favour of the genocide government or a military intervention with clear and limited humanitarian objectives?

The objectives of the French military intervention in Rwanda as well as its modalities of realisation were to oppose President Mitterrand and his Prime Minister Balladur. The minister of Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppé personally got very much involved in the launching and publicity of the initiative. In a fairly special way, this Minister of the right wing aligned himself with President Mitterrand’s positions. President Mitterrand’s project of intervention in Kigali itself was to divide both the town and the country into two and allow either a re-conquest by FAR, or force negotiations on the positions defended by the French army. This French military intervention, in favour of FAR which was committing genocide, seemed to have been prepared for some months. Thus, Sébastien Ntahobari, the military attaché of the Rwandan Embassy, during the genocide, in a letter addressed to Paul Quilès gave an instructive retrospective clarification of the visit that Lieutenant-Colonel Rwabalinda paid to General Huchon, head of the military mission at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Referring to the coded telephone that General Huchon entrusted to Rwabalinda for delivery to the Chief of staff of FAR, General Bizimungu, to “forward to Paris protected information for the security of French soldiers of Opération Turquoise which was being prepared.”

Alison Des Forges reported that the French diplomats in charge of defending Opération Turquoise at the Security Council may have presented a map indicating an intervention area including “the whole territory situated at the west of a line starting from Ruhengeri in the north, then went down to the south-west towards Kigali and ended its course in a south western in Butare. That area would have included Gisenyi, where the interim government had taken refuge, the same region which Habyarimana originated from, like other high ranking army officers. This area, where the government forces had concentrated the bulk of the troops and supplies, may have constituted an ideal site to launch a counter-offensive.”

On 13th June 1994, Bernard Kouchner went to Kigali to plead the case for Opération Turquoise with General Dallaire. In the UNAMIR headquarters, Kouchner may have presented once again a map showing demarcation of the intervention area of the French soldiers including some districts of Kigali and the entire western part of the country. Kouchner may have asked Dallaire “to request for the intervention of the French soldiers to save the orphans and missionaries trapped behind the Interahamwe lines, in the capital”. Without directly pointing at President Mitterrand, the former Prime Minister Edouard Balladur confirms the existence of the wish for a French military intervention in Kigali. In his hearing at the MIP, he stated that it is “correct that some leaders envisaged a military intervention, especially in Kigali” A little earlier, he had pointed out the objective of those who defended the intervention in Kigali. The MIP repeats his remarks in the following terms: “an intervention in the form of interposition: this solution, presented by those who were its champions as a way of stopping the advance of the RPF troops, may have involved an act of war led by the French troops on foreign soil. Mr. Edouard Balladur specified that he had opposed it, considering that France was not supposed to meddle in what might quickly look like an operation of the colonial type.” In a letter published as an annex by the MIP, he affirms, with regard to President Mitterrand, that, in his eyes, “he was no responsible for punishing the Hutu perpetrators of the genocide nor was he responsible for allowing the latter to take shelter in Zaïre”.

The Prime Minister opposed President Mitterrand’s aggressive option and gave the following five conditions for deployment of Opération Turquoise:
- Authorisation by the United Nations Security Council;
- Restriction of the operation in time to some weeks while waiting for the arrival of UNAMIR;
- Restriction of operations to humanitarian action (sheltering children, the sick and terrorised populations and not indulge in what might be considered as a colonial expedition at the very heart of the Rwandan territory. Any sustainable occupation of a site or part of a territory would present very serious risks, considering the hostility that may result and the political interpretation that they might give to it;
- Positioning of our forces near the border, on the Zaïrean territory, the only one that is available to us;
- Launching of the operations as soon as enough contingents are provided by other countries, except perhaps some operation at the border that we might carry out alone.

Balladur’s opposition seems to have prevented French attack on Kigali, as confirmed by a military source not revealed to Patrick de Saint-Exupéry: “during the first days, it was intended to go to Kigali. These orders were cancelled at the last moment.”

In the face of points of view, the French army would opt for the implementation of two visions, one official, that of Prime Minister Balladur and the other secret, that of President Mitterrand.

But perhaps the main reason that restrained President Mitterrand’s aggressive ambitions is that it was perhaps already too late. On 30th June, seven days after entry of the French forces in Rwanda, General Dallaire went to Goma where the headquarters of the opération turquoise was, to get in contact with the commander of the operation, General Lafourcade. During the discussion, General Dallaire showed a map of the demarcation of the area, which, according to him, Opération Turquoise should occupy. That area had been established according to the positions already occupied by RPF, by establishing a narrow no-man’s land between the two forces. “I went towards Lafourcade’s plan and drew the line, which, according to me, would constitute the extreme limit of the area under French protection, inside Rwanda. He was dismayed: he could not believe that the RPF had moved at such a speed during the previous week.” Dallaire showed that there was rather little space remaining to the east of Gisenyi, that RPF was a about twenty kilometres from the point far east of Gikongoro and finally that the region of Butare was mainly under its control. Faced with this situation, France had to save face by establishing, at the beginning of July, “a safe humanitarian area” situated in the south-west of the country. We shall come back to it.

In the meantime, on 22nd June 1994, the Security Council voted resolution 929 that allowed France to intervene in Rwanda under chapter VII (authorisation to use force in case of need). Five countries abstained. These were China, Brazil, Nigeria, New Zealand and Pakistan. The international community authorised this operation with a lot of reservation and in a very conditional manner. The resolution highlighted the strictly humanitarian nature of the intervention, its limit in the time of two months and forbade her to form “an intervention force between the parties.”

1.3 Orders of operation, composition and progress

The orders of operation were established on 22nd June. The mission of the Turquoise forces is “to bring an end to the massacres wherever it is possible, by possibly using force.”

The rules of engagement are as follows:
- To adopt an attitude of strict neutrality towards the different factions in conflict. This imperative means that it is a question of stopping both the massacres of Tutsis by the militia and the exactions committed by the RPF in reprisals against the Hutus;
- To emphasise the idea that the French army came to stop the massacres and not to fight RPF, nor support FAR […];
- To affirm the humanitarian character of the operation, working in liaison with NGOs, whenever possible. […]

The orders of operation foresaw also the realisation of two additional operations. It involved first of all “being ready ultimately to progressively control the area of the Hutu country towards Kigali and the South towards Nyanza and Butare and intervene on the regrouping sites to protect the people”. Secondly, Turquoise forces were required “to assert with the Rwanda authorities, civilian and military, our neutrality and determination to stop the massacres on the entire area under control of the Rwandan armed forces, by encouraging them to re-establish their authority”.

Finally, the rules of engagement established by General Lafourcade indicate that “the political objective sought is to implement the Arusha Accord, supported with determination by France. The stop of massacres and observance of a ceasefire are the conditions sine qua none of the resumption of dialogue between the parties, initiated in Arusha, as the only possible solution of the conflict. France is determined in her support to this process, therefore to stop the exactions.”

In the context of a total genocide organised by the interim government and committed by and with the support of FAR, in a context of constant and quick retreat by the latter, the only way of considering the return to the Arusha Accord was through the imposition of this government on the RPF through a confrontation between the French troops and the latter.




1.4. Impressive human and material means

To carry out this operation, France lined up a total of 3,060 men from the best units of her army: units of the 3rd semi-brigade of the foreign Legion, the 2nd foreign infantry regiment, the 2nd foreign regiment of paratroopers, the 6th foreign engineering regiment, units of the marine tanks infantry regiment; special forces of the RPIMa acting in the framework of “special operations” (OPS) with agents of the GIGN and the EPIGN, and in parallel with the CRAP teams of the 11th DP and units of the 13th RDP; two units of the army health service, (a rapid medical intervention unit called EMMIR based in Cyangugu and the Bio-force based in Goma), units from the 11th CRAP parachutist division of the 35th RAP, support and transmitters of the 14th RPCS . Describing the deployment put in place, a journalist from Libération depicts Turquoise as an outfit of “elite forces belonging especially to the land force, […], the air force, the marine and the gendarmerie [which] are the best trained, the best equipped […] of the French army, equipped with exceptional means, in terms of fire power, communication system and intelligence”

Troops of the French army were supported by 508 soldiers provided by seven African countries : Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Egypt, Niger and Congo. These seemed to serve as an international security to the French armada.

At the material level, the means are equally important. With regard to the most visible of the aerial equipment, according to a specialised military magazine, Opération Turquoise deployed on the advanced bases of Goma, Bukavu and Kisangani “six C-130 Hecules, nine C-160 Transall, a Falcon-20 and a communications CASA-235. Besides, the air force chartered an Airbus, a Boeing-747 as well as seventeen Antonov-124 Condor and Illyshin II-76 for heavy freight. On the Kisangani base was kept four Jaguar tactical support planes (from Bangui), four Mirage-F1 CT tactical support planes (from Colmar), four Mirage F1-CR reconnaissance planes (from Reims), and two C-135F in flight supply planes”.

All these troops were under the command of General Lafoucarde who, as the chief of operations, “has a post of theatre inter-armed command (PCIAT), directly linked to the Paris inter-armed operational centre (COIA), that is to the Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Jacques Lanxade.” Lafourcade’s PCIAT is based in Goma near the airport.

Opération Turquoise had four phases, starting with the official installation, on 23rd June 1994 and the entry into Rwanda up to the retreat, on 22nd August. Phase 1, devoted to “exceptional operations”, was carried out exclusively by the 222 units of the specialised Group which was a detachment of the Special Operations Group (COS), consisting exclusively of “special forces”. The role of the specialised group was to open up the way to the rest of the force. It was commanded by Colonel Rosier who led the communications and operations Detachment (DLMO) established in Bukavu. In Rwanda, the same COS-Turquoise Groups were in action: the Group 1 COS-Turquoise, which was under the command of Colonel Didier Tauzin alias Thibaut, and consisted of 68 men of the 1st RPIMA. This group entered Rwanda officially on 23rd June through Cyangugu. It went directly to the Tutsi refugee camp of Nyarushishi to which it “provided security”. It stayed there for about a week while part of the group deployed on the side of Gikongoro. There was Group 2 under the command of Rémy Duval, alias Diego, commanding 43 Air parachutist commandos of the specialised Group of the National Gendarmerie (GSIGN) to the town of Kibuye. This group was transported by helicopter. Finally, there was the Group 3 COS-Turquoise consisting of 44 Trepel marine commandos and four gendarmes of zGIN. They were under the command of army Captain Marin Gillier alias Omar. This group left Cyangugu on 24th and went to Kibuye, then turned back to settle at Kirambo and Gishyita. The group’s assignment was to make a reconnaissance of the southern part of Kibuye, including the region of Bisesero.

During the first days of July, Phase 1 saw the end of the activities of the COS detachment even if most of the troops remained in Rwanda and were reinforced by new arrivals. Two groups and a detachment were constituted and remained in the country until the end of the operation on 22nd August 1994.
The North Inter-arms group included the prefecture of Kibuye and was under the command of Colonel Patrice Sartre and consisted of three units of marine troops as well as Senegalese, Guinea-Bissauan, Congolese and Nigerien contingents.

The South Inter-arms Group, which included the prefecture of Cyangugu, was under the command of Jacques Hogard. It consisted of a tactical headquarters of about 400 men essentially from the foreign Legion and a Chadian contingent. Finally, this group also had a rapid intervention military medical Unit (EMMIR) established in the Kamarampaka stadium of Cyangugu.

During this Phase 1, at least during three skirmishes, French troops clashed with those of the RPF. The latter even held under fire a long column of French soldiers who were only freed after negotiations between the two parties at the highest level.

Phase 2 corresponds to the establishment, on 6th July, of the so-called “safe humanitarian area” (ZHS). Faced with the rapid retreat of FAR under RPA pressure and the movement of hundreds of thousands of people towards the south-west of the country, France informed the United Nations Secretary General of the intention to set up a ZHS in Rwanda and requested UN approval. In order to do this, France thought that she did not need a new resolution on the basis of resolutions 925 and 929. The essence of the French argument was as follows:

“[…] using resolutions 925 and 929, to organise a safe humanitarian area where the people would be sheltered from the war and the resulting grave consequences in this country. The Franco-Senegalese forces would see to it that, in the framework of the mandate that was theirs, there was no activity that was likely to affect the security of those people, and that it was carried out in or from this area. This area should centre on the region where humanitarian problems are most acute, taking into sufficiently vast consideration the people concerned and all in one block to stabilise the people on the ground and facilitate the movement of humanitarian support. On the basis of the information in our possession, this area should include the districts of Cyangugu, Gikongoro and the southern part of Kibuye, including the Kibuye-Gitarama axis until and including Ndaba Hill”

On 6th July, the United Nations Secretary General gave his approval to the French initiative on the basis of paragraph 4 of resolution 925. Whereas RPF captured Kigali on 4th July and Ruhengeri and Gisenyi were about to fall, on 8th July they announced demands in relation to ZHS. The latter was supposed to be reserved strictly for civilians, and FAR and the militia who were there were supposed to be disarmed and those responsible for the massacres arrested.

Finally, a number of commanders and members of the elite troops involved in COC groups were former elements of Noroît and DAMI of 1990-1993.

- Colonel Jacques Rosier, commander of Opération Noroît from June to November 1992 was the leader of Group of Special Operations (COS) during the Opération Turquoise.
- Colonel Didier Thibaut and Colonel Jacques Rosier commanded COS which were the spearhead of “Turquoise”, they were there to wage war against RPF, as illustrated by the vitriotic declaration by Thibaut on 4th July at Gikongoro.
- Colonel Etienne Joubert, chief of DAMI/Panda from 23rd December 1992 to 18th May 1993, incorporated in the Chimère detachment, came back during Turquoise as an intelligence, then operations officer in the 1st RPIMA detachment.
- Thierry Prungnaud, warrant officer class 1 of GIGN, member of the DAMI-Presidential Guard, trained the Presidential Guard in 1992 and is detailed to the COS detachment commanded by Marin Gillier.
- Erwan De Gouvello, commander of the marine troops, was an AMT at the beginning of 1994, stationed at camp Kigali of FAR. He was adviser to Colonel Satbenrath at Gikongoro during Turquoise.
- Lieutenant-Colonel Marcel was commander of the operational sector of Byumba during Opération Chimère in February-March 1993. In 1994, he is stationed under the PC of Colonel Jacques Rosier during Turquoise.
- Commander Chamot (squadron major), MT, was ambassador in Kigali on 6th April 1994. He was under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Hogard at the south EMT during Turquoise.
- Commander Fargues (or Forgues?), squadron major, AMT, was in Kigali on 6th April 1994. He found himself under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Hogard at the south EMT during Turquoise.

General Dallaire had lunch with General Lafourcade , and his officers, during his visit on 30th June at the general Headquarters of Opération Turquoise in Goma. He reports what he heard: “They refused to accept the existence of genocide and the fact that the extremist leaders, the bosses and some of their former colleagues are part of the same clique. They did not hide their desire to fight the RPF.”

According to orders of the operation, the equipment and the personnel of the command of Opération Turquoise, all the conditions of a war against RPF were in place but, unfortunately, it was against the Tutsis generally. Contrary to the declarations of French intentions, what the description of the action of the French troops of Turquoise in Rwanda shows in an abundant, recurrent and precise manner is that shadowy but quite murderous war against the Tutsis, in the middle of genocide.

1. CYANGUGU

The prefecture of Cyangugu was situated at the extreme south-west of the country. Today, the administrative divisions have changed. Part of its western façade faced Lake Kivu, while the southern part of the façade was linked with Zaïre by a short land border. Finally, the extreme south of the prefecture formed an important stretch of land that entered the Burundian territory. The main access road to the prefecture coming from the centre of the country was the Kigali-Cyangugu road which crossed Nyungwe forest. The prefecture had not been affected by the fighting because it was part of the so-called “safe humanitarian Zone”. It was the theatre of the genocide like the major part of the country until UNAMIR took over from the French troops, on 21st August 1994, as we shall see. After the first campaigns of massacres, the prefecture and town of Cyangugu had experienced a relative calm; there, like everywhere else, most of the Tutsi population had been massacred before the arrival of Opération Turquoise. There were only a few people remaining hidden here and there, perhaps in small groups. The only important assembling point for survivors was at the Nyarushishi camp where there were approximately 8,000 displaced Tutsis. On 19th, 20th and 21st of July, a massive exodus of the people, the militia and FAR invaded the town, on their way to Zaïre.

Group 1 of the Turquoise COS entered Cyangugu on 23rd June 1994 and went directly to the internally displaced Tutsis’ camp of Nyarushishi. It consisted of 58 men of the 1st RPIMA under the command of Colonel Didier Tauzin alias Thibaut. His deputy was Colonel Hervé Charpentier, alias Colin. The intelligence and then operations officer of the 1st RPIMA detachment was Lieutenant-Colonel Joubert.

On 30th June, the south Turquoise group covering the prefecture of Cyangugu took up its duties in the prefecture. It consisted of troops of the foreign Legion under the command of Colonel Jacques Hogard. Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Louis Laporte was the second in command, in charge of logistics. Captain Bruno Gilbert was deputy operations officer, Captain Georges Le Menn was second operations officer, and Captain Bernard Gondal was head of the intelligence office. The post of the southern group command was based at the Kamembe airport.

The first contingents of Opération Turquoise were received with joy and jubilation by the official regional and some national authorities, the senior FAR officers, Interahamwe and the rank and file FAR. The press, duly invited, echoed this triumphal reception.

“There are triumphs that people could do without. On Thursday the 23rd, it is under applause and cheers that a first detachment of the 11th paratrooper division penetrates if not on Rwandan, on Hutu soil. Leaving a heavy feeling of contempt in its wake, strewn with hurriedly sawn French flags - sometimes upside down –.”

“Right away, Colonel Didier Thibaut, patron of the Red Berets of Cyangugu, makes every effort to clear up the misunderstanding. “We are here neither to fight the RPF nor to support the FAR”, he says to the préfet and the military officers, duly convened.”

When he wanted to go to Nyarushishi, Colonel Thibaut requested the cumbersome reception committee not to follow him, perhaps because he didn’t want to be in the lens of the camera at the time of rescuing the Tutsis.

“It is very simple, he emphasizes to the three dignitaries whom he summoned and who are now surrounding him in silence, I don’t want to see neither machete, nor bow, nor spear and above all no effusiveness! Civilians should not accompany my men beyond the borders of the town. Do you understand?”
When he reached the Nyarushishi camp, a few kilometres from the town, the Colonel made a solemn declaration.

“Amahoro” shouted Colonel Didier Thibaut in Kinyarwanda (Peace be with you!) We came on a peace mission, the officer explained. We don’t want to make war to nobody. We just want to stop the massacres. Therefore, this evening, we shall stay here.” And to the préfet who is getting ready to leave: There is one thing that we cannot accept, Mr. Préfet: it is attaching civilians. The fights between the government forces and the RPF are not our concern. Is it clear?”

Here is the picture of the Opération Turquoise that the French army wanted to present. Doubts began to cross journalists’ minds when during the first days French soldiers did nothing to disarm the militia, a position assumed by Colonel Thibaut who plainly asserted: “We have no orders to disarm the militia”.

Genocide survivors, militia, former members of the FAR and other inhabitants of Cyangugu give a particularly gloomy picture of the French action during its two months presence in the prefecture. In a recurring manner, various witnesses show how French soldiers closely collaborated with the militia, the main perpetrators of the massacres, ordering them to arrest all the Tutsis whom they meet. Then, how they, in a systematic way, let the militia continue to kill, often before their eyes. Another important theme of those testimonies is France’s action in the Nyarushishi camp and on the way the protection posts, established and guarded by several French soldiers at various access points of the camp, were doubled by a perimeter larger than the roadblocks mounted by the Interahamwe whose mission was not to let the Tutsis enter or leave the camp; a number of those who tried it were killed. Still in the Nyarushishi camp, a victim narrates how French soldiers subjected her top particularly atrocious sexual slavery. Elsewhere in town, many victims talk about collaboration between French soldiers and the killers to bring them very young Tutsi girls to rape, whom they then threw back in the street knowing very well that they were likely to be killed. Finally, various witnesses tell how French soldiers strongly incited the population to flee to Zaire.

1) The Opération Turquoise, shield of the FAR in Cyangugu

The Opération Turquoise had a military action of protecting the FAR on the run particularly apparent in Cyangugu according to the analysis by Major Félicien NGIRABATWARE, a direct witness of the facts. A member of the FAR, in 1994, he was a student at the National University of Rwanda at the faculty of LAW at MBURABUTURO in Kigali. He rejoined the army on 13th April 1994 and was stationed at Muhima Camp, from where he left for Ruhengeri at the beginning of July; then he went to Cyangugu. He stayed in that area until the end of August 1994, the date on which he joined the RPA.

“From a military point of view, to be received implies two things; to provide cover fire for troops retreating under enemy fire and to receive them in a secure place. The cover is provided by the units that are behind the others on the battlefield who shoot at the enemy to prevent him from the retreating troops. This was done by the French soldiers in zone Turquoise for the FAR who were fleeing from the RPF. As for the reception, it is the act of receiving the pursued soldiers, treating the injured, helping them to regain morale and sheltering them from the enemy. Militarily, in Cyangugu and Kibuye [part of the Zone Turquoise in which he lived] the French soldiers served as “overhead bridge cover” although referred to by some people as humanitarian zone. The understanding of the role played by the French on one hand and that played by the FAR on the other hand, results from the mastery of the general context of the war. I never saw anything humanitarian in the Opération Turquoise; for me there is nothing to justify this qualifier. This operation is in keeping with the nature of their military support. At Rubengera, the French soldiers ordered the population and the soldiers to go down towards Cyangugu by separating soldiers from civilians. When they arrived in Cyangugu on the 19th, 20th, and 21st July 1994, they found the buildings still intact among them those belonging to the government. But after that date, looting and destruction of property were systematic and the French soldiers let go. The role of France in the genocide amounts to that military support that she persisted in providing to the FAR since the beginning of the war against the RPF and that she maintained during the genocide under cover of humanitarian action by ensuring their orderly retreat in order to return later with renewed force.”

Bernard Surwumwe is an ex-FAR. He illustrates in a synthetic manner the previous remarks by showing the French protection given to the ex-FAR since the last clashes against the RPA in Ruhengeri in the middle of July until the retreat into Zaire by passing through Gisenyi, Kibuye and Cyangugu.

“I witnessed French assistance to the FAR in combat in July 1994 when the RPF threatened the town of Ruhengeri. We fled towards Gisenyi and, while we were at the top of Mukamira, General Bizimungu encouraged us to resist and not to flee because, he said, the French had already arrived to help us. Indeed, they had already installed their support weapons at the hill tops of Bigogwe and threw bombs at the Inkotanyi who were pursuing us. The French managed to slow down their progress and this enabled us to extricate ourselves. We continued towards Kibuye then Cyangugu where our leaders were hoping to organise a resistance. On the way, it is the French who were protecting our itinerary. They had already erected roadblocks in several places like at Gishyita and Ntendezi. When we arrived in Cyangugu, we were quartered in the buildings of the MRND (Mouvement pour le Rassemblement National et de Développement, Habyarimana’s party). And during the crossing of the border towards Bukavu, they are the ones who transported our arms up to the military camp of Mpanzi where General Bizimungu joined us by helicopter in the company of Prime Minister KAMBANDA and two French men.”

2) Collaboration between the French soldiers and the Interahamwe in the continuation of the assassinations of Tutsis

Various witnesses relate how French soldiers collaborated with the Interahamwe in the continuation of the assassinations of Tutsi survivors. This cooperation was either active when those soldiers gave instructions to the Interahamwe to continue killing, or passive by letting the Interahamwe kill in their full view whereas as an occupying force they knew the legal and moral obligation to bring those killings to an end.
Elisé Bisengimana, completing the university and a native of Cyangugu, was there during the entire period of the Opération turquoise. After the genocide, he was the préfet of Cyangugu and he is currently a member of parliament. His testimony shows the evolution of the collaboration between the French soldiers and the militia in the screening of Tutsis and their delivery to the Interahamwe for killing.

“Since their arrival, the French soldiers first of all collaborated with the gendarmes and the Interahamwe on the roadblocks and in patrols. But in the end, they remained with the Interahamwe only after setting the gendarmes aside especially at the time of the exodus towards Zaïre. At the roadblocks in the town of Cyangugu, they checked identity cards and searched people and vehicles, recovering the arms found on the ex-FAR in flight and having them kept by the Interahamwe. During the identity checks at the roadblocks, the term “Hutu” on the identity card authorised the person to pass whereas the term “Tutsi” or the features of the Tutsi type were enough for not crossing the roadblock and being handed to the Interahamwe. As for the destination of the arms recovered on the roadblocks, some of them were given to the Interahamwe who helped the French on their patrols and on those roadblocks. The rest was carried DRC during the general flight.”

Jean Ndihokubwayo was an Interahamwe and a foreign exchange dealer at the Rusizi I border near the bridge which separates Cyangugu from Bukavu in Zaïre. The extract of his testimony is on the collaboration between the French soldiers and the Interahamwe to whom they distributed arms to track down and kill the Tutsis.

“The French soldiers entered Rwanda in 1994, after crossing the RUSIZI I boarder of Cyangugu from Zaïre. Those soldiers entered in two different stages. The first time, a group of three French soldiers came to Rwanda’s border (Rusizi I). They discussed with the immigration officer whom they told that they were coming for the zone turquoise but that they were going to cross the same day. The second time, a group of French soldiers entered the following morning. They met Colonel SIMBA and Député KAYONDE. After their discussion, the French soldiers explained to us that they were coming to save the HUTUS who were likely to be exterminated by the TUTSIS.

Then they asked us to call the soldiers of that area. I called six of them and we all went with SIMBA and that group of Frenchmen. We went to a house that belonged to SIMBA, slightly set back from the road in comparison with the rest of the town. That house was surrounded by a thick bush. The French soldiers drove their lorries into the courtyard of the house. Inside the courtyard, we lined up perpendicular to the French lorries. Then the French soldiers started distributing arms insisting on clearing or burning down the vicinity of their general headquarters to avoid any infiltration by the elements of the RPF or their accomplices. They told us literally through SIMBA: “we are going to give you arms and machetes to clear the bushes and thus avoid that the Tutsis might shoot at us.”

Then they gave us three guns, grenades and machetes. The machetes were in big boxes which the French brought themselves in their car to distribute them to us. We dispersed in different directions around the house and started searching the brushwood. We flushed out two Tutsis whom we killed, one by machete, the other one tried to run and one of us, a soldier by the name Masunzu shot him., We were using arms received from the French. Further on, near the prison, we flushed out another five who managed to dodge our shots. We went to give a report of operation and they paid us 700 FF. I kept two hundred and my companions shared the remainder. They then asked us to stay with them to help them. It is in this sense that after consulting the French, SIMBA sent us to look for reinforcements. I was able to bring three young men who in turn received arms and grenades.

Jean Bosco Habimana alias Masudi was a member of the FAR who underwent commando training. At the end of June 1994, he was in Cyangugu and was one of the six soldiers brought by the previous witness, Jean Ndihokubwayo, to the French soldiers at the border. He participated in the search in the brushwood surrounding SIMBA’s house in which the French detachment was going to settle.

“The French soldiers arrived in Cyangugu, crossed the Rusizi saying that they were coming to save the Hutus. As soon as they arrived, they told the Interahamwe group, who received them warmly, that they feared that the Hutus were the ones being killed, that if that was the case the situation would have been more complicated. But, since it was the Tutsis who were being killed, there was no problem because they were coming to protect the Hutus and thwart the RPF advance towards Cyangugu. Immediately after crossing the border [arrived in Colonel Simba’s house], they distributed among us grenades, guns and two-edged machetes. We were a group of Interahamwe and former soldiers. Since I was a former soldier, I received an L4 gun, an M28 grenade and a machete. They ordered us to go into the vicinity to track the enemy, that is to say the Tutsis, who might be hiding in the bushes and kill them with machetes. We did it, and actually killed Tutsis who had hidden in the bushes. Moreover, we no longer feared going to search peoples’ houses since we were armed, something that we could not do without those arms. […] They were used to kill the Tutsis at the Gasandara roadblock and very near the river Rusizi where corpses of the people killed were thrown in the river. I killed two people with those guns at the same place. Similarly, a certain Marcel, with a machete that he had received from the French, killed a Tutsi who had hidden in the bush situated below Vuningoma’s home. […]. The killings intensified and there were many corpses in the river Rusizi. The French told us that we were stupid to let the corpses float on the surface of the water, that it would become a serious problem if photos were taken, and then they showed us what to do to ensure that those corpses don’t float. They climbed into boats and went towards the floating corpses which they disembowelled with the use of bayonets.”

Calixte Gashirabake is a native of east Kibuye, in the former commune of Kivumu where he saw the soldiers of the Opération turquoise arrive. He gave specific examples of screening displaced persons, in search of Tutsis, at a roadblock manned by French soldiers and the FAR and who were entrusted by the French soldiers or the FAR for killing. He gives other examples of the same type of action, this time in Cyangugu.

“In June 1994 I saw French soldiers at Kivumu. They were there in the framework of the Opération turquoise. In the company of the FAR and Policemen, they first of all put up a roadblock near the commune, then they organised a meeting with the displaced persons of Isanza to tell them that the had come to ensure their security and if possible protect them during their flight into exile because the Inkotanyi were likely to massacre them. At that roadblock, the French and FAR were carrying out a rigorous control so that no single Inkotanyi might escape them because the latter could hide in the crowd of displaced persons. I, personally was arrested when I tried to pass without an identity card. I was going to lose my life if the commune adviser, Ndaryemera, had not intervened in my favour. It is at that roadblock that a lady by the names of Béatrice alias Nyamunini was arrested and killed with her husband. She was a clerk of the court. The Rwandan policemen pulled her out of the crowd and went to kill her in the bush not far from there. The French soldiers saw everything but they did nothing to stop them. She was suspected of being an accomplice of Inkotanyi. The French soldiers advised the FAR to carry out a serious check in such a way that no Inkotanyi was able to escape from them. That is why they asked every passer-by to show his identity card. That is how at that same place, a certain Nyamaswa was arrested and they asked him for his identity card. They realised that he was Tutsi. This was confirmed by the people who knew him. According to them, he had been absent from the village for a long time and it was murmured that he had gone to be recruited by the Inkotanyi. Since that day, he has never been seen. Later on, while people were fleeing from Inkotanyi on the road to Cyangugu, we found another roadblock manned by the French and the FAR soldiers. They arrested four people among us. Then, the rest of us, they forced us to continue our way. Nobody will know their fate. We spent a whole month in that area. The French used to tell us that they are going to Zaïre to prepare our place of refuge and that they would take us there thereafter. Finally, we were transported and concentrated in the Nyarushishi camp before continuing to Zaïre. On the bridge of Ntendezi, the Interahamwe arrested and killed a young man suspected of being Inkotanyi when he tried to cross that bridge. They asked him his identification and he told them: “frankly, don’t waste your time, I am Tutsi!” Hardly had he pronounced the last word than they stabbed him. The French who were sitting on the bridge saw everything and didn’t bat an eyelid.”

Thomson Mubiligi was an Interahamwe and collaborated with the French troops during the genocide in Cyangugu.

“I saw the French arrive in Cyangugu. Some of them went to Nyarushishi, others to the airport and another group of soldiers moved everywhere. They collaborated closely with the Préfet of Cyangugu and the gendarmerie and often held meetings with FAR senior officers as well as the leaders of the Interahamwe. In this framework, they closely collaborated with the President of CDR, Bantari Ripa, the President leader of the Interahamwe in Cyangugu, Nyandwi Christophe, as well as Yusuf Munyakazi, leader on the Interahamwe of Bugarama who went to give reinforcement in Kibuye. […]
In Cyangugu, the Interahamwe continued to kill in spite of the presence of the French soldiers. Indeed, those Interahamwe kept their roadblocks and the French did nothing to neither disarm them nor chase them away from those roadblocks. Some Interahamwe from Kigali looted in the town of Cyangugu and also the French did nothing to stop them. […] One of the senior French officers was called Lieutenant-Colonel Hogard, others called themselves Commanders to foreign legions. […]
The French distributed arms to some people, among them: me, Habimana Anaclet who was a soldier in the FAR, and another Habimana. They also gave red bands that we were supposed to wear for identification, telling us that we were going to help them in providing security. In return, we received iron rations. […] The French let the Interahamwe kill with impunity.”

Vincent Nzabaritegeka was a mechanic in the Nyungwe Forest project at Ntendezi in the prefecture of Cyangugu. He asserts that French soldiers distributed arms to the leaders of Interahamwe who then used them to kill the Tutsis.

“Towards the 25th of June, it was a Monday [The witness gets it wrong in his approximation, Monday was the 27th June], Samuel Manishimwe, préfet Bagambiki and 7 Frenchmen in their jeeps came and ordered me to open the gate. They were with gendarmes. Immediately, I saw them enter a Benz lorry, hermetically closed, belonging to the French. They told me that they were looking for the project director, Mr. Déo Mbanzabigwi, so that he may give them a free room. After telling them that the director was absent, Préfet Bagambiki ordered me to give him the keys, and I did so. He opened one of the rooms and ordered the 12 gendarmes to unload the arms which were in the lorry. According to what one of the gendarmes said, they were M16 guns and 5 boxes containing grenades. The préfet told the gendarmes that they were supposed to stay behind and guard those arms. […]

The following day, Yusuf [Munyakazi], Samuel Manishimwe, the préfet and the director came back and held a meeting during which they said that the reservists were reenlisted in the army that, therefore, the arms were going to be distributed to the militarily trained Interahamwe. Thus they distributed arms and grenades. They were giving a gun and grenades to each person. After that they told them to go and “work”, starting with Bugarama. Déo said that I could not stay without means of defence and they gave me a gun and grenades. They also gave guns and grenades to our engineer and to two other people to guarantee the security of the centre and its vicinity. […]

On the 28, towards evening, Yusuf came back and told us that he had solved the problem of Gafunzo [a locality of the Bugarama region, Yusuf Munyakazi’s stronghold], where the only serious problem remaining was Bisesero where attacks had been conducted since he 27th and that people had to find a way of going there. We took out the arms, guns and grenades that were remaining in stock and the gendarmes loaded them in Yusuf’s vehicle. Before leaving, the latter told us that the attack on Bisesero would take place on Friday the 29 [Once again the witness gets the day wrong, the 29th was a Wednesday. On the other hand the dates given in reference to Bisesero in this extract correspond to the events in Bisesero].

Actually, they went to attack Bisesero on the 29th, […] The French distributed, publicly, the guns that were used to perpetrate the massacres. I witnessed this distribution when I was accompanying the director and the engineer. Mutabazi and even those two used them publicly. Moreover, those guns were used to kill the people of Nyamuhunga. Also, when I was coming back from Nyamasheke to transport a wounded person whom Yusuf had entrusted me with, I came back to Ntendezi and I noticed that the people had started being killed at Ntendezi roadblock. It is in this framework that a certain Eugène was killed. Some people said that he was a musician at chez Lando and a native of Butare but we inquired and learnt that he came from Gishoma. At the Shagasha, people were also killed by the guns distributed by the French.”

Gaspard Nteziryimana received military training from French soldiers so as to be a member of the “red bands”, a group of auxiliaries of the French soldiers. After being assaulted by the Interahamwe and left for dead because he had hidden Tutsis, the French soldiers forced him to accuse the RPF while they were filming his declarations.

“I saw French soldiers in June 1994. They trained us in the use of firearms and military tactics at Mataba in Nyamasheke. We were more than 160 young men from the former sectors of Mubumbano, Nyamasheke and Butambara. […] We started the training that was going to last 15 days. We received training from 7h00, had a break for an hour and a half and resume until 17h00. We went back home in the evening. We asked them why they let us go back home whereas we were undergoing military training and they told us that we would no be recruited in the army but that we were going to support the Opération Turquoise so as to stop the Inkotanyi from crossing Gikongoro and overrun Cyangugu. After the closing ceremony of the training, we went back home. After some time the sector advisers summoned us to receive the equipment according to our merits and to start the service. At Nyamasheke, the French gave us about fifteen guns (FAL and Kalashnikovs) and military uniforms, the same as those of the FAR. They also gave us a document certifying that we had received those arms from them and a band of red cloth that we wore on the shoulders to differentiate us from the FAR and prove that we supported the French. At one time, the French took back the arms that they had given to us and I went back home. [...]I had hidden four Tutsis at home, among them was Dusabe Julienne and they were discovered by the Interahamwe during the distribution of the property of the Tutsis. The Interahamwe, among them Antoine Hitimana, Cyrille Kalisa, Sabin, Patrice, François, Barthélemy Iyakagaba and many more came to look for me and burgomaster Aloys Kamana with his elder brother who was the President of the MDR Power gave the order to kill me. The Interahamwe assaulted me with a machete and went away thinking that they had killed me whereas I had only fainted. When the French learnt about it, they came and evacuated me on board their jeep. They took me to Kamembe, at the Saint-Francis health centre run by the Sisters. The French soldiers cared for me, they put me in a tent and they took their time to treat me. Three days after, I had regained consciousness and they asked me to explain to them what had happened. I explained to them that it was the Interahamwe who had made an attempt on my life but they didn’t want to accept the explanation. They brought a native lady from Butare to translate what they were telling me. They told her to explain to me that I had to write asserting that it was the Tutsis of the RPF who had done it so that they may continue to treat me. I explained to her that it was not true, that it was the Interahamwe who had done it because I had hidden Tutsis. They let me know that they could not continue treating me, saying that they were going to throw me out because I refused to lie that it was the Inkotanyi who had wanted to kill me. They photographed me. I had no choice and since I was likely to be killed if I returned home, I accepted to tell lies. A report saying that the perpetrators of those acts were Inkotanyi was prepared by the French soldiers, assisted by the lady and I was forced to approve it. […] Afterwards, a Frenchman from Bukavu came to interview me. He had a camera and asked me to say that “it was the Inkotanyi who had wanted to kill me with a machete because I had killed Tutsis” and to describe them by saying that “they were tall with long noses”. The lady told me that I was supposed to repeat this and I noticed that the Frenchman wrote down only his questions and my answers while ensuring that the camera was switched off at the time of the lady’s interventions. After the interview, they continued treating me. […] During the flight to Congo, I had already recovered and I saw the French who were controlling the passage of refugees stop a young man who was on an AG 100 motorbike at the Rusizi. They said that he was Tutsi. It was General Kabiligi who took the motorbike and threw it in the Rusizi. The French brutally grabbed that man by the belt and took him towards the convent of the Saint-Francis Sisters in demolished houses. He was never seen again and the way he was led away was a bad sign; they were not going to spare him. […] Another time, I also saw the French screen the Interahamwe who were looting the Ituze hotel. They said they were screening the Tutsis. They took tall people whom they called Tutsis; put them aboard their helicopter saying that they were going to throw them in the Nyungwe forest. Moreover, in Kamembe, it was often said that the French soldiers threw people in the river Rusizi.”

Alphonsine Mukakarangwa is a peasant survivor of genocide. She recounts how French soldiers made her, and her mother, get out of the health centre where they were treating them when they learnt that they had been victims of the Interahamwe. Those French dropped them at a roadblock manned by Interahamwe.

“At the beginning of the genocide, I went to hide at the home of a Hutu lady by the name Mama Faida in Kamembe town and, upon the arrival of the French soldiers of the Opération Turquoise in Cyangugu, my mother sent someone to tell me that security had been restored, and that I could come back home. I returned home and two days afterwards, we were attacked by two soldiers accompanied by my brother in law who was an Interahamwe. They injured me seriously, I managed to escape but, later on, I fainted as a result of a serious haemorrhage. My mother was also seriously beaten, she received hammer blows on the head as well as knife blows. They left her for dead. We were found by my brother and the in-charge of the cell called François who evacuated us to the Kamarampaka stadium where the French had set up camp. They had set up camp there and divided into two the tents in which they put the injured: one section for those who returned from the frontline, injured and transported by helicopter, and another section for us who had been wounded by the Interahamwe. Above the bed of each patient, there was a form. In our section we were five and we were all naked, even my mother. The French came to take photographs of us. I was wearing a slip only, they cut it with scissors so that I may also be totally naked before taking our photographs. […] One day, a Frenchman consulted my form. I heard him pronounce the word “Interahamwe”. He brutally disconnected the drip which they had administered to me and threw it down. I could not walk, he pulled me and took me out of the stadium. My mother followed us shouting that I was her daughter and begged him to leave me alone. He put both of us, naked, in their vehicle and took us near the hospital of Bushenge, at the junction of the roads leading to the hospital and Nyamirundi. They made us alight from the vehicle and left us there. It was at a roadblock of Interahamwe, they had lit a fire there but there was nobody, they had launched an attack on Nyamirundi. After some time, a man in a blue apron arrived and asked us if we were the people brought by the French. We said yes. He asked us to give him money so that he can treat us. My mother explained to him that we didn’t have any and proposed to give him our piece of land. He told us to enter and go to room number two. I could hardly stand; I tried to walk with a bent back and, from time to time, on all fours. We went into room II in which there was only one patient injured on the foot with his mother as a nurse. The nurse told us that we were lucky that Interahamwe had gone to loot at Nyamirundi and that usually those whom they brought there were killed. She gave us her two pieces of cloth to cover ourselves. […] We left the hospital a few days later. When we arrived at Gihundwe, we met two men who said that they had seen French soldiers kill a man. We thought, they added, that the French had come to save human lives but what they did in addition to that was worse than what the Interahamwe did. Indeed, we saw the corpse of that man covered with a mat near the Gihundwe market.”

Anthère was a FAR corporal until December 1993. He recounts that French soldiers gave two guns to an Interahamwe leader.

“A week after their settlement in Nyarushishi, the French gave two guns to Edouard Bandetse who was a shopkeeper here in Kamembe; he was also the president of Interahamwe in the Nyakabuye commune. They were the type of guns that military drivers were carrying. I was the one going to teach him how to handle them, their assembly and dismantling. There were also two pistols which he took with him when he fled the country.”

During the Opération Turquoise Straton Sinzabakwira was a burgomaster of Karengera commune of which he was native. He was also a member of the political bureau of the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) in 1994. His testimony is based on what he observed himself and what he heard from other people because he was well informed.

“I am one of the local authorities who were in office during the 1994 genocide since I was a burgomaster of the Karengera commune and I am one of those who admitted their role in the genocide of the Tutsis which took place in Rwanda. […] During the Opération Turquoise, the French collaborated with the killers in the perpetration of the genocide. They selected also the people who were supposed to be killed and abandoned them to the fate.
[…] French soldiers visited all the communes and held meetings with burgomasters or leaders of Interahamwe to give us instructions on the behaviour to adopt. When they arrived in Cyangugu, they were in charge of everything; they supervised and gave instructions to reinforce patrols in order to prevent the RPF from infiltrating. In order to recognise the RPF, they had given us the instruction to look at the shoulders if there might be gun strap marks and check on legs for marks of boots. In Cyangugu, after seeing the bodies of the people killed floating on Lake Kivu and in the river Rusizi, they suggested to the killers to open the stomachs of the floating corpses and fill them with stones so that they may sink. They toured all the roadblocks giving those instructions to the killers. They wanted to hide evidence of the genocide from international journalists. I was told, but I also saw it myself.
[…] The French soldiers of the Opération Turquoise were involved in the genocide of the Tutsis, and here is how:

1. At the Ntendezi roadblock in the Karengera commune of which I was a burgomaster, I was with Christophe Nyandwi, leader of Interahamwe in Cyangugu, when French soldiers came to the place where we were checking cars that were coming from Gitarama, Butare and Gikongoro. We were looking for Tutsis in those cars, because nobody could cross the roadblock without showing his identity card to make sure that he was really Hutu. We had put aside five Tutsis and we were with Interahamwe in uniform. The French soldiers came out of their vehicles and we discussed with them. We told them that we were looking for the enemy. They knew Nyandwi as a leader of Interahamwe since they used to meet him at the prefecture and in meetings. They guaranteed us their support and went away. Those who were behind in the vehicle raised their hands in the air as a sign of support. Nyandwi took the five Tutsis and killed them between the Gisuma commune and the Shagasha tea factory. If they had come for humanitarian purposes, they would have saved and evacuated those Tutsis.

2. At Nyarushishi where the Tutsis were hiding, the French raped women and girls in tents and the wood nearby. And in their so-called “humanitarian action”, they did not give food to refugees. I was told this by the people who went to sell food to the displaced people in that camp. I used those people in my official capacity to obtain information on the way those displaced people were living and how their relations with the French were. The Opération Turquoise had no humanitarian character whatsoever. It was a support and protection mission for the Interahamwe to enable them to flee.

3. In the Nyungwe forest at Gasare, the French soldiers captured people, tied them up, put them in sacs, loaded them into helicopters and went and dropped them in the forest. The victims were referred to as accomplices of Inkotanyi. According to information that I received from people who were running away from Kigali, those who were killed by the French by throwing them from the helicopter into the Nyungwe forest were very many. I personally saw bodies of two people tied up who were thrown by the French soldiers in Gasare in Karengera commune. Apart from those, other people suffered the same fate. After the RAR defeat and before helping the killers escape to Zaïre, the present Democratic Republic of Congo, the French soldiers of Turquoise insisted on first of all eliminating the traces of cannabis which was grown in the Nyungwe forest. They collected what had been harvested, then eliminated all the traces by destroying that plantation and killing the staff that maintained it, as well as those who helped with its destruction. According to the information that I received from my friend Emmanuel Nteziryayo who was the burgomaster of the Mudasomwa commune and with whom I was in the refugee camp in Zaïre, the agricultural officer who was in charge of maintaining that plantation was killed in the same way around the 5 July 1994.

4. I personally was beaten by the French soldiers around the 15th July 1994, when they learnt from Interahamwe that I had helped Claudien Kanyeshyamba [a Tutsi] to flee to Burundi. The French came to look for me because hthey had been told that I worked for the enemy and that I had arms that were to be used by the Inkotanyi once they arrived in the region. The French soldiers came to search at my home and they found nothing, but they harassed and beat us, me and my family;

5. The French soldiers ex-filtrated the criminals and encouraged the people to go into exile. They frightened them with the gesture that their throats would be slit if they stayed behind, encouraging them to flee. At Bugarama, they moved people from their homes by force.”

Kamembe Airport

The headquarters of the southern unit of Opération Turquoise headed by Colonel Hogard was located within Kamembe airport . Different witnesses have affirmed to the Commission that corpses were brought to the airport, loaded on helicopters and dumped either in Lake Kivu or in Nyungwe forest. Finally, a witness who kept a precise memory of the happenings of the time affirmed to having seen half a dozen fresh Tutsi corpses within the protected perimeter of the French army inside the airport.

Cassien Bagaruka was a former fire fighter who was at the Kamembe airport fire fighting station at the time of Opération Turquoise. He spoke of the close collaboration between the French army and the Interahamwe which permitted the continuation of the killings. He saw French soldiers arriving in Cyangugu.

“When they arrived at Kamembe airport, they installed a radio transmitter which was controlled by Corporal Thierry and Sergeant Galant Olivier, and other various military equipment which included vehicles transported by helicopters and Transall Hercules 730 type of aircrafts. Shortly thereafter, French soldiers led by Colonel Hogard attended a meeting organised by local authorities among who were Colonel Kabiligi, Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho, Tharcisse Muvunyi and Sylvère Ahorugeze [some of these persons are accused while others have already been convicted of masterminding the genocide]. After that meeting, helicopters started the operation of transporting Interahamwe in the early mornings and bringing them back later in the evenings. In fact, the French soldiers closely collaborated with the Interahamwe. I personally saw the French soldiers bringing Tutsis who were tied up, to the empty runway of the airport where they were shot dead before being dumped into Lake Kivu using helicopters. Those Tutsis, who mainly came from Bisesero (Kibuye) and Ntendezi, had been brought to the French base by the Interahamwe. In the same way, one of the fire fighters at the airport called Gratien, who was being pursued by killers, took refuge in the French military base located at Kamembe airport. He was killed at that very base before the French soldiers yet they could have protected him. In my view, the French soldiers came to protect genocide perpetrators and facilitate them to cross the border towards Zaire where they controlled.”

Abdallah Kayitsinga was a carpenter. During Opération Turquoise, he was staying close to Kamembe airport.

“I saw the French soldiers arriving at Kamembe aboard their vehicles, equipped with heavy arms. […] At Kamembe, I saw them driving towards neighbouring villages and coming back carrying corpses in their military Jeeps heading towards the airport. You see, their jeeps were so small that we could see the feet of corpses hanging from their rear. As I was living near that airport, I noticed that, each time, shortly after these Jeeps had passed, their helicopter would thereafter take off. It was said that the French soldiers used to dump corpses in Nyungwe forest; I cannot deny it as I had seen them transporting those corpses towards the airport.”

Luc Pillionel , a Swiss national, is married to a Rwandese. He came to Rwanda on 19th July 1994 to pick up members of his wife’s family who had sought refuge in Nyarushishi camp. Being a Swiss, he was able to forge a relationship with the French soldiers and benefited from their assistance. The extract from his testimony is about the discovery of half a dozen fresh corpses, most likely Tutsis, inside the protected perimeter of the French military base located within Kamembe airport. At the same military base is where the command post of the southern unit of Opération Turquoise was located, which also housed the office of Colonel Hoard. The extract of the testimony starts at the time when Luc Pillionel lands at Kamembe airport, coming from Bukavu in Zaire.

“The helicopter landed close to a very large metal warehouse which was surrounded by fortification positions of the command post made from sand bags. I entered the military base. I remember having talked to a French army officer, Captain Guillaume Ancel who promised that we would very shortly be leaving for Nyarushishi. We left the base with three cars, Captain Guillaume Ancel and I seated in the back seat of a chauffer driven 4x4 Jeep which was loaded with a machine-gun, calibre 308 OTAN. I would rather say it was a traditional calibre. Driving right behind us were two big 4x4 trucks.

At that moment, I remember we were driving on the side of the base and along the runway. I have trouble remembering the direction we were at from the runway. I think we were south of the runway in the runway direction, taking into account the position of the sun. On my right, there was a bunker for the French, the command post, inside it, a large metallic warehouse. We left our position with the car and drove along the runway with the sun to our right. It was around 11h30. I can remember that vehicles were driving slowly on the lawn surrounding the airport. After about 100 or 200 m, there were almost half a dozen fresh corpses. I remember amongst the corpses were two young men. There must have also been some women and I think that they were lying on their backs, on their sides or maybe the reverse based on the place where I was situated.

So I was moving in the direction of the runway, to the south and we had reached the control tour when we turned left. It was there that corpses were placed. I was particularly struck by the sight of a corpse whose head had almost been severed and I could see the pink flesh of the person who was lying there. There was a pool of blood on the ground that was not yet dry. The sky above was reflected in the pool of blood as if it was a mirror made of mercury. The French passed nearby without any reaction. There is not a shadow of doubt that these were people who had been fleeing from the genocide for weeks. This was noticeable from the tiny face of the male person who was lying in dust next to me with a beard that had not been shaved for weeks. He was very thin and dressed in shabby dirty clothes.

These corpses were close to the runway, some few meters from the runway. They were 150 or 200 m inside the extremely protected French military position. For me it was impossible that civilian Rwandans in poor health conditions and starving for a long time could have taken any military action against the French. Moreover, they were not armed.”

During his hearing, commissioners asked him for further clarification on the nature of the perimeter and about its exclusive control by the French soldiers and how come the corpses were lying inside the perimeter. Below was his response:

“In my opinion, the entire perimeter was permanently secure and given the nature of the place with its short grass and no bush, without anything on the runway which I would say was flat and in good condition, any person who moved especially in the daytime could very easily be seen and corpses could not have been there if the French soldiers had not let them get in.”

When the Commission wanted to know how Luc Pillionel had interpreted the presence of corpses, he replied as follows:

“In my opinion, the French let them enter the base alive and I think that the base was organised in such a way that there was only one entrance. My second opinion is that they had been brought there by the French. So, they let them enter, where were they heading to? From the entrance, they crossed the runway in order to move towards the French. Therefore, they were allowed to get inside so that they could be killed by the Interahamwe or by the French themselves, I know nothing about it. […] Thirdly, they were brought to the base aboard a plane. There was a runway with numerous helicopters landing and taking off, and possibly aircrafts too like the Transall type. There could have been more aircrafts.”

With regard to his third opinion where he suggested that those persons could have been brought from outside already dead, he was asked if that opinion could match the quantity of fresh blood that he had earlier described, he answered:

“With regard to my opinion, I would say it was a personal thought and your observation is pertinent. Therefore, I think that my opinion that the corpses could have been brought dead and thrown from either a vehicle or an aeroplane is most likely erroneous because such an amount of blood would not be seen if they had been killed from elsewhere.”

3) Nyarushishi displaced people’s camp

As we have seen above, Nyarushishi camp was supposed to be the most important humanitarian objective of the whole Opération Turquoise. However, testimonies from displaced persons and the Interahamwe who were active in the neighbouring areas of the camp have proved otherwise. In fact, killings by the Interahamwe went on under instructions of the French soldiers and violence and rapes were committed by the latter against survivors that they were supposed to protect.

Valens Tuyisenge, Théogène Nteziryayo, Déo Mahanga, Thaddée Renzaho, Théoneste Ngiruwonsanga and Eric Kamuzinzi are survivors who sought refuge in Nyarushishi camp. They explained in a collective interview the security set up of Nyarushishi camp; the surrounding security detail constituted of guard positions of French soldiers, roadblocks manned by the Interahamwe and Rwandan gendarmes. These witnesses also explain that philanthropic organisations distributed food but without any firewood. This forced the survivors therefore to risk their lives by going out of the camp to collect firewood.

“During the genocide, around the end of June 1994, the French arrived at Nyarushishi where they set up their positions. However, in the areas surrounding Nyarushishi camp, there were roadblocks manned by the Interahamwe and gendarmes. In order to arrive at Nyarushishi, the French had to cross all these roadblocks. […] One day, three young persons were flushed out from a tea plantation by the Interahamwe. They ran towards the French military camp and the Interahamwe run after them. They successfully entered Nyarushishi camp. The commander of the gendarmes post who was there assisting entered the camp, got the three young people and took them away. This happened in full view of the French soldiers who did nothing about it. We did not see the three young persons again.” [Testimony of Théogène Nteziryayo]


“[…] The French were accomplices of the Interahamwe in killings and tortures committed against the Tutsis. Most of the Tutsis who sought refuge in the camp were apprehended by the Interahamwe since they had to cross the roadblocks that were manned by the Interahamwe. […] A man called Safari took me to one of these roadblocks located not far from the French base. The Interahamwe tied me up and threw me down to the ground. I was awaiting my death. The French passed by emotionless in their Jeeps as if nothing was going on. […] One day, the French escorted us into the bush to collect firewood near the transmitter. While we were collecting firewood, their Jeep came by to pick them up; they drove away and left us there. We were attacked soon after and most of us were killed. Almost all the survivors were injured. […] It was really hard to collect firewood and as such people living in the camp were obliged to destroy houses belonging to the Interahamwe to get firewood. One day, it was on a Saturday, when one Tutsi was caught demolishing a house and was killed with a machete. Many Tutsis were killed while collecting firewood outside the camp yet the French were there. They did not respond at all.” [Testimony of Théoneste Ngiruwonsanga]

Still in the Nyarushishi camp, survivors tell about sexual violence that was committed by the French soldiers against girls in that camp.

“[…] The French raped Claudine in turns. She was between 14 and 15 years old in 1994; she was so traumatized that she run mad. They also raped Umulisa, Oscar’s sister. They tortured them sexually and even put pepper in their sexual organs. They raped many girls, but we do not know their names. There was one girl who was tall, she now works at the hospital. [It is probably Concessa whose testimony shall be seen later, she is tall and works at the big regional hospital] and another lady who was born in Kibuye.” [Testimony of Théoneste Ngiruwonsanga and Théogène Nteziryayo]

“They also raped young girls whom they had evacuated from Ntendezi Agro Forestry School; they used to come to look for them in the camp. In order to escape from them, the young girls would sleep in other tents so that they could not be traced.” [Testimony from Déo Mahanga, Théoneste Ngiruwonsanga and Théogène Nteziryayo]

Aloys Gasasira was an Interahamwe. During the time of the French soldiers’ presence, he stayed near Nyarushishi camp and manned a roadblock. He affirms that the French soldiers had requested them to kill any person who tried to enter their camp.

“I was staying 300m from the camp and I saw the French soldiers who controlled the Nyarushishi camp where Tutsis had sought refuge during the genocide. We had a roadblock about 1000m from the French camp. At that roadblock, we killed many people and the French often came to ask us what was going on. We explained to them that we had killed Tutsis. They requested us to ensure that nobody else entered the camp and ordered us to kill whoever tried to enter. With those instructions, we killed a woman together with her young daughter and a young man. I did not personally know them, but they said that they came from a place called K’Uwinteko. We also killed Tutsis who were leaving the camp to go and collect firewood among whom was Charles, son of Sembeba. After killing them, we would throw them into a mass grave near the roadblock. The French came over to see what we were doing and commended us as real soldiers. As a reward, they gave us some of their rations. They also sometimes joined us for night patrols. After the RPF victory, the French forbade us from killing any more Tutsis so as to avoid RPF reprisal. Instead they advised and invited us to flee the country, saying that the RPF would cut our throats. They got angry at those people who did not heed to their advice but instead delayed to leave their homes.”

Aloys Karemera was a driver at the time. He is among the survivors that sought refuge in Nyarushishi camp. Below is his account of the killings by the French soldiers who were in charge of guarding the camp where he escaped from, as well as sexual abuse against young female survivors.

“I saw French soldiers coming to Nyarushishi on 23rd June 1994. They met with gendarmes of the government called Abatabazi under the command of Colonel Bavugamenshi Innocent, the gendarmerie commander at Cyangugu. Upon their arrival, the French took over from the gendarmes except for a small number of them who stayed there to work with the French. The French soldiers forbade us from going out of the camp to collect firewood and fetch water from the spring that was within the camp. I once went out of the camp with two men K and Emmanuel. When the French saw us near the camp, they threw a grenade at us. My two companions were killed immediately but I managed to escape. The French soldiers sent gendarmes inside the camp to find girls to be raped. On several occasions, they took Mado Mukayiranga, she is now dead, Pascasie Mukayeze, a native of Cyumbati in Kibuye where she has a small café and Jacqueline Mukayitesi, who now lives in Biryogo. Gendarmes would come looking for them and take them to the French soldiers’ tents. […] By the time the French soldiers left, they had a very bad attitude towards the displaced persons. They had noticed that we were happy when the UNAMIR Ethiopian troops took over and came to tour our camp. They burnt their tents and their food stores. We had to hide since they were very aggressive.”

Joseph Ngiruwonsanga is a genocide survivor who sought refuge in Nyarushishi camp. Below is his account of the deeds of the French soldiers and how they beat him up.

“In the beginning, Nyarushishi camp was guarded by gendarmes. However, the Interahamwe who were in possession of lists, regularly moved within the camp to look for Tutsis who they would take away to be killed. Later in June 1994, the gendarmes were replaced by French soldiers who came into Rwanda from Zaire. At that time, the Interahamwe had set up their positions all around the camp, inside Shagasha, Rwamiko and Mutimasi tea plantations and in tea plantation on the mountain slopes. During the period when Nyarushishi camp was guarded by French soldiers, the Interahamwe went on killing people around the camp. For example, a man called Anselme who came from Gihango and a lady with a baby on her back were killed when they got out of the camp to collect firewood. […] Four days after the arrival of the French soldiers in Nyarushishi camp, they knew that I had not taken part in the night watch. They asked the chiefs of zones to find me and take me to the residence of the Camp Commander named Marcel. A Red Cross Coordinator who was from Kibuye tried to explain my case. They beat me up and left me for dead, they threw me into a 1.80m pit from which I could not get out. My fingers and my mouth were bleeding. When school pupils coming from Kibuye saw me at around 18h00, they informed a white man called SADE who was the Red Cross coordinator. Sade assisted by the school pupils took me out of the pit and took me back to the camp. I spent eight days in bed and under treatment from Red Cross agents. During that entire period my urine was full of blood. To this day I am still facing the after effects of the beating. I am required to see a doctor often. The French tortured many people inside the camp. Unfortunately I cannot remember their names.”

The sexual enslavement of Concessa

C. Mussa is a survivor who with a baby on her back, sought refuge in Nyarushishi camp. She was 18 years old at the time of the Opération Turquoise. After a perilous journey where she and her baby survived being killed several times, she finally reached Nyarushishi camp where the French soldiers found her.

“At the beginning of the genocide, I sought refuge at Gasirabwoba where [the Préfet] Bagambiki came accompanied by the Interahamwe to kill all the people who had sought refuge there. When they shot at us, we fell over one another and I was lucky not to be seen by the killers who were checking and finishing off any survivors using spears. Me and my baby were the only survivors in my family. I left Gashirabwoba and kept on hiding in banana plantations and bushes. I later decided to move to Cyangugu. Midway, I was caught by Interahamwe at the Kadashya roadblock. They lead me to the tea factory where I found six other women. While they lit a fire to burn us, some other Interahamwe cried out that they had flushed out other Tutsis from tea plantations. Our killers then rushed away to get reinforcement which gave us an opportunity to escape.

I started walking towards Kamembe. The Interahamwe had taken away all my clothes. I was completely naked and held my baby on my back with a small piece of cloth. I arrived at Kamembe roundabout where there was a roadblock manned by an Interahamwe called “Tourner” I was caught again by the Interahamwe. They were about to kill me when gendarmes who were in a nearby small shop came over. I told them that the father of my baby was also a gendarme called Jean Baptiste. They let me know that he had been transferred to Butare and promised to take care of me. They took me away and gave me food. I was about to die from hunger; this enabled me to get some energy and continue with my journey. But before reaching Cyangugu, a militiaman saw me in the bush and raped me. I arrived at Cyangugu three days after the massacres at Gashirabwoba. I stayed there in hiding while the Interahamwe were coming over to get people to be killed. There was one Hutu boy who was hiding amongst us while spying for the Interahamwe. He advised us to leave the place very early in morning at 4h00 and he thereafter informed the Interahamwe who attacked us on our way. That day, 362 people were killed. Survivors of that attack went back to the stadium where we were attacked with grenades on orders of Préfet Bagambiki. ICRC staff from Bukavu implored Bagambiki to let us leave and they took us to Nyarushishi camp.

Some days after our arrival at Nyarushishi camp, the Interahamwe came to attack us but they were diverted by the Bukavu ICRC agents who informed Colonel Bavugamenshi about our situation and he came back with gendarmes for our protection. Upon his arrival, Bavugamenshi reassured us that he would be in charge of our security and informed us that the French soldiers were to arrive in some hours to protect us. The French came in the afternoon and Bavugamenshi requested us to warmly welcome them with dancing. Upon their arrival, the French soldiers had a tour of the camp and took photos. After three days, the French soldiers had identified places in the camp where they could find young ladies. From the fourth day, those who had identified places where to find the young ladies came back with other French soldiers and took the ladies to their tents and raped them.

They used to give us liquor and cigarettes. They also used to drink. They took photos of us drinking and showed them to us. They would then take off our clothes. Personally I knew the worst rape experience. After taking off my clothes, I was raped by a group of four French soldiers at the same time who then let another group of four to take their turn. One put his penis in my mouth, another in my vagina or the anus while others were caressing my breasts. At the same time some others were taking pictures. They showed me the pictures and said that they would show them to their wives. Those who were waiting for their turn were present and watched the scene. They said that their wives were different from us. They said that our sexual organs are different from those of the French women. They had even learnt the names of female sexual organs in Kinyarwanda and touched them saying it in Kinyarwanda. After the first group finished their turn, the other group began theirs doing just as the first group had done. They did it savagely. After the two turns, they took a short break of around 5 minutes to drink liquor with us and thereafter resumed the rapes. They had tents in different parts of the camp, they would call their colleagues to come over and see the beautiful women they had as well as the difference between their women and Tutsi women.

I was with other women; they used to free us early in the morning at 4h00 and would pick us up the following day. Sometimes, they picked us up in the morning and brought us back in the evening. Whenever we tried to hide, they would organise a team to look for us and take us back to them. In addition, whenever we passed by their tents on our way to fetch water they would call us. When we tried to run away from them, they would point their guns at us and we were obliged to stop. Among the soldiers who abused us, there was a Colonel. Sometimes after raping us, they would give us some of their combat rationss and cookies.

The abuse lasted the whole period of time they stayed at Nyarushishi camp and finally I fell pregnant. Since they never stopped raping me, I had a miscarriage. An old woman who was staying in a tent close to mine used to come to massage me with hot salty water in which I had to sit. My sexual organs had been damaged.

When they came to check on me in the course of the week, I explained to them what had happened. They waited only for six days before they resumed raping me. Sometimes, they smeared their sperm all over my back or my belly or in my mouth and asked me to swallow. At one point, the Colonel asked his colleagues to leave me to him and to find themselves other women. I stayed with the Colonel for two days before Opération Turquoise came to an end, and they left.

Due to the savage acts I had been subjected to, I later developed serious gynaecological complications: I had a very painful infection in my uterus. Whenever I remembered how they had raped me in addition to the rape I had faced in the hands of the Interahamwe, I would loose my mind and attempt suicide. However, the fact that I had a child strengthened me and I tried to get medical assistance despite having permanent back pains and persistent irregular menstrual periods.”

Elisé Bisengimana, who has already been quoted herein, makes the following analysis of Opération Turquoise based on what he saw at Nyarushishi camp.

“Despite being seen as a humanitarian operation, Opération Turquoise was in no way beneficial to the genocide survivors. It on the contrary served the interests of the genocide perpetrators. To illustrate this, I shall give you the example of hunger and lack of medical care that were prevalent in Nyarushishi camp and in Kamarampaka stadium in spite of the presence of the French soldiers. In addition, the camps were very unsafe, Interahamwe were still hunting, raping and killing young Tutsi women who were moving around looking for food in the fields. The French therefore contributed to the declining security of the genocide victims through the distribution of weapons to the Interahamwe who were using them in committing their crimes. My intention is not to exaggerate if I affirm that the French Government played a key role in the Tutsi genocide of 1994 as an accomplice. Firstly, just before the genocide, the French soldiers trained, advised and materially helped the Rwandan army who later participated in the genocide. Secondly, during the genocide in the Zone Turquoise, they collaborated with the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe at roadblocks and during patrols. Killings, rapes, kidnappings, thefts and pillaging were still being committed in full view of the soldiers who did not do anything to salvage the situation. Lastly, the French did nothing to save the victims who so badly needed their help; instead they facilitated the escape of the killers to Zaire with arms and their luggage.”

4) Rapes

Different witnesses accuse the French soldiers of having committed rapes against genocide survivors. There are also former Interahamwe witnesses who watched acts of rape or who supplied women, sometimes very young girls, to French soldiers for rape. Some of the other witnesses are young girls who were raped by the French.

Jean Ndihokubwayo, who has already been quoted herein, was an Interahamwe and a foreign exchange dealer. He told the commission that he watched French soldiers raping Tutsi women:

“The French soldiers also raped young girls who they found in Cyangugu town. I unexpectedly found them twice raping young girls who might have probably been between 14 and 15 years old. The first time, I had gone to exchange their foreign currency. When the group of soldiers heard the sound of the engine of my motorbike, one of them blocked my way pointing a gun in my direction. However this did not stop me from seeing how the other soldiers had undressed a young girl. I cried out to denounce what I had seen. A nearby night guard from the Carmelites came to help but immediately went back when the French soldier pointed his gun at him. The second time, I was trying to find a French soldier who had paid me with counterfeit money. I suddenly found a Jeep parked in the forest and saw a group of six soldiers with three girls. I personally saw one soldier bending over; two others were holding the young girl while the other three were guarding the two girls who were calling me for help. They were crying with their faces covered with their wrap clothes. I recognised one of them and she also recognised me. I later met her in Congo where she told me how she managed to escape from the French soldiers while no one else did. She told me that when gendarmes passed by the place where the French soldiers were raping those girls, they shouted out. While the French were trying to cover up their actions, the young girl got the chance to escape.”

Jean Bosco Habimana also called Masudi, who has already been quoted herein, gives an account of how the French soldiers gave him the mission to find only Tutsi girls to be sexually abused.

“The French stationed at Kamarampaka stadium raped Tutsi girls and women during the Opération Turquoise. They had charged us particularly with finding for them Tutsi girls and women, some of these girls and women survived being killed. It was imperative to bring them Tutsi women since they said it would cause no trouble if people got to know that it was the Tutsi that they were raping. It was strictly forbidden to bring them Hutu girls. The first time, I brought them two girls of about 14 or 15 years of age in Kamarampaka stadium. The first girl we found was called M Beata in Mururu cemetery. Since we knew that she was a Tutsi, we took her and brought her to the Stadium where she was raped by the French soldiers. After raping her, they handed her back to us, imploring us not to kill her. We found the second girl at Winteko in Bugayi cell, she was called Mukasine Florence. Like the first girl, she was also raped in Kamarampaka stadium by the French soldiers who also asked us not to kill her. In return, they gave us combat rationss and canned food. I brought them a girl once again when we were close to Nyarushishi camp. There were French soldiers near the camp as well as at the camp. I brought a 19 year old girl named Mukan whom I found about a kilometre from Nyarushishi. She was raped by a French soldier but he refused to give me combat rations. I got angry for that and went to report him to his senior chief. I threatened to kill the girl if he did not give me any ration. The soldier retorted that I could kill her if I wished and that he was not concerned. I killed her in his presence and that of another French soldier. I left the place and left her corpse lying there.”

Flore Muka is one of the girls that Masudi refers to in the preceding testimony. Born in 1980, she was only 14 years old at the time of Opération Turquoise. She is a survivor of the Nyarushishi camp who was handed over by the Interahamwe called Masudi to the French at Kamarampaka stadium for rape.

“At the beginning of the 1994 genocide, my family was living at Winteko and consisted of nine children and my two parents. When we were attacked by militia, I managed to escape with my parents and four of my siblings. My other four younger siblings could not escape and were killed. We hid in the hills until my father was flushed out from his hiding place and killed. We decided at that moment to seek refuge at the Nyarushishi camp. We arrived there after one week because we had to wait for night time to move in order to be able to dodge the militia. When we arrived at Nyarushishi, there were many displaced persons who were being protected by French soldiers from Opération Turquoise and life inside the camp was extremely hard. Since it seemed calm after the arrival of the French, who had come to protect us, we began going out of the camp to look for food in the surrounding areas.

One day, as I was going out of the camp with two other girls to look for sweet potatoes in a field located about forty minutes from the camp, a group of about 30 militia spotted us and ran towards us shouting and whistling. We had just started digging for sweet potatoes and I was crunching one. One of the girls I was with was immediately caught and killed, the other one escaped. I went to hide myself in a nearby home where the militia flushed me out. An Interahamwe nicknamed Masudi who had a spear and knives beat me up while insulting me. He grabbed me and led me by hand until we reached the Kamarampaka stadium in Cyangugu after walking for one hour. I was exhausted and was shaking from fear of being killed. I begged him to kill me instead of making me walk, but he replied that he would not kill me. Upon arriving at the stadium’s gate, he talked to four French soldiers who were there and they let us enter the stadium. Masudi went and knocked at the stadium changing room. A gigantic French soldier came out and took me inside a nearby big tent. Being naïve, I thought I was now safe since I was left with the French soldiers, but it was just the beginning of my trials and tribulations.

Masudi left and the French soldier returned to the tent. He closed it and spread a canvas and an old sheet on his mattress. He started removing my clothes but I resisted because I did not want to die naked. He tore all the clothes I had on me. Since I was not fat he easily picked me up like a baby, put me on the mattress and started raping me. Since I was a virgin and young, the pain I felt made me think that he was killing me. I tried to argue with him but when he grabbed what looked like a knife which was placed on the pillow and pointed at me, I gave up and preferred to die silently. When blood was flowing out of me, he wiped it with something and continued raping me. I suffocated and when he noticed that, he left me. He came back and put his penis in my mouth. As I was about to , he stopped. My legs remained spread out; I was torn up and could not lift them. He put me aside and wiped me to reduce the quantity of blood that was still oozing.

He put my clothes back on and used a sort of khaki belt to fasten my under skirt. Since my overall was completely torn, he gave me an old T-shirt. To put my wrapper back on, he spread it on the floor, lifted me up, laid me on it and then knotted it since I could not stand up. Finally, he lifted me and put me outside behind the tent before calling the Interahamwe who took me away. He knew where they were. I did not understand what he told them, but he was using sign language pointing at me and the Interahamwe grabbed my arm and took me out of the stadium.

I could not walk anymore. I was hardly breathing and lay behind the stadium. Masudi asked me to leave the place if I did not want to be killed. He told me that he was going to bring the Interahamwe who would kill me. When he left, I tried to crawl out of the place. Luckily enough, an old woman who was passing by saw me and felt pity on me, I told her my story. She held my arm and helped me to walk; I sat regularly since I was still bleeding. She hired a bicycle and took me to her place. She treated me gently using warm water and ghee. Two months later, I had completely recovered and she took me back to Nyarushishi. It is her who told my mother what had happened since I could not.”

Bea Mukan is another girl that Masudi cited in his aforementioned testimony; she confirms that she gave birth to a child of a French soldier who had raped her. She narrates the circumstances of her rape by the French. Born in 1979, she was 15 years old then.

“At the beginning of the genocide, my family first sought refuge at Cyangugu parish from where the Préfet took us to Kamarampaka stadium. Later, we were obliged to leave the stadium and go to Nyarushishi camp where the French soldiers found us. Upon their arrival, our neighbours who were not targeted in the genocide and who had stayed at the village also started fleeing. Hoping that nobody had remained in our village, my cousin and I decided to go and see what was there as we strongly believed that the killers had fled the country. About 30 minutes from our home, we came across a group of militia who were carrying clubs. We scattered and run for dear life.

My cousin managed to escape, but I got caught by an Interahamwe called Masudi. He took me to the Kamarampaka stadium while beating me and asking me where my brothers were. I told him they had all died.

When we arrived at the stadium, Masudi talked to a French soldier who took me by hand without saying a word. He took me inside a room which was used as a changing room for players. Inside that room, there was a bed. He pushed me and as I was trying to resist, he punched me. After that he did all he wanted. I thought he was going to kill me, but what he did was worse. I would rather he had killed me. He raped me to the extent that I could not go back to the camp. I could not walk and I spent night in the bush and arrived at the camp the following day. When I was leaving the French soldier’s tent, I saw two other girls who were coming out of the other French soldiers’ tents located in the stadium and who had been victims of a similar situation. I had heard them shouting not far from where I was. The Interahamwe had caught them at the Gatandara roadblock. Those Interahamwe had the mission to find women and girls and bring them to the French. Later, I developed gynaecological complications and got treatment when the UNAMIR arrived .”

5) Pillaging carried out by the French soldiers and their failure to intervene in the pillaging and destruction of infrastructure by Rwandans

Kayitsinga Abdallah, who has been quoted herein, was a carpenter during the Opération Turquoise. He lived close by Kamembe airport. He gives an account below of the pillaging that was carried out by the French soldiers.

“[…] I also noticed acts of pillaging carried out by French soldiers. They had trucks which they used for pillaging tea factories of Shagasha and Gisakura. Those trucks passed by driving towards Zaire loaded with fridges and khaki bags full of tea […] at the border; they also confiscated valuables from the Interahamwe as well as from any person fleeing to Zaire, the French kept their looted items in a secure place where no outsider could reach. I remember when I was returning from Zaire carrying my items on a cart, I headed towards that place and I was immediately called and they told me that it was their area and they immediately showed me the right direction to take. I saw metallic gates, fridges and other valuable items. Their trucks were coming to pick them up and take them to Zaire.”

Aloys Karuranga is a native of Rusizi in the former prefecture of Cyangugu. He worked at the Compagnie Nationale de Téléphone (RWANDATEL) since 1970. In 1994, he was posted to Cyangugu. Below he gives an account of the participation of French soldiers in the pillaging of Cyangugu telephone centre which he was in charge of.

“In 1994, I was at Cyangugu and worked at Rwandatel […] On July 18th 1994, people started pillaging and destroying the town of Kamembe. On 22nd the telephone centre which was under my responsibility was also pillaged. In the evening, around 18h00, after visiting the place and noticing that computers and other stored equipment had been looted, I left to see Colonel Hogard who was the Opération Turquoise head of mission at Cyangugu. His office was in a warehouse at the airport. I told him that our office had been plundered and asked him to set a permanent security team. He then gave me a patrol team to go and see what was happening. Upon our arrival, we noticed that computer accessories had also been stolen. However, the central server and rural telephone equipment were still in operation. We went back to report this to the Colonel. However, as regards my request for protection, he said that he could not find a French soldier for every single Rwandan or each house. He nevertheless promised to give me a regular patrol team. What astonished me the most was that the following day at around 14h00; I went back to the office and found that all that had been left was also pillaged including the central server. Worse still, when I went back to the office two weeks later a French military truck was there, the French soldiers were inside the containers in which we stored our equipment. They were with a Rwandan called Musafiri who was an agent of Electrogaz. I think he had requested the French for help to transport these containers. I had a camera with me and went behind an electricity pole, I took some pictures. Finally they pillaged one container. […] Houses had been destroyed and people were still coming back to pillage items. The French who were at the Rusizi border facilitated people to cross the border with pillaged items and sometimes some people came back from Zaire to pillage more.”

Jean Bigirimana was the administrative head of Muganza cell in Bugarama commune between 1990 and 1994. Below he gives an account of the pillaging committed by the French soldiers and the protection they granted the Interahamwe who were destroying infrastructure and residential houses.

“After the fleeing of commune leaders, French soldiers took control of the whole region, they pillaged items in our commune and protected individuals who were destroying infrastructure such as the CIMERWA building, the commune office, the health centre as well as buildings of the Rice Project. In fact, the Interahamwe publicly destroyed and pillaged CIMERWA yet the French had their base in its buildings and did not stop them from doing it. The same applied to the commune and the rice project buildings which were set alight by the Interahamwe in the presence of French soldiers. That is the reason why I am accusing them of complicity in the destruction of property and infrastructure in our region. After the population had run away to seek refuge, militia sent me messages requesting me to collaborate with them without knowing that I was already a supporter of the Inkotanyi. On July 25th and 26th almost all members of the population had fled. At 13h00, French soldiers accompanied by Straton Kayishema came to my house to loot. They searched the cupboard and took away all my work documents, a gun and money amounting to 40.000 Frw. I was not at home that day. I was at the health centre and learnt from the population that the French had plundered my house. I immediately rushed home and met them coming from my house. I retrieved two crates of Primus that they had forgotten to take. In fact, the French soldiers were protecting the Interahamwe who were coming from across the border in Zaire to destabilise members of the population who had not fled the country. The people who were targeted were those who had guns in their homes. They were threatened by the Interahamwe who were under the protection of French soldiers. I remember someone called Raymond Habiyambere at Bugarama who was a victim of the inhumane acts of the French soldiers and the Interahamwe as well as Habiyambere Rahima who was also threatened by the Interahamwe in the presence of French soldiers who did not do anything to stop the harassment. In fact, that man was regarded as an accomplice of the Inyenzi because he had not fled the country. The Interahamwe attacked him at home and shot into his bedroom through the window. In one way or another, the French soldiers were accomplices of the Interahamwe who came from Zaire to destabilise Rwanda particularly in parts of the country that were under the French soldiers control. […] Shortly before the massive flight of the population, the French soldiers and two men from Bugarama, namely Elie and Mudeyi urged the population to flee the country in order to escape the threats of the advancing Inkotanyi. They told the population that the deadline for leaving the country was at 12h00.”

Gonzague Habimana was a soldier in FAR in 1994. He narrates the theft of cars by the French soldiers. He was a FAR soldier between 1986 and 1994, and his service number was18663.

“In the Zone Turquoise, I saw the French taking part in the pillaging and destruction of houses. They also stole cars and crossed with them through the border to Zaire. In fact, I remember that towards the end of July, I saw a group of French soldiers at the Hotel des Chutes. They were asking civilians who were crossing the border to Zaire for their identity cards and vehicle documents. On showing the requested documents, the French soldiers took possession of their cars and drove off to Bukavu. The cars were two brand new Toyota 4x4s.”

Jean Ndikubwayo, already quoted herein, was an Interahamwe and foreign exchange dealer. He attests that when he was in exile in Zaire he sold cars stolen from Rwanda by the French soldiers.

“When I arrived at Kamembe airport, there were three brand new Toyota Corolla vehicles with no owners. The car seats were covered with dust and blood. There was a son of Colonel Simba who was always with the French and he revealed to me that the cars had been brought to Zaire by helicopter. They later facilitated the crossing of 100 cars in my presence. I even became one of the middle men in the sale of cars pillaged from Rwanda in Zaire where they were parked in different sites containing 5 or 10 cars for sale. I sold about ten cars at varying prices, 3000$, 2500$ or 1500$. I was getting a commission of 20$ or 30$ for each sale.”

Cassien Bagaruka, already quoted herein, was a fire fighter at Kamembe airport during the Opération Turquoise. He also attests to the fact that French soldiers were involved in pillaging.

“The French soldiers participated in the pillaging of property. On one hand, the French soldiers had hired all the fire fighters at a 20$ per month fee that was never paid under the pretext that they were not their employees. On the other hand, being the only dealers, they not only made Rwandan cars with private number plates cross the border of Rusizi but they also took the Daihatsu pick up and generator of the ‘Régie des Aéroport’. They could not however take fire extinguishers because I had tampered with their starting system. […] When the buildings of the prefecture caught fire and the airport fire fighters came for extinguish the fire, the French soldiers chased them away saying that there was no reason to waste water.”

Elie Bisengimana already quoted herein, gives an account of the collaboration between the French soldiers and the Interahamwe in pillaging.

“The French let the Interahamwe who had sought refuge in Zaire come back to Cyangugu regularly to pillage, destroy infrastructure and kill. Only the Interahamwe were allowed to loot and whoever else dared to do it was immediately killed. I shall give you an example of one man called Bernard who had his arm amputated as a result of being shot at by French soldiers when he made the fatal mistake of trying to loot. Looting was a privilege only the Interahamwe enjoyed. Since the border was under the control of French troops, it was them who enabled the Interahamwe to go back to Zaire with their plunder. Particularly in the case of vehicles, there was a manifested complicity between the French and the Interahamwe in sale transactions with the Zairians in Bukavu. It was a well organised network. The plunder consisted of all sorts of goods mainly items from stores, movables, household appliances, house windows and doors, iron roofs taken from houses, medical equipment, medicine, vehicles etc. Most of these were sold immediately after they crossed the border at very low prices.”

6) Inciting the populace to flee the country

Different witnesses affirm that French soldiers in collaboration with local authorities incited the populace to massively flee the country.

Jean Baptiste Bihembe was a commander at Kamembe airport in 1994

“The French contributed to the destruction of Cyangugu town. It was them who opened the border when the population was fleeing the country towards Zaire after having destroyed public buildings. The French let them cross the border with iron roofs and doors. They also allowed vehicles to be taken out of the country except for those that belonged to the airport which were left in Cyangugu town. The militia confiscated vehicles of displaced people who were coming from Kigali and took them to Zaire. The French soldiers also facilitated the local authorities to flee the country with their property by providing them with planes and big trucks to transport their property. […]The French soldiers compelled the population of Cyangugu to flee the country telling them that whoever shall not leave, will do so at his own risk. That is how the local authorities left in planes, others left in cars and the rest of the population crossed the border on foot. They wanted everyone to leave the town.”

Jean Bosco Habimana called Masudi also gives an account of how the French soldiers incited the population to flee the country.

“Towards the end of Opération Turquoise, French soldiers incited the population to flee the country after having destroyed all houses so that the RPF could not have anywhere to live. They also considered that staying in the Zone Turquoise was a manifestation of one’s complicity with the Inyenzi Inkotanyi. They then started moving local authorities, by helicopter towards Congo. Some were dropped off at Panzi military camp while others were dropped off at Sayo military camp. For officials who had huge equipment with them, soldiers would drop them off at Kavumu airport and others at Bukavu.”

Cassien Bagaruka, already quoted herein, was a fire fighter at Kamembe airport during Opération Turquoise. He hereby narrates about a public rally that was organised by local authorities and French soldiers to incite the population to flee to Zaire.

“At the end of Opération Turquoise, before the French troops left the Turquoise area for Zaire, a rally was organised where local authorities and French soldiers incited the populace to flee and they provided helicopters for transporting the local authorities. The local authorities’ cars and those of Eliezer Niyitegeka, Minister of Information in the transitional government and Colonel Kanyamanza were transported by Transat planes. When Bihembe, the former commander of Kamembe airport asked about the fate of people wishing to join the new government in Kigali, as a way of responding to him, he was treated as an accomplice of RPF. Luckily enough, he escaped well on time.”

Elise Bisengimana, already quoted herein, witnessed the French soldiers together with the local authorities involved in the genocide inciting the population to flee the country.

“In August 1994, the French soldiers transported by helicopter many political and military officials as well as leaders of the Interahamwe who were all involved in the genocide. Before withdrawing to Zaire, they incited the population to flee en mass. To accomplish that, they moved around the town on several occasions on jeeps accompanied by the remaining authorities and addressed the population through megaphones in the following words: “ The whole population is hereby informed that we are no longer capable of ensuring your security because the French troops are leaving. Therefore, the town will immediately be under the control of the Inkotanyi who shall massacre the whole population. We hereby request all of you to flee to Zaire before the last French soldier leaves Rwandan soil. You are all warned” After that public address, there was a general sense of panic. In order to cross the border, the panic stricken population left in a stampede that some drowned while trying to swim across Rusizi River. At the border military post, the French soldiers were receiving ex FAR arms. They later loaded them onto their trucks before they also entered into Zaire.”

Opération Turquoise was launched with military honour and a humanitarian showcase with media fanfare in Cyangugu through the rescue of survivors in Nyarushishi camp. But soon after, there was a display of close collaboration with local authorities and the Interahamwe who organised massacres in the prefecture and town. According to individual testimonies, French soldiers were behind the operations of the Interahamwe to flush out Tutsis who were hidden near their camps as it is the case for the post which was set up at Colonel Simba’s house. For that reason the French soldiers even supplied the Interahamwe with arms well knowing that the fate of those discovered was death.

French soldiers did not disarm the Interahamwe. On the contrary, they supplied them with arms like those which were given to Yusuf Munyakazi for the last assault on Bisesero. But generally, they encouraged the Interahamwe to continue hunting down Tutsis and killing them. There seems to be a contradiction between their actions and the ensuring the security of the camp. Nyarushishi camp illustrates the French strategy. The camp was also like a prison. French soldiers did not want displaced persons to get in or out of the camp. As such, they manned roadblocks just outside the camp while the Interahamwe manned the surrounding roadblocks which were ever increasing. While Tutsis who came from outside were first intercepted by the Interahamwe before they could enter Nyarushishi camp, those Tutsis inside the camp who under the pressure of hunger or the need for firewood, went out of the camp, were also killed by the Interahamwe. It was on rare occasions that the French soldiers accompanied the displaced persons to collect firewood. Here one can notice the logic behind the French security actions in Cyangugu. The French army seems to have had the goal of protecting only the displaced persons of Nyarushishi camp as long as they did not go out of the camp. All the other Tutsi survivors were left in the hands of the French allies, i.e. the Interahamwe, in order to be killed. There were exceptions, especially some military doctors in health facilities who treated and saved the lives of Tutsi survivors. But that was in rare cases. The only reasonable explanation, rather utilitarian, to explain their strategy could be that the French army in Cyangugu regarded all the Tutsi survivors of Cyangugu whether they were living outside the Nyarushishi camp or living in the camp but wanted to go outside, regardless of their age or sex or age, were suspected of being potential infiltration agents of the RPF. For that reason, they had to die.

The acts of rape on Tutsi survivors by French soldiers, sometimes very young girls, seem to have been frequent and systematic. Rape was committed in the day time for example in the French military base at Kamarampaka stadium. The Interahamwe who brought young girls to the French soldiers often crossed the security posts manned by the French, the rapes were carried out openly and by a big number of soldiers. The savage level of these assaults made young girls scream in different tents, this did not go unnoticed. This proves that the acts of rape, sometimes of very young girls and in a savage manner, were tolerated by the military institution. This reveals that apart from the humanitarian and security strategy of letting the Interahamwe eliminate the threat of RPF infiltrators, the indiscriminate hostility by the French towards the Tutsis lead to their rape as well as their extermination.

In order to avoid a total RPF victory over Opération Turquoise, victory against the FAR and the Genocidal government in Cyangugu, the French army opted for the scorched earth strategy by encouraging the looting and destruction of infrastructure as well as strongly inciting the population.

KIBUYE

Kibuye prefecture is one the three prefectures that were officially under Opération Turquoise. In that prefecture, French soldiers set up three main bases, one was located in Gishyita village, another was in Kibuye town and the last was in Rubengera village. They arrived in Kibuye from three different directions from 24th June. Some came from Cyangugu including Commander Marin Gillier and his troops, mainly marine commandos as well as some members of the GIGN who set up their base at Gishyita, another unit of air force commandos headed by Lieutenant Colonel Rémy Duval called Diego set up its base at Gishyita, lastly another secret military unit which came from Gisenyi arrived on 23rd June at Rubengera and was under the command of Captain Bucquet. The above shows actions of the French army in the triangle of Gisovu, Gishyita and Karongi and Bisesero hills which was in the middle of the triangle as well as Rubengera village. After setting up the aforementioned COS detachments, Kibuye prefecture constituted the northern unit of the Turquoise, commanded by Colonel Sartre with headquarters in Kibuye.

BISESERO

The case of Bisesero, which is important to remember, is one of the most serious accusations against the French army during the Opération Turquoise. It was accused for no less than deliberately delaying by 3 days to intervene in the rescue of almost 2.000 survivors and thus giving time to killers to massacre them.

This event was widely published since it occurred in the presence of foreign reporters and many Rwandans witnessed it. The key fact is that the French army waited for three days before starting the rescue operation for the Bisesero survivors and the army does not contest that fact. However, the reasons behind the delay are the cause of controversy.

The Bisesero case is composed of two episodes, the first is the fact that French soldiers abandoned survivors at Bisesero; the second is that French soldiers refused to intervene during the three days of massacres yet they were only 5 kilometres from the camp. Lastly there are two additions to the Bisesero case, following the French intervention the poor treatment of genocide survivors at Bisesero and the poor medical care of the injured that were transferred to Goma by the French military doctors.

1) Abandonment

Acts of abandonment occurred at the very start of Opération Turquoise led by the COS detachments which had the mission to open Rwanda to the benefits of the mission. The mission involved two detachments of COS, one under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Remy Duval, alias Diego, and another one headed by Commander Marin Gillier.

At the end of the morning of 27th June 1994, Colonel Rosier took a helicopter to see Diego in Kibuye, it seems, to analyse the situation. On the same day, a group of French reporters, including Patrick de Saint Exupéry were at Kibuye. Patrick de Saint Exupéry went to a secondary school run by nuns where Diego and his troops were based. In the school courtyard Patrick de Saint Exupéry met two nuns who told him that two hours from that place there were Tutsi survivors who were living in horrible conditions at Bisesero hills. At that point, Diego joined them and Patrick de Saint Exupéry asked him to go and see what the nun had told them about.

Patrick de Saint Exupéry with two other reporters, among them, Dominique Garraud of the daily Libératio, about ten soldiers and Diego in a minibus and three Jeeps drove towards Bisesero. Midway before arriving at Bisesero, the convoy stopped at Mubuga village where Diego persuaded a teacher called Jean Baptiste Twagirayezu to serve as their guide to Bisesero. Upon arriving at Bisesero hills, they met some ghostly figures that disappeared very quickly. One man approached the French and told them that they were exhausted because they had been fighting their killers who had been hunting them day after day for two months. Slowly by slowly more and more survivors joined the team, Patrick de Saint Exupéry noticed that they were very thin, in completely torn clothes and many of them had machete wounds., “a child whose left buttock was cut off, a man whose right arm was severed”. The survivors showed them a mass grave dug some meters from there, as well as a fresh corpse of a man who had been killed two hours earlier. After that the survivors recognized the guide of the French as being Jean Baptiste Twagirayezu, and accused him of being one of the chief militia who were hunting them down. The French soldiers put him in one of their vehicles for his safety. Then, Colonel Diego informed the survivors that he had to go.

“We will come back, he reassures the displaced persons with a lot of emotion. Do not worry, in two or three days we will be back. In the meantime, you have to hide yourselves and survive!”

“But they are going to kill us! Said one young Tutsi. Stay here! Don’t leave! I beseech you!”
“But we have to go, the officer tries to explain. But we will come back, I promise you!”
“No, we are going to be killed! Stay here or at least tell us where we can find you! Look, only some men and some children are remaining. All our wives have already been killed. We can not resist any more…”
“At the moment, says Lieutenant Colonel Diego with patience, we can do nothing. The most important thing for you to do is to survive for two or three more days, we will come back since we know where to find you….”

The group left. According to suggestions given to the Commission at the site by Jean Baptiste Twagirayezu, Diego stopped the convoy and went aside with his satellite telephone case. “When we came back, he stopped at the junction of Gisovu and Gishyita towards Mubuga. Diego brought out radio equipment that he laid on the ground to send his message for around five minutes before driving ahead. He gave the message at a low voice so that he could not be heard by the rest of the convoy.”

Back at Kibuye, Diego talked to De Saint- Exupéry:

“The lieutenant colonel is still in shock: “I have experience, but this…” This is not an illusion: “Before we can intervene at Bisesero, at least 2.000 more displaced persons will be killed.” Exhausted and full of remorse, the officer sent this information to the army head quarters: It is for them to take a decision. If we go there to protect these thousands of people who are being hunted like animals, we shall be engaged in one way or another and shall run the risk of having all the militia and local authorities turn against us. We are ready and shall obey orders. But are the people in Paris ready?”

In his book, Patrick de Saint-Exupéry talks about and expounds on his various meetings and the abandonment of the Tutsi in Bisesero. He wrote that back in Kibuye“Diego remained on his coded telephone to Paris for long giving report after report.”

The story of Diego’s meeting with the Bisesero survivors is narrated by Patrick de Saint Exupéry in a report of 29/06/1994 published in the Le Figaro, by Dominique Garraud in his report published on the same day in the Libération. Lastly, the meeting was narrated to the Commission by Eric Nzabahimana, Eric Kayumba and other Bisesero survivors who met with Diego. And finally Jean Baptiste Twagirayezu also narrated to the Commission about the meeting.

Consequences of the abandonment

Bisesero survivors all concur that following their meeting with the French soldiers, attacks increased during the three days that preceded their return. According to Bisesero survivors, at the time when they met Diego they were around 2.000 survivors, and after three days of intensive massacres, only 800 people survived. Eric Nzabahimana explained to the Commission what followed the departure of the French.

“While we were discussing, killers who were placed at different parts of the hills were watching us, almost all of us had come out of our hiding places. The three days that followed, the 28th, 29th and 30th massacres intensified. Many soldiers participated and many more people were killed, yet the French soldiers had promised to ask the Préfet to stop attacks against us.”

Fidèle Bagambiki, a survivor from Bisesero was also at the meeting with Diego.

“They asked us if some people were dead or injured. We showed them the injured and fresh corpses of some people who had just been killed. They told us that they were leaving and would return in three days. From that day onwards, attacks became more intense. The Interahamwe were killing day and night and we were only 1.200 or 1.300 people left when the French returned. In fact, the Interahamwe did not know the exact number of survivors until we came out of our hiding places thinking that the French were coming to rescue us. From then on, attacks intensified. […]The worst thing they could do was to leave us behind, in the hands of the Interahamwe. If the French had wanted to save us, they could have done it because they had all the necessary equipment, including heavy arms.”

Pascal Nkusi, a Bisesero survivor too, was also present at the meeting with Diego.

“The following day, they [the French] did not come but we saw a helicopter hovering over the place. From that day, attacks became more intensive and there were more dead people, because almost all of us had come out of our hiding places. […]On the third day, attacks continued and around 14h00 or 15h00, the French finally arrived.”


Official reasons for the abandonment

The Mission d’Reconnaissance Parlementaire (MIP) only allocates 17 lines to the Bisesero case and in an extraordinary way is silent about the meeting of Diego with the Bisesero survivors. It only cites the second part of the Bisesero case, the refusal to intervene by the second French officer who saw killers going up to Bisesero hill and heard gunshots. We shall come back to that point later. Here is the integral part on Bisesero from the MIP

[XXPANTHAXX]

II. OPÉRATION TURQUOISE

1.1. The decision-making process

The decision to launch Opération Turquoise was the culmination of different pressures exerted on the French executive. These pressures were of different nature and various origins. Among the latter were the continuation of the massacres and their effect on the French public opinion, which, at the same time, began to discover the support given by the French Government to the regime that organised those massacres; that of the international press, of the African President clients of France, and that of the new post-apartheid South Africa. But, the most decisive pressure was the perspective of a total defeat of FAR, allies of the French. Finally, that decision was also taken in a context of political cohabitation in France between a socialist President and a Prime Minister of the right as well as a Minister of Foreign Affairs, also of the right wing, and ambitious.

In the preceding part, we saw how France’s support to the interim government and FAR, which were busy committing a total genocide, never failed from 7th April 1994, date of its beginning. At one time, some French officials began to recognise the reality of the genocide, like Alain Juppé, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who acknowledged it on 16th May 1994, followed by a close ally of Mitterrand, Bernard Kouchner, who, on 18th May 1994 on the TFI television chain, affirms: “it is genocide”. But these concessions made at the recognition of the genocide did not in any way influence France’s support to the genocide regime. It is therefore quite logical that on 10th June 1994, Alain Juppé, while answering journalists who asked him if France intended to intervene in Rwanda, declared: “What would we go to do there? One thousand five hundred men would not manage to stop the massacres, especially since one of the parties, the RPF, rejects us”.

The same day, 10th June 1994, several French media consistently reported the massacres of Tutsi children accommodated in a Kigali orphanage run by Father Blanchard, a French citizen. The emotion was at its highest on 11th June, when Father Blanchard, talking on telephone from Kigali, was quoted in all the big television broadcasts of 08 O’clock on the big French channels. On 13th June, the Rwandan tragedy was at the centre of the concerns of an OAU summit that was held in Tunis.

In the meantime, back from Kigali, on 14th June, Father Blanchard, addressed a press conference covered by all the big French radio and television chains. He described the atrocities that the Interahamwe militia subjected to the children of his orphanage. It is at that time that President F. Mitterrand confided in Edouard Balladur and Alain Juppé: “We must by all means do something; I entirely face up to my responsibilities”

MSF considered that “the France of Human Rights bears an overwhelming responsibility in the shameful events taking place in Rwanda since 6th April.” It recalls that Rwanda’s tragedy was “a systematic and planned extermination of opponents of a faction supported and armed by France” and raises crucial questions: “How can one beleive that France doesn’t have any means with her protégés [the self-proclaimed government] to stop those massacres?”

African pressures were also exerted on France and especially on President Mitterrand, the main decision-maker of his country’s African policy.

“(…) other pressures from the “domain” call on the French authorities not to stand by idly. The quick progress of the rebel troops increasingly worried the African heads of State who don’t particularly like the perspective of seeing France allow a rebellion, moreover Anglophone, accede to power by force. They don’t miss the opportunity to let it be known and exert pressure on the Elysée and the Quai dÓrsay so that France respects her principles and “security commitments”; in other words, so that the French army may intervene, like in October 1990 and February 1993, to restore calm and stop the RPF from acceding to power.”

In a diametrically opposed direction, from the official point of view, the South African President, Nelson Mandela, exalted by the progress and the result of the elections which, two months earlier, had buried the apartheid era he declared in a speech pronounced during the OAU summit in Tunis, on 13th June 1994: “The situation in Rwanda is a shame for the whole of Africa, (…) Everything must change; we must assert our will for change by taking action.” According to Gérard Prunier, this declaration may have had a powerful effect on President Mitterrand who may have seen the threat of an English speaking country intervene in France’s African ‘domain’ , and the moral lesson, that a South African intervention decided by Mandela would have represented, would certainly have been a humiliation hard to accept.

The international community’s lack of action also created an intake of air. After the evacuation, on 21st April 1994, of the greater part of the UN peace keeping forces present in Rwanda, the Security Council, by its resolution 918 voted on 17th May 1994, decided to send UNAMIR II and increase its men to 5,500. But the implementation process dragged on. Only Ghana, Ethiopia, Senegal and Zimbabwe proposed a total of 3,200 men, out of the 5,500 required, without equipment and logistic means.

Finally, the RPF’s quick advance on the ground constituted another pressure, certainly decisive. As we shall see preparations for a French military intervention seemed to have started since the beginning of May, on 9th May 1994, Lieutenant-Colonel Rwabalinda held a working meeting with General Huchon. But as revealed by Alison Des Forges, FAR’s military situation, in the mid June, deteriorated rapidly, assuming, for any party that might have wanted to prevent their collapse, a character of extreme urgency. After the failure of FAR’s counter offensive at the beginning of June, on the 13th of the same month, the latter lost the town of Gitarama located at the centre of the country, allowing new RPF advances in the western part of the country.

On 14th June 1994, the decision of a military intervention for humanitarian reasons was taken in the cabinet and was to be under the French flag outside the UNAMIR II.

1.2 Disagreement at the level of the French executive on the objectives and modalities of the intervention

A war of re-conquest in favour of the genocide government or a military intervention with clear and limited humanitarian objectives?

The objectives of the French military intervention in Rwanda as well as its modalities of realisation were to oppose President Mitterrand and his Prime Minister Balladur. The minister of Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppé personally got very much involved in the launching and publicity of the initiative. In a fairly special way, this Minister of the right wing aligned himself with President Mitterrand’s positions. President Mitterrand’s project of intervention in Kigali itself was to divide both the town and the country into two and allow either a re-conquest by FAR, or force negotiations on the positions defended by the French army. This French military intervention, in favour of FAR which was committing genocide, seemed to have been prepared for some months. Thus, Sébastien Ntahobari, the military attaché of the Rwandan Embassy, during the genocide, in a letter addressed to Paul Quilès gave an instructive retrospective clarification of the visit that Lieutenant-Colonel Rwabalinda paid to General Huchon, head of the military mission at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Referring to the coded telephone that General Huchon entrusted to Rwabalinda for delivery to the Chief of staff of FAR, General Bizimungu, to “forward to Paris protected information for the security of French soldiers of Opération Turquoise which was being prepared.”

Alison Des Forges reported that the French diplomats in charge of defending Opération Turquoise at the Security Council may have presented a map indicating an intervention area including “the whole territory situated at the west of a line starting from Ruhengeri in the north, then went down to the south-west towards Kigali and ended its course in a south western in Butare. That area would have included Gisenyi, where the interim government had taken refuge, the same region which Habyarimana originated from, like other high ranking army officers. This area, where the government forces had concentrated the bulk of the troops and supplies, may have constituted an ideal site to launch a counter-offensive.”

On 13th June 1994, Bernard Kouchner went to Kigali to plead the case for Opération Turquoise with General Dallaire. In the UNAMIR headquarters, Kouchner may have presented once again a map showing demarcation of the intervention area of the French soldiers including some districts of Kigali and the entire western part of the country. Kouchner may have asked Dallaire “to request for the intervention of the French soldiers to save the orphans and missionaries trapped behind the Interahamwe lines, in the capital”. Without directly pointing at President Mitterrand, the former Prime Minister Edouard Balladur confirms the existence of the wish for a French military intervention in Kigali. In his hearing at the MIP, he stated that it is “correct that some leaders envisaged a military intervention, especially in Kigali” A little earlier, he had pointed out the objective of those who defended the intervention in Kigali. The MIP repeats his remarks in the following terms: “an intervention in the form of interposition: this solution, presented by those who were its champions as a way of stopping the advance of the RPF troops, may have involved an act of war led by the French troops on foreign soil. Mr. Edouard Balladur specified that he had opposed it, considering that France was not supposed to meddle in what might quickly look like an operation of the colonial type.” In a letter published as an annex by the MIP, he affirms, with regard to President Mitterrand, that, in his eyes, “he was no responsible for punishing the Hutu perpetrators of the genocide nor was he responsible for allowing the latter to take shelter in Zaïre”.

The Prime Minister opposed President Mitterrand’s aggressive option and gave the following five conditions for deployment of Opération Turquoise:
- Authorisation by the United Nations Security Council;
- Restriction of the operation in time to some weeks while waiting for the arrival of UNAMIR;
- Restriction of operations to humanitarian action (sheltering children, the sick and terrorised populations and not indulge in what might be considered as a colonial expedition at the very heart of the Rwandan territory. Any sustainable occupation of a site or part of a territory would present very serious risks, considering the hostility that may result and the political interpretation that they might give to it;
- Positioning of our forces near the border, on the Zaïrean territory, the only one that is available to us;
- Launching of the operations as soon as enough contingents are provided by other countries, except perhaps some operation at the border that we might carry out alone.

Balladur’s opposition seems to have prevented French attack on Kigali, as confirmed by a military source not revealed to Patrick de Saint-Exupéry: “during the first days, it was intended to go to Kigali. These orders were cancelled at the last moment.”

In the face of points of view, the French army would opt for the implementation of two visions, one official, that of Prime Minister Balladur and the other secret, that of President Mitterrand.

But perhaps the main reason that restrained President Mitterrand’s aggressive ambitions is that it was perhaps already too late. On 30th June, seven days after entry of the French forces in Rwanda, General Dallaire went to Goma where the headquarters of the opération turquoise was, to get in contact with the commander of the operation, General Lafourcade. During the discussion, General Dallaire showed a map of the demarcation of the area, which, according to him, Opération Turquoise should occupy. That area had been established according to the positions already occupied by RPF, by establishing a narrow no-man’s land between the two forces. “I went towards Lafourcade’s plan and drew the line, which, according to me, would constitute the extreme limit of the area under French protection, inside Rwanda. He was dismayed: he could not believe that the RPF had moved at such a speed during the previous week.” Dallaire showed that there was rather little space remaining to the east of Gisenyi, that RPF was a about twenty kilometres from the point far east of Gikongoro and finally that the region of Butare was mainly under its control. Faced with this situation, France had to save face by establishing, at the beginning of July, “a safe humanitarian area” situated in the south-west of the country. We shall come back to it.

In the meantime, on 22nd June 1994, the Security Council voted resolution 929 that allowed France to intervene in Rwanda under chapter VII (authorisation to use force in case of need). Five countries abstained. These were China, Brazil, Nigeria, New Zealand and Pakistan. The international community authorised this operation with a lot of reservation and in a very conditional manner. The resolution highlighted the strictly humanitarian nature of the intervention, its limit in the time of two months and forbade her to form “an intervention force between the parties.”

1.3 Orders of operation, composition and progress

The orders of operation were established on 22nd June. The mission of the Turquoise forces is “to bring an end to the massacres wherever it is possible, by possibly using force.”

The rules of engagement are as follows:
- To adopt an attitude of strict neutrality towards the different factions in conflict. This imperative means that it is a question of stopping both the massacres of Tutsis by the militia and the exactions committed by the RPF in reprisals against the Hutus;
- To emphasise the idea that the French army came to stop the massacres and not to fight RPF, nor support FAR […];
- To affirm the humanitarian character of the operation, working in liaison with NGOs, whenever possible. […]

The orders of operation foresaw also the realisation of two additional operations. It involved first of all “being ready ultimately to progressively control the area of the Hutu country towards Kigali and the South towards Nyanza and Butare and intervene on the regrouping sites to protect the people”. Secondly, Turquoise forces were required “to assert with the Rwanda authorities, civilian and military, our neutrality and determination to stop the massacres on the entire area under control of the Rwandan armed forces, by encouraging them to re-establish their authority”.

Finally, the rules of engagement established by General Lafourcade indicate that “the political objective sought is to implement the Arusha Accord, supported with determination by France. The stop of massacres and observance of a ceasefire are the conditions sine qua none of the resumption of dialogue between the parties, initiated in Arusha, as the only possible solution of the conflict. France is determined in her support to this process, therefore to stop the exactions.”

In the context of a total genocide organised by the interim government and committed by and with the support of FAR, in a context of constant and quick retreat by the latter, the only way of considering the return to the Arusha Accord was through the imposition of this government on the RPF through a confrontation between the French troops and the latter.




1.4. Impressive human and material means

To carry out this operation, France lined up a total of 3,060 men from the best units of her army: units of the 3rd semi-brigade of the foreign Legion, the 2nd foreign infantry regiment, the 2nd foreign regiment of paratroopers, the 6th foreign engineering regiment, units of the marine tanks infantry regiment; special forces of the RPIMa acting in the framework of “special operations” (OPS) with agents of the GIGN and the EPIGN, and in parallel with the CRAP teams of the 11th DP and units of the 13th RDP; two units of the army health service, (a rapid medical intervention unit called EMMIR based in Cyangugu and the Bio-force based in Goma), units from the 11th CRAP parachutist division of the 35th RAP, support and transmitters of the 14th RPCS . Describing the deployment put in place, a journalist from Libération depicts Turquoise as an outfit of “elite forces belonging especially to the land force, […], the air force, the marine and the gendarmerie [which] are the best trained, the best equipped […] of the French army, equipped with exceptional means, in terms of fire power, communication system and intelligence”

Troops of the French army were supported by 508 soldiers provided by seven African countries : Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Egypt, Niger and Congo. These seemed to serve as an international security to the French armada.

At the material level, the means are equally important. With regard to the most visible of the aerial equipment, according to a specialised military magazine, Opération Turquoise deployed on the advanced bases of Goma, Bukavu and Kisangani “six C-130 Hecules, nine C-160 Transall, a Falcon-20 and a communications CASA-235. Besides, the air force chartered an Airbus, a Boeing-747 as well as seventeen Antonov-124 Condor and Illyshin II-76 for heavy freight. On the Kisangani base was kept four Jaguar tactical support planes (from Bangui), four Mirage-F1 CT tactical support planes (from Colmar), four Mirage F1-CR reconnaissance planes (from Reims), and two C-135F in flight supply planes”.

All these troops were under the command of General Lafoucarde who, as the chief of operations, “has a post of theatre inter-armed command (PCIAT), directly linked to the Paris inter-armed operational centre (COIA), that is to the Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Jacques Lanxade.” Lafourcade’s PCIAT is based in Goma near the airport.

Opération Turquoise had four phases, starting with the official installation, on 23rd June 1994 and the entry into Rwanda up to the retreat, on 22nd August. Phase 1, devoted to “exceptional operations”, was carried out exclusively by the 222 units of the specialised Group which was a detachment of the Special Operations Group (COS), consisting exclusively of “special forces”. The role of the specialised group was to open up the way to the rest of the force. It was commanded by Colonel Rosier who led the communications and operations Detachment (DLMO) established in Bukavu. In Rwanda, the same COS-Turquoise Groups were in action: the Group 1 COS-Turquoise, which was under the command of Colonel Didier Tauzin alias Thibaut, and consisted of 68 men of the 1st RPIMA. This group entered Rwanda officially on 23rd June through Cyangugu. It went directly to the Tutsi refugee camp of Nyarushishi to which it “provided security”. It stayed there for about a week while part of the group deployed on the side of Gikongoro. There was Group 2 under the command of Rémy Duval, alias Diego, commanding 43 Air parachutist commandos of the specialised Group of the National Gendarmerie (GSIGN) to the town of Kibuye. This group was transported by helicopter. Finally, there was the Group 3 COS-Turquoise consisting of 44 Trepel marine commandos and four gendarmes of zGIN. They were under the command of army Captain Marin Gillier alias Omar. This group left Cyangugu on 24th and went to Kibuye, then turned back to settle at Kirambo and Gishyita. The group’s assignment was to make a reconnaissance of the southern part of Kibuye, including the region of Bisesero.

During the first days of July, Phase 1 saw the end of the activities of the COS detachment even if most of the troops remained in Rwanda and were reinforced by new arrivals. Two groups and a detachment were constituted and remained in the country until the end of the operation on 22nd August 1994.
The North Inter-arms group included the prefecture of Kibuye and was under the command of Colonel Patrice Sartre and consisted of three units of marine troops as well as Senegalese, Guinea-Bissauan, Congolese and Nigerien contingents.

The South Inter-arms Group, which included the prefecture of Cyangugu, was under the command of Jacques Hogard. It consisted of a tactical headquarters of about 400 men essentially from the foreign Legion and a Chadian contingent. Finally, this group also had a rapid intervention military medical Unit (EMMIR) established in the Kamarampaka stadium of Cyangugu.

During this Phase 1, at least during three skirmishes, French troops clashed with those of the RPF. The latter even held under fire a long column of French soldiers who were only freed after negotiations between the two parties at the highest level.

Phase 2 corresponds to the establishment, on 6th July, of the so-called “safe humanitarian area” (ZHS). Faced with the rapid retreat of FAR under RPA pressure and the movement of hundreds of thousands of people towards the south-west of the country, France informed the United Nations Secretary General of the intention to set up a ZHS in Rwanda and requested UN approval. In order to do this, France thought that she did not need a new resolution on the basis of resolutions 925 and 929. The essence of the French argument was as follows:

“[…] using resolutions 925 and 929, to organise a safe humanitarian area where the people would be sheltered from the war and the resulting grave consequences in this country. The Franco-Senegalese forces would see to it that, in the framework of the mandate that was theirs, there was no activity that was likely to affect the security of those people, and that it was carried out in or from this area. This area should centre on the region where humanitarian problems are most acute, taking into sufficiently vast consideration the people concerned and all in one block to stabilise the people on the ground and facilitate the movement of humanitarian support. On the basis of the information in our possession, this area should include the districts of Cyangugu, Gikongoro and the southern part of Kibuye, including the Kibuye-Gitarama axis until and including Ndaba Hill”

On 6th July, the United Nations Secretary General gave his approval to the French initiative on the basis of paragraph 4 of resolution 925. Whereas RPF captured Kigali on 4th July and Ruhengeri and Gisenyi were about to fall, on 8th July they announced demands in relation to ZHS. The latter was supposed to be reserved strictly for civilians, and FAR and the militia who were there were supposed to be disarmed and those responsible for the massacres arrested.

Finally, a number of commanders and members of the elite troops involved in COC groups were former elements of Noroît and DAMI of 1990-1993.

- Colonel Jacques Rosier, commander of Opération Noroît from June to November 1992 was the leader of Group of Special Operations (COS) during the Opération Turquoise.
- Colonel Didier Thibaut and Colonel Jacques Rosier commanded COS which were the spearhead of “Turquoise”, they were there to wage war against RPF, as illustrated by the vitriotic declaration by Thibaut on 4th July at Gikongoro.
- Colonel Etienne Joubert, chief of DAMI/Panda from 23rd December 1992 to 18th May 1993, incorporated in the Chimère detachment, came back during Turquoise as an intelligence, then operations officer in the 1st RPIMA detachment.
- Thierry Prungnaud, warrant officer class 1 of GIGN, member of the DAMI-Presidential Guard, trained the Presidential Guard in 1992 and is detailed to the COS detachment commanded by Marin Gillier.
- Erwan De Gouvello, commander of the marine troops, was an AMT at the beginning of 1994, stationed at camp Kigali of FAR. He was adviser to Colonel Satbenrath at Gikongoro during Turquoise.
- Lieutenant-Colonel Marcel was commander of the operational sector of Byumba during Opération Chimère in February-March 1993. In 1994, he is stationed under the PC of Colonel Jacques Rosier during Turquoise.
- Commander Chamot (squadron major), MT, was ambassador in Kigali on 6th April 1994. He was under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Hogard at the south EMT during Turquoise.
- Commander Fargues (or Forgues?), squadron major, AMT, was in Kigali on 6th April 1994. He found himself under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Hogard at the south EMT during Turquoise.

General Dallaire had lunch with General Lafourcade , and his officers, during his visit on 30th June at the general Headquarters of Opération Turquoise in Goma. He reports what he heard: “They refused to accept the existence of genocide and the fact that the extremist leaders, the bosses and some of their former colleagues are part of the same clique. They did not hide their desire to fight the RPF.”

According to orders of the operation, the equipment and the personnel of the command of Opération Turquoise, all the conditions of a war against RPF were in place but, unfortunately, it was against the Tutsis generally. Contrary to the declarations of French intentions, what the description of the action of the French troops of Turquoise in Rwanda shows in an abundant, recurrent and precise manner is that shadowy but quite murderous war against the Tutsis, in the middle of genocide.

1. CYANGUGU

The prefecture of Cyangugu was situated at the extreme south-west of the country. Today, the administrative divisions have changed. Part of its western façade faced Lake Kivu, while the southern part of the façade was linked with Zaïre by a short land border. Finally, the extreme south of the prefecture formed an important stretch of land that entered the Burundian territory. The main access road to the prefecture coming from the centre of the country was the Kigali-Cyangugu road which crossed Nyungwe forest. The prefecture had not been affected by the fighting because it was part of the so-called “safe humanitarian Zone”. It was the theatre of the genocide like the major part of the country until UNAMIR took over from the French troops, on 21st August 1994, as we shall see. After the first campaigns of massacres, the prefecture and town of Cyangugu had experienced a relative calm; there, like everywhere else, most of the Tutsi population had been massacred before the arrival of Opération Turquoise. There were only a few people remaining hidden here and there, perhaps in small groups. The only important assembling point for survivors was at the Nyarushishi camp where there were approximately 8,000 displaced Tutsis. On 19th, 20th and 21st of July, a massive exodus of the people, the militia and FAR invaded the town, on their way to Zaïre.

Group 1 of the Turquoise COS entered Cyangugu on 23rd June 1994 and went directly to the internally displaced Tutsis’ camp of Nyarushishi. It consisted of 58 men of the 1st RPIMA under the command of Colonel Didier Tauzin alias Thibaut. His deputy was Colonel Hervé Charpentier, alias Colin. The intelligence and then operations officer of the 1st RPIMA detachment was Lieutenant-Colonel Joubert.

On 30th June, the south Turquoise group covering the prefecture of Cyangugu took up its duties in the prefecture. It consisted of troops of the foreign Legion under the command of Colonel Jacques Hogard. Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Louis Laporte was the second in command, in charge of logistics. Captain Bruno Gilbert was deputy operations officer, Captain Georges Le Menn was second operations officer, and Captain Bernard Gondal was head of the intelligence office. The post of the southern group command was based at the Kamembe airport.

The first contingents of Opération Turquoise were received with joy and jubilation by the official regional and some national authorities, the senior FAR officers, Interahamwe and the rank and file FAR. The press, duly invited, echoed this triumphal reception.

“There are triumphs that people could do without. On Thursday the 23rd, it is under applause and cheers that a first detachment of the 11th paratrooper division penetrates if not on Rwandan, on Hutu soil. Leaving a heavy feeling of contempt in its wake, strewn with hurriedly sawn French flags - sometimes upside down –.”

“Right away, Colonel Didier Thibaut, patron of the Red Berets of Cyangugu, makes every effort to clear up the misunderstanding. “We are here neither to fight the RPF nor to support the FAR”, he says to the préfet and the military officers, duly convened.”

When he wanted to go to Nyarushishi, Colonel Thibaut requested the cumbersome reception committee not to follow him, perhaps because he didn’t want to be in the lens of the camera at the time of rescuing the Tutsis.

“It is very simple, he emphasizes to the three dignitaries whom he summoned and who are now surrounding him in silence, I don’t want to see neither machete, nor bow, nor spear and above all no effusiveness! Civilians should not accompany my men beyond the borders of the town. Do you understand?”
When he reached the Nyarushishi camp, a few kilometres from the town, the Colonel made a solemn declaration.

“Amahoro” shouted Colonel Didier Thibaut in Kinyarwanda (Peace be with you!) We came on a peace mission, the officer explained. We don’t want to make war to nobody. We just want to stop the massacres. Therefore, this evening, we shall stay here.” And to the préfet who is getting ready to leave: There is one thing that we cannot accept, Mr. Préfet: it is attaching civilians. The fights between the government forces and the RPF are not our concern. Is it clear?”

Here is the picture of the Opération Turquoise that the French army wanted to present. Doubts began to cross journalists’ minds when during the first days French soldiers did nothing to disarm the militia, a position assumed by Colonel Thibaut who plainly asserted: “We have no orders to disarm the militia”.

Genocide survivors, militia, former members of the FAR and other inhabitants of Cyangugu give a particularly gloomy picture of the French action during its two months presence in the prefecture. In a recurring manner, various witnesses show how French soldiers closely collaborated with the militia, the main perpetrators of the massacres, ordering them to arrest all the Tutsis whom they meet. Then, how they, in a systematic way, let the militia continue to kill, often before their eyes. Another important theme of those testimonies is France’s action in the Nyarushishi camp and on the way the protection posts, established and guarded by several French soldiers at various access points of the camp, were doubled by a perimeter larger than the roadblocks mounted by the Interahamwe whose mission was not to let the Tutsis enter or leave the camp; a number of those who tried it were killed. Still in the Nyarushishi camp, a victim narrates how French soldiers subjected her top particularly atrocious sexual slavery. Elsewhere in town, many victims talk about collaboration between French soldiers and the killers to bring them very young Tutsi girls to rape, whom they then threw back in the street knowing very well that they were likely to be killed. Finally, various witnesses tell how French soldiers strongly incited the population to flee to Zaire.

1) The Opération Turquoise, shield of the FAR in Cyangugu

The Opération Turquoise had a military action of protecting the FAR on the run particularly apparent in Cyangugu according to the analysis by Major Félicien NGIRABATWARE, a direct witness of the facts. A member of the FAR, in 1994, he was a student at the National University of Rwanda at the faculty of LAW at MBURABUTURO in Kigali. He rejoined the army on 13th April 1994 and was stationed at Muhima Camp, from where he left for Ruhengeri at the beginning of July; then he went to Cyangugu. He stayed in that area until the end of August 1994, the date on which he joined the RPA.

“From a military point of view, to be received implies two things; to provide cover fire for troops retreating under enemy fire and to receive them in a secure place. The cover is provided by the units that are behind the others on the battlefield who shoot at the enemy to prevent him from the retreating troops. This was done by the French soldiers in zone Turquoise for the FAR who were fleeing from the RPF. As for the reception, it is the act of receiving the pursued soldiers, treating the injured, helping them to regain morale and sheltering them from the enemy. Militarily, in Cyangugu and Kibuye [part of the Zone Turquoise in which he lived] the French soldiers served as “overhead bridge cover” although referred to by some people as humanitarian zone. The understanding of the role played by the French on one hand and that played by the FAR on the other hand, results from the mastery of the general context of the war. I never saw anything humanitarian in the Opération Turquoise; for me there is nothing to justify this qualifier. This operation is in keeping with the nature of their military support. At Rubengera, the French soldiers ordered the population and the soldiers to go down towards Cyangugu by separating soldiers from civilians. When they arrived in Cyangugu on the 19th, 20th, and 21st July 1994, they found the buildings still intact among them those belonging to the government. But after that date, looting and destruction of property were systematic and the French soldiers let go. The role of France in the genocide amounts to that military support that she persisted in providing to the FAR since the beginning of the war against the RPF and that she maintained during the genocide under cover of humanitarian action by ensuring their orderly retreat in order to return later with renewed force.”

Bernard Surwumwe is an ex-FAR. He illustrates in a synthetic manner the previous remarks by showing the French protection given to the ex-FAR since the last clashes against the RPA in Ruhengeri in the middle of July until the retreat into Zaire by passing through Gisenyi, Kibuye and Cyangugu.

“I witnessed French assistance to the FAR in combat in July 1994 when the RPF threatened the town of Ruhengeri. We fled towards Gisenyi and, while we were at the top of Mukamira, General Bizimungu encouraged us to resist and not to flee because, he said, the French had already arrived to help us. Indeed, they had already installed their support weapons at the hill tops of Bigogwe and threw bombs at the Inkotanyi who were pursuing us. The French managed to slow down their progress and this enabled us to extricate ourselves. We continued towards Kibuye then Cyangugu where our leaders were hoping to organise a resistance. On the way, it is the French who were protecting our itinerary. They had already erected roadblocks in several places like at Gishyita and Ntendezi. When we arrived in Cyangugu, we were quartered in the buildings of the MRND (Mouvement pour le Rassemblement National et de Développement, Habyarimana’s party). And during the crossing of the border towards Bukavu, they are the ones who transported our arms up to the military camp of Mpanzi where General Bizimungu joined us by helicopter in the company of Prime Minister KAMBANDA and two French men.”

2) Collaboration between the French soldiers and the Interahamwe in the continuation of the assassinations of Tutsis

Various witnesses relate how French soldiers collaborated with the Interahamwe in the continuation of the assassinations of Tutsi survivors. This cooperation was either active when those soldiers gave instructions to the Interahamwe to continue killing, or passive by letting the Interahamwe kill in their full view whereas as an occupying force they knew the legal and moral obligation to bring those killings to an end.
Elisé Bisengimana, completing the university and a native of Cyangugu, was there during the entire period of the Opération turquoise. After the genocide, he was the préfet of Cyangugu and he is currently a member of parliament. His testimony shows the evolution of the collaboration between the French soldiers and the militia in the screening of Tutsis and their delivery to the Interahamwe for killing.

“Since their arrival, the French soldiers first of all collaborated with the gendarmes and the Interahamwe on the roadblocks and in patrols. But in the end, they remained with the Interahamwe only after setting the gendarmes aside especially at the time of the exodus towards Zaïre. At the roadblocks in the town of Cyangugu, they checked identity cards and searched people and vehicles, recovering the arms found on the ex-FAR in flight and having them kept by the Interahamwe. During the identity checks at the roadblocks, the term “Hutu” on the identity card authorised the person to pass whereas the term “Tutsi” or the features of the Tutsi type were enough for not crossing the roadblock and being handed to the Interahamwe. As for the destination of the arms recovered on the roadblocks, some of them were given to the Interahamwe who helped the French on their patrols and on those roadblocks. The rest was carried DRC during the general flight.”

Jean Ndihokubwayo was an Interahamwe and a foreign exchange dealer at the Rusizi I border near the bridge which separates Cyangugu from Bukavu in Zaïre. The extract of his testimony is on the collaboration between the French soldiers and the Interahamwe to whom they distributed arms to track down and kill the Tutsis.

“The French soldiers entered Rwanda in 1994, after crossing the RUSIZI I boarder of Cyangugu from Zaïre. Those soldiers entered in two different stages. The first time, a group of three French soldiers came to Rwanda’s border (Rusizi I). They discussed with the immigration officer whom they told that they were coming for the zone turquoise but that they were going to cross the same day. The second time, a group of French soldiers entered the following morning. They met Colonel SIMBA and Député KAYONDE. After their discussion, the French soldiers explained to us that they were coming to save the HUTUS who were likely to be exterminated by the TUTSIS.

Then they asked us to call the soldiers of that area. I called six of them and we all went with SIMBA and that group of Frenchmen. We went to a house that belonged to SIMBA, slightly set back from the road in comparison with the rest of the town. That house was surrounded by a thick bush. The French soldiers drove their lorries into the courtyard of the house. Inside the courtyard, we lined up perpendicular to the French lorries. Then the French soldiers started distributing arms insisting on clearing or burning down the vicinity of their general headquarters to avoid any infiltration by the elements of the RPF or their accomplices. They told us literally through SIMBA: “we are going to give you arms and machetes to clear the bushes and thus avoid that the Tutsis might shoot at us.”

Then they gave us three guns, grenades and machetes. The machetes were in big boxes which the French brought themselves in their car to distribute them to us. We dispersed in different directions around the house and started searching the brushwood. We flushed out two Tutsis whom we killed, one by machete, the other one tried to run and one of us, a soldier by the name Masunzu shot him., We were using arms received from the French. Further on, near the prison, we flushed out another five who managed to dodge our shots. We went to give a report of operation and they paid us 700 FF. I kept two hundred and my companions shared the remainder. They then asked us to stay with them to help them. It is in this sense that after consulting the French, SIMBA sent us to look for reinforcements. I was able to bring three young men who in turn received arms and grenades.

Jean Bosco Habimana alias Masudi was a member of the FAR who underwent commando training. At the end of June 1994, he was in Cyangugu and was one of the six soldiers brought by the previous witness, Jean Ndihokubwayo, to the French soldiers at the border. He participated in the search in the brushwood surrounding SIMBA’s house in which the French detachment was going to settle.

“The French soldiers arrived in Cyangugu, crossed the Rusizi saying that they were coming to save the Hutus. As soon as they arrived, they told the Interahamwe group, who received them warmly, that they feared that the Hutus were the ones being killed, that if that was the case the situation would have been more complicated. But, since it was the Tutsis who were being killed, there was no problem because they were coming to protect the Hutus and thwart the RPF advance towards Cyangugu. Immediately after crossing the border [arrived in Colonel Simba’s house], they distributed among us grenades, guns and two-edged machetes. We were a group of Interahamwe and former soldiers. Since I was a former soldier, I received an L4 gun, an M28 grenade and a machete. They ordered us to go into the vicinity to track the enemy, that is to say the Tutsis, who might be hiding in the bushes and kill them with machetes. We did it, and actually killed Tutsis who had hidden in the bushes. Moreover, we no longer feared going to search peoples’ houses since we were armed, something that we could not do without those arms. […] They were used to kill the Tutsis at the Gasandara roadblock and very near the river Rusizi where corpses of the people killed were thrown in the river. I killed two people with those guns at the same place. Similarly, a certain Marcel, with a machete that he had received from the French, killed a Tutsi who had hidden in the bush situated below Vuningoma’s home. […]. The killings intensified and there were many corpses in the river Rusizi. The French told us that we were stupid to let the corpses float on the surface of the water, that it would become a serious problem if photos were taken, and then they showed us what to do to ensure that those corpses don’t float. They climbed into boats and went towards the floating corpses which they disembowelled with the use of bayonets.”

Calixte Gashirabake is a native of east Kibuye, in the former commune of Kivumu where he saw the soldiers of the Opération turquoise arrive. He gave specific examples of screening displaced persons, in search of Tutsis, at a roadblock manned by French soldiers and the FAR and who were entrusted by the French soldiers or the FAR for killing. He gives other examples of the same type of action, this time in Cyangugu.

“In June 1994 I saw French soldiers at Kivumu. They were there in the framework of the Opération turquoise. In the company of the FAR and Policemen, they first of all put up a roadblock near the commune, then they organised a meeting with the displaced persons of Isanza to tell them that the had come to ensure their security and if possible protect them during their flight into exile because the Inkotanyi were likely to massacre them. At that roadblock, the French and FAR were carrying out a rigorous control so that no single Inkotanyi might escape them because the latter could hide in the crowd of displaced persons. I, personally was arrested when I tried to pass without an identity card. I was going to lose my life if the commune adviser, Ndaryemera, had not intervened in my favour. It is at that roadblock that a lady by the names of Béatrice alias Nyamunini was arrested and killed with her husband. She was a clerk of the court. The Rwandan policemen pulled her out of the crowd and went to kill her in the bush not far from there. The French soldiers saw everything but they did nothing to stop them. She was suspected of being an accomplice of Inkotanyi. The French soldiers advised the FAR to carry out a serious check in such a way that no Inkotanyi was able to escape from them. That is why they asked every passer-by to show his identity card. That is how at that same place, a certain Nyamaswa was arrested and they asked him for his identity card. They realised that he was Tutsi. This was confirmed by the people who knew him. According to them, he had been absent from the village for a long time and it was murmured that he had gone to be recruited by the Inkotanyi. Since that day, he has never been seen. Later on, while people were fleeing from Inkotanyi on the road to Cyangugu, we found another roadblock manned by the French and the FAR soldiers. They arrested four people among us. Then, the rest of us, they forced us to continue our way. Nobody will know their fate. We spent a whole month in that area. The French used to tell us that they are going to Zaïre to prepare our place of refuge and that they would take us there thereafter. Finally, we were transported and concentrated in the Nyarushishi camp before continuing to Zaïre. On the bridge of Ntendezi, the Interahamwe arrested and killed a young man suspected of being Inkotanyi when he tried to cross that bridge. They asked him his identification and he told them: “frankly, don’t waste your time, I am Tutsi!” Hardly had he pronounced the last word than they stabbed him. The French who were sitting on the bridge saw everything and didn’t bat an eyelid.”

Thomson Mubiligi was an Interahamwe and collaborated with the French troops during the genocide in Cyangugu.

“I saw the French arrive in Cyangugu. Some of them went to Nyarushishi, others to the airport and another group of soldiers moved everywhere. They collaborated closely with the Préfet of Cyangugu and the gendarmerie and often held meetings with FAR senior officers as well as the leaders of the Interahamwe. In this framework, they closely collaborated with the President of CDR, Bantari Ripa, the President leader of the Interahamwe in Cyangugu, Nyandwi Christophe, as well as Yusuf Munyakazi, leader on the Interahamwe of Bugarama who went to give reinforcement in Kibuye. […]
In Cyangugu, the Interahamwe continued to kill in spite of the presence of the French soldiers. Indeed, those Interahamwe kept their roadblocks and the French did nothing to neither disarm them nor chase them away from those roadblocks. Some Interahamwe from Kigali looted in the town of Cyangugu and also the French did nothing to stop them. […] One of the senior French officers was called Lieutenant-Colonel Hogard, others called themselves Commanders to foreign legions. […]
The French distributed arms to some people, among them: me, Habimana Anaclet who was a soldier in the FAR, and another Habimana. They also gave red bands that we were supposed to wear for identification, telling us that we were going to help them in providing security. In return, we received iron rations. […] The French let the Interahamwe kill with impunity.”

Vincent Nzabaritegeka was a mechanic in the Nyungwe Forest project at Ntendezi in the prefecture of Cyangugu. He asserts that French soldiers distributed arms to the leaders of Interahamwe who then used them to kill the Tutsis.

“Towards the 25th of June, it was a Monday [The witness gets it wrong in his approximation, Monday was the 27th June], Samuel Manishimwe, préfet Bagambiki and 7 Frenchmen in their jeeps came and ordered me to open the gate. They were with gendarmes. Immediately, I saw them enter a Benz lorry, hermetically closed, belonging to the French. They told me that they were looking for the project director, Mr. Déo Mbanzabigwi, so that he may give them a free room. After telling them that the director was absent, Préfet Bagambiki ordered me to give him the keys, and I did so. He opened one of the rooms and ordered the 12 gendarmes to unload the arms which were in the lorry. According to what one of the gendarmes said, they were M16 guns and 5 boxes containing grenades. The préfet told the gendarmes that they were supposed to stay behind and guard those arms. […]

The following day, Yusuf [Munyakazi], Samuel Manishimwe, the préfet and the director came back and held a meeting during which they said that the reservists were reenlisted in the army that, therefore, the arms were going to be distributed to the militarily trained Interahamwe. Thus they distributed arms and grenades. They were giving a gun and grenades to each person. After that they told them to go and “work”, starting with Bugarama. Déo said that I could not stay without means of defence and they gave me a gun and grenades. They also gave guns and grenades to our engineer and to two other people to guarantee the security of the centre and its vicinity. […]

On the 28, towards evening, Yusuf came back and told us that he had solved the problem of Gafunzo [a locality of the Bugarama region, Yusuf Munyakazi’s stronghold], where the only serious problem remaining was Bisesero where attacks had been conducted since he 27th and that people had to find a way of going there. We took out the arms, guns and grenades that were remaining in stock and the gendarmes loaded them in Yusuf’s vehicle. Before leaving, the latter told us that the attack on Bisesero would take place on Friday the 29 [Once again the witness gets the day wrong, the 29th was a Wednesday. On the other hand the dates given in reference to Bisesero in this extract correspond to the events in Bisesero].

Actually, they went to attack Bisesero on the 29th, […] The French distributed, publicly, the guns that were used to perpetrate the massacres. I witnessed this distribution when I was accompanying the director and the engineer. Mutabazi and even those two used them publicly. Moreover, those guns were used to kill the people of Nyamuhunga. Also, when I was coming back from Nyamasheke to transport a wounded person whom Yusuf had entrusted me with, I came back to Ntendezi and I noticed that the people had started being killed at Ntendezi roadblock. It is in this framework that a certain Eugène was killed. Some people said that he was a musician at chez Lando and a native of Butare but we inquired and learnt that he came from Gishoma. At the Shagasha, people were also killed by the guns distributed by the French.”

Gaspard Nteziryimana received military training from French soldiers so as to be a member of the “red bands”, a group of auxiliaries of the French soldiers. After being assaulted by the Interahamwe and left for dead because he had hidden Tutsis, the French soldiers forced him to accuse the RPF while they were filming his declarations.

“I saw French soldiers in June 1994. They trained us in the use of firearms and military tactics at Mataba in Nyamasheke. We were more than 160 young men from the former sectors of Mubumbano, Nyamasheke and Butambara. […] We started the training that was going to last 15 days. We received training from 7h00, had a break for an hour and a half and resume until 17h00. We went back home in the evening. We asked them why they let us go back home whereas we were undergoing military training and they told us that we would no be recruited in the army but that we were going to support the Opération Turquoise so as to stop the Inkotanyi from crossing Gikongoro and overrun Cyangugu. After the closing ceremony of the training, we went back home. After some time the sector advisers summoned us to receive the equipment according to our merits and to start the service. At Nyamasheke, the French gave us about fifteen guns (FAL and Kalashnikovs) and military uniforms, the same as those of the FAR. They also gave us a document certifying that we had received those arms from them and a band of red cloth that we wore on the shoulders to differentiate us from the FAR and prove that we supported the French. At one time, the French took back the arms that they had given to us and I went back home. [...]I had hidden four Tutsis at home, among them was Dusabe Julienne and they were discovered by the Interahamwe during the distribution of the property of the Tutsis. The Interahamwe, among them Antoine Hitimana, Cyrille Kalisa, Sabin, Patrice, François, Barthélemy Iyakagaba and many more came to look for me and burgomaster Aloys Kamana with his elder brother who was the President of the MDR Power gave the order to kill me. The Interahamwe assaulted me with a machete and went away thinking that they had killed me whereas I had only fainted. When the French learnt about it, they came and evacuated me on board their jeep. They took me to Kamembe, at the Saint-Francis health centre run by the Sisters. The French soldiers cared for me, they put me in a tent and they took their time to treat me. Three days after, I had regained consciousness and they asked me to explain to them what had happened. I explained to them that it was the Interahamwe who had made an attempt on my life but they didn’t want to accept the explanation. They brought a native lady from Butare to translate what they were telling me. They told her to explain to me that I had to write asserting that it was the Tutsis of the RPF who had done it so that they may continue to treat me. I explained to her that it was not true, that it was the Interahamwe who had done it because I had hidden Tutsis. They let me know that they could not continue treating me, saying that they were going to throw me out because I refused to lie that it was the Inkotanyi who had wanted to kill me. They photographed me. I had no choice and since I was likely to be killed if I returned home, I accepted to tell lies. A report saying that the perpetrators of those acts were Inkotanyi was prepared by the French soldiers, assisted by the lady and I was forced to approve it. […] Afterwards, a Frenchman from Bukavu came to interview me. He had a camera and asked me to say that “it was the Inkotanyi who had wanted to kill me with a machete because I had killed Tutsis” and to describe them by saying that “they were tall with long noses”. The lady told me that I was supposed to repeat this and I noticed that the Frenchman wrote down only his questions and my answers while ensuring that the camera was switched off at the time of the lady’s interventions. After the interview, they continued treating me. […] During the flight to Congo, I had already recovered and I saw the French who were controlling the passage of refugees stop a young man who was on an AG 100 motorbike at the Rusizi. They said that he was Tutsi. It was General Kabiligi who took the motorbike and threw it in the Rusizi. The French brutally grabbed that man by the belt and took him towards the convent of the Saint-Francis Sisters in demolished houses. He was never seen again and the way he was led away was a bad sign; they were not going to spare him. […] Another time, I also saw the French screen the Interahamwe who were looting the Ituze hotel. They said they were screening the Tutsis. They took tall people whom they called Tutsis; put them aboard their helicopter saying that they were going to throw them in the Nyungwe forest. Moreover, in Kamembe, it was often said that the French soldiers threw people in the river Rusizi.”

Alphonsine Mukakarangwa is a peasant survivor of genocide. She recounts how French soldiers made her, and her mother, get out of the health centre where they were treating them when they learnt that they had been victims of the Interahamwe. Those French dropped them at a roadblock manned by Interahamwe.

“At the beginning of the genocide, I went to hide at the home of a Hutu lady by the name Mama Faida in Kamembe town and, upon the arrival of the French soldiers of the Opération Turquoise in Cyangugu, my mother sent someone to tell me that security had been restored, and that I could come back home. I returned home and two days afterwards, we were attacked by two soldiers accompanied by my brother in law who was an Interahamwe. They injured me seriously, I managed to escape but, later on, I fainted as a result of a serious haemorrhage. My mother was also seriously beaten, she received hammer blows on the head as well as knife blows. They left her for dead. We were found by my brother and the in-charge of the cell called François who evacuated us to the Kamarampaka stadium where the French had set up camp. They had set up camp there and divided into two the tents in which they put the injured: one section for those who returned from the frontline, injured and transported by helicopter, and another section for us who had been wounded by the Interahamwe. Above the bed of each patient, there was a form. In our section we were five and we were all naked, even my mother. The French came to take photographs of us. I was wearing a slip only, they cut it with scissors so that I may also be totally naked before taking our photographs. […] One day, a Frenchman consulted my form. I heard him pronounce the word “Interahamwe”. He brutally disconnected the drip which they had administered to me and threw it down. I could not walk, he pulled me and took me out of the stadium. My mother followed us shouting that I was her daughter and begged him to leave me alone. He put both of us, naked, in their vehicle and took us near the hospital of Bushenge, at the junction of the roads leading to the hospital and Nyamirundi. They made us alight from the vehicle and left us there. It was at a roadblock of Interahamwe, they had lit a fire there but there was nobody, they had launched an attack on Nyamirundi. After some time, a man in a blue apron arrived and asked us if we were the people brought by the French. We said yes. He asked us to give him money so that he can treat us. My mother explained to him that we didn’t have any and proposed to give him our piece of land. He told us to enter and go to room number two. I could hardly stand; I tried to walk with a bent back and, from time to time, on all fours. We went into room II in which there was only one patient injured on the foot with his mother as a nurse. The nurse told us that we were lucky that Interahamwe had gone to loot at Nyamirundi and that usually those whom they brought there were killed. She gave us her two pieces of cloth to cover ourselves. […] We left the hospital a few days later. When we arrived at Gihundwe, we met two men who said that they had seen French soldiers kill a man. We thought, they added, that the French had come to save human lives but what they did in addition to that was worse than what the Interahamwe did. Indeed, we saw the corpse of that man covered with a mat near the Gihundwe market.”

Anthère was a FAR corporal until December 1993. He recounts that French soldiers gave two guns to an Interahamwe leader.

“A week after their settlement in Nyarushishi, the French gave two guns to Edouard Bandetse who was a shopkeeper here in Kamembe; he was also the president of Interahamwe in the Nyakabuye commune. They were the type of guns that military drivers were carrying. I was the one going to teach him how to handle them, their assembly and dismantling. There were also two pistols which he took with him when he fled the country.”

During the Opération Turquoise Straton Sinzabakwira was a burgomaster of Karengera commune of which he was native. He was also a member of the political bureau of the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) in 1994. His testimony is based on what he observed himself and what he heard from other people because he was well informed.

“I am one of the local authorities who were in office during the 1994 genocide since I was a burgomaster of the Karengera commune and I am one of those who admitted their role in the genocide of the Tutsis which took place in Rwanda. […] During the Opération Turquoise, the French collaborated with the killers in the perpetration of the genocide. They selected also the people who were supposed to be killed and abandoned them to the fate.
[…] French soldiers visited all the communes and held meetings with burgomasters or leaders of Interahamwe to give us instructions on the behaviour to adopt. When they arrived in Cyangugu, they were in charge of everything; they supervised and gave instructions to reinforce patrols in order to prevent the RPF from infiltrating. In order to recognise the RPF, they had given us the instruction to look at the shoulders if there might be gun strap marks and check on legs for marks of boots. In Cyangugu, after seeing the bodies of the people killed floating on Lake Kivu and in the river Rusizi, they suggested to the killers to open the stomachs of the floating corpses and fill them with stones so that they may sink. They toured all the roadblocks giving those instructions to the killers. They wanted to hide evidence of the genocide from international journalists. I was told, but I also saw it myself.
[…] The French soldiers of the Opération Turquoise were involved in the genocide of the Tutsis, and here is how:

1. At the Ntendezi roadblock in the Karengera commune of which I was a burgomaster, I was with Christophe Nyandwi, leader of Interahamwe in Cyangugu, when French soldiers came to the place where we were checking cars that were coming from Gitarama, Butare and Gikongoro. We were looking for Tutsis in those cars, because nobody could cross the roadblock without showing his identity card to make sure that he was really Hutu. We had put aside five Tutsis and we were with Interahamwe in uniform. The French soldiers came out of their vehicles and we discussed with them. We told them that we were looking for the enemy. They knew Nyandwi as a leader of Interahamwe since they used to meet him at the prefecture and in meetings. They guaranteed us their support and went away. Those who were behind in the vehicle raised their hands in the air as a sign of support. Nyandwi took the five Tutsis and killed them between the Gisuma commune and the Shagasha tea factory. If they had come for humanitarian purposes, they would have saved and evacuated those Tutsis.

2. At Nyarushishi where the Tutsis were hiding, the French raped women and girls in tents and the wood nearby. And in their so-called “humanitarian action”, they did not give food to refugees. I was told this by the people who went to sell food to the displaced people in that camp. I used those people in my official capacity to obtain information on the way those displaced people were living and how their relations with the French were. The Opération Turquoise had no humanitarian character whatsoever. It was a support and protection mission for the Interahamwe to enable them to flee.

3. In the Nyungwe forest at Gasare, the French soldiers captured people, tied them up, put them in sacs, loaded them into helicopters and went and dropped them in the forest. The victims were referred to as accomplices of Inkotanyi. According to information that I received from people who were running away from Kigali, those who were killed by the French by throwing them from the helicopter into the Nyungwe forest were very many. I personally saw bodies of two people tied up who were thrown by the French soldiers in Gasare in Karengera commune. Apart from those, other people suffered the same fate. After the RAR defeat and before helping the killers escape to Zaïre, the present Democratic Republic of Congo, the French soldiers of Turquoise insisted on first of all eliminating the traces of cannabis which was grown in the Nyungwe forest. They collected what had been harvested, then eliminated all the traces by destroying that plantation and killing the staff that maintained it, as well as those who helped with its destruction. According to the information that I received from my friend Emmanuel Nteziryayo who was the burgomaster of the Mudasomwa commune and with whom I was in the refugee camp in Zaïre, the agricultural officer who was in charge of maintaining that plantation was killed in the same way around the 5 July 1994.

4. I personally was beaten by the French soldiers around the 15th July 1994, when they learnt from Interahamwe that I had helped Claudien Kanyeshyamba [a Tutsi] to flee to Burundi. The French came to look for me because hthey had been told that I worked for the enemy and that I had arms that were to be used by the Inkotanyi once they arrived in the region. The French soldiers came to search at my home and they found nothing, but they harassed and beat us, me and my family;

5. The French soldiers ex-filtrated the criminals and encouraged the people to go into exile. They frightened them with the gesture that their throats would be slit if they stayed behind, encouraging them to flee. At Bugarama, they moved people from their homes by force.”

Kamembe Airport

The headquarters of the southern unit of Opération Turquoise headed by Colonel Hogard was located within Kamembe airport . Different witnesses have affirmed to the Commission that corpses were brought to the airport, loaded on helicopters and dumped either in Lake Kivu or in Nyungwe forest. Finally, a witness who kept a precise memory of the happenings of the time affirmed to having seen half a dozen fresh Tutsi corpses within the protected perimeter of the French army inside the airport.

Cassien Bagaruka was a former fire fighter who was at the Kamembe airport fire fighting station at the time of Opération Turquoise. He spoke of the close collaboration between the French army and the Interahamwe which permitted the continuation of the killings. He saw French soldiers arriving in Cyangugu.

“When they arrived at Kamembe airport, they installed a radio transmitter which was controlled by Corporal Thierry and Sergeant Galant Olivier, and other various military equipment which included vehicles transported by helicopters and Transall Hercules 730 type of aircrafts. Shortly thereafter, French soldiers led by Colonel Hogard attended a meeting organised by local authorities among who were Colonel Kabiligi, Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho, Tharcisse Muvunyi and Sylvère Ahorugeze [some of these persons are accused while others have already been convicted of masterminding the genocide]. After that meeting, helicopters started the operation of transporting Interahamwe in the early mornings and bringing them back later in the evenings. In fact, the French soldiers closely collaborated with the Interahamwe. I personally saw the French soldiers bringing Tutsis who were tied up, to the empty runway of the airport where they were shot dead before being dumped into Lake Kivu using helicopters. Those Tutsis, who mainly came from Bisesero (Kibuye) and Ntendezi, had been brought to the French base by the Interahamwe. In the same way, one of the fire fighters at the airport called Gratien, who was being pursued by killers, took refuge in the French military base located at Kamembe airport. He was killed at that very base before the French soldiers yet they could have protected him. In my view, the French soldiers came to protect genocide perpetrators and facilitate them to cross the border towards Zaire where they controlled.”

Abdallah Kayitsinga was a carpenter. During Opération Turquoise, he was staying close to Kamembe airport.

“I saw the French soldiers arriving at Kamembe aboard their vehicles, equipped with heavy arms. […] At Kamembe, I saw them driving towards neighbouring villages and coming back carrying corpses in their military Jeeps heading towards the airport. You see, their jeeps were so small that we could see the feet of corpses hanging from their rear. As I was living near that airport, I noticed that, each time, shortly after these Jeeps had passed, their helicopter would thereafter take off. It was said that the French soldiers used to dump corpses in Nyungwe forest; I cannot deny it as I had seen them transporting those corpses towards the airport.”

Luc Pillionel , a Swiss national, is married to a Rwandese. He came to Rwanda on 19th July 1994 to pick up members of his wife’s family who had sought refuge in Nyarushishi camp. Being a Swiss, he was able to forge a relationship with the French soldiers and benefited from their assistance. The extract from his testimony is about the discovery of half a dozen fresh corpses, most likely Tutsis, inside the protected perimeter of the French military base located within Kamembe airport. At the same military base is where the command post of the southern unit of Opération Turquoise was located, which also housed the office of Colonel Hoard. The extract of the testimony starts at the time when Luc Pillionel lands at Kamembe airport, coming from Bukavu in Zaire.

“The helicopter landed close to a very large metal warehouse which was surrounded by fortification positions of the command post made from sand bags. I entered the military base. I remember having talked to a French army officer, Captain Guillaume Ancel who promised that we would very shortly be leaving for Nyarushishi. We left the base with three cars, Captain Guillaume Ancel and I seated in the back seat of a chauffer driven 4x4 Jeep which was loaded with a machine-gun, calibre 308 OTAN. I would rather say it was a traditional calibre. Driving right behind us were two big 4x4 trucks.

At that moment, I remember we were driving on the side of the base and along the runway. I have trouble remembering the direction we were at from the runway. I think we were south of the runway in the runway direction, taking into account the position of the sun. On my right, there was a bunker for the French, the command post, inside it, a large metallic warehouse. We left our position with the car and drove along the runway with the sun to our right. It was around 11h30. I can remember that vehicles were driving slowly on the lawn surrounding the airport. After about 100 or 200 m, there were almost half a dozen fresh corpses. I remember amongst the corpses were two young men. There must have also been some women and I think that they were lying on their backs, on their sides or maybe the reverse based on the place where I was situated.

So I was moving in the direction of the runway, to the south and we had reached the control tour when we turned left. It was there that corpses were placed. I was particularly struck by the sight of a corpse whose head had almost been severed and I could see the pink flesh of the person who was lying there. There was a pool of blood on the ground that was not yet dry. The sky above was reflected in the pool of blood as if it was a mirror made of mercury. The French passed nearby without any reaction. There is not a shadow of doubt that these were people who had been fleeing from the genocide for weeks. This was noticeable from the tiny face of the male person who was lying in dust next to me with a beard that had not been shaved for weeks. He was very thin and dressed in shabby dirty clothes.

These corpses were close to the runway, some few meters from the runway. They were 150 or 200 m inside the extremely protected French military position. For me it was impossible that civilian Rwandans in poor health conditions and starving for a long time could have taken any military action against the French. Moreover, they were not armed.”

During his hearing, commissioners asked him for further clarification on the nature of the perimeter and about its exclusive control by the French soldiers and how come the corpses were lying inside the perimeter. Below was his response:

“In my opinion, the entire perimeter was permanently secure and given the nature of the place with its short grass and no bush, without anything on the runway which I would say was flat and in good condition, any person who moved especially in the daytime could very easily be seen and corpses could not have been there if the French soldiers had not let them get in.”

When the Commission wanted to know how Luc Pillionel had interpreted the presence of corpses, he replied as follows:

“In my opinion, the French let them enter the base alive and I think that the base was organised in such a way that there was only one entrance. My second opinion is that they had been brought there by the French. So, they let them enter, where were they heading to? From the entrance, they crossed the runway in order to move towards the French. Therefore, they were allowed to get inside so that they could be killed by the Interahamwe or by the French themselves, I know nothing about it. […] Thirdly, they were brought to the base aboard a plane. There was a runway with numerous helicopters landing and taking off, and possibly aircrafts too like the Transall type. There could have been more aircrafts.”

With regard to his third opinion where he suggested that those persons could have been brought from outside already dead, he was asked if that opinion could match the quantity of fresh blood that he had earlier described, he answered:

“With regard to my opinion, I would say it was a personal thought and your observation is pertinent. Therefore, I think that my opinion that the corpses could have been brought dead and thrown from either a vehicle or an aeroplane is most likely erroneous because such an amount of blood would not be seen if they had been killed from elsewhere.”

3) Nyarushishi displaced people’s camp

As we have seen above, Nyarushishi camp was supposed to be the most important humanitarian objective of the whole Opération Turquoise. However, testimonies from displaced persons and the Interahamwe who were active in the neighbouring areas of the camp have proved otherwise. In fact, killings by the Interahamwe went on under instructions of the French soldiers and violence and rapes were committed by the latter against survivors that they were supposed to protect.

Valens Tuyisenge, Théogène Nteziryayo, Déo Mahanga, Thaddée Renzaho, Théoneste Ngiruwonsanga and Eric Kamuzinzi are survivors who sought refuge in Nyarushishi camp. They explained in a collective interview the security set up of Nyarushishi camp; the surrounding security detail constituted of guard positions of French soldiers, roadblocks manned by the Interahamwe and Rwandan gendarmes. These witnesses also explain that philanthropic organisations distributed food but without any firewood. This forced the survivors therefore to risk their lives by going out of the camp to collect firewood.

“During the genocide, around the end of June 1994, the French arrived at Nyarushishi where they set up their positions. However, in the areas surrounding Nyarushishi camp, there were roadblocks manned by the Interahamwe and gendarmes. In order to arrive at Nyarushishi, the French had to cross all these roadblocks. […] One day, three young persons were flushed out from a tea plantation by the Interahamwe. They ran towards the French military camp and the Interahamwe run after them. They successfully entered Nyarushishi camp. The commander of the gendarmes post who was there assisting entered the camp, got the three young people and took them away. This happened in full view of the French soldiers who did nothing about it. We did not see the three young persons again.” [Testimony of Théogène Nteziryayo]


“[…] The French were accomplices of the Interahamwe in killings and tortures committed against the Tutsis. Most of the Tutsis who sought refuge in the camp were apprehended by the Interahamwe since they had to cross the roadblocks that were manned by the Interahamwe. […] A man called Safari took me to one of these roadblocks located not far from the French base. The Interahamwe tied me up and threw me down to the ground. I was awaiting my death. The French passed by emotionless in their Jeeps as if nothing was going on. […] One day, the French escorted us into the bush to collect firewood near the transmitter. While we were collecting firewood, their Jeep came by to pick them up; they drove away and left us there. We were attacked soon after and most of us were killed. Almost all the survivors were injured. […] It was really hard to collect firewood and as such people living in the camp were obliged to destroy houses belonging to the Interahamwe to get firewood. One day, it was on a Saturday, when one Tutsi was caught demolishing a house and was killed with a machete. Many Tutsis were killed while collecting firewood outside the camp yet the French were there. They did not respond at all.” [Testimony of Théoneste Ngiruwonsanga]

Still in the Nyarushishi camp, survivors tell about sexual violence that was committed by the French soldiers against girls in that camp.

“[…] The French raped Claudine in turns. She was between 14 and 15 years old in 1994; she was so traumatized that she run mad. They also raped Umulisa, Oscar’s sister. They tortured them sexually and even put pepper in their sexual organs. They raped many girls, but we do not know their names. There was one girl who was tall, she now works at the hospital. [It is probably Concessa whose testimony shall be seen later, she is tall and works at the big regional hospital] and another lady who was born in Kibuye.” [Testimony of Théoneste Ngiruwonsanga and Théogène Nteziryayo]

“They also raped young girls whom they had evacuated from Ntendezi Agro Forestry School; they used to come to look for them in the camp. In order to escape from them, the young girls would sleep in other tents so that they could not be traced.” [Testimony from Déo Mahanga, Théoneste Ngiruwonsanga and Théogène Nteziryayo]

Aloys Gasasira was an Interahamwe. During the time of the French soldiers’ presence, he stayed near Nyarushishi camp and manned a roadblock. He affirms that the French soldiers had requested them to kill any person who tried to enter their camp.

“I was staying 300m from the camp and I saw the French soldiers who controlled the Nyarushishi camp where Tutsis had sought refuge during the genocide. We had a roadblock about 1000m from the French camp. At that roadblock, we killed many people and the French often came to ask us what was going on. We explained to them that we had killed Tutsis. They requested us to ensure that nobody else entered the camp and ordered us to kill whoever tried to enter. With those instructions, we killed a woman together with her young daughter and a young man. I did not personally know them, but they said that they came from a place called K’Uwinteko. We also killed Tutsis who were leaving the camp to go and collect firewood among whom was Charles, son of Sembeba. After killing them, we would throw them into a mass grave near the roadblock. The French came over to see what we were doing and commended us as real soldiers. As a reward, they gave us some of their rations. They also sometimes joined us for night patrols. After the RPF victory, the French forbade us from killing any more Tutsis so as to avoid RPF reprisal. Instead they advised and invited us to flee the country, saying that the RPF would cut our throats. They got angry at those people who did not heed to their advice but instead delayed to leave their homes.”

Aloys Karemera was a driver at the time. He is among the survivors that sought refuge in Nyarushishi camp. Below is his account of the killings by the French soldiers who were in charge of guarding the camp where he escaped from, as well as sexual abuse against young female survivors.

“I saw French soldiers coming to Nyarushishi on 23rd June 1994. They met with gendarmes of the government called Abatabazi under the command of Colonel Bavugamenshi Innocent, the gendarmerie commander at Cyangugu. Upon their arrival, the French took over from the gendarmes except for a small number of them who stayed there to work with the French. The French soldiers forbade us from going out of the camp to collect firewood and fetch water from the spring that was within the camp. I once went out of the camp with two men K and Emmanuel. When the French saw us near the camp, they threw a grenade at us. My two companions were killed immediately but I managed to escape. The French soldiers sent gendarmes inside the camp to find girls to be raped. On several occasions, they took Mado Mukayiranga, she is now dead, Pascasie Mukayeze, a native of Cyumbati in Kibuye where she has a small café and Jacqueline Mukayitesi, who now lives in Biryogo. Gendarmes would come looking for them and take them to the French soldiers’ tents. […] By the time the French soldiers left, they had a very bad attitude towards the displaced persons. They had noticed that we were happy when the UNAMIR Ethiopian troops took over and came to tour our camp. They burnt their tents and their food stores. We had to hide since they were very aggressive.”

Joseph Ngiruwonsanga is a genocide survivor who sought refuge in Nyarushishi camp. Below is his account of the deeds of the French soldiers and how they beat him up.

“In the beginning, Nyarushishi camp was guarded by gendarmes. However, the Interahamwe who were in possession of lists, regularly moved within the camp to look for Tutsis who they would take away to be killed. Later in June 1994, the gendarmes were replaced by French soldiers who came into Rwanda from Zaire. At that time, the Interahamwe had set up their positions all around the camp, inside Shagasha, Rwamiko and Mutimasi tea plantations and in tea plantation on the mountain slopes. During the period when Nyarushishi camp was guarded by French soldiers, the Interahamwe went on killing people around the camp. For example, a man called Anselme who came from Gihango and a lady with a baby on her back were killed when they got out of the camp to collect firewood. […] Four days after the arrival of the French soldiers in Nyarushishi camp, they knew that I had not taken part in the night watch. They asked the chiefs of zones to find me and take me to the residence of the Camp Commander named Marcel. A Red Cross Coordinator who was from Kibuye tried to explain my case. They beat me up and left me for dead, they threw me into a 1.80m pit from which I could not get out. My fingers and my mouth were bleeding. When school pupils coming from Kibuye saw me at around 18h00, they informed a white man called SADE who was the Red Cross coordinator. Sade assisted by the school pupils took me out of the pit and took me back to the camp. I spent eight days in bed and under treatment from Red Cross agents. During that entire period my urine was full of blood. To this day I am still facing the after effects of the beating. I am required to see a doctor often. The French tortured many people inside the camp. Unfortunately I cannot remember their names.”

The sexual enslavement of Concessa

C. Mussa is a survivor who with a baby on her back, sought refuge in Nyarushishi camp. She was 18 years old at the time of the Opération Turquoise. After a perilous journey where she and her baby survived being killed several times, she finally reached Nyarushishi camp where the French soldiers found her.

“At the beginning of the genocide, I sought refuge at Gasirabwoba where [the Préfet] Bagambiki came accompanied by the Interahamwe to kill all the people who had sought refuge there. When they shot at us, we fell over one another and I was lucky not to be seen by the killers who were checking and finishing off any survivors using spears. Me and my baby were the only survivors in my family. I left Gashirabwoba and kept on hiding in banana plantations and bushes. I later decided to move to Cyangugu. Midway, I was caught by Interahamwe at the Kadashya roadblock. They lead me to the tea factory where I found six other women. While they lit a fire to burn us, some other Interahamwe cried out that they had flushed out other Tutsis from tea plantations. Our killers then rushed away to get reinforcement which gave us an opportunity to escape.

I started walking towards Kamembe. The Interahamwe had taken away all my clothes. I was completely naked and held my baby on my back with a small piece of cloth. I arrived at Kamembe roundabout where there was a roadblock manned by an Interahamwe called “Tourner” I was caught again by the Interahamwe. They were about to kill me when gendarmes who were in a nearby small shop came over. I told them that the father of my baby was also a gendarme called Jean Baptiste. They let me know that he had been transferred to Butare and promised to take care of me. They took me away and gave me food. I was about to die from hunger; this enabled me to get some energy and continue with my journey. But before reaching Cyangugu, a militiaman saw me in the bush and raped me. I arrived at Cyangugu three days after the massacres at Gashirabwoba. I stayed there in hiding while the Interahamwe were coming over to get people to be killed. There was one Hutu boy who was hiding amongst us while spying for the Interahamwe. He advised us to leave the place very early in morning at 4h00 and he thereafter informed the Interahamwe who attacked us on our way. That day, 362 people were killed. Survivors of that attack went back to the stadium where we were attacked with grenades on orders of Préfet Bagambiki. ICRC staff from Bukavu implored Bagambiki to let us leave and they took us to Nyarushishi camp.

Some days after our arrival at Nyarushishi camp, the Interahamwe came to attack us but they were diverted by the Bukavu ICRC agents who informed Colonel Bavugamenshi about our situation and he came back with gendarmes for our protection. Upon his arrival, Bavugamenshi reassured us that he would be in charge of our security and informed us that the French soldiers were to arrive in some hours to protect us. The French came in the afternoon and Bavugamenshi requested us to warmly welcome them with dancing. Upon their arrival, the French soldiers had a tour of the camp and took photos. After three days, the French soldiers had identified places in the camp where they could find young ladies. From the fourth day, those who had identified places where to find the young ladies came back with other French soldiers and took the ladies to their tents and raped them.

They used to give us liquor and cigarettes. They also used to drink. They took photos of us drinking and showed them to us. They would then take off our clothes. Personally I knew the worst rape experience. After taking off my clothes, I was raped by a group of four French soldiers at the same time who then let another group of four to take their turn. One put his penis in my mouth, another in my vagina or the anus while others were caressing my breasts. At the same time some others were taking pictures. They showed me the pictures and said that they would show them to their wives. Those who were waiting for their turn were present and watched the scene. They said that their wives were different from us. They said that our sexual organs are different from those of the French women. They had even learnt the names of female sexual organs in Kinyarwanda and touched them saying it in Kinyarwanda. After the first group finished their turn, the other group began theirs doing just as the first group had done. They did it savagely. After the two turns, they took a short break of around 5 minutes to drink liquor with us and thereafter resumed the rapes. They had tents in different parts of the camp, they would call their colleagues to come over and see the beautiful women they had as well as the difference between their women and Tutsi women.

I was with other women; they used to free us early in the morning at 4h00 and would pick us up the following day. Sometimes, they picked us up in the morning and brought us back in the evening. Whenever we tried to hide, they would organise a team to look for us and take us back to them. In addition, whenever we passed by their tents on our way to fetch water they would call us. When we tried to run away from them, they would point their guns at us and we were obliged to stop. Among the soldiers who abused us, there was a Colonel. Sometimes after raping us, they would give us some of their combat rationss and cookies.

The abuse lasted the whole period of time they stayed at Nyarushishi camp and finally I fell pregnant. Since they never stopped raping me, I had a miscarriage. An old woman who was staying in a tent close to mine used to come to massage me with hot salty water in which I had to sit. My sexual organs had been damaged.

When they came to check on me in the course of the week, I explained to them what had happened. They waited only for six days before they resumed raping me. Sometimes, they smeared their sperm all over my back or my belly or in my mouth and asked me to swallow. At one point, the Colonel asked his colleagues to leave me to him and to find themselves other women. I stayed with the Colonel for two days before Opération Turquoise came to an end, and they left.

Due to the savage acts I had been subjected to, I later developed serious gynaecological complications: I had a very painful infection in my uterus. Whenever I remembered how they had raped me in addition to the rape I had faced in the hands of the Interahamwe, I would loose my mind and attempt suicide. However, the fact that I had a child strengthened me and I tried to get medical assistance despite having permanent back pains and persistent irregular menstrual periods.”

Elisé Bisengimana, who has already been quoted herein, makes the following analysis of Opération Turquoise based on what he saw at Nyarushishi camp.

“Despite being seen as a humanitarian operation, Opération Turquoise was in no way beneficial to the genocide survivors. It on the contrary served the interests of the genocide perpetrators. To illustrate this, I shall give you the example of hunger and lack of medical care that were prevalent in Nyarushishi camp and in Kamarampaka stadium in spite of the presence of the French soldiers. In addition, the camps were very unsafe, Interahamwe were still hunting, raping and killing young Tutsi women who were moving around looking for food in the fields. The French therefore contributed to the declining security of the genocide victims through the distribution of weapons to the Interahamwe who were using them in committing their crimes. My intention is not to exaggerate if I affirm that the French Government played a key role in the Tutsi genocide of 1994 as an accomplice. Firstly, just before the genocide, the French soldiers trained, advised and materially helped the Rwandan army who later participated in the genocide. Secondly, during the genocide in the Zone Turquoise, they collaborated with the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe at roadblocks and during patrols. Killings, rapes, kidnappings, thefts and pillaging were still being committed in full view of the soldiers who did not do anything to salvage the situation. Lastly, the French did nothing to save the victims who so badly needed their help; instead they facilitated the escape of the killers to Zaire with arms and their luggage.”

4) Rapes

Different witnesses accuse the French soldiers of having committed rapes against genocide survivors. There are also former Interahamwe witnesses who watched acts of rape or who supplied women, sometimes very young girls, to French soldiers for rape. Some of the other witnesses are young girls who were raped by the French.

Jean Ndihokubwayo, who has already been quoted herein, was an Interahamwe and a foreign exchange dealer. He told the commission that he watched French soldiers raping Tutsi women:

“The French soldiers also raped young girls who they found in Cyangugu town. I unexpectedly found them twice raping young girls who might have probably been between 14 and 15 years old. The first time, I had gone to exchange their foreign currency. When the group of soldiers heard the sound of the engine of my motorbike, one of them blocked my way pointing a gun in my direction. However this did not stop me from seeing how the other soldiers had undressed a young girl. I cried out to denounce what I had seen. A nearby night guard from the Carmelites came to help but immediately went back when the French soldier pointed his gun at him. The second time, I was trying to find a French soldier who had paid me with counterfeit money. I suddenly found a Jeep parked in the forest and saw a group of six soldiers with three girls. I personally saw one soldier bending over; two others were holding the young girl while the other three were guarding the two girls who were calling me for help. They were crying with their faces covered with their wrap clothes. I recognised one of them and she also recognised me. I later met her in Congo where she told me how she managed to escape from the French soldiers while no one else did. She told me that when gendarmes passed by the place where the French soldiers were raping those girls, they shouted out. While the French were trying to cover up their actions, the young girl got the chance to escape.”

Jean Bosco Habimana also called Masudi, who has already been quoted herein, gives an account of how the French soldiers gave him the mission to find only Tutsi girls to be sexually abused.

“The French stationed at Kamarampaka stadium raped Tutsi girls and women during the Opération Turquoise. They had charged us particularly with finding for them Tutsi girls and women, some of these girls and women survived being killed. It was imperative to bring them Tutsi women since they said it would cause no trouble if people got to know that it was the Tutsi that they were raping. It was strictly forbidden to bring them Hutu girls. The first time, I brought them two girls of about 14 or 15 years of age in Kamarampaka stadium. The first girl we found was called M Beata in Mururu cemetery. Since we knew that she was a Tutsi, we took her and brought her to the Stadium where she was raped by the French soldiers. After raping her, they handed her back to us, imploring us not to kill her. We found the second girl at Winteko in Bugayi cell, she was called Mukasine Florence. Like the first girl, she was also raped in Kamarampaka stadium by the French soldiers who also asked us not to kill her. In return, they gave us combat rationss and canned food. I brought them a girl once again when we were close to Nyarushishi camp. There were French soldiers near the camp as well as at the camp. I brought a 19 year old girl named Mukan whom I found about a kilometre from Nyarushishi. She was raped by a French soldier but he refused to give me combat rations. I got angry for that and went to report him to his senior chief. I threatened to kill the girl if he did not give me any ration. The soldier retorted that I could kill her if I wished and that he was not concerned. I killed her in his presence and that of another French soldier. I left the place and left her corpse lying there.”

Flore Muka is one of the girls that Masudi refers to in the preceding testimony. Born in 1980, she was only 14 years old at the time of Opération Turquoise. She is a survivor of the Nyarushishi camp who was handed over by the Interahamwe called Masudi to the French at Kamarampaka stadium for rape.

“At the beginning of the 1994 genocide, my family was living at Winteko and consisted of nine children and my two parents. When we were attacked by militia, I managed to escape with my parents and four of my siblings. My other four younger siblings could not escape and were killed. We hid in the hills until my father was flushed out from his hiding place and killed. We decided at that moment to seek refuge at the Nyarushishi camp. We arrived there after one week because we had to wait for night time to move in order to be able to dodge the militia. When we arrived at Nyarushishi, there were many displaced persons who were being protected by French soldiers from Opération Turquoise and life inside the camp was extremely hard. Since it seemed calm after the arrival of the French, who had come to protect us, we began going out of the camp to look for food in the surrounding areas.

One day, as I was going out of the camp with two other girls to look for sweet potatoes in a field located about forty minutes from the camp, a group of about 30 militia spotted us and ran towards us shouting and whistling. We had just started digging for sweet potatoes and I was crunching one. One of the girls I was with was immediately caught and killed, the other one escaped. I went to hide myself in a nearby home where the militia flushed me out. An Interahamwe nicknamed Masudi who had a spear and knives beat me up while insulting me. He grabbed me and led me by hand until we reached the Kamarampaka stadium in Cyangugu after walking for one hour. I was exhausted and was shaking from fear of being killed. I begged him to kill me instead of making me walk, but he replied that he would not kill me. Upon arriving at the stadium’s gate, he talked to four French soldiers who were there and they let us enter the stadium. Masudi went and knocked at the stadium changing room. A gigantic French soldier came out and took me inside a nearby big tent. Being naïve, I thought I was now safe since I was left with the French soldiers, but it was just the beginning of my trials and tribulations.

Masudi left and the French soldier returned to the tent. He closed it and spread a canvas and an old sheet on his mattress. He started removing my clothes but I resisted because I did not want to die naked. He tore all the clothes I had on me. Since I was not fat he easily picked me up like a baby, put me on the mattress and started raping me. Since I was a virgin and young, the pain I felt made me think that he was killing me. I tried to argue with him but when he grabbed what looked like a knife which was placed on the pillow and pointed at me, I gave up and preferred to die silently. When blood was flowing out of me, he wiped it with something and continued raping me. I suffocated and when he noticed that, he left me. He came back and put his penis in my mouth. As I was about to , he stopped. My legs remained spread out; I was torn up and could not lift them. He put me aside and wiped me to reduce the quantity of blood that was still oozing.

He put my clothes back on and used a sort of khaki belt to fasten my under skirt. Since my overall was completely torn, he gave me an old T-shirt. To put my wrapper back on, he spread it on the floor, lifted me up, laid me on it and then knotted it since I could not stand up. Finally, he lifted me and put me outside behind the tent before calling the Interahamwe who took me away. He knew where they were. I did not understand what he told them, but he was using sign language pointing at me and the Interahamwe grabbed my arm and took me out of the stadium.

I could not walk anymore. I was hardly breathing and lay behind the stadium. Masudi asked me to leave the place if I did not want to be killed. He told me that he was going to bring the Interahamwe who would kill me. When he left, I tried to crawl out of the place. Luckily enough, an old woman who was passing by saw me and felt pity on me, I told her my story. She held my arm and helped me to walk; I sat regularly since I was still bleeding. She hired a bicycle and took me to her place. She treated me gently using warm water and ghee. Two months later, I had completely recovered and she took me back to Nyarushishi. It is her who told my mother what had happened since I could not.”

Bea Mukan is another girl that Masudi cited in his aforementioned testimony; she confirms that she gave birth to a child of a French soldier who had raped her. She narrates the circumstances of her rape by the French. Born in 1979, she was 15 years old then.

“At the beginning of the genocide, my family first sought refuge at Cyangugu parish from where the Préfet took us to Kamarampaka stadium. Later, we were obliged to leave the stadium and go to Nyarushishi camp where the French soldiers found us. Upon their arrival, our neighbours who were not targeted in the genocide and who had stayed at the village also started fleeing. Hoping that nobody had remained in our village, my cousin and I decided to go and see what was there as we strongly believed that the killers had fled the country. About 30 minutes from our home, we came across a group of militia who were carrying clubs. We scattered and run for dear life.

My cousin managed to escape, but I got caught by an Interahamwe called Masudi. He took me to the Kamarampaka stadium while beating me and asking me where my brothers were. I told him they had all died.

When we arrived at the stadium, Masudi talked to a French soldier who took me by hand without saying a word. He took me inside a room which was used as a changing room for players. Inside that room, there was a bed. He pushed me and as I was trying to resist, he punched me. After that he did all he wanted. I thought he was going to kill me, but what he did was worse. I would rather he had killed me. He raped me to the extent that I could not go back to the camp. I could not walk and I spent night in the bush and arrived at the camp the following day. When I was leaving the French soldier’s tent, I saw two other girls who were coming out of the other French soldiers’ tents located in the stadium and who had been victims of a similar situation. I had heard them shouting not far from where I was. The Interahamwe had caught them at the Gatandara roadblock. Those Interahamwe had the mission to find women and girls and bring them to the French. Later, I developed gynaecological complications and got treatment when the UNAMIR arrived .”

5) Pillaging carried out by the French soldiers and their failure to intervene in the pillaging and destruction of infrastructure by Rwandans

Kayitsinga Abdallah, who has been quoted herein, was a carpenter during the Opération Turquoise. He lived close by Kamembe airport. He gives an account below of the pillaging that was carried out by the French soldiers.

“[…] I also noticed acts of pillaging carried out by French soldiers. They had trucks which they used for pillaging tea factories of Shagasha and Gisakura. Those trucks passed by driving towards Zaire loaded with fridges and khaki bags full of tea […] at the border; they also confiscated valuables from the Interahamwe as well as from any person fleeing to Zaire, the French kept their looted items in a secure place where no outsider could reach. I remember when I was returning from Zaire carrying my items on a cart, I headed towards that place and I was immediately called and they told me that it was their area and they immediately showed me the right direction to take. I saw metallic gates, fridges and other valuable items. Their trucks were coming to pick them up and take them to Zaire.”

Aloys Karuranga is a native of Rusizi in the former prefecture of Cyangugu. He worked at the Compagnie Nationale de Téléphone (RWANDATEL) since 1970. In 1994, he was posted to Cyangugu. Below he gives an account of the participation of French soldiers in the pillaging of Cyangugu telephone centre which he was in charge of.

“In 1994, I was at Cyangugu and worked at Rwandatel […] On July 18th 1994, people started pillaging and destroying the town of Kamembe. On 22nd the telephone centre which was under my responsibility was also pillaged. In the evening, around 18h00, after visiting the place and noticing that computers and other stored equipment had been looted, I left to see Colonel Hogard who was the Opération Turquoise head of mission at Cyangugu. His office was in a warehouse at the airport. I told him that our office had been plundered and asked him to set a permanent security team. He then gave me a patrol team to go and see what was happening. Upon our arrival, we noticed that computer accessories had also been stolen. However, the central server and rural telephone equipment were still in operation. We went back to report this to the Colonel. However, as regards my request for protection, he said that he could not find a French soldier for every single Rwandan or each house. He nevertheless promised to give me a regular patrol team. What astonished me the most was that the following day at around 14h00; I went back to the office and found that all that had been left was also pillaged including the central server. Worse still, when I went back to the office two weeks later a French military truck was there, the French soldiers were inside the containers in which we stored our equipment. They were with a Rwandan called Musafiri who was an agent of Electrogaz. I think he had requested the French for help to transport these containers. I had a camera with me and went behind an electricity pole, I took some pictures. Finally they pillaged one container. […] Houses had been destroyed and people were still coming back to pillage items. The French who were at the Rusizi border facilitated people to cross the border with pillaged items and sometimes some people came back from Zaire to pillage more.”

Jean Bigirimana was the administrative head of Muganza cell in Bugarama commune between 1990 and 1994. Below he gives an account of the pillaging committed by the French soldiers and the protection they granted the Interahamwe who were destroying infrastructure and residential houses.

“After the fleeing of commune leaders, French soldiers took control of the whole region, they pillaged items in our commune and protected individuals who were destroying infrastructure such as the CIMERWA building, the commune office, the health centre as well as buildings of the Rice Project. In fact, the Interahamwe publicly destroyed and pillaged CIMERWA yet the French had their base in its buildings and did not stop them from doing it. The same applied to the commune and the rice project buildings which were set alight by the Interahamwe in the presence of French soldiers. That is the reason why I am accusing them of complicity in the destruction of property and infrastructure in our region. After the population had run away to seek refuge, militia sent me messages requesting me to collaborate with them without knowing that I was already a supporter of the Inkotanyi. On July 25th and 26th almost all members of the population had fled. At 13h00, French soldiers accompanied by Straton Kayishema came to my house to loot. They searched the cupboard and took away all my work documents, a gun and money amounting to 40.000 Frw. I was not at home that day. I was at the health centre and learnt from the population that the French had plundered my house. I immediately rushed home and met them coming from my house. I retrieved two crates of Primus that they had forgotten to take. In fact, the French soldiers were protecting the Interahamwe who were coming from across the border in Zaire to destabilise members of the population who had not fled the country. The people who were targeted were those who had guns in their homes. They were threatened by the Interahamwe who were under the protection of French soldiers. I remember someone called Raymond Habiyambere at Bugarama who was a victim of the inhumane acts of the French soldiers and the Interahamwe as well as Habiyambere Rahima who was also threatened by the Interahamwe in the presence of French soldiers who did not do anything to stop the harassment. In fact, that man was regarded as an accomplice of the Inyenzi because he had not fled the country. The Interahamwe attacked him at home and shot into his bedroom through the window. In one way or another, the French soldiers were accomplices of the Interahamwe who came from Zaire to destabilise Rwanda particularly in parts of the country that were under the French soldiers control. […] Shortly before the massive flight of the population, the French soldiers and two men from Bugarama, namely Elie and Mudeyi urged the population to flee the country in order to escape the threats of the advancing Inkotanyi. They told the population that the deadline for leaving the country was at 12h00.”

Gonzague Habimana was a soldier in FAR in 1994. He narrates the theft of cars by the French soldiers. He was a FAR soldier between 1986 and 1994, and his service number was18663.

“In the Zone Turquoise, I saw the French taking part in the pillaging and destruction of houses. They also stole cars and crossed with them through the border to Zaire. In fact, I remember that towards the end of July, I saw a group of French soldiers at the Hotel des Chutes. They were asking civilians who were crossing the border to Zaire for their identity cards and vehicle documents. On showing the requested documents, the French soldiers took possession of their cars and drove off to Bukavu. The cars were two brand new Toyota 4x4s.”

Jean Ndikubwayo, already quoted herein, was an Interahamwe and foreign exchange dealer. He attests that when he was in exile in Zaire he sold cars stolen from Rwanda by the French soldiers.

“When I arrived at Kamembe airport, there were three brand new Toyota Corolla vehicles with no owners. The car seats were covered with dust and blood. There was a son of Colonel Simba who was always with the French and he revealed to me that the cars had been brought to Zaire by helicopter. They later facilitated the crossing of 100 cars in my presence. I even became one of the middle men in the sale of cars pillaged from Rwanda in Zaire where they were parked in different sites containing 5 or 10 cars for sale. I sold about ten cars at varying prices, 3000$, 2500$ or 1500$. I was getting a commission of 20$ or 30$ for each sale.”

Cassien Bagaruka, already quoted herein, was a fire fighter at Kamembe airport during the Opération Turquoise. He also attests to the fact that French soldiers were involved in pillaging.

“The French soldiers participated in the pillaging of property. On one hand, the French soldiers had hired all the fire fighters at a 20$ per month fee that was never paid under the pretext that they were not their employees. On the other hand, being the only dealers, they not only made Rwandan cars with private number plates cross the border of Rusizi but they also took the Daihatsu pick up and generator of the ‘Régie des Aéroport’. They could not however take fire extinguishers because I had tampered with their starting system. […] When the buildings of the prefecture caught fire and the airport fire fighters came for extinguish the fire, the French soldiers chased them away saying that there was no reason to waste water.”

Elie Bisengimana already quoted herein, gives an account of the collaboration between the French soldiers and the Interahamwe in pillaging.

“The French let the Interahamwe who had sought refuge in Zaire come back to Cyangugu regularly to pillage, destroy infrastructure and kill. Only the Interahamwe were allowed to loot and whoever else dared to do it was immediately killed. I shall give you an example of one man called Bernard who had his arm amputated as a result of being shot at by French soldiers when he made the fatal mistake of trying to loot. Looting was a privilege only the Interahamwe enjoyed. Since the border was under the control of French troops, it was them who enabled the Interahamwe to go back to Zaire with their plunder. Particularly in the case of vehicles, there was a manifested complicity between the French and the Interahamwe in sale transactions with the Zairians in Bukavu. It was a well organised network. The plunder consisted of all sorts of goods mainly items from stores, movables, household appliances, house windows and doors, iron roofs taken from houses, medical equipment, medicine, vehicles etc. Most of these were sold immediately after they crossed the border at very low prices.”

6) Inciting the populace to flee the country

Different witnesses affirm that French soldiers in collaboration with local authorities incited the populace to massively flee the country.

Jean Baptiste Bihembe was a commander at Kamembe airport in 1994

“The French contributed to the destruction of Cyangugu town. It was them who opened the border when the population was fleeing the country towards Zaire after having destroyed public buildings. The French let them cross the border with iron roofs and doors. They also allowed vehicles to be taken out of the country except for those that belonged to the airport which were left in Cyangugu town. The militia confiscated vehicles of displaced people who were coming from Kigali and took them to Zaire. The French soldiers also facilitated the local authorities to flee the country with their property by providing them with planes and big trucks to transport their property. […]The French soldiers compelled the population of Cyangugu to flee the country telling them that whoever shall not leave, will do so at his own risk. That is how the local authorities left in planes, others left in cars and the rest of the population crossed the border on foot. They wanted everyone to leave the town.”

Jean Bosco Habimana called Masudi also gives an account of how the French soldiers incited the population to flee the country.

“Towards the end of Opération Turquoise, French soldiers incited the population to flee the country after having destroyed all houses so that the RPF could not have anywhere to live. They also considered that staying in the Zone Turquoise was a manifestation of one’s complicity with the Inyenzi Inkotanyi. They then started moving local authorities, by helicopter towards Congo. Some were dropped off at Panzi military camp while others were dropped off at Sayo military camp. For officials who had huge equipment with them, soldiers would drop them off at Kavumu airport and others at Bukavu.”

Cassien Bagaruka, already quoted herein, was a fire fighter at Kamembe airport during Opération Turquoise. He hereby narrates about a public rally that was organised by local authorities and French soldiers to incite the population to flee to Zaire.

“At the end of Opération Turquoise, before the French troops left the Turquoise area for Zaire, a rally was organised where local authorities and French soldiers incited the populace to flee and they provided helicopters for transporting the local authorities. The local authorities’ cars and those of Eliezer Niyitegeka, Minister of Information in the transitional government and Colonel Kanyamanza were transported by Transat planes. When Bihembe, the former commander of Kamembe airport asked about the fate of people wishing to join the new government in Kigali, as a way of responding to him, he was treated as an accomplice of RPF. Luckily enough, he escaped well on time.”

Elise Bisengimana, already quoted herein, witnessed the French soldiers together with the local authorities involved in the genocide inciting the population to flee the country.

“In August 1994, the French soldiers transported by helicopter many political and military officials as well as leaders of the Interahamwe who were all involved in the genocide. Before withdrawing to Zaire, they incited the population to flee en mass. To accomplish that, they moved around the town on several occasions on jeeps accompanied by the remaining authorities and addressed the population through megaphones in the following words: “ The whole population is hereby informed that we are no longer capable of ensuring your security because the French troops are leaving. Therefore, the town will immediately be under the control of the Inkotanyi who shall massacre the whole population. We hereby request all of you to flee to Zaire before the last French soldier leaves Rwandan soil. You are all warned” After that public address, there was a general sense of panic. In order to cross the border, the panic stricken population left in a stampede that some drowned while trying to swim across Rusizi River. At the border military post, the French soldiers were receiving ex FAR arms. They later loaded them onto their trucks before they also entered into Zaire.”

Opération Turquoise was launched with military honour and a humanitarian showcase with media fanfare in Cyangugu through the rescue of survivors in Nyarushishi camp. But soon after, there was a display of close collaboration with local authorities and the Interahamwe who organised massacres in the prefecture and town. According to individual testimonies, French soldiers were behind the operations of the Interahamwe to flush out Tutsis who were hidden near their camps as it is the case for the post which was set up at Colonel Simba’s house. For that reason the French soldiers even supplied the Interahamwe with arms well knowing that the fate of those discovered was death.

French soldiers did not disarm the Interahamwe. On the contrary, they supplied them with arms like those which were given to Yusuf Munyakazi for the last assault on Bisesero. But generally, they encouraged the Interahamwe to continue hunting down Tutsis and killing them. There seems to be a contradiction between their actions and the ensuring the security of the camp. Nyarushishi camp illustrates the French strategy. The camp was also like a prison. French soldiers did not want displaced persons to get in or out of the camp. As such, they manned roadblocks just outside the camp while the Interahamwe manned the surrounding roadblocks which were ever increasing. While Tutsis who came from outside were first intercepted by the Interahamwe before they could enter Nyarushishi camp, those Tutsis inside the camp who under the pressure of hunger or the need for firewood, went out of the camp, were also killed by the Interahamwe. It was on rare occasions that the French soldiers accompanied the displaced persons to collect firewood. Here one can notice the logic behind the French security actions in Cyangugu. The French army seems to have had the goal of protecting only the displaced persons of Nyarushishi camp as long as they did not go out of the camp. All the other Tutsi survivors were left in the hands of the French allies, i.e. the Interahamwe, in order to be killed. There were exceptions, especially some military doctors in health facilities who treated and saved the lives of Tutsi survivors. But that was in rare cases. The only reasonable explanation, rather utilitarian, to explain their strategy could be that the French army in Cyangugu regarded all the Tutsi survivors of Cyangugu whether they were living outside the Nyarushishi camp or living in the camp but wanted to go outside, regardless of their age or sex or age, were suspected of being potential infiltration agents of the RPF. For that reason, they had to die.

The acts of rape on Tutsi survivors by French soldiers, sometimes very young girls, seem to have been frequent and systematic. Rape was committed in the day time for example in the French military base at Kamarampaka stadium. The Interahamwe who brought young girls to the French soldiers often crossed the security posts manned by the French, the rapes were carried out openly and by a big number of soldiers. The savage level of these assaults made young girls scream in different tents, this did not go unnoticed. This proves that the acts of rape, sometimes of very young girls and in a savage manner, were tolerated by the military institution. This reveals that apart from the humanitarian and security strategy of letting the Interahamwe eliminate the threat of RPF infiltrators, the indiscriminate hostility by the French towards the Tutsis lead to their rape as well as their extermination.

In order to avoid a total RPF victory over Opération Turquoise, victory against the FAR and the Genocidal government in Cyangugu, the French army opted for the scorched earth strategy by encouraging the looting and destruction of infrastructure as well as strongly inciting the population.

KIBUYE

Kibuye prefecture is one the three prefectures that were officially under Opération Turquoise. In that prefecture, French soldiers set up three main bases, one was located in Gishyita village, another was in Kibuye town and the last was in Rubengera village. They arrived in Kibuye from three different directions from 24th June. Some came from Cyangugu including Commander Marin Gillier and his troops, mainly marine commandos as well as some members of the GIGN who set up their base at Gishyita, another unit of air force commandos headed by Lieutenant Colonel Rémy Duval called Diego set up its base at Gishyita, lastly another secret military unit which came from Gisenyi arrived on 23rd June at Rubengera and was under the command of Captain Bucquet. The above shows actions of the French army in the triangle of Gisovu, Gishyita and Karongi and Bisesero hills which was in the middle of the triangle as well as Rubengera village. After setting up the aforementioned COS detachments, Kibuye prefecture constituted the northern unit of the Turquoise, commanded by Colonel Sartre with headquarters in Kibuye.

BISESERO

The case of Bisesero, which is important to remember, is one of the most serious accusations against the French army during the Opération Turquoise. It was accused for no less than deliberately delaying by 3 days to intervene in the rescue of almost 2.000 survivors and thus giving time to killers to massacre them.

This event was widely published since it occurred in the presence of foreign reporters and many Rwandans witnessed it. The key fact is that the French army waited for three days before starting the rescue operation for the Bisesero survivors and the army does not contest that fact. However, the reasons behind the delay are the cause of controversy.

The Bisesero case is composed of two episodes, the first is the fact that French soldiers abandoned survivors at Bisesero; the second is that French soldiers refused to intervene during the three days of massacres yet they were only 5 kilometres from the camp. Lastly there are two additions to the Bisesero case, following the French intervention the poor treatment of genocide survivors at Bisesero and the poor medical care of the injured that were transferred to Goma by the French military doctors.

1) Abandonment

Acts of abandonment occurred at the very start of Opération Turquoise led by the COS detachments which had the mission to open Rwanda to the benefits of the mission. The mission involved two detachments of COS, one under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Remy Duval, alias Diego, and another one headed by Commander Marin Gillier.

At the end of the morning of 27th June 1994, Colonel Rosier took a helicopter to see Diego in Kibuye, it seems, to analyse the situation. On the same day, a group of French reporters, including Patrick de Saint Exupéry were at Kibuye. Patrick de Saint Exupéry went to a secondary school run by nuns where Diego and his troops were based. In the school courtyard Patrick de Saint Exupéry met two nuns who told him that two hours from that place there were Tutsi survivors who were living in horrible conditions at Bisesero hills. At that point, Diego joined them and Patrick de Saint Exupéry asked him to go and see what the nun had told them about.

Patrick de Saint Exupéry with two other reporters, among them, Dominique Garraud of the daily Libératio, about ten soldiers and Diego in a minibus and three Jeeps drove towards Bisesero. Midway before arriving at Bisesero, the convoy stopped at Mubuga village where Diego persuaded a teacher called Jean Baptiste Twagirayezu to serve as their guide to Bisesero. Upon arriving at Bisesero hills, they met some ghostly figures that disappeared very quickly. One man approached the French and told them that they were exhausted because they had been fighting their killers who had been hunting them day after day for two months. Slowly by slowly more and more survivors joined the team, Patrick de Saint Exupéry noticed that they were very thin, in completely torn clothes and many of them had machete wounds., “a child whose left buttock was cut off, a man whose right arm was severed”. The survivors showed them a mass grave dug some meters from there, as well as a fresh corpse of a man who had been killed two hours earlier. After that the survivors recognized the guide of the French as being Jean Baptiste Twagirayezu, and accused him of being one of the chief militia who were hunting them down. The French soldiers put him in one of their vehicles for his safety. Then, Colonel Diego informed the survivors that he had to go.

“We will come back, he reassures the displaced persons with a lot of emotion. Do not worry, in two or three days we will be back. In the meantime, you have to hide yourselves and survive!”

“But they are going to kill us! Said one young Tutsi. Stay here! Don’t leave! I beseech you!”
“But we have to go, the officer tries to explain. But we will come back, I promise you!”
“No, we are going to be killed! Stay here or at least tell us where we can find you! Look, only some men and some children are remaining. All our wives have already been killed. We can not resist any more…”
“At the moment, says Lieutenant Colonel Diego with patience, we can do nothing. The most important thing for you to do is to survive for two or three more days, we will come back since we know where to find you….”

The group left. According to suggestions given to the Commission at the site by Jean Baptiste Twagirayezu, Diego stopped the convoy and went aside with his satellite telephone case. “When we came back, he stopped at the junction of Gisovu and Gishyita towards Mubuga. Diego brought out radio equipment that he laid on the ground to send his message for around five minutes before driving ahead. He gave the message at a low voice so that he could not be heard by the rest of the convoy.”

Back at Kibuye, Diego talked to De Saint- Exupéry:

“The lieutenant colonel is still in shock: “I have experience, but this…” This is not an illusion: “Before we can intervene at Bisesero, at least 2.000 more displaced persons will be killed.” Exhausted and full of remorse, the officer sent this information to the army head quarters: It is for them to take a decision. If we go there to protect these thousands of people who are being hunted like animals, we shall be engaged in one way or another and shall run the risk of having all the militia and local authorities turn against us. We are ready and shall obey orders. But are the people in Paris ready?”

In his book, Patrick de Saint-Exupéry talks about and expounds on his various meetings and the abandonment of the Tutsi in Bisesero. He wrote that back in Kibuye“Diego remained on his coded telephone to Paris for long giving report after report.”

The story of Diego’s meeting with the Bisesero survivors is narrated by Patrick de Saint Exupéry in a report of 29/06/1994 published in the Le Figaro, by Dominique Garraud in his report published on the same day in the Libération. Lastly, the meeting was narrated to the Commission by Eric Nzabahimana, Eric Kayumba and other Bisesero survivors who met with Diego. And finally Jean Baptiste Twagirayezu also narrated to the Commission about the meeting.

Consequences of the abandonment

Bisesero survivors all concur that following their meeting with the French soldiers, attacks increased during the three days that preceded their return. According to Bisesero survivors, at the time when they met Diego they were around 2.000 survivors, and after three days of intensive massacres, only 800 people survived. Eric Nzabahimana explained to the Commission what followed the departure of the French.

“While we were discussing, killers who were placed at different parts of the hills were watching us, almost all of us had come out of our hiding places. The three days that followed, the 28th, 29th and 30th massacres intensified. Many soldiers participated and many more people were killed, yet the French soldiers had promised to ask the Préfet to stop attacks against us.”

Fidèle Bagambiki, a survivor from Bisesero was also at the meeting with Diego.

“They asked us if some people were dead or injured. We showed them the injured and fresh corpses of some people who had just been killed. They told us that they were leaving and would return in three days. From that day onwards, attacks became more intense. The Interahamwe were killing day and night and we were only 1.200 or 1.300 people left when the French returned. In fact, the Interahamwe did not know the exact number of survivors until we came out of our hiding places thinking that the French were coming to rescue us. From then on, attacks intensified. […]The worst thing they could do was to leave us behind, in the hands of the Interahamwe. If the French had wanted to save us, they could have done it because they had all the necessary equipment, including heavy arms.”

Pascal Nkusi, a Bisesero survivor too, was also present at the meeting with Diego.

“The following day, they [the French] did not come but we saw a helicopter hovering over the place. From that day, attacks became more intensive and there were more dead people, because almost all of us had come out of our hiding places. […]On the third day, attacks continued and around 14h00 or 15h00, the French finally arrived.”


Official reasons for the abandonment

The Mission d’Reconnaissance Parlementaire (MIP) only allocates 17 lines to the Bisesero case and in an extraordinary way is silent about the meeting of Diego with the Bisesero survivors. It only cites the second part of the Bisesero case, the refusal to intervene by the second French officer who saw killers going up to Bisesero hill and heard gunshots. We shall come back to that point later. Here is the integral part on Bisesero from the MIP

4. Bisesero case

Commander Marin Gillier, who was responsible for one of the three units, was blamed for having arrived in a zone under his control to conduct an inspection (Bisesero), and having left immediately and returned three days later, giving Hutus in the area an opportunity to continue massacring the remaining 50.000 Tutsis who were still there.

Those accusations are from testimonies of survivors, comments which are included in reports of African Rights and M. Michel Peyrard, a reporter who was present at Bisesero on behalf of Paris Match newspaper. Putting together elements included in the report of African Rights, in the testimony sent by Commander Marin Gillier to the Mission and the report of the account by the reporter M. Michel Peyrard, it is clear that nothing supports these accusations. If three days effectively elapsed between the moment of the inspection of Commander Marin Gillier’s units in Bisesero zone on 27th June and the day of intervention on 30th June to protect and rescue the population of the Bisesero at that period in time is not intentional (see annexes on that matter

[XXPANTHAXX]

It is noticeable that the MIP avoids mentioning the meeting between Diego and Bisesero survivors on 27th June which is unlike its role as a parliamentary commission of inquiry and instead it shifts the burden to Marin Gillier who was subordinate to Diego. The African Rights report referred to in the report quotes the testimony of Eric Nzabahimana and other survivors calling to mind in a precise way the meeting between Diego and Bisesero inhabitants. It does not mention anywhere Commander Marin Gillier. Similarly in his article published in the Paris –Match, Michel Peyrard only talks of 30th June, where he met other Bisesero people giving hope to their rescue by French soldiers. Finally, in his letter to the MIP which is annexed to the report, Marin Gillier does not mention any of Diego’s visits to Bisesero. It is worth mentioning also that the report of the hearing of Lieutenant Colonel Jean –Remy Duval presented by the MIP does not in any way refer to his meeting with the Bisesero people!

Finally we learn from Pierre Péan’s writings that the only true explanation to the abandonment of Bisesero survivors, a non official explanation, but defended by Colonel Rosier- responsible for the action of COS in the beginning of Opération Turquoise answerable directly to the Armed Forces Chief of Staff – is that Diego did not tell him about the discovery. Hence, Rosier explains to Péan that:

“No, Diego did not report to me what he had seen at Bisesero, I saw him in Kibuye some minutes before he left for Bisesero and he told me nothing. He left with reporters and did not follow instructions. However, he could have immediately reported to me what he had seen at Bisesero. I would have taken the necessary measures. For us, that case could have been a great opportunity at a time when our intervention in Rwanda was being contested. Yes, we met the following day, he had the opportunity to tell me about his mission of the previous day but he did not mention anything about it. It is worse than a fault, it is a lack of a sense of honour”

Péan also gives the position of Lieutenant Colonel Duval explaining that he attempted to communicate with the latter:

“I tried to communicate with Diego who preferred not to get in touch with me. I know however that he agrees that he reported to Rosier and affirmed it to him just before Rosier testified before the Parliamentary commission, on Wednesday 17th June 1998. General Rosier had wished to have a quick recap of events with his subordinates to refresh his memory on the chronology of events. Rosier who had been embarrassed some days before, by accusations made against the French army by a Rwandan lady on television about Bisesero, alleging mainly that the French soldiers waited for three days before intervening, an accusation he denied. While Marin Gillier was narrating the unfolding of events until his arrival at Bisesero, Diego interrupted him:
But I discovered Bisesero on 27th June and I reported to you, General….
You never reported to me, Rosier retorted…..”

In January 2005, Rosier learnt via the army services that a written message dated on 29th June 1994 from Duval had just been found in the archives. The message entitled Fax 3 was in relation to his mission and showed the gravity of the situation of survivors in Bisesero. Therefore, Diego probably informed his seniors in writing on 29th June.

Whom to believe, General Rosier or Lieutenant Colonel Duval?

A number of facts would tend to give credence to Duval’s account:

1) In his testimony before the Commission, Jean Baptiste Twagirayezu showed the place where, while coming back, Diego stopped to make a call. This was between Bisesero and Mubuga.
2) In his report published on June 29th 1994, Patrick de Saint Exupéry mentions that on the way back to Kibuye, Diego “sent this information to the Army headquarters”.
3) In his book L’Inavouable, Patrick de Saint Exupéry writes that during that evening at Kibuye, “Diego was stuck at telephone, sending report after report to Paris.”

4) In the same book, Patrick de Saint Exupéry says that during the three days of waiting to rescue the Bisesero people, he, Diego and his troops used to go to a far located convent where displaced persons often sought refuge. After many hours of driving, suddenly, Diego ordered them to stop. A helicopter landed and Colonel Rosier came out.

“We stayed at a good distance, Sir. The soldiers went on the side and discussed. (..) The discussion lasted for around thirty minutes. The officer left onboard his helicopter. Diego came closer and explained to us that he had just been ordered not to move any further.”

It is difficult to ignore a comparison between the order by Rosier to Diego not to go back to the displaced persons and the abandonment of the Bisesero survivors. Pierre Péan whose source of information seems to be General Rosier writes that Patrick de Saint Exupéry is mistaken and that this meeting between Diego and Rosier probably took place before the expedition to Bisesero. On one hand, the way this meeting is reported in L’Inavouable is clear on the sequence of facts between the two meetings of Diego, on the other hand, its importance, in terms of significance compared to the abandonment of Bisesero survivors, makes it less probable that a serious reporter like Patrick de Saint Exupéry would be mistaken on a such an important fact. As such it would now be General Rosier’s word against that of Patrick de Saint Exupéry.

The pessimism of Diego, when he declared that “before being able to intervene at Bisesero, at least 2.000 more refugees will have been killed” is to me very suspicious, the same as his consideration that ensuring the safety of the Bisesero displaced persons would be taking part in the conflict. This seems to show that beyond his probable personal compassion, he had another mission that was beyond rescuing the people in Bisesero.

Finally, the second episode of the Bisesero case, advancing the position of another direct subordinate of Rosier who refused to go and rescue the Bisesero survivors who were being massacred near him, strengthens the conclusion that Rosier was the key instigator of the abandonment of the Bisesero survivors.

2) Refusal by Captain Marin Gillier to end the Bisesero massacres

The general fighting at Gishyita and going up Bisesero by the killers in full view of French soldiers

The second episode of the Bisesero case occurred 5 km as the bird flies in Gishyita village located below Bisesero.

Jean Baptiste Twagirayezu, Diego’s guide who the French soldiers brought back home in Mubuga village located some hundred meters from Gishyita, used to report to the local authorities who had been organising attacks against Bisesero Tutsi for months.

“After returning to Mubuga, I went to the ‘Abadacogora’ bar belonging to Mr. Namuhoranye Athanase where militia often gathered after their killings. I found different people there including the Assistant Burgomaster Kananira, the Conseiller of Gishyita Muhimana Mika, Ngerageze and other agents of Gishyita commune. I gave them an account of my trip to Bisesero, the estimation of the number of people who might have survived and the promise made by the French soldiers. I spent a night at Mubuga and the following day in the morning at 5h30, I borrowed a motorbike to go to the Burgomaster Sindikubwabo’s home to give him my trip’s report. I let him know that the French had promised the Bisesero people that they would come back to rescue them in three days.

[…] As I had notified the Interahamwe and the Burgomaster, during the two days that followed i.e. 28th and 29th June , the Interahamwe militia were well mobilised in order to intensify their attacks on Bisesero before the return of the French soldiers who came to rescue the survivors on 30th June 1994. During those two days, heavy attacks were carried out in Bisesero. The groups of Interahamwe came from Mubuga and Gishyita, particularly from Mika’s house and Rutaganira’s house; those attacks were led by Burgomaster Sikubwabo in full view and knowledge of the French soldiers who were at their roadblock. During those two days heavy gunshots from Bisesero were heard at Gishyita and there were many dead. It is probable that the Interahamwe had some support.”

28th and 29th June were days of heavy fighting in Gishyita, especially on the 29th when hundreds of people came from everywhere to gather in a small place at the centre of Gishyita. The mass exodus occurred in full view of the French soldiers who had been in Gishyita for almost two days. Around 70 members of the French elite troops, marine commandos and members of GIGN had set up camp in Gishyita around the 25th and 26th June.

Isidore Kayiranga resided in Gishyita at the time, and even though he was opposed to the actions of Burgomaster Sikubwabo, the latter was married to his sister and his younger brother Kamanayo was the Burgomaster’s bodyguard. Kayiranga begins by explaining how the French arrived at Gishyita.

“I saw the French cross the centre of Gishyita coming from Cyangugu towards Kibuye. They were in Peugeot Jeeps escorted by armoured vehicles and two helicopters. Almost everyone came to watch the arrival of the French soldiers. They did not stop at Gishyita that day, they went to Kibuye to spend the night. The following day they came back to Gishyita and dispatched in three groups: the first group set up camp at Fundi’s home, in buildings that used to be called CCDFP built for French volunteers; the second group set up camp on the Cyangugu-Kibuye road, more precisely at the place where the commune police had set up a roadblock. The third group set up camp at Gatoki in houses built for French volunteers.[…] During that period, there were no more killings at Gishyita, but instead killings were being committed at Bisesero given the fact that all the Tutsis had sought refuge in Bisesero hills.[…]

At a certain moment, the French left, leaving behind some of their soldiers at Gishyita. We saw their vehicles and their armoured vehicles heading to Bisesero. However, from Gishyita, Bisesero is about an hour’s walk but it took three days for the French to reach the place. The first day, after covering 1.30km, they spent the night at Dukoni where they set up camp. The second day, they were at Kiziba and they were using binoculars everywhere during their trip. The ascent towards Bisesero lasted three days after which they came back. The day of their return, Sikubwabo gave a message to Uhoraningoga Emmanuel alias Gifaransa about a general mobilisation of the population to launch new attacks. […]

During the days that the French spent at Gishyita, massacres of Tutsis continued while French helicopters were regularly taking off, hovering over Gishyita, Bisesero, Gisovu and Kibuye. […] At Gishyita, we could hear gunshots from Bisesero. Pregnant women got contractions and the extremely frightened got diarrhoea due to the deafening sounds of gunshots which they were not used to. The French heard the sounds of gunshots clearly. The gunshots were heard at Mpembe, close to Ijwi Island and Gishyita is between Bisesero and Mpembe, therefore it is clear that the French being in Gishyita could hear these gunshots especially since heavy guns were also used in those attacks. […] Those gunshots were not from fights between FAR and RPF but rather attacks of the Interahamwe on Tutsis. The French knew it because their helicopters were hovering over the area and nobody tried to shoot at them, not even the Inkotanyi. They knew that there were only civilians in the area being attacked. In addition, the Interahamwe who were climbing Bisesero did not wear complete uniforms and they knew that the government soldiers were so well equipped in uniforms that they could not wear only military shirts without military trousers or boots in war time. […] It is also worth mentioning that from the time that the French went to Bisesero, massacres of Tutsis intensified. In fact, the Interahamwe had stopped hunting the Tutsis as they believed that they had all been exterminated while trying to flee Bisesero. They hence revealed to Interahamwe the presence of the surviving Tutsis in those mountains. The information moved so fast that all the Interahamwe of the region gathered at Gishyita and led a heavy attack on Bisesero Tutsis. […]

Authors of these killings came from zones, I would not say the zones were under French control, but they were zones where the French had set up their bases. Almost all the attacks on the Bisesero Tutsis came from Gishyita. The attackers passed by the French camp and roadblocks manned by the French. They saw the Interahamwe preparing themselves but did nothing to ensure the safety of the victims whom they pretended to have come to rescue. On the contrary, they closely collaborated with local Interahamwe […] I do not believe what has been said about the French. They saved nobody in 1994. If I had seen them rescue anyone, I would have trusted them and left them with the children I was hiding in my house. These children were such a heavy burden to me that at a certain time they made it difficult for me to run away. We had walked for about 30 km when people started threatening to kill them. Fortunately they are still alive.”

Elie Ngezenubwo was living at Gishyita. He participated in massacres in the region and hereby testifies about the conduct of the French soldiers.

“The French were based at Gishyita during the Bisesero massacres. They saw the events unfolding. When they asked Sikubwabo about it, he told them that the population was fighting against Inyenzi. In that way, there was a meeting to mobilise the population at Conseiller Muhimana Mika’s house. The former Burgomaster was anxious that with the presence of the French the attacks in Bisesero were going to cease. He called upon all the Conseillers of sectors and asked them to gather more people to launch the final attack on Bisesero. After that meeting, my elder brother Uhoraningoga Emmanuel alias Gifaransa received a motorbike, a whistle and a drum to help him move around and mobilise people in the area. In his mobilisation message, he called upon the population to go uphill and launch attacks at Bisesero. Many people gathered at Muhimana Mika’s house. They received instructions regarding camouflage and marks that could identify and differentiate them from those they were attacking. They put either matchsticks or banana or eucalyptus leaves on their heads. Killers came from neighbouring sectors, those from Mubuga and Rwamatamu came aboard a Colas project pick up, but there were also militia from Gisenyi and Cyangugu who actively participated in the last attack on Bisesero. […]The Interahamwe, equipped with knives and weapons passed near the French roadblock going to kill Bisesero Tutsis. I saw the French flying over Bisesero during the time of the massacres but they never stopped the killers. They did not even put off the fire when the commune office was set on fire. I can confirm that the fire was set by the French because I saw two French cars coming to the commune office and immediately thereafter the building started burning. […] The killings intensified during the three days which followed the arrival of the French. After that the former Burgomaster convened two meetings to order an end to the Bisesero attacks.”

Japheth Ngayaboshya was also living in Gishyita and participated in the genocide. Below, He gives an account of the general mobilisation for Bisesero killings in full view of the French soldiers.

“In the Zone Turquoise, towards the end of June, the French set up their headquarters at the CCDF, not far from the Gishyita commune office which was headed by Burgomaster Sikubwabo. Their presence did not stop the Bisesero attacks, they manned a roadblock on the Cyangugu-Kibuye road. Ruzindana Obed used to cross that roadblock with his Interahamwe. He also used to pass by Mika’s house and Mika would give him arms and men including my brother Bikorimana Gabriel alias Gisambo, Mutaganda and Nzabandora who were former soldiers.[…] The French said that they had come to ensure the security of threatened people [Tutsis] but it was not the case. The proof is that, there were buses and trucks full of the Interahamwe coming from Cyangugu and Gisenyi, heading to Bisesero to kill Tutsis, led by Ruzindana Obed that passed by the roadblock manned by the French soldiers. In order to go and attack Bisesero Tutsis, we also passed by that roadblock, armed with SMGs, R4s, grenades, explosives, spears and clubs. Before launching those attacks, the Interahamwe, coming from different corners, stop over at Gishyita to get food and receive instructions. Something hard to understand is that at roadblocks the French did not search vehicles of the Interahamwe while other vehicles were meticulously searched.[…] The French did nothing to refrain us from launching attacks on Bisesero yet we organised and planned for them in full view of the French.”

Gaspard Habiyambere was also living in Gishyita at the time and gives an account of the conduct of the French soldiers before the killings.

“The Interahamwe passed by the roadblock manned by the French soldiers and the latter let them pass without any special attention. […] They knew that the Interahamwe were going to kill Tutsis at Bisesero. As a proof, vehicles transporting the Interahamwe were coming from Rwamatamu and Gisenyi and were passing by the roadblock manned by the French soldiers who did nothing to stop them; killers got up very early in morning to go to kill in full view and to the knowledge of the French who remained indifferent.”

Thus effectively, it is Diego’s team which with the help of his guide Jean Baptiste Twagirayezu, who led the killers to know that contrary to what they had believed, there were still many survivors at Bisesero. That information was an instigator of a general mobilisation of killers in the surrounding areas but also the basis for seeking assistance from Cyangugu and Kibuye. The gathering of hundreds of mobilised killers in the small centre of Gishyita was carried out in full view of the French soldiers under the command of Marin Gillier. Every morning for three days, these killers climbed up towards Gishyita, they had to pass by the three roadblocks manned by the French soldiers in prominent entry and exit points of the village. The killers were poorly clothed and did not look like FAR soldiers who wore proper uniforms. Moreover, the majority of the Interahamwe carried knives and other weapons which showed that they were only killers and not fighters against an armed enemy. During those 3 months, gunshots were heard about 5 km in the hills located above Gishyita and the French soldiers were not particularly concerned about the security of the survivors, apart from the small team that was sent to investigate, but with the order not to advance further. The French soldiers mainly stayed close to their base. If they had actually thought that they were RPF elements who were at Bisesero, they would have opted for a more aggressive approach. Finally, according to interviewed witnesses, killers came back uninjured and showed no signs of stress that an actual war could cause them. Lastly, Marin Gillier had helicopters at his disposal that were hovering over the region.

Besides watching every morning for three days the mobilisation and ascent towards Bisesero by the Interahamwe, Marin Gillier was on several occasions informed by reporters that massacres of Tutsi civilians were being committed 5km from his base. The same reporters also requested him to intervene and stop the massacres.

Marin Gillier’s persistent refusal to stop the massacre of Bisesero survivors

Since 26th June 1994, three reporters informed Marin Gillier, at Gishyita, that Tutsi survivors were still being massacred at Bisesero hills. A Croatian priest who had lived in Rwanda for a long time had asked Sam Kiley, a British reporter of the Times, Raymond Bonner of the New York Times and Vincent Hugeux of L’Express, to go to Bisesero because Tutsi survivors were still being killed. After visiting Bisesero, the reporters informed Marin Gillier at Gishyita what they had seen.

In an article published on 12th April 2004, Vincent Hugeux remembers the meeting with Gillier that he places on Sunday 26th June 1994, that is the day before Diego’s expedition to Bisesero: “Immediately, the special reporter of the Times, Sam Kiley, and myself, with the support of a map, informed Commander Marin Gillier, head of the military detachment, of the carnage going on in the neighbouring hills.”

We know the response that Marin Gillier gave to the reporters , as written by Raymond Bonner who was also present: “Earlier this week, Colonel Gillier refused to answer any question about who was carrying out the killings in the mountains and whether there were any Tutsis in need of help. “I do not wish to get involved in any political matter [we note], he said.”

Further, Vincent Hugeux reveals Marin Gillier’s distortion of the truth in a letter where he justifies the reason why he did not intervene early enough in Bisesero. “In a letter sent in 1998 to the Mission d’Information Parlementaire sur le Rwanda (MIP), headed by Paul Quilès, Captain Gillier mentions a meeting with “two British reporters” not mentioning the one of L’Express. Something strange is that the officer pretends to have discovered the Bisesero tragedy only on 30th June in a fortuitous manner. This is a big lie, as we remember or as it is revealed in different testimonies of several survivors and militia in prison.” We shall come back later to Gillier’s statements.

On Wednesday 29th June 1994, the Minister of Defence in an inspection tour went to Gishyita. Le Monde’s special correspondent, Corine Lesnes, who was present, gives an account of the meeting between the Minister and Raymond Bonner of New York Times and Sam Kiley of the Times from London.

“Two Anglo-Saxon journalists asked questions. They were coming from the outskirts of the triangle [Bisesero] where they saw four children with burnt hands. And at that very place they were told that there were still three thousand more imprisoned Tutsis. They could not confirm that piece of information because they were targeted by killers when they tried to approach the place. What is France doing, they asked? Isn’t it avoiding the fundamental thing? “We are doing what we can, this is a delicate matter. It is not a matter of intervening between two warring factions”, replies M. Léotard. Soldiers are only 300 in Rwanda, for hundreds of thousands of displaced or hidden persons whom journalists reported new cases on every day. 232 nuns terrorised close to Butare, 40.000 displaced at Gikongoro. Regarding the triangle, it is important to first verify. Journalists brought the Minister to the Opération Turquoise base. France, says François Léotard, has already made important efforts and it is now having difficult time with government forces after establishing that the problem was not the RPF but the government forces. […] The special correspondent of the New York Times, who probably saw unusual horrors and attempted to expose them to others, insists again. François Léotard, disregarding his status as a minister and his function, when he as leaving, he stopped, turned and came back to where he was standing. ‘Well, he said, we are going for it. Tomorrow we are going for it.”

However, Mr. Léotard’s utterances were not sufficient enough to command Gillier and his troops to go and rescue the Bisesero survivors. It is only a small group of men who disobeyed their commander and decide to go there anyway. The gendarme Thierry Prungnaud of GIGN was among the latter. In an interview to France culture, he gives a particular clarification of the context of their mission in Rwanda and the interdiction from Gillier to go to Bisesero. We hereby present an extract of his story.








France Culture 22 April 2005 bulletins of 8h00, 13h00 and 18h00 extracts from the interview of Thierry Prungnaud by Laure de Vulpian

[In 1994, Thierry Prungnaud is among the men who under the orders of Captain Marin Gillier were stationed at Gishyita. He starts by revealing the briefing he received at his base in France.]

T.P.: The mission at the beginning was to intervene in the so-called massacres of Hutus who would be massacred by Tutsis and when we arrived, after around 15 days, we discovered the truth, that it was the Hutus instead who were killing the Tutsis.

L.V. Who gave you that basic information?

T.P. Well, the basic information came from France in fact, from my boss, I think he was not really aware of what was going on in Africa. Today at the government level, I don’t know. I don’t know at all. […]
[Prungnaud then gives an account of what he was doing at Gishyita]

T.P. We watched, we saw people shooting at others every evening, I would say it is the Tutsis who were killing the Hutus. We had orders not to move, not to do anything, really do nothing.[…]

T.P.: Then every single day we were moving in different units. For example, it was the 13th RDP. We moved to interrogate people here and there and they told us about the valley, Bisesero, where there were Tutsi rebels who were well armed. Then one day we disobeyed.

L.V.: Why, what were the orders?

T.P.: Orders from our commander, it was mainly not to go there.

L.V.: Who was your commander?

T.P.: Commander Marin Gillier He had absolutely forbidden us from going there. And we decided to go to the place.

L.V.: Who?

T.P.: Well, colleagues from the 13th RDP. I shall not mention names. We agreed amongst ourselves and decided that on the following day we should go to Bisesero. It is then that we discovered what had been going on. In fact, it is a valley where 10.000 victims had been killed. Only 800 were remaining in very awful conditions. We evacuated them by helicopter to the Goma medical centre. It was extremely awful. We were then made to understand that it was not the Tutsis who were killing the Hutus, but rather the Hutus who were killing the Tutsis, who were massacring them day by day.

L.V.: Were they armed?

T.P.: The Tutsis? Not at all, they had simple spears, stones that was it. On the contrary, those they were fighting were very well equipped. They had explosives, munitions, grenades, everything.

L.V.: Then once you discovered that, what did you do?

T.P.: We reported to the COS commander, Colonel Rosier. He came immediately. He got aware of the situation. We posted different personnel in turns to protect the people because militia had positions atop the Bisesero hills in order to continue with the killings. We spent the night with them for their protection. The following day, it was the 6th REG’s turn to take over and we left for other humanitarian missions and so on.

Marin Gillier’s explanation for refusing to rescue the Bisesero survivors.

Captain Marin Gillier sent a letter to MIP explaining his actions at Gishyita, his refusal to rescue the Bisesero survivors during the four days as well as circumstances which led, finally, to the rescue of the Bisesero survivors.

Marin Gillier gives his explanation for failing to rescue the survivors during the four days based on two reasons: on one hand, the incorrect aspect of the information that he had about what was going on at Bisesero, and on the other hand the fact that he had at different times requested for authorisation to go there but in vain.

Let’s raise the main points given by Gillier.

First of all a certain doubt is shed on the date of setting up of base by the French troops commanded by Gillier at Gishyita. Gillier says they set up base on 27th June. This lie seems to prove that he was at Gishyita for a short time and hence he tries to explain the reason why he could not know well in advance that it was the Tutsi survivors who were being massacred 5km from his camp. All the Rwandan witnesses who were at Gishyita explain that Gillier and his troops were in the village at least on 26th June , some others say on 25th June , that is a day after their passing by the village on the 24th (assertion by Gillier) when he was heading to Kibuye. Finally, Vincent Hugeux of L’Express asserts to having met Marin Gillier on the 26th probably at Gishyita.

Marin Gillier asserts that he had only about 30 soldiers at Gishyita and that he did not in fact have “enough numbers and support [fire support]” allowing him to intervene. An evaluation which was published in the media mentions 70 French soldiers in the area. Then, Marin Gillier had at his disposal two war helicopters which used to land at Gishyita, without mentioning the armoured vehicles and Milan shooting posts that he personally mentions.

Marin Gillier explains that on 28th and 29th June, he sent a detachment to conduct a reconnaissance on Bisesero. On 29th June, he explains to the Minister of Defence François Léotard that that mission was unsuccessful. Witness Isidore Kayiranga, already quoted herein, explains that for 3 days a group of French soldiers was moving around the road heading to Bisesero and back. But one of the officers, Thierry Prungnaud in an interview already quoted herein explains that he had formally banned them from going to Bisesero.

Marin Gillier explains that he heard gunshots which lasted for half an hour on 27th June. Different witnesses who were living at Gishyita including those we have just mentioned above recount hearing the gunshots on 27th June but even heavier gunshots were heard the following day due to the general mobilisation of Diego’s team, and somewhat less on 29th June. But more importantly Marin Gillier avoids mentioning the general mobilisation which took place on the 28th at the Gishyita central square with cars and pick ups transporting killers from Cyangugu, Kibuye, but also killers who came walking from surrounding areas. The same gathering assembled on the 29th, even though it was reduced in number compared to the previous day. In order to enter Gishyita, people had to cross three roadblocks that were manned by the French soldiers. And from his headquarters in Gishyita, Gishyita central square was in direct view of Gillier as well as the main route used by killers to go up to Bisesero.

Following gunshots heard on the 27th around midday, Gillier asserts that he asked the people who were with him what the sounds were all about. He was told that the militia had attacked RPF. “We can not confirm or refute these words” Further, he explains that getting involved was very risky for his troops “while we neither knew the field nor the present forces to face. We would not even know in which sense to intervene”.

Marin Gillier avoids mentioning that three journalists had come, the previous day, to report to him that there were Tutsi civilians who were being massacred in Bisesero. Asked by those journalists what his opinion was, he had replied “not willing to enter into political considerations [our own translation]”

Raymond Bonner of The New York Times also reports that during the visit of François Léotard to Gishyita on 29th June 1994, Gillier acknowledged that there were people who were being massacred every night. “The French military unit based in Gishyita, four miles west of Bisesero, was aware that people, in the mountains were being killed every night. Commander Gillier said on Wednesday.”

“Discovering” the Bisesero survivors

Following the order from the Minister of Defence François Léotard on 29th June “to go there the following day” which was as a result of the pressure from the New York Times and Times from London journalists as we have already mentioned above, on the afternoon of 29th June, Gillier received orders which, unbelievable but true, did not request him to rescue the Bisesero survivors. “Orders are, if necessary, to penetrate that zone up to around 20km (distance as the bird flies not on the ground!) in order to get in touch with a French priest who lives in a threatened village, and ask him if he wished to come with us {we highlight]”

That priest was at Gisovu which is located past Gishyita, past the valley and hills of Bisesero which Gillier and his troops crossed without stopping. “It is then that I got a radio call from one of the officers under my command that had turned back some hours earlier. In fact, it seemed that he had during our advance seen some persons who looked different from the ones we had seen on our arrival. He was not sure but the thought bothered him so much that he wanted to brush off the doubt”. From Thierry Prungnaud’s interview, stated above, we know this is not the truth, the truth being that a group of some of his soldiers revolted and decided to find the Bisesero people. Instead of informing him of what they had seen, they preferred to report to his direct chief Rosier who immediately decided to undertake the rescue operation.

Thus, we can firmly confirm that the French army had never had the intention to rescue the Bisesero survivors but that it was obliged to do so mainly by some of its members.

3) Colonel Rosier wanted to sacrifice the Bisesero survivors

The two episodes of the Bisesero case, the abandonment of the Bisesero survivors by Diego and the refusal by Gillier for four days (from 26th June , when Gillier was informed in clear terms by the three journalists and had replied that he did not want to get involved in politics) to rescue the Bisesero survivors, lead to Colonel Rosier.

Diego confirms to having informed him immediately after his discovery, and Gillier explains that twice he requested for authorisation to go to Bisesero, on 28th and 29th June. Narrating about the 27th of June, Gillier writes: “Lastly, I am requesting for instructions; in particular I am asking if I have to go to the place. The response to that question delays. I am not surprised because orders are clear: not to get opposed to RPF and not to get involved in the conflict.” With regard to 28th June, Gillier writes: “I am asking for the authorisation to go there so as to find out what may have happened.” We know the answer to Gillier’s requests through the formal interdiction he made to his subordinates not to go to Bisesero. The categorical aspect of the interdiction comes certainly from a received order.

Now, Diego and Gillier were direct subordinates of Rosier who, in addition to that, followed closely the developments on the ground. It is most certain that Rosier got information from his subordinates on the desperate situation of the Bisesero survivors and the request to intervene. It is highly plausible that the abandonment of the Bisesero survivors came from Colonel Rosier’s decision. And it is clearly abandonment because Rosier decided to intervene after the pressure from journalists and after he was put before a fait accompli by some of` Gillier’s soldiers. The statement of Colonel Rosier in the Liberation of 27th June 1994 draws attention to the rationale of his action: “Militia are at war. In order to remain neutral we do not have to intervene. Otherwise, tomorrow, if there are rebel infiltrations, we shall pay the price.”

However, beyond Colonel Rosier’s actions, the Bisesero case proves the adoption of a non ambiguous position in the French army hierarchy. In that respect, the reverse of roles between victims and killers in the briefing preparing the troops for their mission to Rwanda is particularly revealing. As a reminder, it is Thierry Prungnaud who reveals it when he explains, in his interview, that at the military base in France, they had been told that the Tutsis were killing the Hutus. That reverse of roles in the context of the genocide reveals hostility towards civilian Tutsi survivors that the French army was supposed to come and rescue and also connive with the killers. The army commander wanted to manipulate his troops so that their possible compassion for the real victims could not in any way be impeded.

II/ Ambiguities of humanitarian assistance to the Bisesero survivors

The humanitarian care for Bisesero survivors was carried out within the camp of the Bisesero survivors who had been gathered by the French army on 30th June. It was also given in the country hospital under the control of the French soldiers near the Goma airport in Zaire. In both places, the Bisesero survivors accuse the French soldiers of poor treatment having caused the death of men at Bisesero and carried out abusive amputations at Goma.

At Bisesero

The rescue operation of the Bisesero survivors started on 30th June at around 17h00. Immediately, French troops set up a protection line and started operations of gathering survivors who were hidden or injured. According to Gillier, the total number of people was around 800 Tutsis. The following day, on 1st July, the humanitarian care started. Some of the survivors, the seriously injured were sent to Goma for treatment. That day, marine commandos and some members of the GIGN were replaced by elements of the 6th REG.

Once again, the ambiguous attitude of the French soldiers towards the people they protected was to be revealed. First of all, French soldiers rushed to disarm the survivors while they left their arms with the Interahamwe and FAR soldiers who were moving around the survivors’ camp. Next, when the survivors told their protectors that they preferred to join the territory under the RPF control rather than stay in the French controlled zone, French soldiers stopped providing them with food. This led some refugees to take risks by going outside to seek for food. Some never returned they were killed by killers who continued to move around the survivors’ camp. Eventually, the French soldiers executed the transfers to the RPF zones in such a brutal way, putting in danger the lives of survivors.

Eric Nzabahimana, who seems to have been the leader of the survivors’ community, further illustrates on the arrival of the French soldiers and the way they protected them for one month.

“French soldiers arrived on 30th June at around 17h00. They asked me to gather all the injured persons. The following day, they transferred the most seriously injured to Goma by helicopter; another number of injured persons were transferred to Nyarushishi camp. We stayed in Bisesero camp for almost a month. Soldiers fed us with candy and combat rations; there was also an NGO that distributed some beans. There were many armed killers and FAR who passed near our camp. After a certain time, they started disarming them and they let journalists take pictures of them carrying out this exercise. One day I went down to Mubuga village and noticed that the French soldiers were handing back these arms to the killers. I saw it with my own eyes. There was a black man among the French troops with whom I used to discuss. He told me to watch out because they had not come to rescue the Tutsis but rather to help the genocide government, but unfortunately they had arrived too late.[…] One day, the French commanders called me to their camp headquarters. They asked me whether I would prefer to remain under the French protection or to join the RPF controlled zone. I replied that I could not decide on behalf of the whole community and that I had to ask them. I called the community of survivors and relayed the question to them. I advised them that it would be safer to join the RPF zone because there were still killers in the surrounding areas and hence our security was not ensured. They all opted for the RPF zone. In fact I was following the news on radio and the way the French had abandoned us. I thought that our security would be more guaranteed in the RPF zone. That decision was not welcomed by the French and since then they stopped giving us food for a whole week during the operation of transferring us to the RPF controlled zone at a place called Ku Rutare rwa Ndaba. I was among the last people to be transferred. We were transported aboard trucks that were completely covered with canvas such that upon our arrival at the destination point some of us were on the brink of suffocation. During that operation which lasted a week, those who were still waiting to be transferred were starving. Those who could not resist returned to the fields to look for food and some got killed by the Interahamwe including Mutezintare.”

Bernard Kayumba, another survivor who has a certain level of education gives the following account:

“When the French soldiers came back, [on 30th], the survivors were gathered in a camp and the French rushed to seize our knives and other traditional weapons. We became afraid because they let the militia pass nearby with their arms. They had created a route for them to reach the Nyungwe forest where they could reorganize themselves. This shows how the French were supporting the genocide government. When we revolted, they started disarming the militia and FAR soldiers but redistributed theses arms to the gendarmes of Kibuye who were also part of the killers. Another act that shows France’s support for the French to the militia is that, when we opted to join the RPF zone, they got angry and stopped providing us with food in spite of having a full warehouse. Moreover they transported survivors to the zone under RPF control in very bad conditions. We were so packed together aboard the completely covered trucks that some people suffocated. On the other hand, those soldiers were angry because their colleagues had been wounded in the battles during the advance of the Inkotanyi on the Gikongoro side.”

Ezra Musabyimana narrates the same facts.

“They [the French] asked us, one day, if we wanted to join the RPF in its zone or if we wanted to stay under their protection. We opted to join the RPF zone. That choice did not please them and they stopped providing us with food. And when we found out that they wanted to sleep with our women, we stopped going out. […] While transporting us to the zone under RPF control, we were treated as goods. Using the butts of their guns, they confined us to trucks which were completely covered that it was hard for us to breathe properly. We could not even know where we were heading to. We were shouting but in vain. An old woman, whose name I did not know, died from suffocation during the trip.”

Aaron Gakoko explains: “Even upon their return, they continued to treat us very badly. […] When they were taking us to the zone under RPF control, they transported us like goods in trucks such that a brother of Rwagitinywa died from the harsh conditions of transporting us.”

Inhumane treatment and abusive amputations at Goma

The Bisesero survivors who were seriously injured and transported to Goma by the French army keep a good memory of the harsh treatment received from French military doctors. They accuse them on one hand of treating them in a very humiliating manner, but more seriously again, of abusively amputating their limbs. The military medical unit at Goma is the “Groupe Médico-Chirurgical Aéroporté” constituted of 12 members including 2 surgeons, 1 anaesthetist and nurses.

Pascal Nkusi, a Bisesero survivor who was transported to Goma on 1st July, begins by narrating the conditions of their stay in Goma, the way the French soldiers gathered all the injured and brought the most serious cases to Goma for treatment. The injured were transported on plastic tents which were spread in the back of helicopters. The makeshift hospitals were set up in the garden of the military country hospital near the Goma airport and the wounded started to receive treatment the following day in the morning.

“Upon their arrival at Goma, the French treated us in a degrading and humiliating manner. They took off our dirty clothes and burnt them leaving us completely naked for the whole week before giving us clothing. We were all gathered in one tent without distinction, men, women, children all naked. In order to wash us, they would take the injured in small groups of 10, always men, women and children mixed and used a hosepipe to wash us as if they were watering plants.[…] They started by making lists of the injured who would be treated. The first people who were treated were abusively amputated. The first three to be treated, Munyankindi, Mukansonera and Gasarabwe, were brought to the operation theatre, their arms were amputated yet they were suffering from light injuries. Some of those who could speak French asked the French soldiers why they were doing so. They were told that it was easier to heal a fresh wound than an old one and that old wounds are often gangrened. Among the injured, some were scheduled, registered on a list of people whose legs were to be amputated, including me, because I was badly injured on the leg by a bullet. The others were Ruhumuriza who was injured by a bullet on the thigh, Gaspard, was injured by a bullet on the knee and Habimana Jérôme was injured by a bullet on his leg. We rejected the proposed amputations, the French then decided to send us to the HCR camp at Gituku where we were better treated and recovered without amputations.

In my view it was the same Genocidal ideology which was continuing because finally, while the wounded revolted, the French soldiers transferred us to the HCR refugee camp at Gituku where we were treated and healed without being amputated.”


Adrien Harelimana is a survivor of Bisesero who was transferred to Goma by the French army for treatment.

“Like other Bisesero survivors who had been gathered together, men, women, children and old people together, I spent most of the time in the makeshift hospital completely naked and covered with a bed sheet. Even when I was trying to cover my nakedness, they [French soldiers] forbade me with insults. The same applied during shower time, the French soldiers used a hosepipe on the whole group. […] After examining the wound on my thigh, the French told me that they had to amputate it or I could get gangrene. When I went to the operating theatre, there was a young Rwandan lady from Goma who explained to me that they were going to amputate my leg. I heard her tell the French that I was categorically against it and that I would prefer to die or go to Bisesero to be killed by the Interahamwe. They got angry and wondered how they would treat people who were protesting against them. They decided to amputate me anyway and claimed that I otherwise could not recover. I tried to stand up with the help of my walking stick. A Frenchman forcefully pushed me back to the bed saying that I had no right to give them orders on how to treat me. I left the operating theatre fighting with the French. They refused to give me food and water because I refused to have my leg amputated. Three days later, another Frenchman tried to persuade me saying that I could not escape from the gangrene if I did not have my leg amputated. I then informed another Bisesero survivor called Kaneza who also had an injured leg that the French were going to amputate his leg as it was their plan. Unfortunately, Kaneza was put to sleep and upon waking up his leg had already been amputated. It was the same for Munyankindi whose arm got amputated. I qualify these amputations as abusive because when we the injured refused to get amputated, the French soldiers became angry and transferred us to the Gituku camp controlled by HCR. Those injured were treated there and recovered without amputations.

Telesphore Kaneza is a Bisesero survivor who was transferred to Goma by the French army for treatment.

“Upon our arrival, the French soldiers undressed all the injured and left them naked before taking them one by one for treatment. They then started amputating limbs of the injured regardless of the seriousness of their wounds.

It was my turn. I had an injury on my foot for a week but it was not serious because I had walked and fought with others. On the bed, the French told me that they had to amputate my foot and I refused. The following day, they repeated the same thing and I shouted for help. Later they put me to sleep and when I woke up my foot had already been amputated.

When Kaneza was asked how he could have known that he did not need the amputation yet he was not a doctor, he replied as follows: “Some of the injured people I was with and who were more seriously injured than I was and whom the French wanted to amputate managed to escape and recovered without any problem.”

Côme Kayinamura is a native of Rwamatamu commune, close to Bisesero. Though he had lived in Bisesero during the genocide, he had a different experience which also led him to the makeshift hospital of the French soldiers in Goma.

“At the beginning of genocide, I took refuge with others on Bisesero hills. We tried to fight against the killers including gendarmes, ex FAR soldiers and civilians armed with grenades and guns. The killers attacked in throngs and killed many people. They shot at me and I was even hit by shrapnel. I got seriously injured and I was transported by other survivors to Lake Kivu where a swimmer took me to Ijwi Island. From there another refugee from Rwanda named Musana sent a boat to bring other genocide fleeing people to Gituku camp which had more than 2.000 Tutsis who had come from Gisenyi, Kibuye and Bugogwe. Those who came from Gisenyi, Kibuye and were living close to Lake Kivu crossed the lake by boat.

On arrival in Congo, I had no means of getting treatment and in Gituku camp, there was not sufficient equipment to treat the injured. I asked in vain where I could get medicine. I finally learnt that the French were treating injured people brought by helicopter from Bisesero. I was transported to the airport where the French had set up a makeshift hospital. The French received me after lengthy discussions on whether I was actually a Tutsi or a Hutu since normally the camp was reserved for Tutsis who were personally brought by the French soldiers from Rwanda. I successfully persuaded them that I was a Hutu and hence was admitted to their hospital. They decided to amputate my right leg which was injured on the thigh by a bullet as well as my left arm which was injured at fingers. I begged them not to amputate my limbs and to instead treat me because I hoped to recover and keep my wounded limbs.

As the wound on my leg was still open and bleeding, they decided to amputate the leg and leave the arm. I successfully fled their hospital and returned to Gituku camp with the help of a 1959 Rwandan refugee named Kagaba who had brought some clothes. Like the other injured people, men, women, children and old people whom I had joined in the tents I was naked. We felt humiliated as employees who passed by were laughing at us and commenting. Beside that we were hungry.

On the contrary, at Gituku, I was well received at the HCR health centre which was not far away from the airport where I was examined by a white man and three Africans who raised my spirits with the quick care they gave to my broken fingers. I was treated by the Red Cross. That is how I finally managed to recover from my injuries without being amputated.”

Jean Karengera is also a Bisesero survivor who was transferred to Goma by the French army for treatment aboard a helicopter.

“Since our arrival we were badly treated. The French tore our clothes with scissors and threw them in the garbage. Children, men and women of all ages were stark naked. Later they made some clothes for us from bed sheets. We were hungry and were asking for food, instead we got drip with the explanation that we the sick were not allowed to eat, in actual fact we were being prepared for amputation.

They told us that all the injured had to be operated upon and when they started to treat us, I noticed that those who went for treatment returned with their limbs amputated, either a leg or an arm. This was the case for Antoinette who got her arm amputated yet her wound was not so serious. When it was my turn, I got local anaesthesia of the lower part of my body. When I saw that they were about to amputate my leg, I got up to resist. As I could not speak French, I used gestures to resist against the amputation. I got up in order to resist but three white men pushed me back onto the bed. They made an incision on the wounded part of my leg. I got up to check if it was not the whole leg which had been cut off. They reassured me that they would not amputate my leg. They left my leg and instead dressed the wounds. The French were angry because I refused to get amputated and they immediately transferred me to Gituku camp near Lake Kivu. […] There were others like Munyankara, whose knee was injured, and Adrien who also refused to get amputated and whose wounds later recovered.”

Philemon Hakizimana is another person who was among the injured and testifies below:

“The French came back on 30th June when it was almost evening. My neighbours had helped me to get out of my hiding place in order to join them. We were many who were injured and they took us to Goma. At Goma, they undressed all of us. We got some clothes from the 1959 Rwandan refugees. The French then started treating the injured one by one. They first of all took our colleague Canisius, a native of Kiziba whose foot was injured and apparently the wound could recover but he came out of the operating theatre with part of his leg amputated. The second person taken was a man called Gasarabwe who had a visibly small wound on his arm but he had his arm amputated.

It was then my turn and I was taken to the operating theatre on a stretcher. On my way to the theatre I told the translator, a man we met there who spoke Kinyarwanda, that even if I was taken to the operating theatre I would not like to get amputated. The translator relayed the message and the French became angry. One of them called Christophe pushed me off the stretcher and I screamed. They said that I had to go back home since I refused their treatment. I retorted that I did not know the way to my home and that they had to take me back instead of amputating my leg. I also got angry and requested them to let me go and die if they could not cure my leg. I openly told them that we had been aware of their objective to amputate our legs and arms and that I refused. They took me back to the tent without treatment. I then convinced all the people I was with to refuse amputations.

After me, every injured person who was taken into the operating theatre refused to be amputated. The French were angry at me saying that I had influenced all the others to refuse their medical treatment. They stopped giving me their daily ration of candies and water. I secretly shared food with the other sick people and even got some rations from 1959 Rwandan refugees. The French finally transferred all the injured to Gituku camp apart from me and two other people who were seriously sick. I was not able to get any food thereafter because the 1959 Rwandan refugees thought that all the injured had been relocated. They finally drove us to Gituku to join the others but I was suffering from extreme stomach pains.

In my opinion, the French had planned the amputation of all the injured. For the first persons they amputated I thought that it would be normal for a medical doctor to first examine the wounded and then give a prescription for amputation. But later I was surprised and worried by the amputation of Kaneza who had been lightly wounded on the foot and for another woman who had been slightly injured by a bullet on the arm. We ended up leaving Gituku camp to join the Rwanda government and we were transported by Rwandese vehicles, I think it was the Inkotanyi who had sent them for us. Those who were least wounded were sent to Gisenyi hospital, while the seriously wounded were taken to Kigali that is how I was saved from amputation.”

Odette Mukamunana is a nurse of Rwandan origin but born in Congo. She got her education from different medical institutions in Congo. In 1994, she was working at a private clinic, when a priest called Désiré came to her asking if she could help him to treat the Bagogwe survivors who had taken refuge in Congo. The refugees in Gituku camp had contracted dysentery. The priest needed someone who could effectively communicate with refugees in their language.

“I treated the Bagogwe with Father Désiré using poor means, and in the meantime MSF Holland came to support us to eradicate dysentery. Then, we received other refugees and I learned that they were coming from Bisesero. Those refugees had first been treated by French soldiers at the Goma airport site and later the French transferred them to Gituku site. Some of them had already been amputated while others were on the amputation waiting list. The patients were brought by the French soldiers aboard trucks in very bad conditions. The French were laughing at them in spite of their poor health condition. I noticed that the people were really in poor conditions with serious and very infected wounds. In my view, the health situation of these people did not necessarily require amputation as had been decided by the French. I even discussed with the French, who accompanied the sick, about considering amputations as the last resort in an effort to cure the wounds of those who had been injured. They retorted that treating an amputation was easier than treating an infected wound. I called upon Doctor Ricardo of MSF Holland, one of the doctors at the Gituku health centre, to draw his attention to the situation hoping in his capacity as a doctor he would decide otherwise for the patients. And that is what he did, Ricardo was a good doctor.

It so happened that one day after the medical transfer, the French came back to take one patient for amputation. However upon Ricardo’s initiative, a meeting was held to discuss the matter and MSF decided to stop such systematic amputations and forbade the French from getting involved in the follow up of patients who had already been transferred to our institution. […]The medical team worked hard to find the necessary medicine as well as food in order to restore the patients to good health. HCR’s intervention was also very important in the provision of food and clothing. Also, with simple care, all the wounds were healed without amputations except for malformations caused by the wounds, which the doctors could not heal.”

Testimonies of the Bisesero survivors on poor treatment and the abusive character of the amputations are credible. On one hand, there is a strong congruence between different testimonies and a progression from one to another. Finally, regarding the abusive aspect of amputations, while collecting testimonies, members of the Commission systematically asked how they could tell that those amputations carried out or scheduled were not necessary yet they were not doctors. Their answers, as it has been seen, were based on two facts: the conviction that their wounds were not very serious, on one hand, and on the other hand, that when they protested against the amputation they were treated by other doctors and healed without amputations. Finally, the testimony of nurse Odette introduces a medical aspect, corroborating MSF Holland’s Dr Ricardo’s view which makes credible the testimonies quoted.

One could, at the least, take into account the essentials of hygiene, emergency and lack of equipment and infrastructure, putting naked men, women and children of different age groups together, food restrictions as well as the decision to systematically amputate. There were also other factors such as not separating patients according to sex and age for the shower, heavy sanctions for those who refused to get amputated, the act of getting rid of patients and sending them elsewhere instead of treating them, as well as the cynical attitude which shocked Nurse Odette. All these reveal that what happened at Goma was a new manifestation of the hostility that many French soldiers and officers, even doctors, had towards the Bisesero survivors.

RUBENGERA

The screening and execution of displaced Tutsis in Rubengera

One of the bases of the Opération Turquoise in Kibuye prefecture was the small town of Rubengera. It is located 20km east and slightly to the south of Kibuye town. It is located at the junction of the road to Kigali and the road from Gisenyi. In July 1994, when the so called “humanitarian safe zone” controlled by the French army was marked out, Rubengera town was not far from that Humanitarian safe zone and the zone that was controlled by the RPF. Before marking out the humanitarian safe zone, the French army and RPF soldiers exchanged fire and the French bombed RPF positions.

Since June 1994, Rubengera town hosted camps of displaced people coming from as far as the eastern part of Rwanda, regions of Kibungo but also from areas in central Rwanda like Gitarama.

On 23rd June 1994, a convoy of around 20 military vehicles including armoured vehicles from Gisenyi entered Rubengera town. The French soldiers headed on the first day towards the commune office and the following day, they set up their headquarters at Groupe Scolaire de Rubengera.

Inside the school, they set up their office in the premises of the school administration and erected their tents near the building, not far from the main entrance of the school. The inside of the school was divided into two parts all at different levels. There was the raised level which included a certain number of blocks which housed classrooms and the administration office, as well as the lawn where the French soldiers erected their tents. There was lastly, the lower part, much bigger and open, with less buildings and a second entrance at the back.

Upon their arrival, the French soldiers collaborated with local authorities, Burgomaster Bagilishema, but mainly with his assistant Célestin Semanza. They also set up a strong force to help them in their security responsibilities. They asked Semanza to designate responsible and trustworthy people to whom they handed guns to build up a “comité de sécurité civile” (committee for civil security). Those people were of two types: on one hand, junior officials with a relatively high level of education as well s their auxiliaries, on the other hand, physically strong people who were often militia who were known for their role in the massacres that had started in April 1994. The two commanders of the French military contingent in July were Captain Bucquet, in charge of military matters, and Captain Giorda, who was in charge of security. It is the latter who one created the Comité de sécurité civile (committee for civil security).

One of the tasks of the Comité de sécurité civile was to trace Tutsis, who had survived the genocide, were natives of the neighbourhood and who had been sent to the small camp outside the school. On knowing about the arrival of the French soldiers, a certain number of Tutsis who had survived in their hiding places came out of their hiding places. The other task of the committee was to select from the displaced people, the Tutsis that were among them because there was a certain number of the Tutsis that could be found in those camps. Those displaced people were gathered at the upper level of the camp, not far from the French soldiers’ tents. A witness explained that he saw around 30 persons there: men, women and children.

Two witnesses confirmed to the Commission that they saw, behind one of the classroom blocks which led to a small courtyard on a slope with a lawn and bordered by a small forest, corpses being picked up and transported aboard a truck driven by French soldiers. The truck was going to throw those corpses into a mass grave where many Hutu dysentery victims had been buried. A third witness is one of the people who killed displaced Tutsis in that small forest under the French soldiers’ orders.

François Rudakubana, a native of Rubengera, was in the village during the genocide.

“I was at Rubengera and stayed there during the genocide. I was there when the French soldiers came to set up base. The first group came in June aboard helicopters which dropped them by parachute at Rubengera primary school with their back packs; others came the following day on trucks from Cyangugu and Gisenyi. They set camp at Rubengera secondary school premises; school pupils had gone for holidays. Some days after they set up base at Rubengera, genocide survivors in very poor conditions began coming out of their hiding places to seek refuge in the French camp.

After around three days, we saw French soldiers transporting the displaced Tutsis to a place where an office of a pastor who had been killed by genocide perpetrators was situated. It was on the side and in a hidden place. It is evident that those displaced persons were killed there because after that operation we saw a truck driven by a French soldier seated together wit another French soldier and no other passengers. Thrice, I saw with my own eyes corpses being collected. French trucks were transporting corpses to bury them in forest at Gafumba.[…] I was staying close to that forest where a mass grave had been dug and one day I saw the same truck dumping corpses into the mass grave. I am not a Tutsi; as such I was not in hiding. I often went to Gitikinini [it is a big tree near the secondary school entrance] and followed everything that was going on there. At least I saw those trucks thrice.

In fact, the camp of displaced persons that was set up in the secondary school was a Hutu camp which had some Tutsis. At the beginning, there were some displaced Tutsis who were joined by Hutus and other Tutsis coming from different places. At a certain time, the number of displaced persons increased and the French asked the guards, people whom they had given guns to and who were in charge of security, to select, on the basis of identity cards, the Tutsis who had successfully infiltrated the displaced people. That way, the Hutus showed the guards the Tutsis amongst them. The guards thereafter took them to the French who brought them to the aforementioned place and killed them.

The case of the Tutsis who were killed and buried at Gafumba should not be confused with the case of displaced persons who died from dysentery and were buried in the same mass grave. Corpses of Hutus that died from dysentery were carried on foot, on makeshift stretchers, often accompanied by their parents or friends to the mass grave which was not far from the secondary school camp. The loading, by hired guards who were armed by the French, of corpses of Tutsis in the truck was done in a place inaccessible to displaced persons and in discretion, behind the block which housed the office of the murdered pastor. Not very far from there, there was a small dense forest; certainly it is there that they were killed. The two cases occurred and they should not be confused.”

Ismael Kamali, a native of former Mugina commune in Gitarama prefecture, lived in a camp of displaced people established at Rubengera secondary school. He attests to having witnessed different acts of killings carried out or ordered by French soldiers.

“I am a native of Gitarama. When the Inkotanyi were advancing, I fled with my sister to the displaced persons camp at Rubengera School. When the French soldiers arrived, my sister like the other girls went to see them. She eventually stayed with them in their tents, she tried to find other girls for them. She was in the French soldiers’ tents most of the time and as such had become their woman in a way. We settled not far from where they were in huts which were used as roadside shops on the road surrounding the school. I was 15 years old and there was a hole through the fence near the French tents. In the camp that was in the school compound, there were some Tutsi survivors that we had met on our way. The French were very hostile to these Tutsis and said that we had to find Tutsis that were among us as it was because of them that we had left our property. Some of us confirmed that there were some Tutsis in the camp and brought them to the French. The French ordered us to take them to their camp and killed them in a demolished house near the road, close to a place where a car had been burnt. I personally saw them killing 12 people including 4 women. In fact, they would pick people accused of being Tutsi or Inyenzi and take them to their camp. We expected them to return, but we later learnt that they had been killed. The French used displaced people to collect and bury the corpses near the road. In appreciation, they gave them boxes of candy. We learnt of that from the people who had been used to bury them. […] I also saw displaced Tutsis being killed under the orders of the French in the courtyard of Rubengera secondary school. The Tutsis who were brought to them were put into one of their tents in Rubengera School. Those people were killed. I saw some people being taken to the small forest bordering the school. I also saw corpses being taken out of the small forest which was behind the school buildings by members of the ‘comités de sécurité civile’. A truck driven by a French soldier, with another French soldier seated besides him, parked there and the Interahamwe loaded corpses onto the truck. They covered them with a black canvas. Most of Tutsis were killed there under orders of the French.”

Ismael also explained how he saw French soldiers training civilians whom they asked to hunt for Tutsis.

“When I was staying in the camp, I used to get up very early in the mornings and saw the French training some young people. They were teaching them how to use guns and grenades, how to escape grenade shrapnel as well as the use of the camouflage system.[…] all those training sessions were held early in the mornings in the parish courtyard and ended at around 7h00. They promised to arm their trainees and ensure their safety on their way to exile. But the French urged them to hunt any Tutsis who may have been hiding in the fields, reminding them that they were fleeing the country because of the Tutsis.”

The Commission visited the site and talked individually to François Rudakubana and Ismaël Kamali who showed them where the acts had been committed, particularly the backyard of the classroom blocks of Rubengera Secondary School, where they had seen corpses of Tutsis being loaded onto trucks. The facts that were given in their testimonies matched what the commission was shown at the site.

Alexis Ntare is a native of Rubengera village. He was a member of the FAR, military instructor at the Centre d’Entraînement Commando Bigogwe (Bigogwe Commando Training Centre). When the Opération Turquoise soldiers came, he was manning a huge roadblock that was located at one of the entrances to the village and is known as one of the main killers of Rubengera. He was a member of the “comité de sécurité civile” which was set up by French soldiers. Lastly he participated in the massacres of Tutsis which took place behind the classrooms block of Rubengera secondary school mentioned by the two preceding witnesses.

“I saw the French during the Opération Turquoise when they were coming from Gisenyi with armoured vehicles and other military vehicles in order to set up base in Kibuye. They therefore came and set up base in Kibuye stadium. The following morning, other French soldiers came aboard two helicopters. They disarmed us and chased us away from the roadblock that we had set up at Trafipro at the junction of Gitarama-Kibuye and Kibuye –Gisenyi roads. Then, they organised a meeting of intellectual people at Rubengera secondary school. [this is the meeting that put into place the “comité de sécurité civile”]. In the meeting on the following day, they authorised us to return to our roadblock after having given us some more guns and grenades. That day onwards, we returned to the roadblock but observing the directives from the French. They ordered us to send them any Tutsi that we found. At the roadblock, we had the mission to seize any person suspected of being an Inkotanyi, FAR deserters or any person who destabilised the displaced people in the camps. Anyone who was arrested had to be taken to the French camp. They had taught us how to identify an Inkotanyi: We checked if he/she was tall, with a long nose, had gun strap marks on shoulders or on the legs because it was only the Inkotanyi who wore gumboots while FAR wore military boots. […]I remember that they even caught displaced Tutsi people and tortured them inside Rubengera secondary school. They tied them up, poured water on them and beat them up before taking them, it seems, to Nyarushishi by helicopter. We brought other displaced Tutsis who were suspected of being Inkotanyi as well as people who were arrested at our roadblock. They tied them up, tortured them and put them in a makeshift detention room. When their number increased, we put them on trucks which took them to Musaho on the shores of Lake Kivu where they were killed by French soldiers and thrown into the lake. One day we took 13 persons among the displaced Tutsis who were suspected of being Inkotanyi to Musaho. Upon our arrival at Musaho, we found a group of four French soldiers. They ordered them to sit around a fire they had set and tortured them with that fire. They interrogated them about their mission, how they communicated with the Inkotanyi and how they were planning to receive them. At around midnight, the French went aside to talk among themselves. When they came back they asked us to step away. One of the four French soldiers killed them and they ordered us to throw the corpses into Lake Kivu. The second time that I went to Musaho, it was when we were taking there 4 people who had been captured by the population at Gihara and suspected of being Inkotanyi. It seemed that they wore military uniforms underneath their civilian clothes and had a Kalashnikov gun. The population alerted the French who intervened and took the four people to their quarters before taking them to Musaho later. We went there with 2 French soldiers and again met the team we had met at Musaho. This time there was no delay. Without questioning them, one of the French with whom we had come from Rubengera School shot them dead like it had been done before. His name was Jacques. Just after we had left the place, we heard gunshots from neighbouring hills. It was, as it had seemed, the Inkotanyi who were attacking. The French soldiers asked us to pull out quickly and started bombarding the place where gunshots were coming from. […] On another occasion, a commune policeman named MARERE who was always with the French soldiers at their roadblock set up at the entrance of the school came to us saying that the French wanted to talk to us. We immediately followed him thinking that we were going to receive combat rations from them. However, upon our arrival at Rubengera School, two French soldiers let us know that they had some work for us. They showed us a group of 9 to 13 Tutsis, tied up with blue cords and ordered us to take them to a slope behind the school and kill them. We killed them with clubs and ferried them towards Gafumba in French soldiers’ trucks. [We note. This part matches with testimonies from the two preceding witnesses] [….]. I can tell you that I went to Musaho only twice, but the French went there several times.”

2) Colonel Sartre incited people to flee the country

When the advance of RPF was accelerating and its victory was imminent, Colonel Sartre organised two rallies to incite the population to flee. The first one was organised on 13th July 1994 , that is around 10 days after the victory over Kigali and at the time when Ruhengeri and Gisenyi were about to fall under RPF control. The whole population was invited to the rally. The second rally took place on 23rd July and involved only educated people.

The mass rally of 13th July 1994

Apollinarie Nyirabahutu is a Tutsi woman married to a Hutu. Her husband worked at Rubengera Secondary School. When the French soldiers arrived, she came out of her hiding place to apply for a job in the school camp. She attended the first public rally organised by Colonel Sartre.

“The French soldiers who camped at Rubengera secondary school convened a mass rally in the AJEMAC (local NGO) multipurpose hall. The meeting was chaired by Colonel Sartre. I was working in humanitarian aid distributing food to displaced people and attended that rally where the whole population was invited. Sanding before the crowd were Colonel Sartre, Bagilishema the Burgomaster of Mabanza commune, Assistant Burgomaster Semanza Célestin who was translating for Sartre, a Canadian soldier who spoke English accompanied by a Rwandan who was translating from English to Kinyarwanda. There was also Apollinaire Nsengimana, another assistant Burgomaster and Hubert Bigaruka head of AJEMAK. Colonel Sartre told them: “Our mission shall end soon, we are going to hand over to the UNAMIR. You Hutus, don’t be naïve remember that RPF are nearby at Mushubati, as soon as we leave, they shall arrive here. They will for sure ask you where the family or the person who was your neighbour is, if you reply that he or she is dead, they will ask you who killed him or her. Even if you know it, I advise you to say nothing, but rather run away from them.” He even asked those who could not flee not to obey to RPF because its government would not last for long. Colonel Sartre thought he was addressing Hutus only because the survivors were in camps. Thus, the purpose of the rally was to incite the Hutu population to start their journey to exile. That is how the population started fleeing passing through Gisenyi and Cyangugu.”

Hubert Bigaruka was the director of a Rwandan NGO AJEMAC that had hosted the rally organised by Colonel Sartre. It was with great unwillingness that he expressed himself:

“There was a rally organized by Sartre. We could tell that RPF had won the war and that the French were preparing to leave. The hall was full with a capacity of 100 people. There were all categories of people. Sartre was the main speaker. He explained that the RPF had won and they were about to leave. He explained to the people that those who wanted to flee had to go to Bukavu. He told them that the French had to leave but that they would come back.”

Emmanuel Rwagasana is among the young people who received military training from the French during the Opération Turquoise. He also attended the rally that had been organised by Sartre:

“I arrived at Rubengera four days before we heard that a rally was to be organised there. I attended the rally that was organised by Sartre. The rally started at 11h00. Among the speakers were Sartre, Semanza and another white soldier who spoke English and a light skinned man who was translating for him. Semanza translated for Sartre. Sartre told us that we had to flee, that the Inkotanyi had reached Mushubati and that the French were going to help us to come back. He added that those who really could not run away had to hide themselves in bushes and not obey the Tutsi power.”

Rally of the intellectuals convened on 23/07/1994

The former Assistant Burgomaster, Semanza Célestin, currently jailed for suspected participation in genocide maintains his innocence and is awaiting trial. It was with a lot of unwillingness he gave some contextual references of the second rally organised by Sartre in Rubengera School’s multipurpose hall. He explained that the rally took place on 23rd July 1994 that is some days after the first RPF government was set up. Colonel Sartre was coming from Gikongoro where he had been meeting representatives of the movement.

Evariste Niyongamije was staying at Rubengera during the genocide. In 1994, he owned a small shop, but before that he was a primary school teacher.

“The French organised a rally at Rubengera chaired by Colonel Sartre. He came from Gikongoro by helicopter. Before his arrival, the assistant Burgomaster Semanza had moved around the Rubengera streets and in camps of displaced people aboard a pick up of the commune using a megaphone inviting all educated people, all people who spoke French to attend a rally that was to be held at Rubengera school’s multipurpose hall. The hall had a capacity of 500 or 600 people, it was extremely full. I was there. Sartre disembarked from a helicopter and chaired the rally with Célestin Semanza, Athanase Nshimiyimana and Hubert Bigaruka. There were also other French soldiers present whose names were not known to me. It was around the end of July. The agenda of the rally was to discuss the plan of the transitional government to return to power and take over from the RPF as well as to announce their imminent departure as well as the arrival of the Senegalese. Colonel Sartre asked all the young people who had been involved in the genocide to flee to Congo and leave Rwanda to the older people. The younger people would serve during our future attacks in two years. Then the other French soldiers had their chance to speak. They said that we had to explain to all the people that those who remained in the country had to be ready to hide those who would be coming from outside the country with arms. That rally was of great importance and they kept their promise of helping us return to power in two years. Infiltrations and attacks of the “Bacengezi” in 1997 were in line with that plan. We were assured of the French’s assistance and I think that the French Government was aware of the preparation of these attacks.”

In the village located close to the line separating RPF positions and those of the French and which seemed to have been a frontline of a hidden war that the two players were involved in, French soldiers seem to have been particularly merciless in countering any attempt of the RPF to infiltrate. For that reason, they rearmed the militia who had been the key players during the massacres in the preceding months, ordering them to stop Tutsis at roadblocks and pick them from camps of displaced persons. Those military soldiers, it seems, tortured, killed or had the people they suspected killed. In doing this, it seems that they went out of their way not only to kill or cause to be killed Tutsis who looked like they were combatants and expand their killing to others such as the women reported here.

III. KIBUYE TOWN

A certain number of facts are reported about the presence of the French in Kibuye. In that town, witnesses attest to the fact that French soldiers provided the Interahamwe with fuel taken from their fuel tanks. According to testimonies, at the time of the general mobilisation for the Bisesero attack, local authorities of Gishyita and other officials who had come for assistance got fuel from the French soldiers.

Christophe Harerimana was, at that time an Interahamwe and had a bar opposite the Gatwaro stadium where some Opération Turquoise soldiers had set up base. He is now in detention at Gisenyi prison for participating in the genocide.

“[…] I personally saw them, I had a bar opposite the stadium where the French had set up base. The Interahamwe got fuel at the Petrorwanda station and some others from the French. In fact, there were many Interahamwe and FAR vehicles that came from Gisenyi, Cyangugu, Gitarama and Kigali.”

Edmond Mushimiyimana was selling banana beer at Kibuye hospital when the French soldiers of the Opération Turquoise arrived there. He also gives an account of the fuel provisions to the Interahamwe.

“[…] when Petrorwanda fuel reserves were emptied, the French provided fuel to Interahamwe from their own reserves which they had at Mugambira’s house at Bralirwa. They brought petrol and oil barrels by ship, unloaded them and provided some to the Interahamwe that is Kayishema, Sikubwabo, Mika and Rusezera. It was the same at the time of fleeing the country.”

Destruction of public goods and pillaging

Different witnesses from Kibuye village state that the French soldiers passively assisted the Interahamwe in the destruction of the town’s infrastructure. Some of them still came from Zaire where they were in exile and got involved in the destruction.

Ignace Banyanga was an agent at the Kibuye Prefecture in 1994. In his testimony where he deplored some French soldiers actions, he raised the following points:

“[…] The following case concerns their indifference regarding the destruction of public goods. One day, we stopped their jeep to inform them about the destruction of the building that housed the prefecture accounting service, but instead they drove away as if nothing had happened.”

Rosalie Nyinawandoli is a survivor of Bisesero. Before 1994 genocide, she was in charge of social services at Gitesi commune.

“On 25/07/1994, I was at Kibuye. All administrative buildings and other infrastructure were in good condition at that time. Then, Hutu refugees from Congo were coming back to destroy and pillage these public buildings including the prefecture’s offices and schools. All goods were destroyed and looted in full view and to the knowledge of the French who let it happen.”

Evariste Niyongamije is a former Interahamwe of Kibuye. He is now detained in Gisovu Central prison for participating in the genocide. Below is his testimony on the destruction and pillaging of goods.

“[…] another thing, on a date that I cannot remember well, I assisted in a confrontation between the French and the Inkotanyi. The French were protecting people who were coming from Congo and who were entering Rwanda through Masaho to destroy houses and dismantle equipment at coffee washing stations. They would go back to Congo with the looted goods. Instead of discouraging such acts, the French encouraged them. The Inkotanyi tried to stop them from doing so but the French instead shot at them using armoured vehicles. They asked us to use mud to camouflage their armoured vehicles and promised to ensure our security. They located the Inkotanyi with binoculars and shot at them. The engines of their jeeps were always on in the night time. They bombarded the zone under Inkotanyi control and asked us to be vigilant in order to stop their infiltration. […] Their camping sites were located at Rubengera parish, at Kibuye and at Mubuga. At Rubengera, I used to talk to them and they told me that they had come to ensure the security of the Hutus who had fled the Inkotanyi.”

Refusal to give medical care to the injured Tutsis

The refusal to give medical care to the Tutsi who were injured is reported by Christophe Harerimana, already quoted herein. Having been injured, he was transferred to Kibuye hospital where many injured Tutsis were waiting for treatment.

“On 8/07/1994, Interahamwe shot at me in front of the burgomaster’s residence. French soldiers evacuated me to Kibuye hospital. I stayed there for 3 days during which I noticed that the French soldiers were refusing to give medical care to injured genocide survivors. On the contrary, they took care of the Interahamwe and FAR who had been injured in the Bisesero attacks. Afterwards, French soldiers took us to Cyangugu, precisely to Kamarampaka stadium, the same was the case for the injured soldiers coming from Kanombe. They abandoned patients and injured Tutsis at Kibuye saying that they had to be treated by the RPF. At Kamarampaka stadium, they had installed a large infirmary where we joined other injured persons. Before being treated, every patient was asked about the circumstances in which he was injured, and in case he was injured by Interahamwe he did not get care. On 28/7/1994, around 2h00, the French soldiers evacuated us [the injured Interahamwe and the FAR] to the Bukavu general hospital aboard five of their trucks. We passed by Rusizi I. From Kibuye, they refused to take care of the Tutsis and only treated the Hutus. In fact, they took care of me because I also was an Interahamwe. I was a member of the Interahamwe who had erected a roadblock in front of Kibuye hospital.”

GIKONGORO

Gikongoro Prefecture was located in the south of Rwanda and was composed of 13 communes and 3 sub prefectures. It shared borders with Cyangugu, Kibuye, Butare and Gitarama prefectures. Historically, Gikongoro is considered as the home of the genocide in Rwanda, because in 1959 at the end of the Belgian era, Tutsis got killed for the first time. Then, in December 1963, Bufundu, one of the regions of Gikongoro having a large proportion of Tutsis, was hit by acts of genocide in which 15.000 to 20.000 Tutsis were massacred on the instigation of two Parmehutu high officials, Jean Baptiste Rwasibo and André Nkeramugaba. Then there were widespread similar incidences repeated throughout the 1960s and 1970s up to the final solution of April-July 1994.

The first French soldiers of the Opération Turquoise were the COS forces, under the command of Lieutenant –Colonel Etienne Joubert of the 1er RPIMa who arrived there in reconnaissance on 24/06/1994 from Cyangugu. They established their general headquarters in the premises of the SOS Kindergarten. They were joined on June 27th by some legionnaires of the 11th Division of parachutists under the command of Captain Eric Hervé, later by the 2nd Infantry Regiment of the foreign legion from Nîmes under the command of Captain Nicol. Those last contingents set up base in the premises of ACEPER secondary school. The 3rd military company of the 13th semi-brigade of the foreign legion that came from Djibouti, under the command of Bouchez, set up base at the edge of the Nyungwe forest, near Kitabi where they dug trenches.

On 5th July, men of the 11th regiment of marine artillery, as well as the 2nd regiment of infantry parachutists that came from Reunion, took position at the Murambi Technical School which was still under construction and where massive massacres were carried out on April 20th to 21st. The French detachment which was based at Murambi was at that time under the command of Colonel Rosier who was at the same time the COS commander. Upon their arrival at Murambi, the French deployed light armoured vehicles equipped with 90 mm canons. At that time, all people in that area were convinced that the French had come to help the Rwandan government to rout the enemy. This is what encouraged the local authorities led by the préfet Laurent Bucyibaruta to organize a public demonstration holding banners praising the support of France.

The command to the Gikongoro French contingent was first given to Colonel Didier Tauzin alias Thibault. Following his declarations to the press, 4th July 1994, which shall be that the French army shall not hesitate to “halt RPF’s advance” and that orders shall be: “they shall spare nobody”, he was temporarily replaced by Colonel Sartre until 16th July, when one was transferred to Kibuye. The command of Gikongoro was then under Lieutenant Colonel Eric De Stabenrath, assisted by Commander Pegouvelo, they assumed these functions until the complete withdrawal of the Turquoise. After setting up base, the French immediately got in touch with the local administrative and military authorities of the prefecture. They were also in contact with some other national authorities who moved there as the RPF was advancing. They collaborated with the authorities who oversaw the population. They regularly held meetings with the population and conducted tours of the prefecture to select suitable places for setting up roadblocks. These were mainly located at the Mwogo stream, it seems, in order to impede the access of RPF to the Turquoise zone. They also for that same purpose established a roadblock in Nshili commune, which served the purpose of patrolling the whole border with Burundi.

As we are going to see it further, in some communes, the French dismissed some sitting Burgomasters and appointed their own new ones or confirmed the ones in power despite their participation in genocide. Most Burgomasters or sous préfets who worked with the French are today accused or condemned of genocide. The French gave clear instructions to the Burgomasters to seek for RPF infiltrators and accomplices to be taken to them. According to several testimonies, those instructions meant a green light to do whatever, including continuing hunting for the Tutsis and Hutus who refused to get involved in genocide. They also appointed civilian agents for security purposes who were given arms and collaborated with them in supervising activities.

With the Turquoise operation, many displaced peoples camps were set up in different parts of the prefecture, the most important were at Murambi, Cyanika or Karama, Mbazi, Kaduha, Musange, Kibeho, Ndago, Mudasomwa, Muko, Mushubi and others. The French set up their makeshift shelters near most of the camps which were more or less permanent. Among the French camps outside Gikongoro town, the one at Karama situated 7km away was the most important and served to second the headquarters of Gikongoro to control the communes north of the main seat of the prefecture that served the ex prefecture of Kibuye, Gitarama and part of Butare (Nyanza). It is especially in the Karama where the French gathered Tutsis from the communes of these prefectures before taking them to Murambi.

Those camps for displaces persons also hosted civilians who had left regions which were under military operations. They also hosted militia, former FAR soldiers as well as political and administrative authorities responsible for genocide. Those groups continued to hunt Tutsis in camps and in surrounding areas killing many people. The French let these killings take place, especially by not destroying the roadblocks which were manned by the militia. In a nutshell, the testimonies collected show that during their stay in Gikongoro, French soldiers got involved in offences against life, human dignity and physical and psychological integrity of people under their protection. Those facts were committed systematically and generally in different places of the prefecture. Finally, before their withdrawal, the French adopted the scorched earth policy in organising the flight of authorities and ex-FAR troops who are responsible for genocide and inciting the civilian population to flee to Zaire.

I. Distinctiveness of Murambi camp

Murambi camp was set up in the premises of a technical school which was still under construction, where 50.000 to 60.000 Tutsis who had gathered there under orders of Préfet Bucyibaruta were massacred. The French arrived at that site 2 months after the massacres and set up a camp for displaced people as well as a military base equipped with missiles and artillery. They surrounded their camp with barbed wires and trenches in order to control it. For their setting up, they got help from the local population including many militias who were responsible for the famous massacres of April 21st 1994. A big number of corpses were taken away from rooms and buried in mass graves inside the school by the prefecture administration in preparation for the arrival of the French. Some of the corpses were still there and blood was still visible on walls. This obliged the French to clean the premises and bury the corpses that were already decomposing.

For some years, a controversy rose accusing the French soldiers of having set up a volleyball ground on top of one of the mass graves in Murambi. The Commission investigated the place on different occasions accompanied by witnesses and noticed that the ground in question was set up just near the mass grave, not directly on the grave as has often been reported. Nevertheless, the boundaries of the volleyball ground were adjacent to the grave and players and spectators walked on the grave. The question here is why the French who had enough space on the Murambi site did not set up a playing ground elsewhere and preferred to put it near a place that contained human remains and be walked on it. In fact, this created the feeling of desecration of the dead which gave rise to castigation.

Many witnesses said that before one could enter Murambi camp, the French soldiers who controlled the entrance would ask about the persons’ ethnicity. Inside the camp, they mixed indistinctively Tutsis survivors of the genocide, former FAR elements and militia who had participated in the genocide. That cohabitation allowed the militia to go on with killings inside the camp yet the place was presumed to be a safe zone. Testimonies proved collusion between French soldiers and militia which permitted the continuation of the killings, rapes and other human rights violations on that site. Due to the permanent insecurity, genocide survivors who wanted to leave the Turquoise zone and asked the French to transfer them to the zone under the RPF control, not only had their requests rejected, but also faced hostility able to cause their death or their delivery to militia. It sometimes happened that French soldiers collaborated with the militia, especially in asking them to find beautiful women that they raped or drove into prostitution. They asked them to bring Tutsi girls; they were in a state of vulnerability during the genocide.

II. Acts committed by the French soldiers at Gikongoro

The Commission was made aware of acts relating to murder, attempted murder, rape, sexual violence, sexual enslavement, omission to assist a person in danger, complicity with the Interahamwe, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, refusal to supply food and medical care as well as inciting people to flee the country.

1. Delivery of Tutsi to militiamen and inciting ethnic murders

Witnesses reported to the Commission having seen French soldiers arrest civilian Tutsis and bringing them to Hutu militia who killed them in their full view. This was often carried out at roadblocks set up by the militia since April 1994 and which the French allowed to continue operating during the Opération Turquoise. The most popular roadblock was the one which was located at the Mwogo stream bridge separating the former prefectures of Butare and Gikongoro. Some witnesses affirm that some French soldiers killed Tutsis and threw their corpses in the stream. The Commission conducted investigations on those facts, but they found no convincing proof of murder directly committed by French soldiers at the roadblock on Mwogo Bridge. On the contrary, it seems that the French soldiers let the Interahamwe continue checking identity cards at that same roadblock. This checking led to murders committed by the militia in full view of the French soldiers. At different roadblocks, French soldiers either delivered Tutsis to Interahamwe so that the latter could kill them, or gave orders to militia to kill persons identified as Tutsis who had been stopped by Interahamwe or they let Tutsis be killed without intervening in one way or another. The murders of Tutsi survivors which continued after the arrival of the French soldiers were ordered by the French commander of the Gikongoro zone as one important witness narrates it.

Désiré Ngezahayo was at that time the burgomaster of Karama commune, which was located in Gikongoro suburbs. The French second commanding post in the prefecture was situated there. Ngezahayo, who speaks good French, was a close collaborator of French soldiers. He pleaded guilty to the crime of genocide and is in detention.

“Towards 03/07/1994, the French convened a meeting of all burgomasters at SOS Gikongoro. It was chaired by a colonel whose name I do not remember. He told us that the French had come to collaborate with us in order to ensure the security of the population. He added that he did not wish to see Inkotanyi infiltrate the Turquoise zone. For that purpose, he showed us a map indicating the boundaries of the Turquoise zone. He ordered us to tell people to do anything possible to stop the infiltration of the Inkotanyi in the zone. He specified that they were already in Butare near the Mwogo stream bridge and that it was possible for them to infiltrate. He ordered us to inform people to continue with the checking at different roadblocks and night patrols. He gave three criteria for recognising an Inkotanyi: The first was to check his identity card. In other words looking for the Tutsis as we had been doing before and killing the ones we found. The second criterion was to check for gun or ammunition strap marks on the shoulders of those we checked. The third was to check the tibia, because as he said Inkotanyi were wearing gumboots which left marks on their legs. He said that if we found anyone who matched the criteria, we had to immediately kill him/her without any other form of interrogation. At the end of the meeting, we left to go to implement the instructions that we had received from the French. We reinforced checking at roadblocks, verified among displaced persons to make sure there were no Inkotanyi infiltrators. Whenever Tutsis were found, they were immediately killed. Killings continued even though the French were officially saying that they had come to rescue people.”

The former burgomaster of Nyamagabe, Jean Baptiste Mukamarutoki, who was appointed by French soldiers and collaborated with them for one and half months confirms instructions given to burgomasters by French soldiers for the continuation of Tutsi murders.

“French soldiers did not behave well during their presence at Gikongoro. They largely contributed to the divisionism of Rwandans. They were telling authorities, including me, to chase the Inyenzi away from our communes. They gave us that message in meetings that they convened and which were held at SOS.”

Francois Bigirimana was living near Mwogo stream which separates Gikongoro from Butare and near the roadblock mentioned above by Désiré Ngezahayo. He stated:

“When the French arrived at Kinyamakara, they first set up roadblocks and left them manned by ex FAR soldiers, including Habyarimana Jacques, Nkusi and sergeant Gasasira. Among those roadblocks I can mention one which was located between Nyangazi and Kabatwa. The French soldiers delivered to Interahamwe persons they accused of being Inkotanyi or their accomplices. This was the case for Habyarimana a native of Maraba. He was a Hutu who had come to look for his family members who were in the Mbogo camp so as to take them to the zone under RPF control. He was denounced to the French soldiers. They delivered him to the Interahamwe among who was Nyandwi under the pretext that he had no identity card and that that was proof of being an accomplice of the Inkotanyi.”

Bigirimana added that his maternal uncle of Tutsi ethnicity named Rekeraho was murdered by Interahamwe in full view of French soldiers:

“My uncle whose name was Rekeraho was taken from Mwogo roadblock by Rwandan reservists. While they were discussing his fate, the French soldiers patrol arrived and stopped. The reservists lied to the French that he was a Tutsi trying to flee. The French were indifferent and the reservists beat him up in full view of the French soldiers and he died from injuries two days later.”

Daniel Mazimpaka gave an account of the handing over of Tutsis to Interahamwe at two roadblocks, one located at Kigeme and another in Gikongoro town centre:

“When the French arrived at Gikongoro, they announced that peace had come back, that we had no reason to be afraid. Tutsi survivors began coming out of their hiding places to join the French soldiers. They would take them to Murambi camp, but sometimes they handed them to us at roadblocks. I can mention the case of two roadblocks where the French delivered Tutsis: first of all at the Kigeme roadblock where the French got people out of their vehicles and handed them to the Interahamwe. The other case was at the roadblock located in Gikongoro town centre opposite the Petrorwanda gas station. That roadblock was manned by Burgomaster Mukamarutoki. Eight people who were coming from Kaduha were killed over there yet the French were close to the roadblock and armed. This happened at the paved road heading to Butare. When the French delivered Tutsis to roadblocks, they used gestures to ask the Interahamwe to kill them.”

Augustin Nzabahimana was one of the militia who manned a roadblock at Kuwigiti, near Cyanika. He gives an account of the killing of four persons stopped at that roadblock under orders of the French.

“At Kuwigiti, there was a roadblock where displaced persons passed. It was set up with the orders of the conseiller of Cyanika sector, Munyankindi Callixte, assisted by militia like Grégoire and Nteziryayo. One day, we stopped four Tutsis who were among the displaced people who were passing by. French soldiers were nearby. Conseiller Munyankindi told us that Tutsis had to be killed and ordered us to undress them and then to tie them with ropes. A French soldier told us to kill them, but that we had to move to a rock which was at a distance from the road. Nteziryayo killed them all.”

Fidèle Nkeramugaba confirms having seen the préfet Laurent Bucyibaruta and French soldiers moving around Muko commune calling for people to come out of their hiding places. Following those messages, Tutsi survivors came out and were killed by the Interahamwe, sometimes delivered by the French:

“When préfet Bucyibaruta spread the message accompanied by the French, we went out of our hiding places and started to evacuate survivors to Kizi. But at the same time, the French absurdly delivered some survivors to Interahamwe and let them continue the massacres. I know a person who was a native of Gitarama that they delivered to the population at Kaduha, and he was murdered in their full view.”

The delivery of Tutsis to the Interahamwe also took place in Murambi camp where the French let the Interahamwe get into the camp with their arms and select persons who they eventually killed. Cassile Tuyizere declared: “During the time we spent at Murambi, I noticed that the French let the Interahamwe get into the camp with arms as if they were in connivance. They were selecting people and taking them out of the camp to kill them.”

The same experience was known to Aaron Nshimiye:

“I arrived at Murambi in July 1994 with the assistance of friends who had managed to find for me a Hutu identity card which helped me to cross roadblocks. The Interahamwe had no fear at all at roadblocks, they were greeting the French as their comrades in arms. The French would continue going about their business without requesting the dismantling of such roadblocks on which the Interahamwe were killing Tutsis. I shall give the example of the Gatyazo and Kabeza roadblocks which were crossed by the French without dismantling them. Similarly, at Murambi the French let Interahamwe get into the camp. This led to recurrent deaths of survivors and the French did not react. In spite of the setting up of the Murambi camp and the French presence, the Interahamwe continued their killings without any fear. I was beaten up and injured by an Interahamwe inside Murambi, the French were there but did nothing to protect me.”

2. Freedom granted to militiamen to continue murdering genocide survivors

In several cases, French soldiers did not rescue persons who were under imminent danger of either being killed or being victims of grave physical abuse. They did not dismantle roadblocks manned by the Interahamwe which were used as places for screening and killing people. They let armed militia get into camps where genocide survivors gathered and left them to take persons who they later killed. It also happened that the French assisted or incited acts of killing Tutsi genocide survivors who came to ask them for assistance.

In fact, at Mwogo stream, there was a roadblock manned by Interahamwe, and some metres away from there, there was another roadblock that was manned by the French.

Claude Balinda together with other Interahamwe killed two men in full view of the French:

“I was an Interahamwe and was at the Mwogo stream roadblock with some FAR soldiers who had been sent there by the Burgomaster of Kinyamakara, Charles Munyaneza. At that stream, precisely at the main Butare-Gikongoro road, there was a bridge where the French had set up a roadblock to check people who were moving from Gikongoro towards the RPF controlled zone. We stopped two men who were heading to Butare together with their luggage. The Militia who were with me told me that the two men who were going to the RPF zone were Inkotanyi and for that reason they had to be killed. Immediately two Interahamwe named Mafiyeri and Modeste shot dead the two men and there was surprisingly no reaction from the French.”

Désiré Ngezahayo witnessed the refusal by French soldiers to rescue a person who was about to be killed: “A Tutsi lady named Michelline a native of Ruhango was killed by a commune police man under orders of sous-préfet Ntegeyintwari Joseph at a roadblock located near the Karaba sous-préfecture office. The French were present and did not prevent the murder. They did nothing to stop the massacres; their main preoccupation was to control the prefecture’s boundaries so that RPF could not infiltrate the zone.”

This testimony was confirmed by Juvenal Mudenge, a former policeman at Karama: “When Michelline was shot dead, the French had already arrived at Karama. They did not dismantle the Gatyazo roadblock which was manned by the Interahamwe. At that roadblock, many people who were trying to flee to Cyanika or Gikongoro were killed during the genocide and this lasted for the duration of the Opération Turquoise. Those Interahamwe, including Callixte Gahamanyi, found and killed Michelline some meters from where the French were manning a roadblock.”

Côme Bayingana affirmed that the arrival of the French soldiers caused the death of the Tutsis who were still alive:

“When the French arrived at Gikongoro, they said that peace had been restored and that the Tutsis who were in hiding could come out of their hiding places. They distributed leaflets to spread the message. People believed it and got out of their hiding places but unfortunately some of them were killed to the knowledge of the French. I know the case of five women who got out of their hiding places in Nyarubungo sector. In surrounding areas, there were many Interahamwe who were hanging about the camps of Gashwati and Rwondo. When they saw these women moving towards the French, they followed them so that they could not reach the French. The latter did not go to the rescue of those women while they were shouting for help. They were caught and then cruelly killed by those Interahamwe.”

Joseph Kabayiza certified that he saw Tutsis who were murdered by the Interahamwe at the roadblock of Mwogo in full view of the French:

“During the genocide, I went to seek refuge at Rwaniro with my cows. In June, I went back home at Kibaga to get a heifer I had left at home. Upon my arrival at Mwogo Bridge, I found a roadblock manned by French soldiers, Rwandan gendarmes and the Interahamwe all together. I did not want to cross the roadblock because they were checking identity cards. I preferred moving along the valley but at the same time observing what was happening at the roadblock. I then saw the Interahamwe bring some people under the bridge that they immediately killed. The French who were standing near the bridge remained passive; they did nothing to rescue people who were being killed. Among the victims, I could recognise Bambarisha, Twizeyimana, Mivumbi and Kavumbuka. There were also three girls who I could not identify.”

A teacher at Kaduha named Gahigiro was also killed without any reaction from the French soldiers. Béatrice Ahobantegeye explained circumstances under which those Interahamwe killed Gahigiro:

“The Interahamwe found Gahigiro at Mujyebubu’s home in Musange where he had been hiding. They undressed him in full view of the French and had him walk the entire street naked. The French watched the scene without reacting. Then, the Interahamwe murdered the victim in a cruel way and the French did not even try to rescue the man. He was killed by Mucyo Antoine, Mutabazi Aimable, Semana Manassé and Munyengango Edouard near the Kaduha Health centre. After killing him, the killers threw his corpse in the health centre’s toilet. I was there when they killed him, Murera and Turamyiyingoma Landouald who is now detained in Gikongoro prison was also there.”

Epiphane Musabyemariya testified about the same event: “A man named Gahigiro was murdered by the Interahamwe and the French who were there did nothing to prevent the murder.”

Emmanuel Ibyimana gave an account of the case of a group of Tutsis fleeing from Kibuye, who the French refused to rescue well knowing that they were going to be certainly killed:

“On 27th June 1994, the French soldiers arrived at Muko saying that they had information about the presence of armed people at Rwofe. I went down with them since they had appointed me as a security agent in the region. On our way, we met a group of six men. They told us that they were from Bisesero and that they were fleeing from the killing of Tutsis in that region. Those people talked to the French’s interpreter named Ngirinshuti Athanase requesting protection from the French. The French did not want; instead they ordered them to move away from their vehicle. The six men insisted but in vain. They even lay on the ground imploring the French to help them because they were otherwise going to be killed. The French got angry and shot in the air to make them go away. When people heard gunshots, they rushed to the place to see what had happened. The French ordered the people to take those men off the road. They were put aside by force, and we drove away. I did not know what followed, but the men were probably killed.”

Denis Ndarishize stated that two people were killed at one roadblock in full view of French soldiers who did not intervene to rescue them:

“French soldiers passed by here in June 1994 aboard four jeeps coming from Kibuye. Upon reaching the Nyirarangi Bridge, they found a roadblock which had been manned by the Interahamwe since the beginning of the genocide. The chief of the roadblock was Salomon. The French also found there two Tutsis who had been stopped by the Interahamwe and were being questioned. They watched on. Three Interahamwe named Muratankwaya, Munyandamutsa and Salomon killed those Tutsis in full view of the French soldiers who did not react. I was living close to that roadblock and watched what was going on from my house. Among the victims, I recognised one girl whose name I do not remember who lived in former Muko commune, as well as a man who lived in Rwofe Sector.”

Philippe Ntete confirms that French soldiers refused to protect him while he was at a road where militia could kill him:

“During the genocide, I hid near Murambi until June 1994. After the arrival of the French, the person who was hiding me told me that the French were protecting Tutsis. He accompanied me, but did not wish to reach the entrance of the camp fearing that the Interahamwe would see him. He left me near the camp at a place where we could see a French vehicle coming towards us. When the French approached me, I used my hand to stop them. They got out of the vehicle and asked me whether I was Hutu or Tutsi. I told them that I was Tutsi and needed their protection because I was in danger of being killed. They left me there and continued as if nothing happened.”

Consolée Murambeho, a genocide survivor, gave an account of how she had been raped by the Interahamwe at Kaduha and when she went to report the rape to the French who were in charge of public order, they released the person who was responsible:

“When the French came to Gikongoro, they told people that they had come to protect those who were under threat. But they did nothing to ensure the safety of the Tutsis in my region who had not been killed. Instead they protected our killers. I was raped by the Interahamwe and went to see the French to report the matter. They arrested one of them who I had accused. His name was Ngamije. He defended himself saying that my husband was a Tutsi. The French released him without any further explanation. Once released, the came back looking for me to kill me. Luckily enough I had already left the place as I had been advised by some friends who helped me hide.”

Journalists present at the place in July-August 1994, described a situation whereby survivors were threatened with death by militia, while the French were theoretically there to stop massacres. Corinne Lesnes of the French daily Le Monde noticed that “there are at Murambi protected displaced people, but terrorised, who would like nothing else (….) than leaving the ‘security zone’ set up to reassure them of security” . Dominique Garraud of Libération observed the same dangerous environment for genocide survivors:

“Close to the market full of vegetables which is a symbol of regional productivity, French soldiers were greeted by Rwandan soldiers and nonchalant militia who were carrying brand new Kalashnikovs and saluting them. The apparently good behaviour is fake. Among the crowded displaced persons, the militia still hunt for Tutsis and moderate Hutus” .

Official documents of the Opération Turquoise forgotten by French soldiers at Kaduha show that in July 1994, there were still fresh corpses. This tends to confirm testimonies which talked about murders which continued during the presence of French soldiers. In fact, an information copy from Opération Turquoise PCIT dated 10th July 1994 said that: “Many mass graves, some containing hundreds of corpses, were found close to Kaduha. It seems that there could be some fresh corpses near the market.”

The continuation of massacres of Tutsis at Kaduha was noticed by western reporters who arrived there accompanied by French soldiers. This was noticed in July 1994 Christian Lecomte of the weekly La Vie: “In mid July the Kaduha church was still tainted with the carnage which had taken place there: traces of blood were still on the crutches left behind. Nothing had been washed or hidden. The perpetrators did not expect any punishment. […]Because the hunting down of Tutsis was still going on in the sous-préfecture of Kaduha.”

3. Direct involvement of French soldiers in acts of murder

Testimonies collected from the territory of the former Gikongoro prefecture, in present districts of Nyamagabe and Nyaruguru show that there were murders committed directly by the French on unarmed civilians. It had been told to the Commission that the French would have killed people at different places like Mwogo Bridge, Mbogo former Kinyamakara commune, at Masizi former Musange commune, etc. After a number of field investigation at the scenes of the alleged acts, the Commission retained only three cases whose veracity is more convincing.

3.1. Murder of Silas Hangimana at Gashiha

The first case of murder retained is the one of Silas Hangimana, killed by the French at Gashiha, Nyamagabe, to punish his aggressive attitude towards his mother. Juvenal Gakwavu, brother of the victim clarifies circumstances under which the murder was committed.

“One day, following a quarrel, my brother Silas violently beat up my mother. She called me and asked me to go and call the French soldiers who were based at Murambi. They were in charge of public order at that time. My mother wanted the French to help solve the problem with her son who used to beat her. I went to Murambi and explained the case to the French. Two French soldiers accompanied me home. After they had listened to what my mother had to tell them, the two soldiers asked her what type of punishment she would like for Silas. My mother explained that it was not the first time that he had beaten her and that he deserved a dissuasive punishment in order to end once and for all the beatings he had subjected her to. In the end, one of the French soldiers shot at Silas who immediately fell down. They said goodbye and went away without waiting for anything else. Silas lost a lot of blood and died the following day he passed.”

Célestin Senkwavu, another brother of the victim affirmed the story of Gakwavu: “when the two French soldiers arrived at my mother’s house, I was present. Silas was absent. They waited for him. When he arrived, they asked my mother if she had any kind of punishment to propose for him. She replied that she would like a dissuasive punishment so that he could stop beating her. At that time, one of the French soldiers shot Silas on the knee. He bled too much and the following day he passed away” .


Emmanuel Gakunde, neighbour of the victim, confirmed the murder of Silas Hangimana by a French soldier.

“There were disputes between Silas and his mother, and then Silas beat her up. After that Gakwavu went first to inform his brother Senkwavu who lived in Gataba centre. Gakwavu exaggerated what he told Senkwavu because he said that Silas had killed their mother when actually he had only given her a simple blow. Without checking on what actually happened, Senkwavu wet immediately to the French in Murambi. Sometime after I saw the French come with Senkwavu to his mother’s home. Then I learnt the same day that the French had shot dead Silas. The news quickly spread in the region. The following day, several people refused to go to bury Silas saying that his family which got him killed should do it themselves. I am one of those who buried him. There was a lot of sadness in the family and among them.”

These testimonies have been confirmed by other people like Alivera Kubwimana, daughter of Gakwavu who was living with her grand mother, Marie Uwimana, the victim’s wife, Gaspard Ayirwanda, the victim’s neighbour and Juvénal Mudenge, a former policeman at Karama commune where the family was living.



3.2 Murder of Paulin Karemera at Kaduha

The second case of murder which was reported in a convincing way was the murder of Paulin Karemera, shot dead by French soldiers at Kaduha. Jean Rukwekweri, father of the victim, was present at the time of his death.

“The French came to my house in June 1994. At that time there were many displaced people at Kaduha who did not have enough food. To get food, those displaced people used to come and steal from our houses or from our fields. The first time they came, we chased them away. The second time they came, they attempted to steal my cows. Upon seeing them I called upon my son Karemera. We pursed them and Karemera threw a grenade at them. They ran away shouting that they had been attacked by the Inkotanyi. I went back home thinking that the problem was solved. French soldiers who were on top of the hill came down. Sometime later, I heard gunshots close to my home. I went out of the house to see what had happened. I saw my son full of blood lying on the ground. The French soldiers had shot him dead.”

Védaste Kayiranga is a brother of the man who was killed by those soldiers and was at the scene of his murder. He clarified the circumstances of the murder.

“Towards the end of June 1994, there were many displaced people in Kaduha who were coming from different regions of the country and the French arrived here at that time. One day, those displaced people came home to steal food from a Tutsi woman called Christine Bazarama. We fought them and beat them. The second time, they came back in a bigger number. My brother Karemera Paulin, who had served in the army, had a grenade. He unbolted it and threw it at them. The displaced went to report to the French who intervened immediately. When we saw them, we ran away, the French ran after us while shooting at us. Karemera was hit by a bullet on his arm. He started bleeding profusely. I immediately tried to cover the injury with a piece of cloth. The French went on shooting at us and Karemera was hit once again in the belly, he then fell down. The French reached where he was and undressed him in order to cover his injury. He was bleeding too much and after some minutes he died. A French helicopter came and took the soldiers away leaving the corpse lying there and naked. A woman called Mukamihigo removed her wrapper and covered the corpse. After the departure of the French we took the corpse back home and then proceeded to his burial.”

Venantie Mukamihigo stated that she was the first to arrive at the scene of the murder and saw the victim. She related the circumstances of the murder as follows:

“I saw displaced people leaving the house of Rukwekweli chased by Karemera Paulin. Some time after they had left, I heard a loud noise not far from me. When I went out of my house to see what had happened, I saw Keremera lying on the ground. The French were trying to help him recover. They undressed him and covered his injury. Shortly the French were taken away aboard their helicopter. He died a short while after. I was the first to arrive at the scene; I removed my wrapper and covered the corpse.”

Jean Baptiste Nzaramba was on the hill opposite the hill where the murder took place, he watched what was happening:

“Displaced people invaded the house of Karemera’s parents. In Karemera’s defense, he threw a grenade at them. The displaced went to tell the French who started chasing the man who had thrown a grenade. When they reached the place they shot Karemera. I saw it because I was standing on the hill that you see on the opposite side. After the gunshots, a helicopter landed at the place. The French left. The victim’s family came over and took him home.”

François Mwikarago confirms the previous stories of the murder: “I was in the market and I was informed that there had been a murder at my parents-in-law’s place. I immediately rushed there and saw the corpse of Karemera still lying down. I also saw the French soldiers’ helicopter taking off. We took the corpse back home.”

Christine Bazarana, though in hiding at Rukwekweri’s house was an indirect witness of the murder:

“I was hiding at Rukwekweli Jean’s house. He had a son whose name was Karemera Paulin who had served in the FAR army. Karemera went out of the house to chase people who were stealing food from his parents’ field. The thieves screamed saying that they were being chased by the Inkotanyi. Upon hearing the alarm, the French came over and shot at Karemera Paulin without making any inquiry on the matter. He died immediately. Then, they moved to Karemera’s father’s house Rukwekweli, they tied him up using strings and took him to Murambi aboard their Jeep. I met with him later after the departure of the French and they told me that the French had severely tortured him.”

Antoine Mucyo was also a witness of the same murder;

“During the genocide, I was living in Kaduha, working as a teacher of physics and sciences at an agro-veterinary secondary school. French soldiers arrived at the place in June 1994. Their helicopters hovered around the whole region. One day I personally saw them involved in the murder of a person at a place called Joma near Kaduha. I heard gunshots and grenade explosions not far from one of the camps of displaced people. The crowds of people were shouting that the French had just killed an Inyenzi. I, like many others, ran to the place. Upon our arrival at Joma, I saw two men lying on the ground. One was already dead while the other was still alive with his hands in the air. One Frenchman had a gun pointed at him.”

Epiphanie Musabyemariya supported the previous testimonies in her statement:

“The French came to Kaduha and said that they were there to protect people. Unfortunately, I have to admit that they did not do good things at all. I witnessed the murder of Rukwekweri’s son named Karemera. They shot him dead in day time for no apparent reason: accused of being an Inkotanyi by people he was chasing from his family’s fields.

3.3. Murder of a young man in downtown Gikongoro

The third murder case committed by the French soldiers took place in the town centre of Gikongoro. Emmanuel Gakunde, who happened to be on the spot where this happened, confirmed this to the Commission as follows:

“I was a watchman in a project run by the Ministry of Agriculture called P.S.T.P., situated at about twenty meters from the premises of another agricultural project called P.D.A.G. A group of young men came to steal new bicycles in the buildings belonging to that project. I think the French saw them with binoculars, because hardly had they succeeded in breaking into the premises that the French soldiers arrived from Gikongoro Guest House, situated at the top of the hill. When those young men saw them, they run away. The French fired and one of the young boys was seriously injured. His father’s name was Straton Kajeguhakwa. They loaded his body in their vehicle and I do not know what followed thereafter.

Jean Ndahimana alias Karayuriye narrated how the same incident happened:

“I happened to be below the Guest House of Gikongoro, and I heard gun shots fired by the French soldiers, who were going down the hill following thieves who had entered into the premises of P. D. A. G project. The thieves run away but one of them was hit by a bullet fired by the French soldiers, and he died on the spot. The French soldiers put his body in their jeep and drove away.”

Anastase Murengera told the Commission that he was working at Gikongoro Guest House and that he witnessed this murder:

“I was walking on the road leading to P.D.A.G premises coming from work at the Guest House. I heard gun shots and saw at the same time French soldiers running fast towards the P.D.A.G buildings. I got scared and started running away from that place. After some meters, I fell down and was injured on my mouth and this made me slow down. As I was getting up, I looked at the P.D.A.G premises and I saw French soldiers taking the body of the killed person killed towards their vehicle. Latter, I came to learn that that the victim was Sylvain, the son of Kajeguhakwa Straton. I know both the victim and the father. Kajeguhakwa died some years ago. This happened during the month of July, on a date I do not remember very well. It was around 10 o’clock in the morning”.

4. Cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment

The Commission heard accounts of people who suffered cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment at the hands of the French soldiers. The acts were characterized by great violence such as throwing down people into forests or in the open air from flying helicopters, tying up peoples’ body parts and later beating them up, kicking them, and acts aimed at terrorizing people, etc. These acts left some victims handicapped or permanently injured. According to some testimonies heard by the Commission, the French soldiers justified their actions by saying that they wanted to punish troublemakers in an exemplary manner.

4.1 Throwing Tutsis and troublemakers off board flying helicopters into Nyungwe forest.

Desire Ngezahayo, who was the burgomaster of Karama commune where the French soldiers were camping, told the Commission that he worked closely with the French soldiers as an interpreter or providing them with some other services. He confirmed the acts of throwing people off board flying helicopters into Nyungwe forest and told the Commission that such acts were targeted at genocide survivors:

“French soldiers used to leave very early in the morning in their jeeps and would patrol the whole Prefecture. Sometimes, I was with them in my capacity as a Burgomaster, but mainly to serve them as an interpreter. Their aim was to arrest the Tutsi and infiltrators suspected of being Inkotanyi (RPF). These people were arrested either on roadblocks or were reported by the people to the French soldiers. We would first take them to Karama and then to Murambi. From Murambi, the French soldiers would select only Tutsis, beat them up, and tie their arms at the back before putting them in sacks, leaving their heads exposed. They would then carry them in helicopters. Later on, the French soldiers told me that they were throwing these people in Nyungwe forest. When I asked them why they were using such methods, one French Captain told me that they had to get rid of harmful elements. He went on to say that the French did not want people to know that they were killing people and that they threw them in the forest because they had no time to burry them.”

Shinani Siborurema told the Commission that he had been beaten up and thrown into Nyungwe forest by the French soldiers because he had been accused of being an accomplice to Inyenzi (RPF):

“French soldiers tied my legs and arms. Shortly after, I was put in a sack up to the neck and was thrown into their jeep. They took me to my place in Kibirizi, saying that I must be hiding some Inyenzi. They searched my house and found nobody. They took me back to Murambi. Later, they put in a helicopter and flew me over Nyungwe forest where they threw me off board. I dropped at a place called Kuwa Senkoko. I was wounded by a branch of a tree on my buttocks and I was mentally in a shock. I walked slowly with the help of a stick that I had picked from the forest and managed to reach Kitabi and Gasarenda. I met some people I knew who helped me to get to my place. These were Yaramba, Nyirimirera, Bavugirije Andre and Habiyambere”. Siborurema showed the Commission a big scar on his buttocks from the wound he had sustained when he was thrown out of a helicopter.

Emmanuel Izabiliza, the husband of Gloriose Musabyimana, suffered many acts of torture before being thrown off board a flying helicopter at the entry of Nyungwe forest. He had been arrested by French soldiers after being reported by the people to be an Inkotanyi who had infiltrated Zone Turquoise:

“My wife and I took refugee at Gikongoro. When we arrived at Murambi camp, there was nothing to eat. Together with my wife and four other people, we went to Caritas to look for something to eat. Interahamwe reported us to the French soldiers accusing us of being Inkotanyi. The French arrested us and asked us for our identity cards. They read them and took us to SOS. At night, they took off our clothes and tore them into pieces. They tied us naked with these pieces of cloth and bundled us onto their lorries. The following day, they took us to Murambi in a building where one could still see a lot of fresh blood. They beat us very badly. Later, they put us in a helicopter and flew towards Cyangugu. Before reaching Nyungwe forest, they untied us and started throwing us off board one by one. The first person was dropped at Mudasomwa, the second at Nkundwe, the third at Mujoga, the fourth at Kuwingugu, and I was thrown last at a place near Kitabi tea factory known as Mara (former Mudasomwa commune). I fell in a thick bush called “Ibishiha”.

Immediately after landing, people came running towards me, accusing me of being an Inkotanyi. I heard them debating whether to kill me while others were of the view that I should first be interrogated. As they were discussing, I tried to explain to them my problems. Finally, they accepted my explanation and took me to Kitabi tea factory. I was walking very slowly because I had been wounded on my back. The Manager of the factory decided to give me a vehicle to take me home. When we arrived at Gakoma before reaching Kigeme, the driver saw a roadblock manned by Interahamwe, and did not wish to continue. He left me there. The Interahamwe asked me for my identity card, but I did not have it since the French soldiers had taken it from me. They did not believe me, and they said that I was a Tutsi. They made me lie down and started beating me. The Counsellor of Matyazo was passing by and when he recognized me, he asked that I should be let free. I went to the offices of the prefecture where I was given an identity paper. It was this document that I presented and I was let to go home.”

All witnesses interviewed by the Commission from places where victims were thrown off board flying helicopters tended to corroborate the testimony of Emmanuel Izabiliza. Fidele Yambabariye who works at the tea factory recalls:

“During Turquoise and before the genocide, I was working in that factory. One day, I think it was in July 1994, I saw in front of the factory a young man who had been brought there by people; they were saying that he had been dropped at a hill in front of the factory by the French, just at the end of Nyungwe forest. It is a hill that one can see very well on the left when one leaves the factory. I did not follow up what happened with that young man, but he came there escorted by the local people.”

Silas Nyandwi described the same event in the following words:

“I saw a helicopter flying over Cyubushyiga hill and at one time, I saw it coming down as if it was going to land but without reaching the ground, Suddenly, I saw a young man being thrown off board. We went to see him and asked him what had happened. He was in a state of shock and was telling us incomprehensible stories. He would start a sentence and finish it without making any sense. I was however able to understand that he had been taken from a camp of displaced people and that he was not alone in that helicopter. We took him to the authorities and I do not know what happened later”.

Andre Muzigirwa was also thrown off board a flying helicopter after being arrested by French soldiers at Gasarende trading center. He was suspected of being Inkotanyi. He was first tortured by the French and latter thrown off board a flying helicopter at the edge of Nyungwe forest. He was with one of his friends, Jean-Damascene Kalimunda:

“The French came to Gasarenda accompanied by the burgomaster of former Mudasomwa commune, Faustin Kanyeshyamba. I was having a walk with Kalimunda Jean Damascene. They arrested us on the instructions of Kanyeshyamba, saying that we were Inkotanyi. They tied our arms and took us in a lorry to their camp in Murambi. In Murambi, they made us put off our clothes, some of them beat us up with fists, and gun butts. The following day, we were separately put in sacks and into a helicopter. When the helicopter was flying over Nyungwe forest, they threw us off board separately. I spent about a week in the forest without being able to get out, because I was still tied. I walked slowly trying to find my way to Mudasomwa or to Cyangugu. I ate wild fruits. After between three to five days, I found a way out. People who were taking cows to Kinyaga untied me. I walked with them up to Cyangugu.”

Emmanuel Ibyimana a former FAR soldier from 1990- 1992, was at his place at Karama during Opération Turquoise. French soldiers ordered him to ensure the security of the zone where Karama camp was. He told the Commission that he witnessed some acts of torture including throwing people off board flying helicopters:

“One day, French soldiers came and asked me to accompany them to Kaduha. I was told that they were looking for some people, including businessmen Mpambanyi and Emmanuel, son of Buregeya, as well as Katasi. When they found him (Katasi), they tied his arms at the back and he was bundled onto their vehicle. I went with them in their lorry. All the way, they were repeatedly kicking him using their boots. When we reached the bridge leading to Karambo, he was beaten again and put in a sack. . When we arrived at Karama, we left him there, in a barracks they had set up. I did not witness what happened to him thereafter, except that I heard that he was thrown in Nyungwe forest.”

The violence Katasi suffered at the hands of the French soldiers was also echoed by Eliezer Nyemazi, another eyewitness of incidents at Kaduha. Desire Ngezahayo narrated what the French did to Katasi:

“I saw French soldiers tying people’s arms at their back using wires or something that looked like strong strings. One of the victims that I remember was called Benimana Jean known as Katasi, who was a veterinary doctor at the operational unit of PDAG at Kaduha. The French took him to Kaduha in a military lorry. They spent the night in their military camp at Karama, near the communal offices. When Katasi was brought to Kaduha, he was still tied but they later untied him and took to a military cell. The following day, he was tied again and put in a helicopter. When I asked a French captain where they were taking him in that manner, he told me that such types of people were thrown into Nyungwe forest.”

The arrest of Katasi was further confirmed by Epiphanie Musabyimana who lived in Kaduha at that time:

“The French sais they were looking for people who possessed arms with intention of taking them away. They went to Benimana’s place, alias Katasi, probably after somebody reported him to the French. They tied his arms at the back and took him to a military camp in Karama. Later, I heard people say that he had been thrown into Nyungwe forest.”

Joachim Hategekimana, a former sous préfet of Kaduha, summed up the above testimonies and concurred with Desire Ngezahayo regarding the justification given by the French for throwing people off board flying helicopters:

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“When the French arrived at Kaduha, they collected all the survivors from different places: from the nursing school, the agro-veterinary school, and the health centre. They transported them in their Lorries. The French also arrested other people, among them Katasi and Laurien. I heard people say that they were all thrown into Nyungwe forest. When the local authorities raised the issue of throwing people off board flying helicopters during a meeting with the French, the French replied that they were doing it only to individuals who were considered dangerous to the population”

No single witness reported seeing Katasi again after the claims that he was thrown into Nyungwe forest, which makes one to think that he probably died.

4.2 Throwing people off board at the edge and outside Nyungwe forest

Cases of people being thrown out of flying helicopters outside Nyungwe forest were reported in five places: Ruseke, Sheke, Shaba, Rusebeya and Nyakizu. These places are found in communes neighbouring Nyungwe forest south of Gikongoro towards the border with Burundi. They were surrounded with big camps of displaced persons, including Kibeho and Kamana camps. Nyakizu was at the border with Mubuga commune where Kibeho camp was. These different places are at a distance ranging from 15 to 30 km from the edge of Nyungwe forest, except Shaba and Rusebeya which border it.

4.2.1 Throwing people off board at Ruseke

Ruseke is found in former Mubuga commune, Karama sector. During its investigations in this area, the Commission heard Balthazar Musonera alias Gataro, a victim who had been thrown out of a flying helicopter. He narrated his ordeal in the following words:

“I met French soldiers at Butare, behind Huye stadium. They arrested me together with Kirenga and another person that I did not know. They tied our arms at the back and put us in a helicopter. I was thrown out of a flying helicopter and dropped at a place called Ruseke. Many people gathered around me asking me different questions. A former FAR soldier who was there recognised me since I was also a former soldier. He told the people gathered there that I was a Hutu. I was then taken to Ndago at the communal offices. The burgomaster set me free after confirming that I was a Hutu. Thereafter, I went to live with my sister, Mukandekezi Goretti.”

When asked about the above testimony, both Goretti Mukandekezi and Dominique Nzamurambaho concurred with the testimony of Musonera who is a family member. Other testimonies on these incidents were given by other people living in areas where people were thrown out from flying helicopters. Some saw these incidents while others heard people talk about them soon after their occurrence. Nyamwasa Laurent told the Commission the following:

“We were at a roadblock at Ndago when we arrested father Sebera and some nuns who were with him. We took them to the communal offices of Mubuga. Bakundukize, the burgomaster, refused us to kill them saying that he was going to hand them over to the Interahamwe at Mata. We went back to our homes. When we reached Mata, I saw a young man being thrown out of a flying helicopter. He was tied with a military belt. We went away thereafter”

Vianney Ndayambaje confirmed to the Commission acts of throwing people out of flying helicopters in the following words:

“As I was looking after cows in the valley, I saw a helicopter making movements above where I was. When I went back home, I heard family members saying that a man had been thrown out of a flying helicopter at Ruseke. But I did not see the man they were referring to.”

Eric Uwimana saw the person who was thrown out of the flying helicopter. This is what he told the Commission:

“I saw that person. His arms were tied on his back. The local population picked him up. He told us that he had been thrown out together with someone that the other person was thrown at Coko. People took him to the conseiller of Kamana sector. I don’t know what happened to him thereafter.”

4.2.2 Throwing people off board at Sheke

Sheke is a cell, (an administrative entity) that was part of Kamana sector in former Mubuga commune. Several witnesses from this area told the Commission that they were aware of cases of people being thrown out of flying helicopters during the month of July 1994. Narcisse Mbabariye told the Commission the following words:

“I saw a French helicopter between the month of June and July in 1994. It hovered over Sheke School as if it was going to land. It lowered to about 3 m above the ground and a person was thrown out. It went further higher after this. When the helicopter left, we went to the spot where the person had dropped. We found him with his arms tied at the back. He was wearing a pair of trousers with a jean jacket. When we asked him where he was coming from, he told us that he had been arrested by the French. People who were there decided to take him to Munini police station and sous prefecture. I did not go with them. I stayed at my place, but I later learnt that he had been taken to the offices of Mubuga commune at Ndago and that he had been killed together with Father Sebera and the nuns.”

Eric Uwimana was among the people who went to see the person who had just been thrown off board a helicopter and he told the Commission the following:

“A helicopter came and hovered about two meters above the ground. It did not land, but instead a young man was thrown out of the helicopter. I immediately rushed to the spot where this young man had been thrown. He was lying on the ground with his arms tied at the back. He was wearing a jean trouser. He also had a back rack. He told us that in the helicopter, he was with another person and that other people had already been thrown out of the helicopter at Coko. Later, he was taken to the conseiller of Kamana sector and I do not know what happened to him later.”

Catherine Nshutininka also witnessed scenes of throwing people out of flying helicopters and she told the Commission the following:

“I heard the noise of an approaching plane, and I got scared thinking that it was the soldiers at war. I went into the house. When I came out, I heard people talking about a person who had just been thrown off a flying helicopter. I went to the scene and saw a man whose arms were tied at the back. The rope looked like the one commonly used to tie goats. He told us that he was not alone in the helicopter, that they were three and one had just been thrown out at Coko. The conseiller of the sector thereafter gave orders that he should be taken to Ndago at the communal offices. I do not know what happened to him thereafter.”

Emmanuel Urengejeho also recalls seeing people being thrown out of a flying helicopter at Sheke:

“I was not very near; I was on a hill across Sheke. It is from there that I saw a helicopter. It hovered about two meters from the ground and dropped a man. The helicopter flew away thereafter. I did not go to the exact place of scene but was looking at the scene from a distance. But for those who were able to see the man told me that his hands were tied at his back and that he a rucksack.”

Viateur Nkuriza was a security agent in Kamana camp, and he told the Commission that the person who had been thrown out of a flying helicopter was brought to him:

“During Opération Turquoise, there was a refugee camp in our sector Kamana and I was one of the officers in charge of keeping law and order in the camp. I remember seeing a helicopter hover above the area and when it was in Sheke cell, it flew lower and a young man was thrown out. The people of Sheke took him to Kamana, where I was at that time. He was wearing a pair of trousers and a jean shirt. His arms were tied at his back. I went close to him and ordered people to untie him. I interviewed him and he told me that he was from Butare. He had been arrested together with other people and forced into a helicopter. He said that the French soldiers had thrown them off board the helicopter at different places. I took him to the offices of the commune for the burgomaster, Mr. Bakundukiza, to decide his fate. He was taken to Kabayiza by other people whose names I do not remember. Later, I learnt that he had been killed at Ndago together with Father Sebera and Tutsi nuns who were with that priest.”

Innocent Bakundukize, a burgomaster of Mubuga commune between June to December 1994, acknowledged having received in the office of the commune a person alleged to have been thrown out of a flying helicopter by French soldiers. He however denied having played any role whatsoever in his murder, contrary to allegations by eye witnesses. He told the Commission that he did not clearly remember the circumstances surrounding the throwing of that man out of the plane and his fate thereafter.

4.2.3 Throwing people off board at Shaba

Eyewitnesses confirmed seeing people being thrown out of flying helicopters in the sector of Shaba. That sector is in former Kivu commune bordering Nyungwe forest. The place where people were being thrown out was on the edge of the forest. According to Damien Bizimana who killed the Tutsi who had been thrown out of a flying helicopter, this is what happened:

“I was in my field cultivating. I saw a helicopter. I thought it was going to land, and when it was above Akanyaru river, it dropped a person. An old man called Misigaro who was nearby called Rukwavu who was the head of our cell. Rukwavu then called me telling me that we had to get rid of that filth. The victim was only in an underpant and was blindfolded. He had wounds everywhere on his body. Rukwavu asked him why he had been thrown out of a flying helicopter; the victim looked at him and answered nothing. Rukwavu hit him hard on his head with a club and ordered us to kill him. I killed him and I am now serving my sentence, having pleaded guilty before a Gacaca court. ”

Emmanuel Misigaro was also among the witnesses who saw a person being thrown off board a flying helicopter and killed later on:

“I saw a helicopter flying very low as if it was going to land. It did not. Instead, I saw a male person being thrown off board. The helicopter thereafter flew higher and went away. The person was only in an underpant. He was later on killed by Bizimana Damien because he was considered to be a Tutsi.”

Edouard Mpatsinguge described the same event in the following words:

“I saw a man being thrown out of a helicopter and I immediately rushed to the scene. When I reached the place, there were many people who had come to see what was happening. The victim was in the middle of the crowd and looked very scared. Rukwavu, the head of the cell, hit the victim with a club saying that he was a Tutsi whom the French had offered to them as a gift. He then ordered the people to follow the example given by the French, meaning that they had either to kill him or make him suffer. Bizimana Damien obeyed the orders and gave the victim a fatal blow.”

Callixte Munyeshyaka who also witnessed the same event, described it in the following words:

“I saw a helicopter flying very low over Shaba as if it was going to land. It did not. Instead, I saw a man being thrown out of the flying plane. The plane then rose to a higher altitude and flew away. The person who was thrown out of the plane was later killed by Bizimana Damien because he was a Tutsi.”

Juvenal Muhikira, who was the leader of Kivu commune of Kivu from 3rd May 1993 to 5th November 1994, told the Commission that when he was burgomaster, he learnt that there had been a case of people being thrown out of a helicopter at Shaba:

“I remember that during the month of July 1994, the conseiller of Shaba sector gave me a report indicating that a male person had been thrown out of a flying French helicopter in his sector. The victim had been caught by the people and was killed on the orders given by the head of the cell called Rukwavu. I forwarded that report to the prefect, Mr. Bucyibaruta”.

4.2.4 Throwing people off board at Rusebeya

Rusebeya is a hill situated in the former Kivu and Mudasomwa communes on the edge of Nyungwe forest, facing Shaba, where previous acts of throwing people off board flying helicopters were carried out. At Rusebeya, a woman called Gloriose Musabyimana was thrown out of a flying helicopter near Akanyaru River. She narrated to the Commission how the incident happened:

“During Opération turquoise, I was living in a camp for the displaced people at Murambi. As we did not have enough to eat, I went to my sister’s place to look for food. She worked for Caritas, and she used to distribute rice to the displaced people. I was with my husband and three other people. On our way, Interahamwe reported us to the French soldiers and we were stopped. We were tied, bundled into a lorry, and taken to Murambi. While there, we were locked up in separate buildings. The French violently beat us at night and the next day. On the third day, we were put in a helicopter.

When the plane was flying over Nyungwe forest, the French started throwing people I was with out of the helicopter. Despite shouting on top of our voices, that did not move the French from pushing my colleagues out. The helicopter kept on flying towards Gikongoro and then back towards where Nyungwe forest begins, near Akanyaru River, between former Kivu and Mudasomwa communes. At this point, it was not flying very high from the ground. It was at this spot that I was thrown out of the flying helicopter. People from nearby rushed to the scene to see what had happened. Some people wanted to kill me saying that I was Inkotanyi, but one of them called Domina recognised me and explained to the people that I was not Inkotanyi. I was then taken to the offices of Mudasomwa commune. I found there a person who had been with me in the helicopter. I spent there two days to recover my strength. I later went back to Gikongoro in Murambi camp for the displaced people where I found my husband’s family. They told me that my husband was not dead, that he had also come back to the camp. I was two months pregnant; a few days later, I had a miscarriage and got pneumonia.”

At Rusebeya, the Commission heard testimonies about the incident when Musabyimana was thrown out of a flying helicopter.
Domina Kanyanja told the Commission the following:

“I saw a woman being thrown out of a flying helicopter near Akanyaru River. It was about 0900 hours in the morning. People ran to the scene to see what was happening. I also went close to her trying to ask questions and that is when I recognized her as a village mate from Matyazo in Butare. She told us that she was picked together with her husband and other people from Murambi and that the French had beaten them and put them in a building full of dead bodies. The victim went on explaining how the French had put them in a helicopter and thrown them out in different places while it was air borne. Thereafter, some people called the conseiller of the sector who after listening to her ordeal, decided to take her to Gasarenda, where Mudasomwa commune offices were.”

Eugenie Nyandwi was among the first person to arrive at the scene where people were thrown out of a flying helicopter. She told the Commission the following:

“I was in my compound when I heard the blaring noise of an approaching helicopter. The children ran to see it and I followed them to bring back the young one. I saw a helicopter rising to altitude and a person who was lying down on the ground. When I went closer, I saw that it was a tiny young woman wearing a dress. Soon after, other curious people arrived at the scene. Amongst us was an elderly person, now deceased, who requested us not to brutalize her but, urged us to take her to authorities. She was taken by Munyengabe, and when they reached Shaba centre, I was told that they met Domina, wife of Edouard, who recognized her.”

Four other witnesses confirmed to the Commission incidents of throwing people out of a flying helicopter.

Damien Zikamabahari told the Commission the following:

“I personally saw a helicopter flying from Rukoko and which was going round the hill to a point where I could not see it, but I could still hear its noise. A few minutes later, I saw a group of people escorting a young woman, and they stopped at a small trading centre at Shaba, in front of Kanyanja Domina’s house. I heard that Domina recognized the woman who was then taken to communal offices. All this happened at about midday, during the months of June-July 1994. I don’t remember the exact dates.”

Celestin Habimana further confirmed to the Commission the following, “I saw a helicopter flying from Rukoko. When it was above Rusebeya across Shaba, it flew lower and suddenly I saw a person being pushed out. Thereafter, the helicopter left. It was about 1100 hours. People went to see, but I stayed where I was.”

Laurent Bizimana told the Commission the following, “At about 1000 hours in the morning in July 1994, a female person was thrown out of a flying helicopter at Rusebeya, and many people including myself went to the scene. From the scene, we told her to follow us and when we reached Shaba, Kinyanja Domina recognised her. The victim told us that she was in the helicopter with some people. I do not know what happened thereafter.”

Jean Bosco Ntakirutimana told the Commission that that person was taken to the communal offices, “We saw a helicopter flying over this place without knowing where it was coming from. We saw a woman being thrown out of the helicopter and it thereafter went away. The woman was pregnant; she was about 25 years old. Domina recognized her, and she was taken to Gaserenda by the conseiller of the sector, whose name was Munyengabe Innocent.”

4.2.5 Throwing people off board at Nyakizu

Raphael Kirenga, who was a militiaman in Butare where he manned a roadblock opposite Ineza Motel, was arrested by the French in Murambi camp, on suspicion that he was a soldier disguised as a civilian. After his arrest, he was dropped out of a flying helicopter in Nyakizu commune, which bordered Mubuga. He confirmed to the Commission as follows:

“I saw French soldiers in Butare, when they came to evacuate the Bishop and the nuns. I went with them in their convoy to Murambi. One day, the French soldiers came to the camp and arrested me together with two other people for reasons that I do not know. The French tied our arms behind our backs and beat us seriously. The following day, they took away our identity cards and forced us to board a helicopter. While the helicopter was air borne, the French threw us out at different places. Alexis was thrown first at Kamana, Theodore Mbarushimana, at Ndago and myself at Nyakizu. People almost killed me, but a person called Anne Marie recognized me and was able to save me.”

When they were interviewed by the Commission about the above incidents, residents of Nyakizu corroborated the above testimonies. Francois Kamandwa told the Commission the following:

“I was at home when I saw a helicopter coming from Nyaruguru. When it reached Kabuga near the Protestant School, it started flying low near the ground. When it was at the height of a house, it dropped a person who fell in Muhizi’s field. We rushed to the scene and saw that his arms were tied behind his back with a red rope. He also had a rucksack with him. It was a light skinned young boy, and he looked staved. Though people were asking him questions to know what had happened, he looked veery scared and his eyes kept darting around him as somebody who did not understand what was happening. A Mr. Faustin recognized him, and we decided to take him to the burgomaster, Mr. Ntaganzwa. That helicopter was flown by white men; people were saying they were French. I don’t remember exactly which month it was, but it was in 1994, at the time of the French.”

Francoise Mutumwinka told the Commission the following:

“I was coming from the market and when I arrived at Kuwakaguru, I saw a person being thrown out of a flying plane. After some time, he stood up and I saw that he had a sack. People surrounded him and started asking him questions. He told them that he was from Mbazi commune and that he worked for the Bishop in Butare. He explained to us that he had been thrown out of a flying helicopter and that he was with other two people in the helicopter. He said that the other two had been thrown out before him. Some influential people took him to Ryabihindi, at the offices of Nyakizu commune. He was detained, and later discharged. It appears that he is still alive.”

Narcisse Nteziryimana told the Commission: “We saw a helicopter flying over our area without knowing where it was coming from. We saw a person being thrown out and it continued flying. That person had his arms tied behind his back with a very strong rope. We took him to the communal authorities and I did not bother to know what followed later.”

Almost all the testimonies of people who were direct victims of these acts of being thrown out of flying helicopters explained that the reason for this was that they were suspected or accused of being Inkotanyi. At that time, this was a code word to refer to Tutsis in general terms. People who saw the survivors of these acts indicated that these were Tutsi. However, it was not only Tutsis who were thrown out of flying helicopters; some troublemakers were also dropped. It is difficult to imagine that Tutsis who had survived two months of manhunt could turn into troublemakers deserving such a punishment. The fact of being Tutsi was reason enough for the French to dump you in a forest.

The Gikongoro situation of the time was such that in throwing their victims into the forest, French soldiers knew that there was a strong probability that they would be killed.


5. Cases of rape and sexual slavery

Cases of rape, sexual violence, sexual slavery and attempted rape were narrated to the Commission by the victims themselves, most of whom were genocide survivors, who sought refugee at places guarded by French soldiers. Other cases of this nature were reported by those who worked with French soldiers and had either witnessed or heard about them. Most of these acts took place in French military camps of Karama (Cyanika), Murambi and SOS Gikongoro. The same abuses were committed in places where French soldiers stayed for more or less long periods e.g., Kinyamakara, Kaduha and Mushubi. In one of these places, a woman was raped in her house by two French soldiers with the assistance of the area’s burgomaster.

5.1 Accounts of rape by direct victims

Mrs. B.M., a genocide survivor, told the Commission that she was raped by a militiaman in a French camp at Gikingoro SOS, with the help and encouragement of a French soldier on guard. At night, she heard a woman wailing while being raped by a French soldier:

“When the genocide started, I entrusted my two children to my Hutu friends. Towards end of June beginning of July 1994, a neighbour informed me that he had seen them in a camp for the displaced at Kibeho. I went to look for them. When I reached Gikongoro, militiamen came to me and treated me roughly, wanting to know who I was. A certain woman went to tell French soldiers who were drinking beer in a pub not far from that place about my presence. Two of them came and took me with them in a jeep up to the H/Q at SOS. They put me in a tent and I slept. During the night, a certain Rwandan came near my bed and asked me reasons and circumstances of my presence there. Then, he started undressing as if he was getting ready to sleep with me. I stood up and went towards a French soldier who was on guard. I told him what was happening. The French soldier violently pushed me with a kick and I fell on my back. Then the Rwandan immediately pulled me to the tent. He insulted me calling me a cockroach and other insulting words. He told me that he was going to rape me and then kill me thereafter. As I was unable to defend myself, he removed my clothes and raped me. The French soldier was a spectator of the rape and was laughing. That same night, I heard shouts of another woman whose name was E. crying in another tent. The next morning, she told me that she had also been raped by French soldiers.”

Mrs. B.A., a genocide survivor, was also raped by French soldiers, in the SOS at Gikongoro:

“I arrived in Gikongoro on about 20th July, coming from Nyanza. I was staying in the premises of a primary school, near the bishopric. One evening, four to five French soldiers in the company of Rwandans in military uniform, came to me and told me to follow them, telling me that it was for protecting me, and that they were taking me to a secure place. They took me together with some other women, one of whom was called Colette. They took us to an SOS. We found there other girls that they had kept there. Separately, they took us to their rooms. I was raped the whole night by a French soldier. He kept me for five to ten days. They were promising to help us leave Gikongoro to some other more secure places. That is what they were promising us every day. They were telling us such lies, yet at night, they kept on abusing us sexually. One evening, they suddenly told us to go back to the primary school where they had picked us. They did not even accompany us in spite of the fact that the route was very dangerous because of the militiamen who were roaming around. When we arrived there, displaced people that we had left behind were laughing at us saying that we had become wives of white people. When I learnt that RPF was at Mwogo Bridge, I went there clandestinely so that I could reach my home. I met Colette after the genocide, and she revealed to me that as a result of the rape, she became pregnant, but that the baby had died during birth.”

Mrs. M.B., a genocide survivor, hid herself in several places. Towards the end of June 1994, a certain MP went and reported her to the French so that they can get her out of the hiding place. When French soldiers arrived, they led her to CIPEP Gikongoro where she was raped several times:

“During the genocide, I was hiding at Se’s place. In June or beginning of July, MP learnt that the French were at Gikongoro and entrusted me to them. They took me to a place called CIPEP where they were staying. I met there three other girls, survivors of the genocide, who had come to Kaduha, and they told me that they had been there for some days. They told me that if I have an alternative place to go to, then it would be better for me since the French soldiers were forcing them to have sexual intercourse with them. In fact, a few minutes after I had arrived at that Centre, two French soldiers called me and took me to one room. They raped me in turns, and I was unable to resist. I was exhausted from the terrible living conditions during the genocide. Later, those soldiers brought another woman to replace me, and they got me out. I went to join the other two girls that I had found there when I arrived. They explained to me that what I had just went through was happening everyday, that it was what they were doing to them since they were brought to this place. I decided to escape and went to Murambi. I stayed there for five days, and then I went to the RPF zone.”

Mrs. UB., a genocide survivor, had been kept in hiding by a certain person for the whole period of the genocide. When French soldiers arrived at Kaduha, they refused to come to her aid, giving the condition that she comes out of the hiding by herself to their military camp, a thing she found impossible. Some friends managed to get her out of the hiding and took her to the French. The French took her to Karama, and later to SOS where they raped her:

“During the genocide, I was at Kaduha where I was working as a nurse. I was hiding at Bernard’s alias Mu, a carpenter. He was a very religious person who practiced his religion. When he learnt that the French were around, towards the end of June, he asked Gasana who was the Director of ESI Kaduha (School of nurses) to go and talk to them about my case so that they could come and rescue me. The French refused to come. They told him that I had to go where they were based at ESI. It was practically impossible for one to get to the French camp; there was no way I could cross to the trading center without being killed. After one week, the person who was hiding me came to me with a bright idea: he put me in a portable cupboard and took me to the French using his cousin’s vehicle –he was called Benjamin. When we arrived at Karama, they opened it and they immediately drove me to Karama. There was a French military base and many French soldiers (not less than forty). In the vehicle which carried me from Musange to Karame, there was a French doctor called Eric Pieter who was carrying in his hands a wounded child. When we arrived at Karama, I was given accommodation in the buildings of the old commune together with wounded people. There were many wounded people, including some Interahamwe. Tutsis were very few and most of them were children. The majority of the refugees were the Interahamwe. Eric was the person in charge of that pavilion where the civilians were accommodated. The soldiers were staying in the buildings near the entrance of the communal offices and in the sentry boxes. Their superior’s name was Omar and he looked like an Arab. I was helping Eric to treat the wounded, and he too protected me. At one time, the French soldiers wanted to take me to Murambi, and Eric insisted that I remain at Karama, for I was somehow useful to him in taking care of the wounded and in translating for him. When I wanted to have a walk, he would not allow me to go close to where the soldiers were staying, telling me: ‘be careful, those people are savages’.

Towards the end of his stay, Eric offered to take me to Goma; and we went to ask for travel documents from the préfet, Mr. Bucyibaruta. Omar drove us there. Bucyibaruta refused. The next day, they took me back to Murambi together with other people and I was put in a place where there were girls and women who had come from everywhere. The following day, a Rwandan came and told me that the French were looking for me to give me employment. He took me to the entrance of their premises. One of them received me and let me in. There were small rooms made in tents. When I entered, I saw terrible things and I retreated back, but a Frenchman pushed me inside again. As I passed in front of one of the rooms, I saw a girl who was in a kneeling position and a naked French soldier was in front of her. The girl was sucking his penis. In the other small room, a Frenchman was having sex with a girl, this time in a lying position.

In the third small room, there were French soldiers, one of them armed, and the other one had a girl in front of him with his penis in her mouth. I immediately asked the one who had brought me inside to take me back where I was before. ‘You don’t have a choice”, he said. He put me next to the other girls and asked me to choose the position. I did not move. Two other soldiers arrived. One wanted to put his penis into my mouth, but I kept my teeth clinched. He wanted to force me, but I resisted. Then, they talked in a language I did not understand. After a brief discussion between themselves, they threw me on the mattress. They raped me in turns. When the third one was about to start, I managed to stand up and went out running. I had not removed the pull over that I was wearing. As I was getting out, I took my wrapper. They stayed inside laughing. That episode lasted for about a half an hour. Another lady who was there gave me a skirt.”

Mrs. U.B. added that during the genocide, she passed through the premises referred to above and she heard and saw from other rooms such similar acts:

“Next to the little room where I was taken, I heard voices of women who were being raped. I for instance know the case of young genocide survivors (girls) from ESI Kaduha, who were taken by the French soldiers. They were made to suffer the same fate as I had.”

She told the Commission that the French soldiers were using Interahamwe to get girls to rape: “There were Interahamwe who were working in close collaboration with the French in looking for girls to rape. They would take the girls to their camp. It was not the French soldiers who would go looking for them. The Rwandan who had brought me to the French was also an Interahamwe. He came once again to take me back for the second time, but I refused. I plainly told him that I would rather be killed than going through the same ordeal.”

Mrs. I.M, a genocide survivor, went to ask protection from the French. She was accompanied by a friend in adversity called Nyira. Both of them were raped, one by a French man, and the other by their interpreter (Rwandan):

“I was coming from my place where I had gone to see whether there was anything left and I passed by M.C.’s place. On my way, I met H.J. who told me that the French had come to rescue people who were being hunted down, and that if I had a child who had survived the genocide, I could take him or her to them. On my way, I met Nyira. V. She was a Hutu and had married a Tutsi. During the genocide, after the murder of her husband, she took refuge to her parents and her father murdered all her children saying that he did not want Tutsi children in his home. Nyira was sick of that and she told me that she wanted to commit suicide. I advised her to go and see the French and ask for help. We went towards their camp following the road that was passing by Rugarama towards Nyaruhondo. On our way, we met their patrol and we signaled them to stop. They were with a Rwandan interpreter whose name I did not get. They stopped and we explained to them what we had gone through during the genocide. They told us, that they would drive us to their base at Cyanika, former Karama commune, to protect us. We boarded their vehicles.

When we came to a forest before reaching Muyanga, they stopped and they pushed us towards the forest. The French took Nyira, and she was raped by one of them. When their interpreter saw what the French were doing to Nyira, he also took me by force and raped me. After that, the French abandoned us in that forest. I got a sexually transmitted disease from that rape. I first went for treatment at Kirambi health center, and was later transferred to the University Hospital of Butare. I have all the medical papers of the time. I can confirm that the French were also genocide perpetrators because Tutsis were being murdered while the French were present in that region. They raped other Tutsi women, only that the latter prefer to keep quiet. This was the case of K. and N.”

Mrs. M.F, a genocide survivor, was raped by French soldiers in one of the buildings of the former Kinyamakara commune:

“I saw French soldiers at Kinyamakara in June or July 1994. During the genocide, I took refuge at B.J.’s place, then at my maternal uncle’s place, Mw.M. Towards June or July 1994, somebody called S.I who was working for the French as an interpreter, brought two French soldiers where I was hiding. They took me to the offices of the commune, where the present offices of Kigoma sector, Huye District stand. The French took me in a room and told me to sit down. A little later, one of them came and he started touching me and taking off my clothes. I resisted trying to fight back, but his colleagues came to help him. They held me tight and removed my clothes. They put me in a position where I was kneeling. In turns, two French soldiers raped me from behind. At a certain point, I fell down and the person who was raping me continued his action, this time in a lying down position. I became unconscious. When I came to, they ordered me to leave immediately. I had no strength, but I tried to walk painfully and went to the family of Har that I knew, which was living not far from there. He gave me some water and I asked him to escort me up to Mw’s place. I stayed there up to the time when the French left; I did not want to see their faces anymore.”

Mrs. M.P. was a Tutsi woman married to a Hutu. She told the Commission that she was raped by two French soldiers accompanied by the burgomaster, Ngezahayo, the organiser of genocide in Karama:

“During Opération Turquoise, French soldiers came to our place. They were about five or six and were accompanied by burgomaster Ngezahayo. When my husband saw them, he was scared and jumped over the fence to go into hiding. He thought that Ngezahayo had come to harm us, because he had threatened several times to kill us. Two French soldiers entered the house saying that they were searching for arms that we were hiding. I followed them explaining to them that we did not have any arms in the house. When we reached our bedroom, they threw me on the bed and threatened to kill me. Later, they got off my clothes by force and two of them raped me, one after the other. In the course of that act, one of the French soldiers was holding up my legs and when one finished, another came for his turn. I resisted but they were stronger. You can see that they even broke my finger, it is deformed permanently [one of my fingers on the left hand is bent]. When they were raping me, the third French soldier was ransacking my room. He took away with him our three million six hundred thousand Rwandan Francs which were in my suitcase. The other soldiers stayed outside while waiting for their colleagues.”

This testimony is corroborated by that of her husband as follows:

“During Opération Turquoise, I was threatened by French soldiers. They came to my place, and when I saw them, I jumped over the fence of my house. I was frightened because I had heard that the French had killed a man who was beating his mother. They came into the house and my wife followed them. They searched the whole house and stole my money. I was a coffee dealer and I had three million six hundred thousand Rwandan Francs. In the meantime, two French soldiers raped my wife, while others were searching the house saying that they were searching for Inkotanyi’s arms. I think it was burgomaster Ngezahayo who reported me because since 1990, he was among the people who threatened me because my wife was a Tutsi.”

Desire Ngezahayo, former burgomaster of Karama commune and who is now in prison for genocide after pleading guilty, told the Commission that he indeed went together with French soldiers to the witness’s place, and that the French entered into the house with his wife:

“Yes, I went there together with French soldiers to look for arms. Two French soldiers got into the house with M.P. and stayed inside for about half an hour. They also searched in their neighbour’s place whose name is M.J.”

M.J, a neighbour of the couple and whose wife was raped, confirmed to have seen French soldiers go to their home: “French soldiers left their cars on the road side and went to their home on foot. I saw them, but I tried to move away from them. When they left, we went to see what had happened. His wife was crying.”

Mrs. M.G., a genocide survivor, was a victim of rape committed by a French soldier in Murambi:

“I come from Butare but I had fled to Gikongoro. I was in Cyanika camp and I went to Gikongoro market with my husband. When we reached the market, we met acquaintances and we started chatting. Shortly after, French soldiers found us and drove us to the SOS village for children, saying that they were going to protect us. The following day, they took us to Murambi where they separated men from women. They took me into a separate room and a French soldier raped me several times during the night.”

5.2 Rapes narrated by eyewitnesses

Mrs. M.C., a genocide survivor, told the Commission that she was an eyewitness of the rape of two girls by French soldiers at Groupe scolaire ACEPER (a secondary school):

“During the genocide, I was hiding at our neighbour’s place till July. When the French arrived, those who had hid me took me to their camp at ACEPER. I found there two young boys who had come from Rukondo. In the evening, the French transferred the two boys to Murambi and ordered me to stay with them to do their housework. Late at night, they brought two other girls and they kept us together. One of the girls’ names was Olive and I cannot remember the name of the other. Every night the French took the oldest in their tents and slept with her. As for Olive and I, they were just happy caressing us, kissing us, and touching our bodies from the breasts downwards. Once they tried to rape me, but I resisted. The following day, I decided to run away and went to Dusego, the place where I had hidden during the genocide. They got the information from Olive and her elder sister and knew where I was. They came looking for me and took me back to ACEPER. The first night, I noticed that they were sleeping with Olive. One of the French men told me that I had a mental problem and that is why they were not sleeping with me. I remained in that situation until the time the French left. During my stay at ACEPER, I often saw French soldiers coming back with girls and taking them to their tents for a whole night. I remember one and her name was Nyira.”

Desire Ngezahayo told the Commission that while in the camp at Karama, he witnessed repeated sexual abuses by the French soldiers. Young girls would be forced to live with the French and do housework work for them as if they were their wives:

“The French assembled people at Karama; these would be people taken from the communes of Gikongoro near Kibuye, before taking them to Murambi and Cyangugu. They would select beautiful girls and keep them for about two weeks. Regularly, they would replace them with others. Those girls would be treated as if they are wives since you would find them openly kissing them. They would more often wash their clothes and do housework without any pay. I remember one of them whose name was U.B who hailed from Kaduha. The French kept her at Karama for almost a month. At Karama, they had the habit of taking girls in the trenches where they were sleeping. Many of those girls were raped there in a scandalous manner. The girls would tell us that the French would force them to kneel and then penetrate them from behind. These were very common things and well known in the region. At that particular place, inhuman sexual acts were committed by the French. I was a witness to such occurrences.”

Emmanuel Ibyimana was a former soldier who was recruited by the French soldiers on 25th June 1994. He was given a gun in order to help them keep law and order in Muko commune. He told the Commission about the rape cases committed by the French in Gikongoro:

“French soldiers gave us orders go and bring people who had survived the genocide. Among those we brought, they kept certain girls with them. Few examples that come to my mind are those of one girl, U.G., as well as a woman who was a nurse at Kaduha. They were kept there and raped for several days. It is U.G. herself who told me in confidence. Usually, she lived at Murambi camp, but I saw her several times at the SOS at the French military headquarters. I asked her whether she had found a job there, and she said no, adding that she was taken there by the French who forced her to have sexual intercourse with them”.

Jean Mbigizembishaka was working at the children SOS at Gikongoro before the genocide. He was working as a messenger and a store keeper. During Opération Turquoise, he worked for the French soldiers as a house worker. He saw those committing acts of rape on Tutsi girls:

“When the French soldiers arrived at Gikongoro, I was living in the premises of SOS Centre. The children and the employees of the centre had been evacuated to Bukavu. French soldiers kept me as in charge of their laundry. I stayed with them up to the time of their withdrawal. During that time, I could see that certain soldiers, including their superiors, slept with girls and kept them permanently. At night, they would light a fire and would send me to go and look for girls and cannabis for them. A boy whose name was Jean Marie was doing the same job for the French. We would bring in girls and they would pay us by giving us food rations. The French would choose the most beautiful girls and send away those who were not good looking. Essentially, we chose among those who came from Kibuye. The commanders were sleeping with those girls in the rooms; other soldiers raped girls from behind the buildings. Among them, I remember M.D. who was from Kigembe commune. She was sleeping with a French Second Lieutenant in the premises of SOS. Sometimes, I would serve as a go between in arranging their appointments. There were also girls who would sleep with the French for money. That was the case of Cy., A., and Co. The French used to have sexual intercourse with them in the open in the garden, as if it was a game or an entertainment.”

Assumani Mikeno who hailed from Nyanza but stayed at Gikongoro, told the Commission that there was a systematic selection among the displaced girls and women who were living in the premises of Gikongoro primary school, and that the selected girls/women would later be taken to the French camps at SOS:

“I lived near the SOS in the premises of Gikongoro primary school. At night, French soldiers would come and select the most beautiful girls and took them to sleep with them in the buildings of SOS. They would keep them for about four days. Then, they would come back to take other girls among the displaced. They used us as a medium. They would look at girls’ faces and point at those who were to follow them. When I realized that life there was not good, that there was no security, I left and went to Kibeho.”

Innocent Sekuvumba who lived in the same camp corroborated the previous testimony, both testimonies being very close to the story of B.A. narrated above:

“Five French soldiers accompanied by the sous-préfet of the prefecture of Gikongoro whose name was Oreste , came at night in the premises of Gikongoro primary school where I was staying. They woke us up and made us line up. They were looking at each individual face using a torch. Oreste pointed out two young Tutsi girls who had managed to disguise themselves and hide in the crowd and he took them. The French chose two other Tutsi girls and took them to their camp at SOS. They kept them for four days. When they came back, they told me that they were forced to have sexual intercourse with them. Colette even had a half cast child, but the child later died.”

As the previous witness, Laurent Mugambira confirmed to the Commission the fact of selecting Tutsi girls and women by the French at Gikongoro primary school, and that these would be taken to SOS and kept there for sometime.

The same was confirmed by Desire Nyandwi, a member of Parliament who reported that he used to go quite often at SOS to meet Lieutenant Colonel Eric De Stabenrath as a member of “Comite d’initiative locale” (Local Initiative Committee) which worked in collaboration with the French, and that he would see girls who were staying there:

“I very often went to SOS and saw girls there seated in front of the houses of French soldiers on benches near the entrance of the centre. Everybody who was passing by there could see them. I also think that the French officers saw them, for one could not enter SOS without seeing those girls. Every time I passed there, be it before noon or in the afternoon, I would see girls seated on those benches just in front of the lodges of the French soldiers.”

Another witness, Aaron Nshimiye who was living in Murambi, told the Commission that rapes were committed in the camp:

“In the entire period of three weeks that I lived in Murambi, I noted that the French soldiers had the habit of raping Tutsi girls who were in the camp. They would take the most beautiful ones to their tents, and I can give an example of Ny.F and another called Jacqueline”.

The sexual abuses committed by the French soldiers on the survivors of genocide were not always done using physical force. But the circumstances in which such sexual relations with the survivors happened were such that those girls and women had no better option but to surrender into submission. These were people who had lived through a horrifying two months and a half being hunted down as Tutsis, and the environment in which they lived despite the French presence was always characterized by violence. Often, Interahamwe served as beaters for the French soldiers. The later sometimes used open physical violence to intimidate their victims. In addition, hunger added to this context of violence. Hunger forced some girls and women to submit sexually to the French soldiers in order to get some food.

5.3 Physical torture, humiliating and degrading treatment

A number of witnesses told the Commission that the French soldiers committed physical torture on civilians, beating them and keeping them in confinement. Others reported that some people had suffered humiliating and degrading treatment . Even though they were terribly weakened, they did not lose their human dignity.

5.3.1 Physical Torture

Jean Rukwekweri told the Commission that he had been tortured by the French soldiers who had just murdered his son. This happened at Kaduha:

“After killing my son, the French soldiers who were responsible for that murder ordered me to lie on the ground and remain in that position. One of them was keeping an eye on me, his finger always pointing at my face. Others went to my place firing in all directions, I do not know for what reason, except that I heard people saying that they were looking for Inkotanyi and arms that were hidden in Kaduha. They searched everywhere and found nothing, but they set my house on fire before coming back to where they had left me. When they came back, they tied my arms behind my back, and bundled me into their jeep while beating me. They took me to Cyanika. When we arrived there, they took me into a building and started interrogating me. There was a girl who was serving them as an interpreter. They asked me several times if I was hiding Inkotanyi and if I possessed arms. I denied vehemently. They were noting down all my answers.

After the interrogation, they told me to lie down. They put something very heavy on my back, and a soldier blindfolded me using a red cloth. They got me out and threw me in a ditch and started piling sand on me using spades, burying me alive. When I was covered with sand up to the shoulders, they stopped and left me in that state. A short time later, they removed the sand and got me out of the ditch. At night, I was put in another building, still tied. The following day, they took me to Murambi, still blindfolded. When we arrived there, I was taken to their commander. The commander asked me similar questions I had been asked the previous day and then gave orders to his subordinates to take me back to my place, telling me that he was of the opinion that my son had been murdered for no wrong doing. The worst is that the French did not give me a chance to burry him. I am still suffering for that.”

Raphael Kamanzi lived in Murambi camp, and he told the Commission that French soldiers tortured him almost to death:

“On 23rd July 1994, I was at Murambi camp with a group of other survivors. French soldiers asked us to produce our identity cards. At around 0800 hours in the morning, they put us in a minibus, and six of them escorted us. I was with Eliphaz Nzajyibwami and Callixte Kanamugire. As we were approaching a hill called Remera, the soldier who was driving all of a sudden stopped the vehicle. Others came out of the minibus and pointed their guns at us. They ordered us to get out and told us to turn our backs. Then they gave us a second order saying: “put your hands against the embankment”. We refused to abide by the orders. They said it for the third time: “Lie down, this is an order”. I do not know what others did, but as for me, I knelt down. Their guns were still pointed at us. My other colleagues were shouting begging for mercy. The soldiers discussed among themselves at a distance and we were then ordered back into the minibus. We were taken back to Murambi without understanding the reason of terrorizing us like that. When we got back to Murambi, I later learnt that it was Interahamwe who had reported us to the French, saying that we were looking after Tutsis who had infiltrated into the camp.”

This terror episode inflicted on Kamanzi was also narrated by Regine Mukakalisa who lived in Murambi camp:

“During all the time that I lived in Murambi, I noted that French soldiers had not come to save us. They were torturing people. One day, they wanted to murder a certain Kamanzi and his colleagues. They took them in the forest and tortured them.”

Gaspard Nzeyimana narrated to the Commission other acts of violence:

“I saw a person who had been caught by the French at the camp for the displaced at Kibeho. They were accusing him of being Inkotanyi. They had tied him on their jeep bumper with four strong ropes. They displayed him to the people and took him later to Gikongoro in that state.”

Shinani Siborurema told the Commission that he was violently beaten by French soldiers in Murambi camp before being thrown into Nyungwe forest:

“One day, I went to Murambi to sell doughnuts and sweets. Somebody shouted saying that I was an accomplice of Inyenzi. A French soldier came running towards me and held me by the neck. I did not understand what he was saying because I didn’t speak French. He then distributed all my goods to the refugees as well as my six thousand Francs. He forced me into a house where I found 12 other Rwandans. Other French soldiers arrived and ordered us to put our heads down and our legs up in the air. They beat us violently. Some of us bled much from the nose. After several kicks, they threw us out.”

The witness went on with his account, saying that the torture continued until he was thrown into Nyungwe forest at a place called Kuwa Senkoko.

Humiliating and degrading acts.

Felicite Mukaruhimbana told the Commission how she was forced to have a bath from a watering can used by a Frenchman in the presence of adults and children:

“When French soldiers arrived at Kaduha, we were still hiding in the bushes. We had heard that they had come to save Tutsis who were still alive. At night, I went to ESI of Kaduha, a school of nurses, where many survivors had camped. When I arrived there, I found French soldiers washing men and children naked using a watering can. A soldier asked me to remove my clothes. I refused because I found the act of adults removing clothes in the presence of children rather degrading. He told me that he would not allow me to spend the night there if I did not take a bath, and that it was an imperative order. I found myself in a situation between life and death, with no free choice possible, and I accepted to remove my clothes, but I kept my underwear. They washed us in a very shameful manner, with no respect that a human being deserves. A French soldier would order you to bend, poured water on your back with soap, and would rub you with a rug. Another Frenchman was taking photographs of each person being washed naked. It was very humiliating to wash us in that way while young children were there watching. They would put us in an Indian file, each of us with a plate. A y soldier would just put one spoonful of food on each plate, and would ask each one of us to leave and come back after finishing that spoonful. I think one wound make about ten rounds, and the French would still put on one spoonful. All the times, there was another French soldier taking photographs. After ten rounds of going and coming back, they would then bring a big plate full of food. Despite being hungry, we had lost appetite and would refuse to eat that food.”

Antoine Mucyo who was working at Kaduha told the Commission that he had witnessed humiliating acts where the French would spray water on completely naked people, using a watering can.

“I saw French soldiers at ESI Kaduha. There was a camp of genocide survivors. I had gone there to see the Director of studies at that school. It was around 2000 hours. As I was passing by, I saw two soldiers. One of them had a gun and the other a water pump with strong pressure. That soldier was showering naked people. There were about ten people. It really shocked me because in that group, there were children, men and women put together.”

6. Insufficient distribution of food and medical care to the survivors of the genocide

An accusation which kept being mentioned in many testimonies about Murambi camp was the lack of care for the sick and the wounded, and lack of sufficient food and water. That situation of misery and hunger would compel genocide survivors to get out of the camp looking for food. When they went out, some survivors were caught and killed by militiamen. The same situation forced young girls accepting to have sexual intercourse with the French soldiers in order to get some food.

Philip Mbaraga told the Commission the following:

“During the time I stayed at Murambi, there was really nothing to eat. The French were only giving us biscuits and some of us suffered from diarrhea and dehydration. There was even an old lady who died of hunger, whereas other displaced people who were in camps other than Murambi were given food by certain International Organizations. In Murambi camp, the French did not allow NGOs to supply us with food or drugs, yet among the survivors, there were very many wounded people. At the same time, the French were taking advantage of the situation of hunger and would take women and girls to their tents and give them rice and tinned food in exchange for sexual favors.”

Regine Mukakalisa added:

“I saw for the first time the French when they came to Butare to evacuate Bishop Gahamanyi and other religious people who were with him at the bishopric. I was hiding at the parish and I went with them. When we arrived at Gikongoro, the French gave us food only the following day. It was a small packet of biscuits. Later, they proceeded to the evacuation of other religious people and important personalities to Zaire or to Europe. They were forcing some girls to have sexual intercourse with them in exchange for food and other advantages that others did not have. Those girls had to accept due to the very poor conditions in which they were living, such as hunger.”

Cassilde Tuyizere was among the people who had been evacuated from Butare with Bishop Gahamanyi by the French and settled in Murambi camp. She told the Commission the following:

“When we arrived at Gikongoro, we waited till the following day to get something to eat. The French gave each one of us a small packet of twenty biscuits. At Murambi, there were many orphans and the wounded that were in a very critical condition, but the French were not treating them. Myself, I had an old plaster and they removed it because I had insisted. They did it in a very brutal way, using a kitchen knife. French soldiers were compelling Rwandan girls into prostitution. The girls had been given a separate building, in exchange for sexual favours. They were giving them enough food and clothes.”

Raphael Kamanzi who was also at Murambi camp spoke about the poor sanitary and feeding conditions that the French were not willing to address:

“At Murambi, life was very hard. There wasn’t enough food for people like us who had lived through such hard times. From time to time, the French could give us a packet of biscuits for an adult to last for two days. A child or a minor would get half of that. Then after four days, they would give some maize and beans. The problem was that the people who distributed food on behalf of the French were Interahamwe. The later would give us very small quantities, would sell the rest in town or give it to their friends. As I was a nurse, I tried to look after the sick, but French soldiers would refuse to give me drugs. One day, after much begging, they gave me some serum with no appropriate accessories, and this was of no use. Noting the bad will of the French, I asked Dr.Twagiramungu Edison of Kigeme hospital to give some drugs, and it was thanks to what he gave me that I was able to treat those who were seriously sick.”

Charles Ndagijimana who also lived in Murambi camp told the Commission about the indifference of the French for the hungry and the wounded that were supposedly under their protection:

“I had been seriously wounded by Interahamwe during the genocide and when French soldiers arrived; my brothers and I were hiding at our neighbours’ place. They evacuated us to Murambi, passing through Karama and at SOS centre. Given the fact that I was seriously wounded, they separated me from my brothers and I was put in a room where there were other wounded people. Life was very hard. Sometimes, they would give us some porridge but no treatment. For us to eat, we had to wait for our neighbours who had hidden us to bring us some food.”

Philippe Ntete also lived at Murambi camp and described the scarcity of food and lack of medical care in the following words:

“When I arrived at Murambi, the French put me in a room where there were other genocide survivors. Life was extremely difficult. We had nothing to eat. Sometimes the French would give us some biscuits, which were not enough to feed an adult person. Those who could would go outside the camp and bring food for the others. Unfortunately, some would get caught by Interahamwe and would be killed.”

7. Inciting people to flee the country

Many witnesses indicated that when they were withdrawing from Gikongoro, French soldiers incited people to flee to Zaire. This was orchestrated at the highest level of the French army hierarchy, by Lt-Col. Erik De Stabenrath. During a meeting that he had organized for the local authorities, he invited them to sensitize the population on the urgency and the necessity of running away from Rwanda. In other cases, it was the local authorities who incited the people to flee, but the French did nothing to oppose this propaganda. At the same time, the French looted Government property, factories and agricultural projects and carried with them to Zaire.

Desire Ngezahayo described how fleeing the country into exile by the local population was encouraged by the French:

“Around 20th August 1994, the burgomasters were convened to a meeting by a colonel whose name I don’t remember, who was commanding the French forces. He told us that the French were going to withdraw from Rwanda and that RPF would take position in Zone Turquoise and kill the population. He gave instructions to the burgomasters to sensitize the population of our respective communes to run away from the country towards Zaire, and that the French were undertaking to protect them during the exodus. In the afternoon, we went with the French to meet the RPF delegation at Maraba. Colonel Zigira explained to us that the new government would work towards the unity of all Rwandans, and that there was no reason of running away from the country. He asked us as authorities to do all that was in our powers to stop the people from fleeing. On the way back, the French colonel, insisted that we should not believe what RPF was saying, that we should rather sensitize the population to leave Rwanda before the departure of the French so as to be protected by the French in their exodus. On the eve of their departure, the authorities of the interim government who were still there, led by Callixte Kalimanzira , organized a popular demonstration to support French soldiers. The demonstration ended up at the French headquarters at SOS. The French colonel who was heading Turquoise took the floor and told the population that the French army had completed its mission in Rwanda, and he reminded us that his advice was that people should flee the country since it was not yet too late to do it.”

Jean-Baptiste Mukamarutoke who was the burgomaster of Nyamagabe from May 1980 to March 1990, and again held the same post on appointment by the French agreed with Ngezahayo’s testimony:

“I worked with the French for a month. During that time, I attended two meetings that had been organized at SOS. They were chaired by a French colonel who was the Commandant of the French detachment at Gikongoro, accompanied by a tall Captain. The second meeting took place towards the month of August and it was meant to sensitize people to flee the country. That French colonel was addressing the people saying that he did not understand the attitude of some people who were not taking the decision of running away. He explained that those who had committed killings will also be killed by RPF, and that the best solution would be to run away and take refuge outside the country. That speech frightened many people and they opted for going into exile.”

Desire Nyandwi, a member of Parliament who lived in Zone Turquoise in Gilkongoro, gave atestimony which corroborated that given by these two former authorities of the prefecture:

“I remember once on Gikongoro-Kitabi road, seeing some Frenchmen telling the people that if they remained there, they would be killed by Inkotanyi. They were making signs of cutting the throat. That gesture scared the people and prompted them to flee to Zaire.”

Colonel Martin Ndamage and his colleague officers of FAR who had written a communique while in Gikongoro condemning the genocide and had expressed desire to work with RPF, were taken to Zaire and mistreated for having tried to return to Rwanda. Colonel Ndamage said the following:

“Some days after the arrival of the French at Gikongoro, I and a group of nine officers of the FAR published a communiqué, indicating that we were disassociating ourselves from the people in power then who were committing genocide and all its machineries. After its publication, the French came to see us and told us that we had gone beyond the point of no return. They added that the interim government had given orders to the FAR command to kill us, and that to avoid this; they were going to evacuate us to Bukavu. We accepted and they took us with our families to Bukavu (Kavumu). We spent four days there, fed by the French and living in tents that they had given us.

During that stay, we asked them to put us into contact with General Dallaire. We wanted to know if he could help us to return to Rwanda. At first they refused but ended up accepting and Dallaire came. We had a discussion with him and intimated to him our willingness to return to Rwanda. The following day after his departure, early in the morning, the French got us out of the tents and settled us in another one, much smaller, situated at about fifty meters away from our first camping. They were not talking to us. At around 1400 hours, they took their arms and surrounded the place. They disarmed us. Then, they got us out of the tents and threw us out, saying that they did not want to keep people who were against the action of the interim government. They took out our entire luggage and threw them in the bush. They gave us an order to leave the place immediately.”

Cyprien Munyanziza who was living near Murambi camp told the Commission the following:

“The French were going around neighbouring places in their vehicles and would put their hand on the neck, implying that RPF was going to cut our throats if we stayed. That campaign compelled a big number of people to flee to Zaire”.

Laurent Mugambira also saw how people were incited to flee the country:

“The French soldiers were going around everywhere in the camp for the displaced encouraging people to leave for Zaire. Through their interpreters, they told people that if they didn’t leave, RPF were going to massacre them. The French were also making the signs of cutting the throat, indicating that RPF soldiers would cut the throats of all those who stayed behind after their departure.”

Gabriel Musilikare spoke of the French zeal in making the people flee the country:

The French encouraged us to flee to Zaire before the arrival of RPF in Zone Turquoise. Before their departure, they went around with their interpreter whose name was Nkurunziza Etienne in the commune of Kinyamakara where I was living, and they were inciting us to leave for Zaire. They were saying that if we did not leave, Inkotanyi would cut our throats. My elder brother Ntasoni Jean left after that mobilization but latter on returned. I was equally convinced to leave and I went to Bukavu and lived in Kashusha camp.”

8. Looting of public property

Before leaving Gikingoro, French soldiers looted Government property and that of public institutions and took them to Zaire. Sometimes they would help people in looting and destroying public property.

Desire Nyandwi, a Member of Parliament, recalled:

“I was also able to note that the French were involved in the looting of public property. For example, in the office of the préfet, there was a very big safe which contained some money. They also opened the doors of the buildings of the prefecture and allowed the populace to enter and loot. At Kitabi, during the last two days before their departure, the French looted the property of UGZ 4 which was under my management. They opened the doors with military machinery and they took with them goods and the rest were distributed to the people.”

Fidele Yambabariye told me the Commission that the French soldiers looted machines in the tea factory at Mata:

“The French who were staying at Kitabi used to come to get water and firewood from Mata tea factory. Before leaving the country, they stole two machines, one was serving as a supplier of fuel to the factory, and the other was used in the laboratory. I saw them loading those machines in their vehicles. They also took a cupboard which had been left behind by an executive of the administration of that factory who had run away and had not been able to take it with him, for he did not have enough space in their vehicle.”

The arrival of the French soldiers did not improve fundamentally the security situation of the genocide survivors. The local authorities who had carried out the massacres for two months and a half were kept by the French soldiers and many of those who replaced the old guard were also implicated in the genocide. French soldiers kept in place all the roadblocks that were manned by Interahamwe, giving the latter instructions to keep on hunting Tutsis and killing them. Through a systematic campaign of throwing Tutsis out of flying helicopters into Nyungwe forest, they killed a substantial number of them. In places which were under the French control, murdering of Tutsis continued with the full knowledge of French soldiers. Widespread rapes and other sexual abuses against the survivors of the genocide continued between the period the French came and the two months of genocide. Finally, having recognised that FAR were being defeated and that they were being forced to withdraw, French soldiers carried out an earth scorched policy by inciting the population to run to Zaire and by encouraging the looting of infrastructure.

Annex: List of some authorities who collaborated with the French in Gikongoro and their present situation

The purpose of this table is to show the French authorities who led Opération Turquoise in Gikongoro and who collaborated with the criminal authorities or put people in places of authority who were implicated in the genocide. At the time, most of them were well known killers, and it was not difficult to identify them by carrying out a simple survey. Moreover, testimonies of French soldiers that were collected by the journalists during Turquoise prove that French soldiers knew very well the persons they were dealing with when they chose to collaborate with those burgomasters and sous-préfets, be it in Gikongoro, Cyangugu or Kibuye. This is what Commander Martin Gillier told journalist Christian Leconte in July 1994: “We know that most of the burgomasters and the sous-préfets in the region are implicated in the massacres of Tutsis, even in instigating them. We accumulated testimonies that prove it. But for the time being, they are our only collaborators among a million and a half of Hutu refugees who flocked into the zone”. The views of Colonel Didier Tauzin were not different when he qualified members of the interim government and FAR as “legal organizations”, but admitting at the same time that they “certainly have blood on their hands” . He added: “the legitimacy of that government is not my problem.”



Name Previous Occupation Position given by the French during Turquoise Present judicial status
Laurent Bucyibaruta Préfet of Gikongoro Préfet Gikongoro Refugee in France, warrant of arrest by ICTR issued
Damien Bina Sous préfet of Munini Sous préfet Munini Wanted by Rwandan judicial authorities
Joseph Ntegeyintwali Sous préfet of Karaba Sous préfet of Karaba Sentenced to death at Manga
Joachim Hategekimana Sous-Préfet of Kaduha Sous-Préfet of Kaduha Under trial, currently in Gikingoro Prison
Desire Ngezahayo Burgomaster of Karama Burgomaster of Karama Sentenced to death, Gikongoro prison
Juvenal Muhitira Burgomaster of Kivu Burgomaster of Kivu Under trial, Gikongoro prison
Didace Hategekimana Burgomaster
of Rukondo Burgomaster
of Rukondo up to end of July 1994 Sentenced to death
Jean Hakizayezu Teacher Burgomaster
of Rukondo from end of July-August 1994 Sentenced to 15 years in jail, released, now doing community work
Paul Kadogi Burgomaster
of Nshili Burgomaster
of Nshili Sentenced to death, Mpanga prison
Innocent Bakundukize Agricultural officer at Mata tea factory Burgomaster
of Mubuga Under trial, Gikongoro prison
Mathieu Rutambuka Sector Conseiller Burgomaster
of Kinyamakara Under trial by Gacaca court
Bernard Bizimana


Burgomaster of Musange
Burgomaster of Musanze up to July 1994 A fugitive in Uganda, wanted by the Rwandan judicial authorities

Nkezabaganwa Simon
Teacher
Burgomaster
of Musanze from July 1994
Sentenced to death
Mukamarutoki Jean Baptiste Sector Conseiller, former Burgomaster Burgomaster
of Nyamagabe from July 1994 Confessed and sentenced to eight years imprisonment for genocide
Gashugi Augustin Burgomaster
of Karambo Burgomaster
of Karambo up to July 1994 Wanted by Rwandan judicial authorities, could have died in DRC
Rwabarinda Francois Inspector of schools Burgomaster of Karambo up to the departure of the French Free
Kayihura Albert Burgomaster
of Muko Burgomaster
of Muko up to July 1994 Wanted by Rwandan judicial authorities, could have died in DRC
Ndahayo Emmanuel Assistant Burgomaster Burgomaster
of Muko from July 1994 Released from prison, awaiting trial unde Gacaca courts
Ndizihiwe Jean-Chrysostome Teacher Burgomaster
from June 1994 Imprisoned and released without trial
Nteziryayo Emmanuel Burgomaster
of Mudasomwa Burgomaster of Mudasomwa up to July 1994 In prison for genocide in the UK .
Kanyeshyamba Faustin Former Burgomaster of Mudasomwa Burgomaster of Mudasomwa from July 1994 Sentenced for genocide, 7 years imprisonment
Mugerangbo Silas Burgomaster of Rwamiko Burgomaster of Rwamiko up to August 1994 Died in Butare prison
• The death Penalty in Rwanda was abolished on 25/07/07.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the actions of the French soldiers, especially the most reprehensible ones, were repeated in a remarkable way in the three prefectures where Opération Turquoise was operating. They were therefore not accidents or excesses of simple young soldiers or of a commander who made mistakes, but a well thought-out strategy, systematic actions produced and tolerated by the norms and practices of Opération Turquoise.

The most remarkable deed that one finds in the three prefectures in a rather repetitive way is the continuation of the genocide on the instructions of the French officers, who kept the préfets in their functions and part of burgomasters and junior administrative authorities with whom they collaborated. They kept in place roadblocks of Interahamwe and collaborated with them. French soldiers asked them very clearly, as we have been able to see at Gikongoro, to continue hunting down and killing Tutsis. Still at Gikongoro, we have seen how they dropped mainly Tutsis in the Nyungwe forest from their helicopters, doing it in such a way that the fall was not fatal but knowing that, in those circumstances, they were very likely to be killed. At Rubengera, we have seen how the French asked Interahamwe to hunt down Tutsis who could have infiltrated the camps for displaced Hutus, and that they asked the Interahamwe to kill such infiltrators. At Cyangugu, we have seen that the French allowed the continuation of roadblocks manned by Interahamwe around Nyarushishi camp, who wantonly killed Tutsi survivors who either tried to enter the camp or get out. Still at Nyarushishi and at Murambi camps, French soldiers allowed Interahamwe access into the camps, taking Tutsis to be killed. We have seen also how the French soldiers supplied arms to the leaders of Interahamwe such as Yussuf. It is in light of the above that one has to understand the sacrifice of the Bisesero survivors by Colonel Rosier. So, the Bisesero issue was not an accident, nor was it an exceptional criminal act. It was part of the general strategy of Opération Turquoise, only that it was one of the most striking examples.

Behind those acts of continuous killings, one sees very well the will of the French in taking measures to stopping infiltration by RPF soldiers. But none of the testimonies has shown that Interahamwe tried to make the any distinction between the infiltrators, therefore potential combatants, and the ordinary Tutsis. They kept on committing massacres, often in the presence of the French.

French soldiers did not necessarily bear a grudge against the real or potential RPF fighters. The manipulation of minds began during the pre-deployment briefings where, by reversing the reality of genocide, it was explained to the French soldiers of Opération Turquoise that it was the Tutsis who were killing the Hutus. This aimed at defusing any possible conscience problems which could be caused by the fact of mistreating the victims of genocide. There are other acts of hostility and aggression against Tutsis which tend to show that

Hunger remained rampant in the areas protected by the French soldiers, as was the case in Bisesero, Nyarushishi and Murambi camps. In those three camps, some survivors, pushed by hunger, went out of the camps to look for food and got killed by militiamen. There were very frequent rapes were tolerated by the commanding officers. At Cyangugu and Kibuye, survivors, especially women and young girls, were denied medical treatment because of their ethnic belonging.

Lastly, there were unnecessary amputations of survivors’ limbs at Bisesero and at Goma. All this shows that, besides the Tutsis who could have posed some threat of a military nature, French soldiers attacked, allowed and had Tutsis killed indiscriminately.



ORGANISATIONAL CHART OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT 1990 – 1995

Office of The President Prime Minister Minister of Defense Minister of Cooperation Minister of Foreign Affairs
1.





2.
















3



























4. President : Francois Mitterrand (1981 – 1995)




Secretary General in the Office of the President: Jean Bianco
(June 1982-May 1991)


Hubert Vedrine
(1991-1995)






Special headquaters of the Presidence Office

Special Chief of Staff of the President of the Republic

- General Jean Fleury
(1987- 1989)

- Amiral Jacques Lanxande
(April 1989- April 1991)

-General Christian Quesnot
(April 1991-Sept.1995)

Vice-admiral Jean Luc Delauney
(8 Sept. 1995-29 April 1999)

General of division Henri Bentegeat
(30 April 1999- 3 Oct. 2006)

Assistant of Quesnot:
-General Huchon
(up to April 1993)

Colonel Bentegeat

Council for African Affairs

Advisor for to the President on African Affaires:

- Guy Penne (1981-1986)


- Jean Christophe Mitterand
(1986-July 1992)



- Bruno Delaye
(July 1992-January 1995)



Prime Minister:
Michel Rocard (May 1988 – 15 May 1991)


Edith Cresson
(15 May 1991-02 April 1992)


Pierre Beregovoy (3 April 1992-29 March 1993)





Eduard Balladur (29 March 1993-11 May 1995)

Eduard Balladur
(29 March 1993-11May 1995) 1. Minister of Defence: Charles Hernu (1981-1985)


Paul Quiles (1985-1986)



Charles Millon (1986-1988)

Jean Pierre Chevenement (May 1988- January 1991)

Pierre Joxe
(January 1991-1993)

Francois Leotard
(1993-1995)

2. Chief of military cabinet of the Minister of foreign Affaires

General Marc Amedee Monchal
(Jan.1991-May 1994)

General Jean Rannou
(April 1991-May 1994)

General Philippe Mercier (24 May 1994- 31 August 1995)

3. Chief of staff of the Armed Forces:

General of the army: Jeannou Lacase
(1st Feb. 1981 –July 1985)

General of the Air Force Jean Saulnier (August 1985-Nov. 1987)

General Maurice Schmitt (1987-April 1991)

Admiral Jacques Lanxade (24 April 1991-8 Sep 1995)

General of the Air force
Jean Philippe Douin
(9 Sept. 1995-24 April 1998)

General of the armed forces Jean Pierre Kelche (9 April 1998-29 October 2002)

General of the armed Forces Henri Bentegeat
(30 October 2002- 3 October 2006)


General of the armed forces Jean Louis Georgelin
(4 October 2006)

Chief of Cabinet of Lanxade: General Philip Mansuy

Counsel of Chief of staff COS for African Affaires: Col Delort

Deputy chief of operations at the headquarters of the armed forces:

Guillon (1990)
Raymond Germanos (1994) 1. Minister of Cooperation: Jacque Pelletier (May 1991- April 1992)

Edwige Avice
(May 1991- April 1992)


Marcel Debarge (April 1992-30 March 1993)





Michel Roussin (1 April 1993-1994)





2. Military mission for cooperation

Chief of Military Mission:

General Jean Varret (October 1990-April 1993)

General Jean Paul Huchon (April 1993)







3.Civil cooperation mission 1. Minister of Foreign Affaires: Roland Dumas (May 1988-March 1993)

Alain Juppe (1993-1995)



Director of cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs:





Pascal Gendreau (1993)





Domonique de Villepin, Director of Cabinet of Alain Juppe (1st April 1993-1994)













FRENCH REPRESENTATIION IN RWANDA
Ambassadors and Representatives Military Attaches Assistant Military attaches and Military Advisors to FAR Command of Operations in Rwanda
Georges Martes
(11Sept. 1989- March 1993)

Jean Michel Marlaud
(May 1993-April 1994)

Jacques Courbin


Jean Claude Brochenin
(31st January 1998)

Francois Ponge
(7 Sept. 2000)

Dominique Decherf (2004) Military attaché in Kigali. He is also chief of military assistance in Rwanda

Colonel Rene Galinie
(August 1988-July 1991)

Colonel Bernard Cussac
(July 1991-April 1994)

Clonel Gilbert Canovas
(11/10/1990 – 25/11/1990)

The lieutenant Colonel Gilles Chollet
(03/02/1992-03/03/1992)

The lieutenant Colonel Jean Jacques Maurin (24/04/1992-14/04/1994) Colonel Rene Galinie (October 1990)

Colonel Jean Claude Thomann
(21/10/-02/12/1990)

Colonel Rene Galinie
(Dec.1990- July 1991)

Colonel Bernard Cussac
(July 1991-Janv 1993)

Colonel Philippe Tracqui
(8 Feb. 1993-21 March 1993)

Colonel Bernard Cussac (April 1993-Dec 1993)

One Commander of Operations (Noroit + DAMI) during the crisis situation:

Clonel Jean Rosier (June – November 1992)


Colonel Dominique Derlot (February-March 1993)

Commanding Officer of Opération Amaryllis: Jean Jacques Maurin then Henri Poncet

Commanding Officer of Operation Turquoise: Jean Claude Lafourcade



PART THREE:

INVOLVEMENT OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AFTER THE GENOCIDE

1. Political support to the interim government and military support to former FAR and Interahamwe after July 1994

1.1 Official contacts with the interim government in exile

It is clear from a report written by Jerome Bicamumpaka about his mission to France in September 1994 that France maintained its cooperation with the interim government, by among other things giving advice of a political nature to improve its image and to recover the legitimacy it had lost for having perpetrated the genocide. Bicamumpaka was received twice by a French official, and informally by two other personalities, during a mission that was meant to: “sensitize the French authorities about the tragic situation which Rwanda was experiencing; to find out the French position on the Rwandese problem; to appeal for French political support to our cause on the international scene; to appeal for humanitarian aid for the refugees and for financial support.”

In his report, Bicamumpaka pointed out that France was advising the interim government and FAR to adopt a “ low profile”, but that France will not stop sympathizing with them and giving them assistance as such: “To the French, the RPF Government would be illegitimate, for it is a government that was brought to power by the Ugandan army, whose majority do not speak either Kinyarwanda, or French; a government that rules a country deserted by the majority of its population; in short, a government of an occupation army. As far as they are concerned, that government should give way to another that really represents the population. The transitional government in exile represents a bigger majority of the Rwandan population, but it remains discredited [not our emphasis]”.

Concerning the advice given to that discredited government, Bicamumpaka noted: “The French still recommends that we organize ourselves so that we can occupy as much as possible the international scene, carrying out unprecedented media activities; we should increase the number of our declarations, but these will have to be well thought out that are in line with coherent and responsible strategy and not aggressive declarations which would bring about polemics. That would not be in line with the low profile politics that they recommend.”

During that mission, Bicamumpaka also discussed with his interlocutors the question of direct French military support and this is the answer he was given: “On the question of French support, our interlocutors replied that that support was impossible for the time being mainly for the following reasons:
-The world is still under the shock of all those massacres;

France is accused by the international community of having played a role in the Rwandan “genocide”; the period of elections in France [….]. Even if it were possible to give support, we should do it in a shrew manner: for example, find a “friendly” African country” which would receive that financial aid and cede it back to us. And that is where the importance of President Mobutu comes in our strategy. [….]
And that is why we should refocus our diplomacy as a matter of priority towards the President and other Zaïrean authorities and get them to allow us free political activities on their soil, while demanding caution from us at the same time”.

With regard to returning to power in Rwanda, France advised the interim government as follows: “As we had requested their opinion on our possible return to power in Rwanda through military activities, our interlocutors told us to be very careful because for the time being, we would have the whole world against us. That action would certainly be a blatant failure. For them, what is important for us is to exist and be recognized by the international community as the true representatives of the Rwandese people. (Example: The French Government in exile in London or the Polish Government in exile also in London from 1939 to 1945 or the PLO Government)”

It is clear that France did not want to carry out activities in the open, preferring rather to provide indirect support through President Mobutu. From the testimonies of General Rwarakabije and Colonel Murenzi (c.f the annexes), we will find out that France indeed provided this indirect support through President Mobutu.

French support to former FAR and Interahamwe was characterized by two essential aspects: covering arms supplies that were passing through Goma, and direct support to the restructuring of FAR, military training of Interahamwe and encouragement of operations that were carried out by armed groups in order to destabilize the new Rwandan government.

1.2 Supply of arms and covering their delivery by Turquoise

France continued to give military and logistical support to FAR and the interim government during the presence of Turquoise at Goma and after its departure. On 2nd July 1994, Prime Minister Jean Kambanda admitted: “We receive arms, it is clear. Without that, we would not have been able to hold on untill now. Now, I understand how one wins a war. The problem of the embargo does not rise anymore as this was the case a month ago”. On 4th July 1994, a former FAR officer confirmed what Kambanda had said, saying that FAR continued to receive arms at Goma.

That flow of arms was also noted by journalists who were in Goma. They revealed that cargo had started arriving mid-April and went on during the whole summer of 1994 in the presence of the French army at Goma. Arms were brought in by Boeings 707 from Nigeria and by other anonymous planes which landed at night between 2030 hours, and with each landing, they would bring in 18 tons of arms and ammunition. Le Figaro confirmed that it had detailed proof that “on 18th July, a flight that transported cargo worth 753,645 dollars of arms landed at Goma. The Rwandan Embassy in Paris financed that flight for an amount of 175,000 dollars, the Rwandan Embassy in Cairo, for an amount of 578,645 dollars”. In June 1994, Colonel Dominique Bon, the French military attaché in Kinshasa made it clear that arms supplies to former FAR had not stopped and that they were coming through the airport of Goma.

An administrative and financial report of the Rwandan Embassy in France written from 31st July to 5th August 1995 by the Rwandese Audit Commission revealed that between 4th July and 29th December 1994, Colonel Sebastien Ntahobari, the Embassy’s military attaché, continued to incur expenses related to the purchasing of arms using account No. 034728-35 managed by Banque Nationale de Paris, Ternes Monceau agency. On the orders of the Minister of Defense, he transferred 1.200.000$ on 17/6/1994 to GPP group of Captain Barril as the beneficiary “no one knows for what purpose. Only Barril, Ntahobari and Bizimana [minister of defense of the interim government] knew”, noted the auditors.

On the same day, other amounts were transferred to the accounts of the Rwandan Embassies in Kinshasa (200,000$), in Washington (28,000$) and Nairobi (40,000$). On 27/ 6/1994, a sum of 1,100,000 French francs was transferred to the Rwandan Embassy in Cairo. On 5th July 1994, 1,086,071 French francs were transferred to a citizen whose name was Robert-Bernard Martin. It is very likely that those funds transfers from the Rwandan Embassies’ accounts in the period very close to between mid-June and beginning of July 1994 were used to finance the purchase of arms bought by the interim government, channeled through Zaire destined to FAR.

According to the opinion of Rwandan experts who checked the accounts of the Rwandan Embassy in France, “Colonel Ntahobari was working as a middleman between MINADEF (Ministry of Defense) and some arms dealers. He was aware of most orders of military equipments and account No. 034728-35 was sometimes used to effect funds transfers meant to pay the bills related to those orders. At the time of this audit in Paris, we identified the names of three companies which were involved in that deal or in the transportation of military equipment with Rwanda:
- OGA: Office General de l’ Air (France)
- EAST AFRICAN CARGO (EAC) based in Zaventem (Belgium)
- DYL INVEST LTD: represented by Dominique LEMONNIER and based at CRAN-GENERIER (FRANCE)”

The experts indicated that they did not find any other figures in the accounts of the Embassy and explained that Colonel Ntahobari had burnt all the records of his department before leaving the Embassy in December 1994. However, the report of the experts revealed very important movements of funds on the account of the military attaché, an indication that could give credence to the assumption that arms were purchased either officially or through some private organisations.

Concerning this question of arms financing by France, on 3rd July 2007, the Commission heard M. Martin Marschner Von Helmreich, a German citizen residing in Monaco, who pointed out that a French company called Rochefort Finances was a subsidiary through which clandestine operations were financed in Africa, particularly in Rwanda. M. Marschner based his accusations on the following fact: in 1994, he had signed a financial brokerage agreement with “La Case Centrale de Reassurance” (CRR), a company which depended directly on the French Treasury, by depositing an amount equivalent to three million Euros.

On 19th August 1994, CRR informed him that it had lost one billion French francs belonging to its subsidiary, Rochefort Finances. On 14th September 1994, he was surprised to note that the French Treasury paid him back the whole amount without any explanation. Marschner felt that this malfunctioning was an indication of the involvement of the Ministry of Budget in the clandestine financing of operations, and that France could have used this same method to finance the organization of the genocide in Rwanda. He handed a very big document of about 800 pages to the Commission which he considered to be a collection of the incriminating evidence related to the financing in question. The Commission studied it thoroughly together with documents from the National Bank of Rwanda, but the inquiry on that subject could not support the accusations of Mr. Marschner. What is clear, however, is that some funds whose sources remain obscure transited through a French bank, BNP (Banque Nationale de Paris) and could have most probably been used to purchase arms and ammunition for FAR after the embargo and their withdrawal to Zaïre. Another point which indicates the responsibility of the French government in direct rearming of FAR, concerns arms deliveries on the battlefield. In fact, the airport of Goma through which the arms meant for FAR and the militia was transiting between the months of June and August 1994, was controlled by the French army and was only supposed to serve for humanitarian purposes.

But that airport was also used to receive arms and ammunition meant for FAR and Interahamwe, something which could not have been possible without the readiness of the French soldiers to oblige. Acting under the mandate of the UN, the French army, among other missions, had to enforce the embargo adopted by the Security Council and thus stop any transit of arms through Goma.

1.2 Restructuring, re-arming and re-training of FAR and Interahamwe

After July 1994, the French authorities continued with their military support to the defeated regime, to FAR and Intrahamwe. During the stay of Turquoise troops in Zaïre, France got involved in a policy that some writers qualify as “low intensity war” , including training their Rwandese allies in the camps in Zaïre, Congo Brazzaville and Central Africa.

1.2.1 Supporting FAR and Interahamwe in Zaïre.

In Zaire, France gave moral and military support to FAR through Marshal Mobutu. When Turquoise was still in Goma, close and regular contacts between France and FAR high ranking officers continued with the objective of helping them to get reorganised and motivated to resume the armed struggle in Rwanda. After the restructuring exercice, France continued to give them technical, moral and military support. France’s support was not confined to FAR, it also extended to Interahamwe. The French gave them military training as well as logistical and moral support. Many testimonies of militiamen confirmed the participation of the French in their reorganization and training. This was done through the intermediary of former FAR officers, but French soldiers provided logistical support.

General Paul Rwarakabije testified as follows:

“Opération Turquoise was not involved in saving those who were being hunted. It rather favoured the authorities of the previous regime and helped them to leave the country. When they arrived outside the country, the contacts between the French soldiers’ headquarters based in Goma and the leaders of FAR continued, mainly with Gen. Bizimungu, Lt col. Anatole Nsengiyumva, Lt col. Bahufite and many others that I don’t remember, such as General Bizimungu’s aide de camp. Every time such contacts took place, we would hold meetings and our colleagues would report to us about those contacts. They would explain that their objective was to restructure FAR so as to enable the latter to be in a position to attack Rwanda as soon as possible.

Among the French officers of Turquoise who kept contacts with FAR were those who had worked in Rwanda before, with Noroît detachment. There was for example Colonel Canovas that one could see quite often. Regarding General Lafourcade, he was not moving about in FAR camps. The Rwandan officers would rather go to meet him at his headquarters. Once Colonel Canovas went to do some sensitization in a Rwandan military camp, saying that his name was Carlos and that he was Spanish, which was wrong. Like in Noroît detachment, he used to go inspecting here and there in the country, he was known. In short, the objective of those contacts was to see how the defeated Rwandan army could launch attacks inside Rwanda”.

In July 1994, General Dallaire noted a very close connivance between French senior officers of Turquoise and the military leaders of former FAR. First, on 11th July 1994 at 1100 hours, Dallaire met General Bizimungu in the French camp.When he came out, General Lafourcade asked Dallaire “to be discreet about the way the meeting had been arranged ”

That caution of Lafourcade shows at least that he had something to hide or to reproach himself. Then on 12th August 1994, Dallaire met Bizimungu again under the escort of French officers who had been provided by Lafourcade. Dallaire said that he found General Bizimungu “surrounded by some senior Zaïrean officers, [and] some French officers”. It is therefore clear there was collaboration in Goma or at least very close contacts between French senior officers of Turquoise and former FAR senior officers, who were genocide perpetrators.

General Rwarakabije explained that those contacts between the French and former FAR were established during Turquoise to allow the latter to get reorganised in the preparation for a comeback, and that those contacts continued with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) during 2000-2002:

“After the withdrawal of Turquoise, we launched Operation ‘insecticide’ in Rwanda, but the French did not participate since they had gone home with Turquoise. They came back after the launching of FDLR in the years 2000, 2001, and 2002. The commanding officer of FDLR, called Ntiwiragabo, was living in Kinshasa and had a group of people who kept contacts with France through its Embassy in Kinshasa. A Frenchman who was a member of the General Directorate for External Security called Jean Benoit, came from France and was staying at the FrenchEembassy in Kinshasa. It was through him that contacts were made between the office of Colonel Ntiwiragabo and France. Among them was Celestin Harelimana, today in prison in Rwanda”.

General Rwarakabije added such that type of contacts between the French and the military and political leaders of FDLR also existed in the French Embassy in Kenya and in France:

“The same type of contacts existed also at the French Embassy in Kenya. The First Secretary of the French Embassy named Deflorene was in charge of maintaining these contacts. The same contacts in France were coordinated by Lt. Col. Christophe Hakizabera in charge of external relations in FDLR, assisted by Major Faustin Ntirikina who now lives in France. They were working under the orders of Ntiwiragaba with the objective of consolidating the relationship with France and finding new allies”.

Colonel Evarest Murenzi was a former officer of the Presidential Guard of FAR, a unit he joined in 1992. After the defeat of FAR, he was at first the commanding officer of Mugunga battalion from 1994 to 1996. From March to November 1998, he was involved in infiltration activities in Rwanda with his battalion, and when the infiltrators, “Abacengezi” were defeated, he went back to DRC and led a brigade called ARTEL. In 2000, he was sent by the leadership of FDLR which was at that time called “Alliance pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALIR)”, to Kinshasa as a liaison officer between their headquarters and the headquarters of Kabila. In 2002, he became G2, which means the officer in charge of intelligence in the operational headquarters of FDLR. He decided to come home to Rwanda in April 2004 and joined his family that had remained in the country. He was integrated in The Rwandan Defence Forces in July 2004. Today, he is the commander of 501 brigade based in Rusizi. His testimony corroborated the story of Rwarakabije on the involvement of the French on the side of ex-FAR and Interahamwe in Zaïre.

“I crossed the Rwandan border on 17th July 1994, passing through Goma. I settled in Mugunga camp. That is where I saw the French soldiers of Turquoise, some of them had worked in Rwanda before. I recognized among them Colonel Canovas who was the founder of CRAP at Kanombe. During Opération Turquoise, Colonel Canovas continued collaborating and working with FAR military headquarters. I found him with General Bizimungu at Mugunga, at Keshero precisely in an orphanage run by a white pastor, which had been requisitioned to accommodate FAR. FAR military headquarters was at that particular place, and that was where Canovas and Bizimungu used to meet. Apart from Canovas, the other French officer who used to come to Keshero was Lt Col. Gregoire De Saint Quentin. I saw with my own eyes and I knew very well before. I saw him at Keshero, in Mugunga. They came there practically every day either for meetings or for other supporting activities for Bizimungu. I was not part of the military headquarters, but I would often pass there and I could see them going and coming back at Keshero. They would take the Goma-Sake route and go to the FAR Military headquarters at Keshero. That is where most meetings were held between the French officers and the FAR commanders. Following the request of the pastor, the military headquarters were moved to Lac Vert and contacts continued even there.”

Colonel Murenzi confirmed that after the departure of Turquoise collaboration never stopped, and it was channeled through the army of Mobutu, supervised by the French:

“After 1994, the activities that Canovas and De Saint Quentin were carrying out at Keshero did not really stop. It is true that the visible contacts with the French officers and FAR military headquarters were discontinued after the withdrawal of Turquoise. But after 1994, during the reconstruction of the command of FAR under Bizimingu’s supervision, the latter had very high level contacts with the hierarchy of Mobutu’s army. FAR delegations often went to Kinshasa. General Bizimungu would participate personally, or he would be represented by his assistant, General Kabiligi, whose base was at Bukavu. I also know very well that the Commander of the Zairean Armed Forces was supervised by French officers. For example, the training centre of the airborne troops (CETA) who was based at Ndjili airport in Kinshasa was headed by a French colonel whose name was Canard. As long as the French continued to collaborate with Mobutu and the military headquarters of FAR headed by Bizimungu, they were bound to collaborate closely with the hierarchy of the Zaïrean Armed Forces, (FAZ). It was impossible to disassociate the collaboration between the French officers who supervised FAZ with FAR who were refugees in Zaïre. The collaboration between those three institutions was evident. It was between 1994 and 1996, before the collapse of Mobutu’s regime”.

The last element that was stressed by Colonel Murenzi concerning France’s supporting activities to FAR relate to the operation named “Insecticide” which was supported, as some other witnesses said, by the French (cf. infra) during the genocide between May and June 1994 at the Bigogwe camp. Colonel Murenzi emphasised the consequences of that operation, pointing out that it was this operation which gave birth to the first destabilization activities of Rwanda:

“In May or June 1994, I saw a Frenchman in the camp of the Presidential Guard in Kigali. The commanding officer of the camp, Major Mpiranya, told me that the French had come with about ten other French soldiers, in the company of one of Habyarimana’s sons. He told me that they had settled at Bigogwe to train a Rwandan military unit in infiltration techniques. That was what was given the name of ‘Operation Insecticide’. What I want to underline here is that that operation which was launched in Rwanda by the French during the genocide, continued to be carried out in Goma between 1994 and 1996 and gave birth to ALIR, which carried out various sabotage actions in Rwanda in the years 1995-1998. The activities launched by the infiltrators during those years were thus a continuation of the operation ‘Insecticide’ which had been started at Bigogwe by the French. It was from that operation that destabilization activities were launched in Rwanda by ‘abacengezi’ (infiltrators), particularly the destruction of electric polls, laying anti-personnel mines, etc.”

This testimony shows the role the French soldiers played in the training of ALIR. This role is corroborated by a document dated 2nd June 1998 from the French army headquarters, Special Operations Command, headed by General Yves Germanos at the time. The document was signed by Colonel Gilles Bonsag, chief of the 7th marine infantry regiment, and was addressed to three people, two of whom had Rwandan names, Leon Habyarimana, son of the former President, and Pascal Twagiramungu; the third person it was addressed to had a Congolese name, Pascal Chitarawanga. That document showed the money given by the French army to former FAR, to ALIR and to Interahamwe. It also addressed the military situation on the ground in Rwanda and its risks, as well as the estimates of additional military aid which the French army intended to give to the forces which were fighting in Rwanda. Here below is the text of that document:

“I can confirm that the recorded expenditure from 14th October 1997 amounted to 23 million FF, and this is only for the groups which enjoy our support. These are the Rwandan Liberation Army, ALIR: 2300 men; former FAR: 1565 men and INTERAHAMWE: 1250 men. According to our teams in Kigali, we have realized that power is in the hands of PAPA ROMEO 2 who replaces No. 1. In case of an offensive, there is likelihood of an intervention by Ugandan forces since the latter was at one time the Chief of intelligence services in Uganda. We have put aside multiple rocket launcher canons which can be dismantled, from our stocks in Ndjamena (Chad)”.








REPUBLIC OF FRANCE
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MILITARY HEADQUATERS FOR GROUND FORCES
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND.



Place de Caylus, 2nd June 1998




General Yves GERMANOS
Chief of Staff of Special Forces

To Mr. Leon HABIARIMANA and Julien TWANGIRAMUNGU
76, rue de Cedre 06000. Nice (France) and Pascal CHITARAWANGA

I would like to inform you that the expenses recorded to date since 14th October 1997 amount to 23 million of our Francs; this is only for the groups we support. These are the Rwandan Liberation Army: ALIR: 23000 men; former FAR: 1565 men and lastly INTERAHAMWE: 1250 men.

According to our teams in Kigali, we have realized that power is held by PAPA ROMEO 2, who replaces No. 1. In case of an offensive, there is likelihood of an intervention by the Ugandan forces since the latter was at one time the Chief of intelligence services in Uganda.

We have put aside multiple rocket canon launchers which can be dismantled, from our stocks in Ndjamena (Chad).


For Col. Gilles BONSANG
Chief, 7th RIMA






















There are other witnesses, including administrative authorities, who revealed that the French soldiers of Turquoise gave military, logisticaland moral support by training former FAR soldiers at Bukavu and its surroundings, through mobilization for the purpose of attacking Rwanda and provision of arms. Straton Sinzabakwira, former burgomaster of Karengera explained as follows:

“While in exile at Bukavu, I was among the leaders who were organizing meetings for sensitisation and organization to attack Rwanda. I confirm that in that context, the French supervised the setting up of training camps for former FAR with the purpose of attacking Rwanda. There was a training centre run by the French at Bulonge in Walungu Zone in south Kivu. The most important site was at Bulonge where arms were stocked (artillery, bombs and others), and it was from there that sporadic operations were launched against Rwanda. We also held meetings with the French soldiers during which they mobilized us and assured us that they would support us with arms. Meetings were also held in Bukavu at a place called La Fregate, at Kashusha, at Uvira and at Bulonge. In Kamanyola training camp where I was staying, French soldiers continued supporting us in our preparations aimed at launching attacks in Rwanda. That support lasted until our defeat in 1996. In our disarray, France sent a plane from Nairobi to evacuate the highest civilian and military authorities of the defeated regime to Nairobi, Bangui, Cameroon and Paris.”

Francois Habimana was a teacher in Rwanda before fleeing to Zaire. When he arrived at Bukavu, he was recruited in the former FAR Nyangezi II. He narrated how arms were distributed to FAR in that camp by the French from Opération Turquoise, and how they were trained to recapture power:

“What I remember is that in the refugee camps, there were training activities. These were at first carried out in Panzi. Then it became embarrassing due to the fear of external observers, and it was decided to move to Bulonge. The French came to Panzi and distributed arms, M16 and their ammunition. In Bulonge and Shimanga camps, they gave out munitions for R4 guns that used to belong to FAR: they had run out of munitions. That is what I saw with my own eyes. The arms and the munitions were brought in a plane in containers. The planes would land at Kavumu, often coming from Goma. When they arrived at Kavumu, those arms and munitions were loaded in military trucks.

At the end of Turquoise, I was with General Laurent Munyakazi in August 1994 on a date I do not remember. I met him in the town of Bukavu coming from Bulonge. He was going to Panzi. He told me that we should not [former FAR] have any problems because the French were leaving us part of their military equipment before their withdrawal. When the French gave those guns and munitions, it was in August. The M16 riffles were stocked at Bulonge. Others were put in a part of the depot that was at Sayo camp. Contacts between the French and former FAR continued to the extent that there were even arms that transited through Goma, probably given by the French. Those arms came from Goma during the month of May 1995; they were brought in ships that had been hired and which docked at Bagira. There were 80 tons. The news that they had come from the French was revealed to us by colonels Musonera and Ntiwiragabo. Both of them came to Nyangezi camp where I was, and they told us this as a way of encouraging us, saying that we will not have any problem, that we should continue the training with the objective of attacking Rwanda ”.

Francois Habimana gave further explanations on collaboration between former FAR and the French and the circumstances in which the decisions of supplying arms were reached:

“When they [the French of Turquoise] were still at Cyangugu, they had secondary headquaters at Kibogora, Nyamasheke and Mibirizi. These were collaborating with the military headquaters of former FAR based in Bukavu. Officers at the military headquarters would meet and inform the French about their needs. When they came back, the French would tell them what they would leave them. At the end of Turquoise, before their withdrawal, the French gave to the FAR headquarters their old arms which they had requisitioned. Then the FAR headquarters based at Nyawera would distribute them to different training camps and other places where there were strategic positions. I even learnt that the French had left a case of funds that were to be used”.

Some former Interahamwe gave reports also about the active involvement of the French on their sides. Emmanuel Nshogozabahizi reported an episode near Goma as follows:

“I was at Katale camp at that time and we were training in the forest near a certain locality called ‘Quartier sept’. The French came to tell us that they were going to help us to return to our country, and that motivated us in our training. Those French soldiers came in rotations. They were based at Goma, and they would come in Peugeot pick-up with military colours. I did not see them again from January 1995”.

Jean-Damascene Muhimana talked about a public meeting chaired by General Bizimungu in the presence of French soldiers during which aid was promised to Interahamwe to attack Rwanda:

“General Augustin Bizimungu held a meeting with us and informed us that the French were still supporting us and that we will not be short of arms. The French were present and told us that even if the Tutsis had won, they would give us arms and munitions which would lead us to military victory. We then started the training at Bulengo again.”

Jean Baptiste Dushimimana also remembered the logistical support given by the French soldiers to former FAR and to Interahamwe in the perspective of attacking Rwanda:

“The French supported us in Congo for the purpose of preparing us to attack Rwanda. I first took refuge in Inera camp in Bukavu. I was part of the bodyguards of a cousin of Habyarimana. Later, I left Bukavu for Mugunga camp. In Bukavu, I saw that the French gave arms to former FAR in Panzi and Sayo camps and to Interahamwe in Bulengo and Inera camps. In Goma, the French took the arms to Katindo camp. When I was in Mugunga, we were training using arms that the French had given to FAR after crossing the border. We were under the command of Colonel Bivugabagabo [he now lives in France]. The French were not showing themselves openly. Bivugabagabo and his entourage showed us the military equipment and they told us that we had external supporters. That is how we were able to carry out operations in Rwanda, at Iwawa, Kanama and Nyamyumba”.

Jean Habimana, called Masudi, a former FAR soldier trained at Bigogwe, confirmed that the French supervised former FAR in Bukavu:

“When the Rwandan refugees settled in Congo, the French soldiers started training former FAR again. They were giving us combat uniforms and different types of arms. Those arms were transported in their helicopters and from Kavumu; they were taken to the camps. It is in that context that we were trained in different groups with the objective of carrying out attacks in Rwanda to destabilise the government and to kidnap the people who had stayed in the country.”

Documents reveal that Panzi camp was an important base for FAR because that is where high level meetings for organization and sensitisation were held. On 4th November 1994, a briefing meeting on the reorganization and restructuring of FAR which was attended by 54 officers was held in the camp under the chairmanship of General Bizimungu, General Kabiligi and Colonel Gasake, who was at one time Minister of Defense of the interim government.

During that meeting, General Bizimungu gave a general overview of the geopolitical and geo-strategic situation, indicating to the participants that he hoped for some French aid, and that he could see it as a good sign that the French had not invited Rwanda to the Biarritz summit: “1) The Anglo Saxons have embraced the cause of RPF and they have even proposed a project of taking us far from the borders with Rwanda. 2) The French who have helped us before have not yet spoken openly: no official recognition of the Kigali government and Rwanda has not been invited to the Franco-African summit in Biarritz.”

A study carried out by Human Rights Watch (HRW) between November 1994 and March 1995 in Zaire, confirmed Sinzabakwira’s testimony that the MINUAR officials revealed to HRW researchers that “French soldiers had carried out a number of flights between the months of July and September 1994 to take FAR officers, the militia and the special commandos to unknown destinations. Colonel Bagosora and the leader of the extremist Hutu militia, Interahamwe, Jean Baptiste Gatete, were among them”.

1.2.2 Training FAR and Interahamwe in Congo Brazzaville and in Central Africa

The same HRW study reports that in October 1994, the ex-FAR soldiers and members of the Rwandese and Burundian Hutu militia were trained by the French instructors in Central Africa. When that research study was published, French authorities reacted by formally denying it. When the new Rwandan Ambassador to France Christophe Mfizi, asked them for explanations. “Certainly we are not angels, but we are not kids either, to play the game of war, rather than that of peace in Rwanda”, declared Michel Dupuch, advisor to the President Chirac, to Ambassador Mfizi. However, the testimony collected by the Commission confirms that the French really trained the elements of ex-FAR and Interahamwe in Congo Brazzaville and in Central Africa. That is revealed by the following revealing testimony by Kayiranga Jerubbal.

An ex-soldier of ex-FAR, Kayiranga took refuge in Zaïre where he became a member of FGLR. He confirms to have met the French soldiers in the training camp of Bulonge where, accompanied by Bizimungu and Kabiligi, they were sensitised, and then trained with the objective of going to war once again. He was also trained by the French in Central Africa, and was involved in several operations in Congo, Burundi and Rwanda:

“I was a refugee in Bukavu and I was living with other soldiers in Panzi camp of. We had a meeting with Bizimungu and Kabiligi during which they sensitised us as to starting up the training again. We went for training in Bulonge. Bizimungu and Kabiligi came to see us with the French. The latter told us that their country was touched by the defeat, but that they would assist us to return home. They told us that a soldier never gives up, that we were still able to recapture the country, as we are now fully supported by a big part of the population. They also told us that we should not get worried, that there would be arms available. Later, I went back to Mpanzi to carry out some infiltration operations in Rwanda. We were about one hundred and fifty. We formed three brigades, and those were Alfa, Bravo and Chache whose commander was Major Bizimungu. I was in a unit called Kagoma, composed of commandos. The name of the commander was Sezirahiga, alias Bangubangu. That unit had the speciality of doing ambushes. It was the beginning of infiltration activities (igicengezi).

Later, I was sent to Burundi with my section in CNDD-FDD of Nyangoma to train them. I stayed there up to the time of attack in 1996. When the attack started, I was in Panzi. I saw the French again on Mount Itifemu in Bukavu. Kabirigi assembled us and told us that the French had sent us arms, the 104 and M16. With those arms, we fought RPA, but we lost and we withdrew to Walikale. I was deployed in the Kabirigi bodguard, whcich was at a distance. A vehicle would take us to Tingi-Tingi. The French were there and they would boost our morale. They would encourage us and they gave us guns called ‘Chechene’. They were coming from Tchetchenia and they looked like Kalachnikovs. They also gave us uniforms and guns called ‘Fomas’, which the French had used during Turquoise. Among those French, there were some that I had seen in Rwanda. They were telling us the war was continuing, and that we should not give up, but we were losing ground in spite of their aid and assistance. Mobutu’s planes were also assisting us, but in vain. Inkotanyi were stronger than we, tactically. They surrounded us in the forest, and then they would launch attacks on us.

In 1996, I went to Central Africa together with the officers Manishimwe and Ziragorora. We had been trained by the French at Ubongo camp. They were training us with other rebels from different countries, like Chad and Senegal. They were giving us lessons on ambush techniques, the deep war fighting, spying and posing mines connected to electricity. After three months, we came back. Those exercises that I had received in Central Africa, I had to apply them in the infiltration activities. I went back to Rwanda in 1997, where I was part of the infiltrators who were carrying out ambushes. I was in a battalion called “Hotel” led by commandant Haguma. Our battalion was based in the volcanoes. That operation went on up to the end of 2002 and we went back to Congo. While we had started eight hundred there were now only 400 soldiers left. We took the direction of Burundi to join FDD. There the war started and we lost 200 soldiers. We came back to Zaïre and we prepared Opération Trompette. The preparations went on up to 2003. We were at Kirembe next to the airport in Mfizi zone. The French used that airport to supply us with arms. They encouraged us saying that we were going to retake the country in a very short time, and that it was the CRAP who were going to make the war. There were two sections of CRAP, Sonoki (secteur operation du Nord Kivu) and Sosuki (secteur operation Sud Kivu). I was in Sosuki, our commandant was Lieutenant Iyonasenze. We went into Nyungwe forest through Cibitoke and Uvira in October 2003. In the context of CRAP, they sent me to do some reconnaissance in Butare. I was caught by a patrol of the Rwandan army at Kiruhura. I ended up telling the whole truth. Thanks to the information I gave, many infiltrators were arrested. That was the end of Opération Trompette.”

Faustin Gashugi is an ex-FAR who was a refugee in Zaïre in 1994; he later became a member of FDLR. He declared to have been a witness of the assistance that the French soldiers gave to ex-FAR in Zaïre. After the destruction of the camps and the defeat of ex-FAR and Interahamwe in 1996, he went to Congo-Brazzaville, where he was recruited and trained by the French who were involved in the overthrow of President Pascal Lissouba:

“After the take-over of Gitarama, our battalion went on to Gikongoro, Cyangugu, then to Bukavu. We settled in Panzi camp, where the soldiers and their families were staying together with Interahamwe. The soldiers who were bachelors were settled in Bulonge camp and in Kashusha. The French soldiers were giving us some aid but in an indirect way. They were disguising them as members of NGOs like MSF, but one would recognize some faces of those who had lived with us in Rwanda before the genocide. I recognized one of them who had lived in the Para commando’s battalion at Kanombe. We were even paid the salaries that had not been paid. Our officers were even benefiting from some additional aid because they were always in contact with the French. I can give the example of Kabiligi and of Rwabukwisi. The bodyguards of Kabiligi were telling us that the French were coming to see him quite often at Bukavu. I was in the Kashusha camp. Later, we went on with our training, and when the Banyamurenge war started, we received M16 and SMG guns, as well as Kalachinikovs that were coming from Kinshasa. I do not know who had sent them, but I heard people say that it could be the French.

In 1996, Inkotanyi destroyed all the refugee camps and we took the route to Nyabiwe, behind the civilians while engaged in a war they call the retarded war. We entered the equatorial forest so as to take the route to Bunyakiri. There were no commanders, it was total disorder. When we arrived at Mbandaka, I was leading a unit of forty people. I suggested to them that they should go to Congo-Brazaville. When we arrived there, MSF workers put us in Lilanga camp. Later, I was recruited to be part of the soldiers of Sassou Nguesso. We were trained by French soldiers in Biroro camp. They later took us to Brazaville. We were received by the French. They were dressed as civilians but they were residing in the military academy of Sassou Nguesso. Our commander was a certain Zubi Basile, a member of the Sassou Nguesso army. He came with the French, and among them I recognized some of them who had lived in Rwanda. I was able to identify an instructor whose name was Gilbert. I joined Sassou Nguesso’s army with major Mugarura. I was with others: Supert, Dusenge Adeodatus, etc. There were also some French mercenaries. We were doing operations with them and we were sharing the same lodges.

After the take-over of Brazzaville, the French were not disguising themselves any more. They took their jeeps, and were moving all around the town with their flag. After, Sassou Nguesso got on good terms with Kabila and sent him some Rwandese soldiers, with the mission of ensuring the security of ex-FAR officers who were collaborating with him. I am among those who went to Kinshasa. They deployed me to the security of colonel Renzaho, to the security of the engineer Ruhorahoza and Ntibirabaho, alias Haji. I ended up knowing that there would be no war anywhere. I then took the decision of going back to Rwanda after the negotiation between the European Union and Monuc. I came home in 2002 with 45 other people in the Monuc plane”.

Ndihokubwayo narrates the distribution of arms to ex-FAR and to Interahamwe by French soldiers, as well as the recruitment and training in the camps at Bukavu, then in Congo Brazzaville, with the promise of aid and support of the French, in recapturing power once again in Rwanda:

“The French soldiers put together all the arms of FAR before crossing the border into Congo. Once the settlement of the refugees was over, the French gave their arms to ex-FAR and to Interahamwe. Colonels Gasarabwe, Ndahimana came to recruit in the refugee camps of Nyangezi and assured us that we were able to recapture our country. It was for that reason that we were getting training, at night, on the hills of Bulonge. After we had left Bukavu, the training in which I participate went on in Tingi-Tingi, in Kisangani and in Congo-Brazzaville, in a camp called Biroro. In that camp, we were given arms; type M16 that had been transported in detached pieces in maize and biscuits cartons. A Rwandese colonel who was in charge of us explained to us that those arms were coming from France and that the French were supporting us, but that they could not show themselves openly”.

2. Constraints to the efforts of reconciliation in Rwanda from July 1994

The other aspect of this supporting policy to the government and other forces that had committed genocide was to set up obstacles to the reconstruction of Rwanda. After the defeat of FAR and the setting up of a government of national unity, on 19th July 1994, France utilized all its influence to put obstacles for the new government to get emergency aid and assistance; which would have given it the ability of facing humanitarian problems and general security problems that had been brought about by the genocide.

2.1 Blocking aid funds for the improvement of the situation posterior to genocide

Marc Rugenera, Minister of finance from 1992 to 1997, describes a very hostile conduit line by France towards Rwanda in the months that followed the genocide. This was a very clear determination to block all activities that were meant to re-launch the economy of the country:

“After July 1994, I participated as a minister in two round table meetings that had brought together all donors of Rwanda. I observed that the attitude of the French was always hostile to the new Rwandan government. France was not willing to participate in any effort of redressing the country. It was very clear. Another thing that I personally experienced is that during the negotiations with the World Bank, and International Monetary Fund, the attitude of the French was very clearly that of opposing all favourable decisions for Rwanda. Sometimes, the French delegations would even look for allies in the executive board members of the World Bank and IMF, and of the African Development Bank, in order to oppose the positive proposals in favour of Rwanda. That conflict was there openly, and it was very well known. Luckily, France would encounter the opposition of other countries, which understood the position of Rwanda, and which were defending it”.

Mr. Iyamuremye Augustin had the same experience, respectively as a minister of agriculture, of information and of foreign affairs after 1994. Iyamuremye twice came to know the hidden agenda of the French authorities, first with the minister of cooperation, Michel Roussin, between the months of September and December, in 1994 in Paris:

“During the month of October, I was on a mission in France. I was attending a conference on desertification at UNESCO, but the government of national unity had also requested me to contact the French authorities, to see if we could resume our cooperation. Via our Embassy in Paris, I contacted the French minister of cooperation requesting for an appointment. He told me that he would receive me at UNESCO during the conference. He received me standing in the corridors of UNESCO, where the whole public was passing, and he told me somewhat despising me that Rwanda had refused French language and we should not ask anything from France. He said directly: ‘Whoever speaks French buys French’ then he left with his advisors, leaving me in that state”.

The second time, it was in 1995, during a stay in Paris; for the preparation of the second round table in Geneva, that had assembled all the donors of Rwanda:

“At that time, I went to France accompanied by the governor of the National Bank, and the representative of UNDP. We were doing some survey after the round table meeting, so as to see which governments were ready to assist Rwanda, and to mobilize them on the urgent humanitarian questions that were rising in Rwanda. The French authorities told us that they were not promising us anything, but that this time France would not go against the initiatives of other nations which would be ready to contribute financially to the reconstruction of our country.”

The continuous hostility of France was also clear during the Summit “France – Afrique” of Biarritz from 8th-9th November 1994. Not only was Rwanda not invited, and yet it was a francophone country, but also the Elysee services attempted to tarnish the image of the new government, at the same time trying to justify the activities of France in Rwanda. In fact, from the opening of that Summit, the services in charge of its preparation and its organization distributed a text giving the then situation of Rwanda, and one could read:

“The democracy that they had announced to us no longer exists in Kigali. A report by Amnesty International denounces the expedient justice of the new leaders. There were therefore not the good and the bad, the killers and the liberators, that Manichean vision in the name of which they have unfairly ridiculed the French activities. Those who were giving lessons yesterday are today strangely dumb”.

‘L’Humanite’ commented on that text in the following words: “Even if that writing is not signed, there is no doubt that its origin is Elysee”.

In mid-November 1994, Bernard Debre, the new minister of cooperation, who had just replaced Michel Roussin, revealed that Elysee was against the idea of starting up again the relations with Rwanda and the reason given was that “President Mitterrand is much attached to the ex-president Habyarimana and his family, and that related to the old regime” Debre gave the precision that the closeness of Mitterrand could not allow France to have a consideration of Rwanda in “a policy reached by consensus” He stated that “he would do a complete review of the French policy on Rwanda” so as to re-define it after consulting external actors like the NGOs: “I have decided to have a meeting on Rwanda with all political, social, and economic actors next week. We are going to talk about it with the president (Mitterrand). I will call the NGOs. There will be a definition of our policy”.

It is true that a meeting took place on the 25th November 1994, and after the meeting Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without borders) and OXFAM, organized an open conference in Bruxelles during which they denounced the radical French policy that consisted of imposing “unrealistic conditions to the Rwandese government to release European aid”. The senator Guy Penne, an old advisor for African Affairs of Francois Mitterrand, took the same line and criticized vigorously the fact that “France posed a veto to an aid project by the European Union to the government of Rwanda”. That attitude did not change at all in spite of continuous efforts by the Rwandese authorities to improve the relations between the two governments.

While blocking immediate aid, the French government imposed conditions to Rwanda that would be difficult to realize as regards starting up cooperation again. It was revealed on 18th December 1994, in a speech given by minister Debre in Brazzaville, in which he declared that the French and European aid for Rwanda was subjected to three conditions: “Democracy, the return of refugees and organization of elections ”.

Although these principles in themselves present nothing extraordinary, it was not normal for him to impose their immediate requisitions in a battered country which had just come out of a genocide, at the same time refusing to give it the means that would help in solving humanitarian and security problems. Without any appropriate answer to those questions, neither democracy nor the return of the refugees nor the holding of free and transparent elections was possible.

This radicalism was openly denounced by the president of the Republic, Pasteur Bizimungu, in an interview he gave to the French press:

“We were expecting all the states that had a role in the genocide to assist us in turning over the page. However, some governments are only too happy to keep the ditch open between Rwandans created by the genocide. Several times, we sent our minister of foreign affairs to Paris, to try and bridge those gaps. Nonetheless, in international meetings where the issue was to raise funds for the reconstruction of the country, France ditches us instead of giving its contribution. ”

All those French schemes that have been described above; boycotting aid for a country without any resources, propaganda to discredit the new powers, military reorganization with the aim of keeping insecurity climate and latent destabilization reveal the extent to which France was prepared to resort to means equivalent to a heavy economic and political artillery, with the intention of suffocating Rwanda. The French authorities were determined not to tolerate a regime that came to power without their blessing and worse still, after a military victory to which France was extremely opposed. To them this is what is going to justify a double game policy, consisting of, on one hand, having the representatives of the defeated regime and discreetly giving them advice on a strategy to adopt in giving themselves a better image that otherwise had been tarnished by a monstrous genocide, that it had very well prepared and executed. And on the other hand, to show an apparent attitude that would seem neutral, in order not to be out of line with the international community.

3. France as a turf for denial and revisionism of genocide

The French government has clearly recognized the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda by subscribing to the resolution creating the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), like other permanent members of the Security Council. However, together with that official recognition, the French statesmen, the top person being the President Mitterrand, have from before the end of genocide consistently expressed revisionist and negation statements. But again, France is a land of predilection for public or private initiatives that preach revisionist or negation as it were.

3.1 The revisionism and the denial of the French authorities and institutions

3.1.1 French Political leaders

The revisionism or the denial of French politicians is very constantly apparent with President Mitterrand. On 31st May1994, on the wings of the Franco-German summit held at Mulhouse, Mitterrand, while having break fast with German chancellor Helmot Kohl, explained to his guest that there had been reciprocal massacres in Rwanda and not genocide. “We are accused of having supported the previous regime. There is a unilateral story of massacres. The reality of the matter is that ‘everyone kills everyone ’”. On July 14th, 1994, asked by the journalist Patrick Poivre d’Arvor of French channel TF1 on the responsibility of France in Rwanda, Mitterrand declared: “Do you think that genocide stopped after the victory of Tutsis?”

On 8th and 9th November 1994, the 18th Franco-African summit was held in Biarritz in southern France. The written text of the speech of President Mitterrand distributed to the participants mentioned the “genocides” of Rwanda. During the press conference ending that summit, a journalist raised the issue of genocide in Rwanda and Mitterrand rectified the word shouting the same word and this time in the plural, ‘genocides’. Colette Braeckman who witnessed the incident reported to the Commission: “At the final press conference given by President Mitterrand, my colleague Patrick De Saint Exupèry raised the question of genocide in Rwanda. I will always remember that Mitterrand replied: “the genocide’ or ‘the genocides?’ In those countries, they have always killed; massacres, it’s not something new.”

Collette Braeckman went on with her testimony, giving the precision that President Mitterrand was happy with the statement he had just made: “It is on that note that the press conference came to an end. I accompanied one of my colleagues on the Belgian radio who had a microphone and who got closer to the president who was already two metres away from other journalists trying to follow him. By the time he entered his car, he told one of the people who was next to him: “Ah! You see this stupid journalist. I've still been good. I answered him well. Let him get it. And there the sentence is well recorded by my colleague of RTBF, and made other journalists hear it. We could measure his cynicism”.

During an official reception organized by state house at Elysee, in honour of heads of diplomatic missions and international organizations accredited to France, addressing the cooperation issue, President Mitterrand raised the issue regarding the achievements of Turquoise and affirmed in his conclusion: “whatever people say, I am proud that the mission Turquoise was able to save several thousands of lives that would have perished in the genocides [our emphasis]. I however note that the recent information reaching me after the departure of this mission makes me believe that these genocides [our emphasis] have not stopped.”

Alain Juppé who was the Minister of foreigner affairs boasts as having been the first on the international community to have clearly qualified the genocide, while it was going on in Rwanda. What he actually did in an article published in Liberation of 16/05/1994. Yet as of mid-June 1994, he used the expression “genocides” to suggest that two parties in conflict i.e. ex-FAR and RPF each perpetuated genocide.

A revisionist perspective is also in the writings by Bernard, Debré ex-minister of cooperation. In 1998 he published a book entitled “Le retour du Mwami.” He wrote in his introduction that he wanted to highlight the “true history of Genocide” of Rwanda. In an interview given to Paris Match about his book, Bernard Debré preferred the term Massacres to that of Genocide. He attributed the responsibility to “Paul Kagame” who he called ironically the Mwami. In this interview, Bernard Debré cleared France of any responsibility in the genocide, declaring that the recognition of the wrongs by France would be making “France unnecessarily guilty, in all evidence doubled with evidence of lack of political perspective”. When he came back on the controversial issue of attack on the aircraft of Habyalima, he said bluntly that the responsibility of the crash was “that of RPF with assistance of Americans”, concluding that the Rwanda after genocide was “a country of no rights where a dictatorial apartheid regime reigns”.

Revisionism of the Tutsi genocide also appears with Dominique de Villepin, who was the minister of foreign affairs and prime minister under Jacques Chirac, respectively. In September 2003, during an interview about Rwanda on RFI he spoke of the “genocides”. This plural shocked the journalist Patrick de Saint-Exupery, who published a book in which he reminds De Villepin that “the genocides’ in plural have never happened anywhere. If in your own words, in your speeches, in your wishes it is not to avoid that file, inherited from another president, but which you seem to fully embrace.”


3.1.2 Contamination in schools

The introduction of revisionism in schools, even if it had only affected a few, does not mean that it was not vigorously used by revisionist networks by way of denial. Two examples can be identified during the end of the 1990s.

The first is the Academy of Rouen which, for examination at the end of college (end of 3 years of secondary education), allows one to pass to high school if a student offers a topic on Rwanda dealing with the "conflict between Tutsis and Hutus and [this conflict provokes massacres involving throwing of dead bodies on roads] “the crowd of Rwandan refugees”. The marking scheme proposes the correct answer as "any that refers to the conflict pitting Tutsis against Hutus".

The second example, six years later - that is ten years after the genocide – was a publication of a history manual for students in their final year (last year of secondary school), sections of “humanities” and “economic and social studies” which uses iconographic support on which there is a photograph of the camp of survivors of the genocide of Nyarushishi, taken on June 30th, 1994, whose legend is the following one: “Rwanda experienced a genocide between Hutus and Tutsis. These children live in a refugee camp which shelters 8,000 people placed under the protection of the French Army” (p.128)

These two examples are undoubtedly raised in restricted areas, but that does not make them raise fewer questions. In the first case, the concept of genocide is completely removed, in the second; the photograph is used as an instrument for the genocide to make the promotion of the action of France in Rwanda, without one knowing really who the real victims of the genocide are.

3.1.3. Legal manipulation

On 17th November 2006, the investing judge with TGI of Paris, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, signed an order, which was announced in the press, giving international arrest warrants against nine Rwandan personalities, including the head of state. It charged them with direct responsibility in the attack on Falcon 50, which cost the life of ex-president Juvénal Habyarimana.

In this court order, Bruguiere describes the genocide as a “concomitant launch of reprisals on the Tutsi population”. He blames RPF for its “wish to make the war drag, knowing that this would lead to the massacre of Tutsis.” He also stresses that the RPF “considered Tutsis of the interior of Rwanda as collaborators of the Habyarimana regime and that their deaths were a political calculation”. He concludes that “the decision to make an attempt on the life of President Habyarimana was a daring act whose effect would necessarily result in provoking the most extremist Hutu branch. This decision was taken by RPF during at least three meetings at the end of 1993 and at the beginning of 1994, at the general headquarters of the military High Command of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (APR) at Mulindi.”

In the final analysis, the court order drowns the genocide in a strategy of war and of conquest of power, to reverse the responsibilities to turn the victims into authors of the crimes which destroyed them. At the end, the genocide would be an act of self-defence; there would not have been any planning, since this crime was as a result of spontaneous anger of the Hutus to avenge their president assassinated by Tutsis with the help of Belgians . The fallacious nature by the assertions of Judge Brugière, stressed sufficiently by the French press and international press , is typical of today’s manipulations. That is how they make a foundation of denial that is developing in certain French circles.

3.3 Mobilization of ex-Soldiers of Turquoise

The former Turquoise commanders, ganged together around their former chief, General Jean-Claude Lafourcade, created in December 2006 an association called France-Turquoise of which the main objective is to defend the honour of France and the French Army in its action in Rwanda.

General Jean-Claude Lafourcade, who commanded the Turquoise operation, and Colonel Jacques Hogard, who was in charge for the operational sector of Cyangugu, show themselves as most active in the disinformation campaign of denial. They multiply publications and public involvement intended to distort the truth on the genocide and the role played by France. In their presentation of the facts, Jean-Claude Lafourcade and Jacques Hogard portray the genocide as a direct consequence of the strategy of the RPF to seize power by force, being aware that they would not get that power through democratic means . On this point, one sees well the relationship between the conclusions of Judge Bruguiere and the set of themes developed by the two ex-officers of Turquoise in their current crusade. They claim that Turquoise put an end to the genocide, that it saved thousands of human lives and stabilized the populations on the Rwandan territory:

“Since 1994, writes Lafourcade, I asked myself questions about the strategy of General Kagamé: inexplicably late intervention of his army, refusal of any cease-fire… etc. Seeing that he was unable to seize power by democratic means initiated by the Arusha agreements to which France had contributed, the solution was not a military conquest by the force at whatever cost” .

In his frequent interventions, Colonel Hogard often accuses RPF of having caused the genocide: “Today we see very well that the warped thesis of the plot by RPF, to some extent, to push the extremist Hutu to crime is not unbelievable, as some claimed. One should read, in this respect, a book very well documented by a Cameroonian journalist, Charles Onana, “Les secrets du Genocide Rwandais” published in April 2002. Nobody in reality can ignore the real responsibilities in the Rwandan genocide [our underlining]”. For Hogard, “the RPF, in particular its chief and inspirer, is the one who encourage the worst policy of starting a foreseeable cataclysm of a programmed assassination of President Habyarimana ”

In the spread of its propaganda of revisionism, the France-Turquoise association was helped by well-selected personalities. Thus, on December 6th, 2006, with the initiative of the former minister for Co-operation, Bernard Debré, the association organized a conference in one of the rooms of the National Assembly, in which General Lafourcade participated, the journalist-writer Pierre Péan and the historian, Bernard Lugan.

The strategy of the association consists of resorting to the revisionist authors or those who preach denial or again the opponents of the Rwandan government to propagate the negation of the genocide, while resorting to stereotype racist clichés.

3.4 Support of French politicians in revisionist or denial propaganda

The propagandists of the theses revisionists and negationnists of the genocide in Rwanda get very important support from important politicians who put conference rooms at their disposal, at the National Assembly or at the Senate. This gives the denial campaign a character of respectability and acceptability from French government institutions.

So, like on 4th April 2002, the Senate accommodated a conference in one of its rooms whose theme was “Tomorrow’s Rwanda”, placed under the patronage of Mrs. Daniéle Bidard-Reydet, at the time vice-president of the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Senate. During discussions followed one by one on the platform by speakers very well known for their revisionist and denial thesis. Pierre-Claver Kanyarushoki, former ambassador of Rwanda in Uganda, evoked the genocide of Tutsis, but superimposed it with another “genocide of Hutus in DRC and in Rwanda carried out by the RPF”. Antoine Nyetera, a veil artist, technician, whom the promoters of the denial gave the honourable rank of a historian, claimed that “RPF had prepared important attacks much before April 6th, 1994”, that “250 Hutus were killed during the two days which followed the attack against the plane of President Habyarimana” and that the “genocide had never been planned”, that it was only “political massacres”. Alain De Brouwer, member of the Belgian section of ‘Internationale Démocrate Chrétienne’ (IDC), supported the fact that “there was no planning of the genocide, because there were no documents found which prove it.” Advocate Frederic Weil, lawyer with TPIR, declared that “it is not abnormal to dispute the reality of only one genocide” and that “it is peoples’ right to discuss the existence of one genocide in Rwanda in 1994.” The conference ended with the intervention of a journalist, Marie-Roger Bilo, who congratulated himself for having been “one of the first journalists to affirm that in Rwanda, there has never been a genocide, and that the others start now to realize it”.

On 16th October 2003, Charles Onana, an author invited by Colonel Hogard to "tell the truth" on the issue of shooting down the Habyarimana plane, was invited to the French National Assembly to hold a conference on Rwanda, under the patronage of the socialist Member of Parliament Arnaud Montebourg. In this parliamentary enclosure, Onana gave a speech openly denying the Tutsi genocide and attacking the ICTR that it does not have any proof on the planning of the genocide: “I am not denying that there were deaths in Rwanda in 1994, but what I say is that what happened was a war between Hutus and Tutsis, that each group killed and that each group had victims. The lie and the manipulations made the whole world accept that there was a genocide planned by Hutus against Tutsis. [...] There was neither information nor indication of a planned genocide. ICTR does not have proof on any planning of the genocide. A fax from Dallaire mentioning the death of 1000 Tutsis in 20 minutes is a forgery. To validate the thesis that the genocide had been planned by Hutus, the ICTR buys witnesses, tortures defendants, threatens lawyers, hires pseudo experts and uses forged documents ”.

4. Obstacles to the judgment of the presumed perpetrators of the genocide

In spite of the presence in France of many Rwandans, presumed perpetrators of the genocide, the placing of several plaints to the French jurisdictions for the last twelve years, the French judiciary to date has not yet organized any proceedings. It also tried to dissuade its judges who were active in the pursuance of instructions of the Rwandan issues.

The first complaint was brought by the surviving victims of the genocide and their beneficiaries in the Kalinda case and others, aiming at Rwandan citizens who are residing in France as refugees, supposed to be responsible for the acts of genocide, dated July 4th, 1994. It was followed by a plaint against Father Wenceslas Munyeshyaka that goes as far back as July 1995, and which knew long procedural adventures influencing the other businesses. Then came the plaint against Sosthène Munyemana which was also lodged in 1995 by Gironde on behalf of the Rwandese who were based in Bordeaux. Other complaints came in from 5th January 2000, initiated this time by FIDH, the French League of the Rights of Man and of Citizen (LDH), the association Survvie and Communauté Rwandaise de France (CRF), and it was aimed at six people. In 2001, the collective of the civil parties for Rwanda (CPCR) took over a certain number of old complaints and introduced new ones.

4.1.1 Reopening the case of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka

The Munyeshyaka case was one of the oldest and knew many legal bounces which illustrate the uneasiness of France to judge the genocide perpetrators residing on its soil. Following the plaint, legal information was open on July 25th, 1995, against Munyeshyaka by the investigating judge in the Court of Grand Instance of Privas, and he was put in examination on July 29th, 1995 for “genocide, tortures, ill treatments and inhuman and degrading acts”. His being put into examination was based on the universal competence stipulated in the convention against torture of 1984, ratified by France, and integrated in its internal laws. The accused was placed in temporary detention pending trial, appealed and was released on August 11th, 1995 by the Court of Appeal of Nimes.

On 20th March 1996, this court handed down a judgment stating that the French jurisdiction was incompetent to judge genocide crimes committed in a foreign country, by a foreigner, and against foreigners. However, articles 689-1 and 689-2 of the new French criminal procedure code give the French jurisdictions competence to continue and judge, without conditions of nationality or of author or of the victim, any person residing or being in France having made acts of torture out of the French territory. To circumvent this clause, the court of appeal of Nime noted that the implication of that suit for acts of torture and ill-treatment based on the convention of New York of 1984 was impossible with the reason that, if the facts of the accused were proven, the prosecution would emerge in fine on the qualification of genocide of which France would not be qualified to judge. The case remained blocked until 22nd May, 1996.

On this date, the French Parliament voted the law n° 96-432 bearing adaptation of the French legislation to the provisions of resolution 955 of the Security Council relating to the creation of ICTR, which stipulates that the States will take all necessary measures under the terms of their internal laws of the country, to apply the provisions of the statute of the International penal court for Rwanda. The law of May 22nd, 1996, then transposed the statute of ICTR in the French internal laws introducing the universal competence in internal tribunals to recognize the same crimes as the ICTR. From this date, the presumed perpetrators of genocide, crime against humanity and violation of international humanitarian law can be sued and judged by a French jurisdiction in application to the French law.

This new judicial procedure led the French court of appeal, on request from plaintiffs, to resume on 6 January 1998, the case against Munyeshyaka, which dated as far back as 1995. In its decision, it concluded that the court of appeal of Nîmes had violated the law, by only taking into consideration only the crime of genocide, while other crimes, such as torture, could be prosecuted under article 689-2 of the French penal code, which recognizes universal competence. The case was returned to the court of appeal of Paris which, on 12 May 1999, decided to reopen from zero the judicial investigation, assuming that the previous one had not been carried out rigorously. In September and October 2000, the judge le Loire requested that two international derogatory commissions be sent to Rwanda, in order to hear the witnesses. No follow up was done to the judge’s suggestion.

Having been fed up by the slowness of the procedure and one of the plaintiffs, Yvonne Mutimura, put the matter before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 1999. In the Court’s order of 8 June 2004, it condemned France for the slowness of its justice in investigating the complaints against Munyeshyaka. The ECHR concluded that the duration of the procedure constituted a violation of the right to justice in reasonable time and the right to effective procedure as provided for in articles 6 and 13 of European convention on safeguarding the Human Rights. In December 2005, Rwanda announced that an international arrest warrant had been issued against Munyeshyaka, and requested France, for his extradition, but the request was ignored. He was tried in absentia by the Kigali military tribunal and, on 16th November 2006, he was condemned to life imprisonment the crime of genocide, (rapes and complicity), together with General Laurent Munyakazi.

In 2005, the ICTR accused Munyeshyaka and Bucyibaruta and communicated the matter to France, though the charges remained under seal. On 19/07/2006, the principal private secretary of the Minister of justice, Laurent Mesle, wrote a letter to the prosecutor of the ICTR “to confirm the consent of the French legal authorities to examine the facts and object of procedures followed by the ICTR in accusing Wenceslas Munyeshyaka and Laurent Bucyibaruta ”. At the end of June 2007, there began a legal imbroglio around these cases which is not yet over. Indeed, on June 21, the prosecutor of the ICTR signed an arrest warrant against Munyeshyaka, Bucyibaruta and Dominique Ntawukuriryayo, and requested the French authorities to look for the three suspects and arrest them. The warrants were not for handing them over directly to ICTR, but only for arresting them and putting them under detention in France while ICTR was deliberating on whether to hand over their files to France or ask for their transfer to the ICTR.

In compliance with the arrest warrants, Munyeshyaka and Bucyibaruta were arrested on 20 July 2007 and put in preventive detention. They appealed on 1 August 2007 and the Paris Court of Appeal released them saying that their imprisonment was incompatible with the French law governing the presumption of innocence. On 13 August 2007, the ICTR issued another arrest warrant, this time including a request for the suspects to be transferred to its head office in Arusha. On 7 September 2007, the two individuals were again arrested, and on the 19 September 2007, while people were expecting a decision to transfer them, the investigating chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal Paris set the two men free. Then, on 27 September 2007, the court deferred the case to 21 November, 2007 for examination of the decision regarding their transfer. Thus, up to this day, it is not known whether and where their case will be tried.

4.1.2 Other pending cases

In January 2000, complaints against other Rwandans were lodged at the public prosecutor of the Paris high court by the FIDH and LDH, this time against Laurent Bucyibaruta, Laurent Serubuga, Fabien Neretse, Télésphore Bizimungu and Tharcisse Renzaho . On March 10, 2000, the prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that the files of the suspects were addressed to every prosecutor in the area of residence of each suspect. In May 2000, Laurent Bucyibaruta was arrested on orders of the tribunal of Troyes and was put under investigation. In June 2000, he was transferred to ‘La prison de la Sante’ in Paris. On 9 June, 2000; he appealed against the imprisonment and was released on 20 December 2000 and placed under judicial supervision. On 25th March 2003, the CRR rejected his application for political refugee status. It concluded that: “(...) there are serious reasons to believe that Bucyibaruta used his authority to shield those who committed acts of violence which led to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. He is an accomplice of the genocide, in terms of the period defined by the resolution of the United Nations Security Council which was adopted on 8th November 1994.” Since then, no progress has been recorded in Bucyibaruta’s case up to the recent legal rumblings mentioned above.

The file regarding Colonel Laurent Serubuga, former chief of staff of the FAR, was transferred to the court of Strasbourg and was filed without any follow up, because of lack of evidence on 22nd May 2001. On 10th December 2001, the “FIDH, Survie et la Communauté Rwandaise de France” (CRF) took civil action, and on June 28, 2002, legal proceedings begin against Serubuga on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. But since then, Serubuga was not been put on trial. However, it is not the signs that show his participation in the planning of the genocide that are lacking. Didn’t ambassador Martres declare to MIP, on the 22nd April 1998, on the matter regarding the case of Serubuga: “the genocide was foreseeable from that time [autumn 1993], without however being able to imagine its scale and atrocity. Some Hutus had had the audacity of making allusion to it. Colonel Serubuga, assistant chief of staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces was happy that FPR had attacked them, and that this would serve as enough justification for the massacres of the Tutsis.”.

Another file is that of Telesphore Bizimungu, former director general in the Ministry of Planning, and founder member of RTLM. Transferred to the public prosecutor’s office at Creteil, legal proceedings were opened against him, but this did not lead to any preliminary investigation. With regard to the case of Fabien Neretse, the public prosecutor in the TGI of Paris informed the FIDH, on 10th March 2000, that the case has been closed, because the suspect was not on French territory. He in fact resides in Belgium, but he went to that country after learning that a complaint had been lodged against him in France. As for the plaint against Lt Col. Cyprien Kayumba who organized and directed the flow of supplies of weapons to the organizers of the genocide, it was lodged by FIDH, Survie, and the CRF on the 10th December 2001 in the office of the prosecutor general of Laon. A preliminary inquiry was opened in the month of March 2002 without resulting in any instruction of the case.

Finally, in connection with the plaints initiated by or entrusted to the “Collectif des parties civiles pour le Rwanda” (CPCR) regarding Wenceslas Munyeshyaka, Laurent Bucyibaruta, Sosthène Munyemana, Domonique Ntawukuriryayo and Agathe Kanziga (plaint of 13th February 2007). About thirty other plaints were lodged by the CPCR, and by other people of Rwandese origin, but the French jurisdiction declared itself incompetent, giving the reason that the suspects were not found at the addresses they had indicated. On the 6th April 2001, the Associations Survive and CRF, presented to the criminal chamber of the county court, requesting that all Rwandan cases be put together in one single jurisdiction of the investigation.

The request was based on the specific historical dimension, which requires some investigations in a foreign country, which could only be carried out by a specialized jurisdiction. The county court accepted the request, and from then, gave to the chamber of instructions of TGI of Paris the responsibility of opening up the judicial investigations in France against people of Rwandan origin. It is henceforth the case with the big majority of cases, except the case of Bizimungu, which is still blocked in the office of the prosecutor of Creteil, and the one of Kayumba in front of the investigating judge of Laon. The least we can say is that we can observe a high degree of nervousness in the handling of the Rwandan cases that are pending in the French jurisdiction. The general impression is that of inertia of the investigating judges who follow each other in handling those dossiers. Those judges are somewhat reluctant to go on with the investigation of those cases.

Another problem arises at the level of starting up the court cases. Usually, with regard to crimes committed in France or on a French subject, the prosecutor’s office takes the initiative of carrying out investigations, and arresting the suspect(s). But as regards pursuing those who committed the crimes in Rwanda or in other countries, and who reside in France, the starting up of the investigations and accusations is subject to the prior request by the victims. It is always the victims who request the prosecutor’s office and sue for damages in order to compel his hesitancy. The plaintiffs are thus obliged to take place of the Criminal Investigation Department in looking for those who could have killed members of their families; it is particularly heir responsibility to locate them, otherwise the opening up of a preliminary investigation is rarely accepted. However, if it is the prosecutor general’s office that launches the preliminary enquiries, so as to verify the presence of the presumed genocide perpetrator on French territory, this step would constitute an advantage for the victims, because it would reverse the burden of producing evidence on the prosecutor general’s office, which moreover has enough means to carry out that task.

This inaction by the French public prosecutor’s offices is incomprehensible since in the eyes of the law of 22nd May 1996, the prosecutors have the competence to open up an inquiry on a person suspected of committing a crime of genocide, and crimes against humanity, from the time when the person in question is found on French territory. What one can observe is that, from the time this law was adopted, no preliminary investigation has been opened up, intended to pursue a Rwandan case on the referral of the office of the prosecutor itself. One of the consequences of that lack of action is that this allows the presumed genocide perpetrators to get refugee status in France, even getting naturalized French citizens, like in the case of Isaac Kamali, and many others. And yet, some decisions of refusal by OFPRA, and by CRR, are explicit as to the criminal history of many of the Rwandan citizens, and for that matter, these organizations should have alerted the office of the prosecutor general to open up inquiries concerning these individuals.

5. Frustrating Judge Brigitte Raynaud’s investigation

On 23rd December 2005, following a law-suit filed on 15th February 2005, by six genocide survivors regarding crimes committed by the French military, during Operation Turquoise, the army tribunal prosecutor in Paris(TAP) opened a judicial inquiry against X for “complicity in genocide and/ or complicity in crimes against humanity” and entrusted the investigation to judge Brigitte Raynaud. The press then published a number of testimonies of survivors accusing the French military of several crimes . The Minister of Defense, Michèle Alliot-Marie, took a stand and reacted with anger, claiming that “it is inadmissible that the military should be accused of things which, most of the times are completely way-out. ”

On 7th July 2005, the prosecutor of TAP made it known that he considered the accusations hardly credible and, according to article 86 of the Code of Procedure, he asked the examining magistrate to hear the plaintiffs so as to verify their credibility before opening any investigations. The plaintiffs, in person, were summoned to Paris, but found it impossible to leave the Rwandan territory in order to go to France . As a consequence, Prosecutor Jacques Baillet, of TAP wrote on 6 October 2005, requesting that, the investigating judge either delivers an international letter requesting the Rwandan authorities to hear the complainants or that the investigating personally judge travels to Rwanda to hear the complainants.

By an Order of 12th October 2005, the investigating Judge decided to go on the ground, in accordance with the ruling of the Court. The Minister of Defense tried to oppose this move and started a struggle using serious maneuvers and inserting pressure on the judge with the intention of blocking her investigation . He alerted the magistrate through a warning letter: “I bring to your notice the fact that we do not have in this country the military means for protection that we were able to provide to you in Côte d’Ivoire” . The Ministry added in its missive a note falsely attributed to the secret services, which originated in fact from the office of the Ministry of Defense, and which indicated that the journey to Rwanda “could prove to be inappropriate due to the situation of the media and the judiciary, and that this could risk radicalisation of the position of the Rwandan authorities and could lead to serious pressure even “menace”.

The note specified that on 23 November, journalist Pierre Péan, was going to publish a book “highlighting the responsibility of RPF in the setting off of the genocide as well as the Western complicity from which it benefited”, adding that “this book would also indicate the merit of the French forces activeness on the ground from 1990-1994”. The note concluded by mentioning the notorious investigation by judge Bruguière- whose results were still awaited at the moment- which “could lead in the coming weeks to accusations of Kagame for his involvement in the attack on the President’s plane in 1994” .

Judge Raynaud was not convinced and proceeded to Rwanda in November 2005. Arriving on the ground, the Prosecutor of TAP warned her that there existed doubt in the validity of the hearings she was conducting. On 23rd December 2005, Court passed an order demanding the investigating Judge to only entertain the cause of action in respect to only two plaintiffs out of the six and declare others inadmissible claiming that the cause of action in respect to other plaintiffs were not sufficiently clear to warrant opening of an effective judicial inquiry. The court ruled that the case of the 4 plaintiffs could not take precedence over a wrong on themselves personally or directly, yet these people had lost their close relatives during the genocide and sustained serious injuries. The investigating judge later on over ruled an earlier order by an order of 16th February 2006 and ruled that all the six civil actions were admissible.

In order to counter the courage of the investigating judge, the prosecutor launched two sorts of offensive. On one hand, he made an appeal before the Investigation Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Paris, against the ruling of 16 February 2006, as regards the four complaints, which they considered inadmissible. On the other hand, the prosecutor asked the Appeal Court to halt and order the investigating judge from traveling to Rwanda with the aim of putting in question/ doubting all the six civil suits. The Prosecutor hoped that should the appeal be successful, then it would be easy to ask court for an order quashing all activities incidental to the work of the Investigating Judge.

In support of the application, court ruled that since it is a foreign territory and that in absence of an international convention or judicial cooperation, a French judge did not have the power to hear the complainants.

But French law allows that in the absence of a convention, mere acceptance by a foreign country is enough to remove the obstacle which the sovereignty of this country poses to ensure the accomplishment of the mission for the French investigating judge. This was the case in point, because once Judge Raynaud had informed the Rwandan authorities about her mission to Rwanda, mere giving her an entry visa constituted acceptance. In May 2006, the Investigating Chamber made a definite decision by dismissing the application and ordered that all the six complaints were admissible.

Observers note that this resistance by the courts was coming from the French government- implying that courts are not independent - that the French government did not want the alleged facts against its military investigated, let alone judged, fearing that such issues would make clear the magnitude of the French involvement in the genocide. In fact, the soldiers who were accused by the complainants committed such crimes during the mission that had been assigned to them by their superiors following a political decision made at the highest hierarchy of the State administration. It is therefore important to appreciate that it is this highest hierarchy of the French State that bears the responsibility for the accusations before TAP. All these elements explain why the military court was fighting with so much zeal to block the progress of the law suit .

When interviewed by radio France culture, on 24th February 2006, Judge Raynaud admitted to having had impediments in the management of the Rwandan file and indicated that there was a divergence of views between her and the prosecutor with regard to the way to handle the investigations on the three sensitive files which she was in charge of. These files were about the complicity of the French soldiers in the genocide of Tutsis, the business of Firmin Mahe in Côte d’Ivoire which incriminated General Henri Poncet in his murder , as well as the problem of the bombardment of the French military camp at Bouaké. Judge Raynaud has since not performed her duties as an investigating judge at TAP and has now joined an Inter-ministerial delegation for the prevention of delinquency. The law suit for the Rwandan genocide survivors is now before judge Florence Michon, however, till to date, no progress has been made.

6. Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) with the aim of favouring the interests of genocide suspects

Just before the beginning of operation Turquoise in June 1994, the then Minister of foreign affairs, Alain Juppe wrote: “Our soldiers will use what ever means to get evidence on the killings, so that France is able to provide her contribution to the international authorities charged with establishing the truth ”.

The fact is that since the creation of ICTR, France has worked with this jurisdiction in a very unfriendly manner. France generally complicates collaboration with the ICTR investigation department while showing more cooperation with the defence of the accused people, especially former superior officers in the ex-FAR.

In 1998, France was requested by the prosecutor at the ICTR, Louise Arbour, to send French officers to testify as witnesses for the prosecution against accused people of Kibuye, but the Minister of Defence, Alain Richard, declared that it was not be possible, arguing that French officers do not collaborate with “a spectacle of justice ”. Hubert Védrine, the then Minister of foreign affairs further warned ICTR against the so called attempt “to put on the same juridical and media level witnesses and the accused ”. This French hesitation had in fact manifested itself in the autumn of 1997, following the sending to Paris, by the office of the prosecutor of ICTR based in Kigali, investigators charged with questioning, in an informal manner, three French officers: Lt Col. De Stabenrath, Commander Marin Gillier and a warrant officer of the gendarmerie. Previously, the ICTR had recorded a preliminary statement of Colonel Patrice Sartres. Following these private auditions, the office of the prosecutor wanted to quote officers Marin Gilliers and Patrice Sartres as witnesses in the prosecution of Clement Kaishema. The refusal by Paris was categorical despite the guarantees that had been offered by ICTR to avoid eventual leakage during the procedure in respect to questions given to witnesses, instructions given to a magistrate in which to conduct cross examination , etc

Investigations done by “L’Express” about the refusal to collaborate with the prosecutor’s office(ICTR) revealed that what makes France hesitate, is the fear to see its history in Rwanda examined by international justice and probable accusation of certain French military officials. If it were not for the refusal of the military hierarchy and political officials, certain soldiers were ready to say what they know before the international justice. To this effect, “L’Express” interviewed a “high official familiar with the matter” who responded as follows: “to go and give testimony? The principle does not disturb me. Even though we must have had clear instructions from our superiors, they should not tell us to lie. In that case, they better sort it out themselves so that they do not send us”. And another officer, a Colonel made it clear in the following words: “to condemn the military to silence is to simply condemn them”. Another officer adds his bitterness in an accusing tone: “politicians adapt themselves to a situation of which they are responsible but are not guilty. What are they afraid of? That an officer giving evidence on oath may reveal information, which he passed to the political power and the directives which he received in return? ”.

Another pitfall characterizing absence of cooperation by France with the ICTR prosecutor manifested itself with the refusal to open its military archives to investigators from this jurisdiction on ground that they are protected by the defense secrete Act. The only document given by Paris to investigators from ICTR was the “Journal des marches et operations” of General Lafourcade, done during Operation Turquoise. But, as under lined by journalist Vincent Hugeux, who made an investigation into this matter, “such a document, of an administration nature does not hold any state secret ”. The other documents are also stamped with a seal “Defense secret" and are inaccessible to investigators from ICTR, this angered Louise Arbour who was outraged by the uncooperative attitude from Paris by declaring: “According to me, States must put in balance the protection of their legitimate national interests or their military secrets and the interest there is to put in the open the truth on serious subjects, like genocide or the crime against humanity.”

By refusing to cooperate with the prosecutor, France however brought to light three facts which show her partiality: collaborating with the defence of the most prominent accused people before the ICTR, accepting to take in France those sentenced by ICTR and acceptance in France of some accused and acquitted people. To this day, three French officers, Lafourcade, Hogard and Rosier testified in January 2007 in favour of General Kabiligi. In December 2006, Colonel de Saint-Quentin testified in the defense of Colonels Bagosora, Nsengiyunva and of Major Ntabakuze .

For France to allow these officers to testify in favour of the accused, several conditions were imposed namely, hearing the case in camera, utilization of a pseudonym, not to communicate statements made in court to outside parties, to retain the discretion from not to answer some questions and to make all the statements in presence of a French representative . But the question that remained unanswered was why France refused to send its soldiers to testify in Kayishema’s case upon request by the ICTR but accepted to cooperate in the defence of prominent suspects.

France was also the first European country to sign in 2001, with ICTR, an agreement to the effect that convicts of this jurisdiction could serve their sentences in foreign countries. Certain commentators see in this agreement, which was hurriedly signed, as strategy by France to host those found guilty and with whom she has privileged relations, so as to avoid disclosing of information in their possession that marked the French presence in Rwanda. Finally, one can imagine a French strategy hoping to create an opportunity for the sentenced to have conditional liberation, once the ICTR completes its mandate, thus bringing to an end a long common journey between France and those allies found guilty of genocide.

SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Archives

1.1. RWANDA
- Archives from the office of the President of the Republic of Rwanda.
- Archives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Archives of the Ministry of Defense
- Archives from the National Bank

1.2. France
- Francois Mitterrand Fund

2. HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS
- Public and closed door hearings
- Investigations in Rwandan Provinces

3. RESEARCH WORK AND TESTIMONIES

BA, Mehdi, Rwanda: A French genocide, Paris, L’Espirit-frappeur, 1997.

BARAHINYURA, Shyirambere, Major General Habyarimana. Fifteen years of tyranny and hypocrisy in Rwanda, Frankfort, Izuba Verlag, 1988.

Barril Paul, Secret wars at the Elyséée, Paris, Albin Michel, 1996.

BOUCHET-SAULNIER, Francoise, “UN and the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsis: Virtual politics and artificial intelligence to the test of the real world”, Les Temps Modernes, July-August 1995, no 583.

BRAECKMANN, Colette, Rwanda: History of a genocide, Paris, Fayard, 1994.

CHRETIEN, Jean- Pierre, “Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and in Burundi”, Jean Loup Amselle and Elikia M’bokoko, at the heart of the ethnic group, Paris, Editions La Decouverte, 1985, p. 129-166.

CHRETIEN Jean-Pierre, « Rwanda: The responsibility of France », Politique africaine, June 1994.

CHRETIEN, J-P. et al., The media of the genocide, Paris, Karthala, 1995.

CORET, Laure & VERSCHAVE, Francois-Xavier, eds, The horror which hits us on the face, Paris, Karthala, 2005.

Dallaire Romeo, I shook hands with the devil. The failure of humanity in Rwanda, Quebec Libre Expression (“Quebecor Media”), 2003.

ESSOUNGOU, Andre-Michele, Justice at Arusha. An international tribunal politically supervised facing up to the Rwandan genocide, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2006.

GOUTEUX, Jean-Paul, A Secret of State Genocide- France and Rwanda, 1990-1997, Paris, Social Editions, 1998.

HARROY, Jean Paul, Rwanda: From feudality to democracy. (1955-1962), Bruxelles, Hayez, 1984.

HASSEN, Alain, Disillusionment with cooperation. A survey in the country of a thousand aid workers, Paris, L’harmattan, 1989.

KROP, Pascal, the Franco-African Genocide-Should Mitterrand be tried? Paris, J.C.Lattes, 1994.

LANOTTE, Olivier, France in Rwanda

LEMARCHAND, Rene, Rwanda and Burundi, New-York, Praeger, 1970

LINDEN, Ian, Christianity and power in Rwanda (1900-1990), Paris, Krthala, 1999.

LOGIEST, Guy, Mission to Rwanda: A white man in the Hutu-Tutsi fight, Bruxelles, Didier Hatier, 1988.

LUGAN, Bernard, Francois Mitterrand, French army and Rwanda, Paris, Editions du Rocher, 2005, p.141

MBONIMANA, Gamaliel, “Traditional Constituent Institutions of National Unity”, notes from the center of conflict management, no2, Butare, Editions de l’ Universite nationale du Rwanda, 2001.

MOREL Jacques, Helping the assassins, electronic edition of 13 July 2007.

MOREL Jacques, The command of Turquoise and the committed units, electronic edition, 2007.

Morel Jacques, Helping the assassins. French leaders accomplice to Tutsi genocide in Rwanda in 1994, 10 February 2007.

NEWBURY, Catharine, The Cohesion of Oppression, Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960, New York, Columbia University Press, 1988.

NKURIKIYIMFURA, Jean-Nepomucene, Livestock and the Rwandan society, historical evolution: from 12-14 centuries to 1958, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1994.

NOEL, Roland, Incurable wounds of Rwanda, Paris, Editions Paari, 2006.

NTEZIMANA, Emmanuel, “The Rwanda Social, Administrative and Political at the end of the 19 century”, in Gudrun Honke, To the deepest of Africa, Editions Peter Hamer Verlag, Wupertal, 1990.

PERIES, Gabriel and SERVENAY, David, A black war. Investigation on the origin of the Rwandan Genocide (1959-1994), Paris, La Decouverte, 2007.

PRUNIER Gerard, Rwanda: The genocide, Paris, Dagorno, 1996.

REYNTJENS Filip, Power and law in Rwanda, public law and political evolution 1916-1973, Tervuren, MRAC,1985.

REYNTJENS Filip, Rwanda, three days that shook history, Paris, The Harmattan, 1995.

RUMIYA, Jean-Gualbert, Rwanda under the Belgian mandate (1916-1931), Paris, L’Harmattan..

Saint Exupery(de), Patrick, The shameful. France in Rwanda, Arenes 2004, p.245.

SANDERS, Edith R, The hermitic hypothesis: its origin and functions in time perspective, Journal of African History, vol.X, no4.

SITBON, Michel, A genocide on the conscience, Paris, Esprit frappeur,1998.

UVIN, Peter, Aiding violence, West Hartford, Kumarian Press, 1998.

VAITER, Marc, I was not able to save them all, Paris, Plon, 1995.

VERSCHAVE, Francois-Xavier, complicity in Genocide? The politics of France in Rwanda, La Decouverte, 1994.

Watson, Catherine, Exile from Rwanda. Background to an invasion, The US committee for refugees, Issue paper, February 1991.

3. REPORTS OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTIGATIONS

3.1 PARLIAMENTARY AND GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS

French National Assembly, Report of the parliamentary information mission on Rwanda, Paris, 1998.

Belgian Senate, “Report of the parliamentary investigation commission concerning events in Rwanda”, December 1997, p, 519-525

US Department of State, cable number 099440, to US Mission to the United Nations, New York, “Talking points for UNAMIR Withdrawal”, April 15,1994. Confidential.

3.2. INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

a) United Nations Organisation

Economic and Social Council, “Report by the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, M. Ayala Lasso on his mission to Rwanda ( 11-12 May 1994)”, E/CN.4/S-3/3, 19 May 1994.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), The Prosecutor Vs Edouard Karemera, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorera, case no ICTR-98-44-AR73(c), 1 December 2006

NDIAYE, Bacry Wally, Report on the violations of human rights in Rwanda, Doc. UNO E/CN4/1994/7/add.1.

United Nations Organisation (UN), Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the actions of United Nations organisation during the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, S/1999/1257, December, 1999.

R. Degni-Segui, Report of the international commission of inquiry on the violation of human rights in Rwanda since 1 October 1990, March 1993, United Nations organisation Document, no E/CN.4/1995/7.

b) Organisation of African Unity

CEC, http://cec. Rwanda2.free.fr /doc/Rapport-OAU/RWANDA-f/oua.htm

3.3. Organizations for the protection of human rights

Amnesty International, The squadron of death, Bulletin CRIDEV no109, 1993

Amnesty International, Rwanda: persecution of the Tutsi minority and the repression of government detractors, 1990-1992, London 1992. Index AI: AFR 47/02/92.

The Rwandan association for the defense of people s’ rights and public liberties, Report on human rights in Rwanda (September 1991- September1992), Kigali, December

Bernard Cazeneuve, Information Report no 3394 on the reform of the military cooperation of 20 November 2001
(3394 -Rapport d'information de M. Bernard Cazeneuve (commission de la Défense) sur la réforme de la coopération militaire).

Report of the mission done by Eric GILLET, Member of the Bar in Bruxelles, to Rwanda, from 12 to 20 August 1991, Kigali 11 October 1991, pp.35-36.

Committee for refugees, Issue Paper, February 1991.

Human Rights Watch, Leave None to Tell the Story.

Human Rights Watch, Rwanda/Zaire, Rearming with impunity.

Human Rights Watch, The Rwandan Genocide: How it was prepared, working paper, April 2006, p.14-16.









































General Conclusion

The number, convergence and agreement of several testimonies produced on the important facts as well as their crosschecking with the archives and documentaries make it possible to reasonably come to a number of conclusions on the responsibility of the French Government in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

France knew about the preparation of the genocide

France knew that the Habyarimana regime was likely to commit genocide or massacres of a very large scale since 1990. Thereafter, she could not be unaware that the preparations of the massacres were in progress, more tragic than those that were committed between October 1990 and February 1993. Well, if it is a question of ethnic massacres exceeding in scope the acts of genocide previously organized by the regime, there was every reason to recall, since the years before April 1994, there was preparation of the genocide of a higher scope. The conclusion according to which France was supposed to know that the genocide was being prepared follows from the development of the country’s political and security context as well as the privileged position of the French officials in all the workings of the country’s security apparatus. Following are the facts on which this conclusion is based:

The political and security context from October 1990 developed towards the radicalization of the regime, leading to the gradual formulation of a political doctrine of an openly genocidal nature. In the context of a State founded on an official ethnic discrimination, the regime reacted to the October 1990 attack by the RPF by turning against the internal Tutsi population which was not party to the armed conflict launched by the RPF. The regime responded to the attack with massacres of thousands of Tutsis and the arrest of dozens of thousands of others. In the days following the attack of 1st October 1990, road blocks were erected – and kept until 1994 – where they systematically arrested Tutsis, some of whom were carried to sites where they were tortured or executed.

In a diplomatic telegram of 15th October 1990, Colonel Galiénié refers to the risk of genocide. In a letter, also dated 15th October, Ambassador Martres does the same. Finally, in front of the MIP, Ambassador Martres acknowledged that the genocide was foreseeable since October 1990, quoting in particular Colonel Serubuga, the deputy Chief of Staff of the Rwandan army, who had rejoiced in the RPF attack because it would serve as a justification for the massacres of Tutsis.

During this first period of conflict, an extremist press close to the regime was born, and one of its first notable actions was the publication by the Kangura journal, on 6th December 1990, of the “10 Bahutu commandments” which referred without any ambiguity to the Tutsis as the enemies of the Hutus and the State. In January 1992, the Director of African Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paul Dijoud, during a meeting in Paris had given to Paul Kagame, then commander in chief of the RPA, the following warning: “if you don’t stop fighting, if you capture the country, you will not find your brothers and your families, because they will all have been massacred”.

At the beginning of 1992, a system was set up to carry out well organized mass massacres on ethnic basis. In February 1992 there was the effective start of the programme of “civil defence” in the north and north east of the country. At the start of 1992, the training of Interahamwe began in the country’s main military camps. In March 1992, these Interahamwe played a predominant and publicly-denounced role in the Bugesera massacres, working in conjunction with the Presidential guard. On 21st September 1992, the army chief of staff, Déogratias Nsabimana, sent a secret memorandum to his subordinates in which he defined, among other things, the Rwandan refugees, the Tutsis of the interior of the country, the Nilo-hamitic tribes of the region but also the “disgruntled Hutus” as being “the enemy”. The document was made known to the public some time later. Mid-October, a computerized register of wanted people and to be monitored (WPTBM) was made operational by the Centre for Criminal Investigation and Documentation (CCID). Its purpose was to facilitate registration, investigation and monitoring of Tutsis and political opponents.

On 22nd November 1992, Léon Mugesera, very close to President Habyarimana, launched a public incitement calling for the massacre of Tutsis. He was obeyed, because during the following weeks hundreds of Tutsis were massacred. During the days that followed the 2nd February 1993 attack by the RPF, and in reaction to the development of the Arusha peace process, the Rwandan internal political scene experienced political adjustments towards the creation of a front for the rejection of the peace agreement process, and the subsequent formation of the Hutu-power coalition. In August 1993, the Special Reporter for the Human Rights Commission, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, at the end of his mission to Rwanda in April 1993 , published a report describing as genocide the massacres that littered the period from October 1990 to January 1993. That report confirmed the one published in March 1993 by the International Commission on the investigations of violations of human rights in Rwanda since 1st October 1990, which had also referred to the massacres as genocide.

After the death of Ndadaye, the Burundian President, on 21st October 1993, the Hutu-power coalition formalized its discourse by advocating the massacre of Tutsis and Hutus sympathetic to the peace process. It is also at this time that the Radio des Mille Collines started its broadcasts that promoted hatred against Tutsis and Hutus opposed to Hutu-power. During the last term of 1993, the training of the Interahamwe speeded up, the phenomenon took on new dimensions, by the fact of their number, in Kigali and especially in the north of the country, but also according to their level of organization with vehicles, modern European weapons and the redoubled efficiency. But the Interahamwe had no known calling other than participation in massacres of Tutsis and other acts of violence and intimidation against Tutsis and opposition supporters. In 1994, on 20th February, the same chief of staff of the FAR, Déogratias Nsabimana showed to his cousin, Jean-Berchmans Birara, another list of 1500 people meant to be assassinated. The latter took it to Western chanceries, including the French embassy.

However, during the entire period from October 1990 to April 1994, French officers were present in almost all the organs of the Rwandan security. With effect from 1991, until at least December 1993, there were several French advisers next to the FAR, the gendarmerie, the advisers in the investigation organ of the gendarmerie, the CRCD, as well as in almost all the specialized units, including the Presidential guards. The French military advisers could be found at all levels, in the headquarters, in the elite units and on each of the operational sectors on the edge of the front line. At the headquarters, they participated in and often directed the preparation of strategies, made battle and security plans, especially for Kigali. In the operational sectors, they directed the FAR’s combat actions. Until April 1994, there were French advisers in the army and gendarmerie headquarters as well as in the para-commando battalion, one of those that were heavily involved in the starting of the genocide. Thus, the French soldiers were not only everywhere in the country’s security organs, but they also occupied very important roles.

According to General Dallaire, by virtue of their presence in the training structures of the Far, the French soldiers: “were well aware that there was something brewing that could lead to great massacres”. In November 1993, the UNAMIR established a small cell for the collection of information. One month later, its main officer, lieutenant Mark Nees, in spite of his lack of training for this assignment, and, it seems, his errors, wrote, thanks to a network of informers, reports that revealed meetings at the Government’s highest level, to destabilize the UNAMIR, kill opponents and Tutsis. It is in this framework that in January 1994 UNAMIR came into contact with the leading Interahamwe “Jean Pierre” who revealed a plan to exterminate the Tutsis in Kigali. If UNAMIR, with its limited means and its confessed amateurism in terms of intelligence, managed to glean this type of information, you can imagine the quantity and quality of information that the French officers had in their possession.

France participated in the most important initiatives of the genocide

At the political level and ideological level, France reinforced the Habyarimana regime in the preparation of its genocide doctrine. In their internal communication, diplomatic telegrams, service reports and other documents, the different people in charge of the Rwandan dossier between 1990 and 1993 state their radically ethnic option of the Rwandan conflict. For these officials, and in the first place President Mitterand, it is, in the first place and above of all, a matter of an ethnic and regionalized war, opposing the majority Hutus and the “Nilo-hamitic” minority Tutsi. This report provided many examples of this French vision, with the French decision makers and the implementers of various military interventions during the entire period of the Rwandan conflict. As an example, we can mention the declaration President Mitterand made in the cabinet, insidiously justifying the ongoing genocide, on 22nd June 1994: “The president of the Republic recalls that Rwanda, like Burundi, is essentially inhabited by Hutus. Therefore the majority of the inhabitants naturally supported President Habyarimana’s government. If this country were to come under the very minority ethnic Tutsi domination that is based in Uganda where some people are in favour of the creation of a “Tutsiland” including not only the latter country but also Rwanda and Burundi, it is obvious that the democratization process would be interrupted. And the essentially political and ethnic fear of the conflict was the main point of disagreement between, on one side the moderate opponents, and on the other hand, the Habyarimana regime and the Hutu-power coalition.

From October 1990, France aligned herself with the most radically ethnic vision of the conflict of the extremists and supported them. Thus, towards the end of the negotiation process of the Arusha agreement, one of the main stumbling blocks had been the refusal by the RPF and part of the internal Hutu opposition to include the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic in the widely based coalition government (WBCG) which was supposed to get out of the peace agreement. French diplomats exerted pressure so that that openly racist party, which, already at the time, called for the massacre of the Tutsis and moderate opponents, may be included. Apart from the simple role of support to the extremists, the French decision makers led the action of promoting the ethnic war. A few weeks after the 8th February 1993 attack by the RPF which had sunk the FAR defences, at the time when the peace negotiations were reaching very sensitive heights, the French Minister of Cooperation and Development, Marcel Debarge, came to Kigali on 28th February 1993. During his visit, he urged the opposition political parties to “forge a common front” with President Habyarimana against the RPF. Both the Rwandan political actors and the observers made a very precise interpretation of that call by Debarge reported here by the French historian, Gérard Prunier: “Even if it is understandable that Paris would like to exploit the closing of Hutu ranks against the RPF against the Tutsi RPF, the French minister’s official declaration is shocking. In such a climate of ethnic tension, after the massacres of the previous weeks that call for a “common front” of course based on race, is almost a call to racial war.” The Belgian journalist, Colette Braeckman, present in Rwanda at the time, affirms that while pretending to support the Arusha process, “in private, the French diplomats boasted of having divided the opposition parties by encouraging the birth of Hutu power.” And the creation of the Hutu-power coalition was a prerequisite for the successful implementation of the genocide.

France supported to the hilt by organizing, training and arming the FAR. It also fought on their side at different times, in October 1990, in January 1991, in June 1992 and in February 1993. And that army had a military doctrine of the genocide type, since it referred to a part of its civilian population as an enemy and that it put that doctrine into practice when members of the gendarmerie and the Presidential guard participated in the massacres of the civilian population like in March 1992 in Bugesera. The French soldiers participated in the erection of road blocks in different regions of the country, but most particularly around Kigali, where they made identity checks on ethnic basis, stopping Tutsis. Some of the latter were thereafter tortured and assassinated in collusion with the French soldiers.

The French soldiers in Rwanda contributed to the conceptualization and organization of the “civil defence” which was to serve as an administrative instrument of the execution of the genocide. We must remember also that it is a matter of a programme of paramilitary training and arming the population in general, under the supervision of the local authorities. It is through this programme that with effect from May 1994 the genocide will be systematized on the entire territory under the control of the interim government. This programme is different from the Interahamwe militia which however constituted its spearhead. Thus, Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Canovas, after an inspection tour of the front line in February 1991, wrote a report in which he proposed to the Rwandan army “the creation of small civilian elements, disguised as peasants, in the sensitive areas, in order to neutralize the generally isolated rebels” . It was a question of conceptualizing the use of disguised soldiers or civilians in actions of war.

In February 1992, the programme of “civil defence” started in the northeast of Rwanda. In spite of the reservations issued in a diplomatic telegramme by the French military attaché in Kigali, Colonel Cussac, who seemed to be anxious to protect himself, at the same time it was the French soldiers who launched that programme. It had been a subject of discussion between Rwandans for months, but it had never taken off. It is the organizational and logistic support of the French army that enabled it to be launched. Soldiers went to look for volunteers from the governors to participate in the training programme; they offered arms for the first groups of participants, provided logistics, supervised the training and gave some courses.

The French soldiers trained and contributed to training militarily the Interahamwe between the beginning of 1992 until the departure of Operation Noroît in December 1993. Some witnesses, but it is not systematic, say also that in some cases French soldiers contributed to the ideological training whose main teaching point was to define the Tutsi as the enemy. This training was done in five big military camps where French soldiers were found. After the Bugesera massacre of March 1992, that was followed by Colonel Robardey, the French army knew that the Interahamwe whom they were training had as their main mission the massacre of the Tutsis, a mission that was confirmed in the course of time. The French soldiers fully participated in the intensification of training during the last term of 1993. This intensification was part of the preparations of the genocide, and the French army could not know it, for reasons described above.

The French soldiers contributed to the registration of the Tutsis and political opponents. The French gendarmes attached to the CRCD introduced the computerization of the service’s data banks, especially the register of persons to be registered and watched (PRAW). On 14th October 1992, Colonel Robardey wrote to the chief of staff of the national gendarmerie, Colonel Augustin Ndindiliyimana, informing him the PRAW was ready for use, and that he was only waiting for his approval to make it operational. General Jean Varret, head of military Cooperation mission from October 1990 to April 1993, had been the initiator of the French military cooperation project at the CRCD. During his interview by the MIP, he affirmed that he had had the feeling that the work of French gendarmes at the CRCD would be to register the Tutsis. And, at the beginning of the genocide, the soldiers who moved from house to house to kill political opponents or distinguished Tutsis carried printed lists. The gendarmerie had the area in numbers and logistics necessary for a good collection of information, and it had the software prepared by the French gendarmes. A former cadre of the Central intelligence Service affirmed that his institution had never reached that level of organization. There are also strong chances that these lists used at the beginning of genocide were made with the contribution of the PRAW.

During the days that followed the attack on President Habyarimana’s plane, Ambassador Martres urged Colonel Bagosora to take over power. A year earlier, the latter had publicly announced that he was going to “prepare the apocalypse”. Thereafter, Martres gave his blessing to the formation of an interim government that brought together almost exclusively members of the Hutu power coalition. And both Colonel Bagosora and almost all the future members of the interim government were known for their position defending a violent solution against those whom they accused of being internal accomplices of the RPF, the Tutsis in general and the Hutu opposed to Hutu power.

Colonel Bagosora is considered as the brain of the genocide, and the interim government its main organizer. Bagosora and most members of the interim government have either already been sentenced for the genocide at the ICTR, or they are still on trial. Their positions were perfectly clear from the time before the genocide. Without France’s support at the time, it is most likely that the extremist circles would have restricted their genocide action: “Obviously the akazus judged the world from the height of their local dictatorship, but they would probably have not deviated to that extent if they had known that it would lead to their total isolation on the international scene. Thus, France unintentionally encouraged Rwanda’s final dive into a blood bath.” However we have our reservation on the evaluation of the voluntary nature or not of this support.

France participated in the execution of the genocide

During the entire period of the genocide, France supported diplomatically and militarily the interim government which, to the knowledge of the whole world, in real time, was organizing and executing a genocide. On 27th April 1994, that is to say three weeks after the starting of the genocide, two envoys from this government, Jérôme Bicamumpaka, the minister of Foreign Affairs, and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, one of the CDR leaders, were received in Paris at the Elysée and at Matignon, whereas the United States and Belgium had refused them a visa. They held discussions with French high ranking officials, especially the Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Alain Juppé, and Bruno Delaye, head of the African cell in the President’s Office.

On 9th May 1994, General Huchon received Lieutenant-Colonel Ephrem Rwabalinda, adviser to the Chief of Staff of the FAR. During their conversation, the two officers discussed “as a matter of priority”: “ - Rwanda’s support by France at the international political level; - the presence of French soldiers in Rwanda […] for assistance in the framework of cooperation; the indirect use of regular or non-regular foreign troops; […]” General Huchon promised to provide 105 mm ammunitions, ammunitions for individual arms, as well as transmission equipment to facilitate the monitoring of secret communications between him and General Augustin Bizimungu, commander in chief of the FAR. These communications were meant to be used in preparing France’s direct military intervention in Rwanda.

During the entire period of the genocide, French soldiers who remained in Rwanda fought on FAR’s side. During that period, France continued to supply ammunitions and arms to the government section that was committing genocide. Different deliveries from or financed by France are well documented for the months of April, May, June and July 1994. In June 1994, when FAR were about to be defeated by the RPF, President Mitterrand decided to intervene militarily in Rwanda by launching the Operation Turquoise. The main purpose of this intervention was to divide the country into two from Kigali, stop the RPF’s advance and force it to negotiate a power sharing with the genocidaire government. Prime Minister Balladur opposed the project, but above all, when the Turquoise landed in Rwanda, it was too late; the RPF had advanced too far.

During the pre-deployment briefing, the French military officers reversed the reality of the genocide by explaining to their soldiers that it was the Tutsis who were massacring the Hutus. They were obviously trying to defuse the difficulties that might have arisen when he would ask his soldiers to attack the victims. During the first days of the Turquoise operation, this report shows very clearly that Colonel Rosier deliberately sacrificed the survivors of Bisesero knowing very well that they were being massacred in an intense manner between 27th and 30th June 1994. The Bisesero affair, dramatic as it was, because of the thousands of survivors killed during those three days, is nothing but the emblem of the global strategy of Operation Turquoise. The analysis of the Turquoise action in the three prefectures that it covered, namely Cyangugu, Kibuye and Gikongoro, shows clear recurrences that make it possible to detect a policy.

Upon their arrival, the French soldiers hastened to ensure the security of some enclaves like the camps of the survivors of genocide, Nyarushishi, or later on, Murambi, with a lot of publicity. On the other hand, in the rest of the region, they collaborated with the prefectoral, communal and local authorities in organizing the extermination of their Tutsi population. They left behind the infrastructures of genocide, namely the roadblocks manned by the Interahamwe. They clearly demanded that the Interahamwe continue to control those road blocks and continue to kill the Tutsis who might try to move about. They also clearly demanded that that the Tutsi who might try to sneak into the camps of displaced people be brought to them and that the Interahamwe kill at least some of those Tutsis. Almost everywhere in the three prefectures, they let the Interahamwe kill Tutsis under their eyes. The French soldiers committed many rapes, forced sexual relations specifically with the Tutsi survivors. These sexual abuses that targeted the Tutsi survivors in particular were systemic, that is to say, frequent, tolerated and organized according to the norms and practices of the institution to which belong the people who commit them. In this case it is a matter of expression of the French soldiers’ aggression against the Tutsi survivors in the context of genocide. The disgraceful conditions, especially nutritional, in which the survivors of genocide assisted by the French soldiers were kept, whether in the camp finally established at Bisesero, Nyarushisi or Murambi, forcing once again the survivors to risk their lives by leaving the “protected” enclaves to look for something to eat, led to the death of some of them. The refusal of medical care to women and young girls by some French military doctors in Kibuye and Cyangugu, as well as the abusive amputations in Goma, all this shows a clear hostility of the French soldiers against the Tutsi survivors, for the mere fact of their ethnic belonging. These facts took place during the period of the Operation Turquoise that is to say from 23rd June to 2nd August. Finally, whether it is in Gikongoro, Kibuye or Cyangugu, during the last days of the presence, the French soldiers carried out squashed earth policy. They ordered the local authorities to encourage the Hutu population to flee in large numbers to Zaïre. Senior French officers in command positions held public meetings to directly encourage the population to flee. Finally, during the last days of their mission, the French encouraged looting and destruction of public infrastructures, they even took part.

From October 1990, France supported the Habyarimana regime in its acts, especially in committing acts of genocide before 1994. She supported it in the preparations of genocide. From April 1994, France supported the interim government and the FAR who were busy committing total genocide in the face of the world. France’s support was of all nature: political, military, diplomatic and logistic. And from October 1990, the Habyarimana regime, and thereafter that of the interim government, distinguished themselves by the massacres of the civilian Tutsi populations, non-belligerent and most often far away from the scene of war operations. From 1990, those massacres were of no strategic use, nor did they have any practical justification. These are episodes of an ethnic war carried out against a civilian population, before moving, in April, to a war of extermination of that population. At no time did France try to force her ally to practice restraint, whereas the latter owed her everything in her war against the RPF. There is no sign whatsoever of any attempt by the French political and military decision makers to bring to an end that war against the Tutsi civilians. The persistence and determination of their support leads to ask the question of France’s real role in the preparation and perpetration of the genocide. This persistence shows that the French political and military decision makers had made their own this war against the Tutsis. The people who organized that military intervention from October 1990 to August 1994 are almost the same. It is easy to identify them.

During Operation Turquoise, payment for the genocidaire project by the French decision makers was more directly visible. When on 6th July 1994 France received the United Nations Secretary General’s approval to create the “Safe humanitarian Zone” (SHZ), on the entire area of this zone, she becomes an occupying force, and therefore holder of all authority. Antoine Mindua explains that the SHZ is as a matter of fact a “security zone”, part of the territory “under the real authority of a belligerent or under the authority of a rival or allied party, on which the facts of arms are forbidden and which is supposed to provide shelter to the people under threat or at risk.”

By establishing the SHZ, the French army had assumed the full use of authority, to the exclusion of any other institution. By deciding to keep and collaborate with the political and administrative personnel, with the people at hand and their infrastructures which had perpetrated the genocide during two and a half preceding months, by asking and/or letting them continue the assassinations of the Tutsis who in this context were constituent of the crime of genocide, often under their eyes, the French soldiers of Operation Turquoise and their partners took charge of the genocidaire project.


RECOMMENDATIONS


At the conclusion of its inquiry, the Commission found out that the French Government played an active part in the preparation and implementation of the 19994 genocide. In view of the seriousness of the facts but also after taking into consideration the general context of the problem and its complexity, the Commission, in accordance with the law that established it, makes the following recommendations:

The Commission requests the Government of Rwanda to reserve the right to lodge a complaint against the French Government for its involvement in the preparation and implementation of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda at the competent international judicial authorities.

The Commission recommends to the Government of Rwanda to find a political settlement of the problem with the French Government in as much as the latter is prepared to accept the entire extent of its responsibility in the preparation and execution of the genocide in Rwanda and to undertake the relevant reparation measures in agreement with the Government of Rwanda.

The Commission requests the Government of Rwanda to support any individual or collective action by the victims who may wish to lodge a complaint at the tribunals for damages caused by the actions of the French Government and/or its agents in Rwanda.

The Commission recommends to the Government of Rwanda to make a wide distribution of this report.

The Commission requests the Government of Rwanda to establish an authority for the follow-up of this problem.

[XXPANTHAXX]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS i
Introduction to the Annexes 1
1. Adrien Harelimana 1
2. Alexis Ntare 2
3. Aloys Munyaneza 3
4. Ambassador Amuri Sued Ismaïl 4
5. Ananie Habimana 7
6. Agnès Mukabacondo 8
7. Augustin Nzabahimana 11
8. A. T. 12
9. Balis Walter (Colonel) 13
10. Be M. 18
11. B. M. 20
12. Bernard Kayumba 21
13. Bernard Munyaneza 22
14. Bernard Surwumwe 24
15. Callixte Gashirabake 25
16. Cassien Bagaruka 26
17. Charles Bigirimfura 27
18. Christine Bazarama 29
19.CM 30
20. Colonel Evariste Murenzi 32
21. Colonel Martin Ndamage 34
22. Come Kayinamura 37
23. Cyprien Katarega 38
24. Jean-Damascène Uzabakiriho 39
25. Damien Bizimana 42
26. Daniel Mazimpaka 43
27. Emmanuel Mwumvaneza, Member of Parliament 44
28. Joseph-Desire Nyandwi, Member of Parliament 47
29. Desire Ngezahayo 49
30. Elie Ngezenubwo 54
31. Elisee Bisengimana, Member of Parliament 55
32. Emmanuel Ibyimana 58
33. Emmanuel Izabiriza 61
34. Emmanuel Ndindabahizi 62
35. Emmanuel Nshogozabahizi 64
36. Emmanuel Twizeyimana 66
37. Eric Nzabahimana 67
38. Ezéchiel Bazimenyera 69
39. Fidèle Simugomwa 69
40. François Bigirimana 70
41. François Habimana 71
42. F.M. 72
43. Major-General Paul Rwarakabije 74
43. Gérard Ndabakenga 78
44. I. M. 80
45. Isidore Kayiranga 81
47. Ismaël Kamali 84
48. Jean Baptiste Dushimimana 85
49. Jean Baptiste Twagirayezu 89
50. Jean-Claude Murejuru Tuyishime 92
51. Jean Karengera 94
52. Jean-Loup Denblyden 95
53. Jean-Marie Vianney Nzabakurikiza 101
54. Jean Ndihokubwayo 102
55. Jean-Paul Gasore 104
56. Jean Paul NTURANYENABO 106
57. Jean-Pierre Martin 108
58. Joachim Hategekimana 112
59. John Mbigizembishaka 114
60. John Yankurije 115
61. Joseph Ngiruwonsanga 115
62. Laurien Twagirayezu 116
63. Luc Pillionel 117
64. Lucien Nibaseke 126
65. M. 127
66. Major Félicien Ngirabatware 130
67. Marc Rugenera 133
68. Marcel Bayingana 135
69. Marcellin Karangwa 136
70. M. B. 137
71. Michel Campion 138
72. M. F. 142
73. Muk. B. 143
74. Odette Mukamunana 144
76. Pascal Nkusi 147
77. Philemon Hakizimana 148
78. Philippe Mbaraga 150
79. Pierre Celestin Ngarambe 151
80. Raphael Kamanzi. 152
81. Raphael Kirenga 155
82. Jean de Dieu Tuyisenge 158
83. Samuel Zirimwabagabo 161
84. Senator Augustin Iyamuremye 163
85. Shinani Siborurema 167
86. Silas Ndagijimana 168
87. Straton Sinzabakwira 170
88. Sylvestre Munyandinda 174
89. Télésphore Kaneza 175
90. Twayibu Nsekanabo 176



Introduction to the Annexes

This corpus of annexes is a collection of various testimonies based on the accusations levied on the French Government, as shown in the main body of the Commission’s report. These testimonies appear in an alphabetical order of the witnesses. As will become clear, most testimonies touch on a number of topics which should clarify the report or illuminate situations and contexts in which they happened. This is due to the fact that nearly all witnesses went through eventful experiences that enabled them to have full knowledge of the facts relating to the period the Commission investigated.

Most of the testimonies we present were obtained in Kinyarwanda, the mother tongue of the majority of the witnesses. Others were given in French. With regard to the former, the texts we present here are translations into French. During the process of translating them, great care was taken to find the exact equivalence of the original in French but where necessary deletions were made to avoid redundancies.

The testimonies obtained in French were equally repetitive, especially when the witness wanted to make a point or wanted to insist on the gravity of the action inflicted on him/her. This insistence on the part of witnesses was removed, and so were hesitations that are typical of the oral style. This harmonization was judged to be necessary especially because there are witnesses who were heard more than once.

Clearly then, although the texts presented here have been synthesised, they are very close to the original versions recorded and transcribed. They will be archived with the rest of the body of the documents produced by the Commission and anyone wishing to ascertain their authenticity can have access to them.

1. Adrien Harelimana

Adrien Harelimana is a survivor from Bisesero. He used to be a peasant farmer during the 1994 genocide. He gave his testimony on 18th December 2006. His first contact with the French was a week after the Interahamwe shot him in the thigh.

Like many other survivors, he blames the French for failing to come to the rescue of people in danger, inhumane and humiliating treatment carried out by them and for unnecessary and arbitrary amputations of limbs they carried out in Goma.

“I came across the French for the first time in Bisesero. We went down and met them where there were many wounded people and fresh corpses. We asked them to protect us from the killers who were carrying out the genocide. But those French soldiers told us that they were not in position to do anything for us because they did not have the means. In fact, they immediately went away without providing the help we needed. Yet, they could have requested for reinforcement from their superiors if they had wanted. They, however, came back about fifteen days later and took with them about fifteen people who had serious wounds. I was one of them. They took us to Goma by helicopter. On arrival, they said they were going to treat us but we spent a whole week without food to eat.”

As for the humiliating treatment they got from the French, this is what he had to say:

“All the survivors without exception: men, women, children and elderly people, spent all the time at the hospital field naked. I could only wrap myself with a bed sheet that I was meant to cover myself with in bed. They even insulted me and stopped me from covering my sexual organ. Similarly, when time came for us to take a bath, French soldiers used a garden hose to shower us all together.”

With regard to the unnecessary amputations, Adrien says:

“After examining my wound on the thigh, the French told me they were going to amputate my leg otherwise, they said, I ran the risk of developing cancer. They then took me to the operating room where I found a young Rwandan woman living in Goma. She explained to me that they were indeed going to amputate my leg. I decided to let them know that I categorically refused to be amputated. If they wanted they could kill me or take me back to Bisesero and deliver me to the Interahamwe. They were furious, wondering how they could treat people who were rebellious. They insisted that they were going to amputate my leg. I decided to stand up using my walking stick but a French man forced me back to the bed, saying that I did not have lessons to give on how I should be treated. I struggled and eventually managed to leave the operating theatre. As a result of this incident, they refused to give me food and water.

Three days later, another French person tried to convince me that I would really develop cancer if I did not undergo an amputation. But I told him that I preferred the cancer. This led me to warn another survivor from Bisesero by the name of Kaneza who had a wound on the leg. I told him that the French had a scheme to amputate our limbs. This is indeed what happened. In the end, Kaneza was put to sleep and when he awoke, his foot was gone. This is also exactly what happened to Munyankindi whose arm was amputated. I say that these amputations were unnecessary and arbitrary because when other survivors refused them, the French got angry and we were all transferred to the Gituke camp ran by the High Commissioner for Refugees. There, all the wounded people were properly treated and no one underwent any amputation.”

2. Alexis Ntare

Alexis Ntare comes from Rubengera in the District of Karongi in the Western Province. He used to serve in the Rwanda Armed Forces (FAR) and was an instructor at the Commando Training Centre in Bigogwe and of Interahamwe. He was at a roadblock in Kibuye when French soldiers serving under “Opération turquoise” arrived. His testimony was given on 8th January 2007, in camera.

His testimony is about the involvement of the French soldiers in the distribution of weapons to the Interahamwe and in the killing of people suspected to be Inkotanyi. This is what he said:

“I saw French soldiers relocating from Gisenyi to Kibuye in armoured and other military vehicles as part of the “Opération turquoise”. They came and pitched camp at Kibuye stadium. Next morning, others came in two helicopters and joined them. They chased us away from the roadblocks we had erected at the junction of Gitarama – Kibuye - Gisenyi road. They also took away all our weapons, including the grenades we had. They then summoned a meeting of educated people from the area which was held at the Rubengera College. The day after the meeting, we were allowed to go back to our roadblock and were given more weapons and grenades. From that day onwards, we manned our roadblock but followed their instructions. They instructed us that we should send them all the Tutsis that we arrested and that we had the mission to apprehend all the suspected Inkotanyi, deserters from the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and people who caused trouble in the internally displaced camps. All the people who were arrested had to be taken to the French Camp. They even taught us how to recognise the Inkotanyi: check first if the person in question is tall; check for a pointed nose; and also check for long boot marks on the legs. The Inkotanyi wore long boots while the Rwanda Armed Forces wore ankle boots, or had gun strap marks on their shoulders.”

As for the fate of the people arrested on roadblocks, Alexis Ntare says:

“They tied and beat up all the people we took to them, who were suspected of being Inkotanyi. They were then put in temporary confinement cells. When numbers increased, we put them on trucks and took them to Busaho on the shores of Lake Kivu. They were then shot and thrown into Lake Kivu. I went there twice but the French went there many times. As for the trouble causers in the internally displaced camps, their arms and legs were tied; they were then put in sacks and taken by a helicopter to an unknown destination. We never saw them again.”

3. Aloys Munyaneza

Aloys Munyaneza served with the Rwanda Armed Forces (FAR) before fleeing to Congo after the defeat of the government forces. On his return, he was prosecuted for his role in the genocide. He was subsequently given a life sentence and imprisoned in Musanze. He has recently appealed. The Commission heard his testimony in camera on 9th July 2007.

Aloys Munyaneza’s testimony is about the role of the French soldiers in the training of the Rwanda Armed Forces and the part they played on the battle front. With regard to the training of the Rwanda Armed Forces, this is what he said:

“I was recruited into the Rwanda Defence Forces (FAR) in November 1993, at Mukamira. At the beginning of the training, we were trained together with some civilians. But later, those civilians got extra training from designated soldiers from their communes of origin.. At Mukamira, French soldiers trained Rwandan officers, who, in turn became trainers for us. At Mukamira, the training offered by French soldiers involved mainly 120 mm mortar firing and 105 canon firing.”

Regarding the involvement of the French on the battle field, this what he says:

“Even before I joined the military, I knew that the French were supervising the Rwandan soldiers. In February 1992, they used their support weapons from a football pitch in Gisesero near Mukingo to remove the Inkotanyi from Ruhengeri town. They were fighting side by side with the Rwandan army. In February 1994, I saw French soldiers at Kayenzi in Gitarama. They came with the ex-FAR to a place where they had placed their heavy weaponry. In most cases, it was them that used them. They had an office in the Mukingo Commune and their weapons were located at Gisezero.”

4. Ambassador Amuri Sued Ismaïl

Ambassador Amuri Suedi Ismaïl served as the Secretary General in charge of State Protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then as the Secretary in the Rwandan Embassy in Bangui, Rwandan Ambassador in Ivory Coast and Rwandan Ambassador in Egypt. He is currently an advisor to the President. His testimony was heard in camera on 1st November 2006.

Ambassador A. Sued Ismaïl’s testimony revolved around the anti-Tutsi xenophobia by French diplomats and military before the 1994 genocide and about President Mitterrand’s relationship with Habyarimana’s regime.

“I started my career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where I worked for a long time. Before the 1994 genocide, ethnic division in that ministry was apparent to all. This was mainly in regard to the choice and distribution of duties, but it was also visible amongst colleagues themselves. To become a diplomat or simply to work in that ministry, you had to have been selected by the Minister, not to have friendship with Tutsis, to be proud of being a Hutu, and to have well known Hutu roots that are not contested .

Because I was born a Muslim to Suedi, who was the regional head of the Rwandan National Union (UNAR), my colleagues mistrusted me and sometimes even harassed me. I tried all the same to adapt and survive in that environment. That situation also helped me to understand the extent to which Rwandan diplomacy was skewed and the friendship that existed between the French and Habyarimana government.

There were French people within the Rwandan military as well as in other sectors but I did not know their mission. Previously, it had been the Belgians who had military cooperation in their portfolio. It was only later that the French came in. Some of them actually developed personal friendship with Ikinani . The French were good at fostering this kind of relationship. They knew how best to approach him, how to become conspicuous and be known, and how to win over his trust in comparison with the Belgians.

If I remember well, we did not have any French advisers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is only shortly before genocide that they could easily be seen in the corridors and offices of the Ministry. I was not trusted enough to be given information about their activities. Nonetheless, despite the fact that I was given a rough time, I managed to be friends with some of the French people whenever I showed interest in them. Meeting them in the stairs or in reception parties enabled me to make friends with some and to get to know some of their activities. It is about the same time that the anti-Tutsi sentiment intensified. During the French’s presence, Tutsis were increasingly marginalized and stigmatized. It was considered a pleasure for a Hutu to attack a Tutsi at leisure. We often wondered how this dangerous situation would end. The anti-Tutsi culture was deep-rooted and it appeared that the whites had embraced it. They too knew who to mingle with and who not to. The French were not shy to ask if you were Tutsi or if so and so was.

As the person in charge of protocol, I had many encounters with Ambassador Martres and his successor Malraud, and I developed some friendship with them. I was often invited to their official or private ceremonies and I usually found myself seated next to Martres or Marlaud. We never finished a meal without talking about the Tutsis; how bad they were; and the need to marginalize them. This was often the topic of their discussion. Marlaud s’ hate for the Tutsis was a lot more virulent than Martres’ and it was said that he was a member of the French Secret Service, the DGSE. Mr. Martres was much more reserved and diplomatic although he did not hide his dislike for Tutsis whom he often referred to as “bad” people. Both personalities expressed hostility towards Tutsis openly and in public, even in the presence of Tutsis themselves, as was the case once with my former colleague, Mr. Gashumba.

I often found them in anti-Tutsi conversations that a seasoned diplomat would not be expected to indulge in. Whenever I tried to find out why they hated Tutsis so much, they told me that it was a well known fact that Tutsis were bad people. Our discussions always ended up in disagreements. I nonetheless told them that as diplomats, they should refrain from the kind of language that is likely to create divisions among the Rwandan people. I am sure that their discourse derived from a racist ideology found in the writings about the so-called Hima Empire.

The inhumane treatment of Tutsis persisted and became widespread among the French soldiers, who also used anti-Tutsi rhetoric like their diplomats. French soldiers were actually renowned for their systematic segregation against Tutsis. On several occasions, I saw them hurling insults and physical abuse on Tutsi civilians on the roadblocks they manned along the Kigali-Ruhengeri road. I went to Ruhengeri every week with my wife and I was arrested more than once by the French soldiers at the Shyorongi roadblock. When they saw my wife, one of them asked a colleague who had taken her identity card: “Is she Hutu or Tutsi?” Even before reading her identity card, the one who was holding it retorted: “Can’t you see that she is Tutsi?” This they did so more often that I can’t remember how many times we had to endure the experience. On another occasion, I was witness to an incident where they made people sit on the ground at a roadblock at Nyirangarama and insulted them openly. This hostility against Tutsis was clear to all and it was a precursor to what was to follow. The French soldiers cannot pretend that they were not aware of the prevailing segregation in Rwanda at the time, and that all the signs that genocide was being prepared were in place. On the roadblocks, especially those on the road to Ruhengeri, they forced people out of vehicles and put some aside simply because they were Tutsis. Besides, they had put in place the necessary resources to stop the advance of the people they called “the invading Tutsis”. Habyarimana regime had total confidence in the French and their presence was felt within the government. The French soldiers gave the impression that they had come with the sole purpose of protecting President Habyarimana.

The transformation of the relations between France and Rwanda into personal friendship between Habyarimana and Mitterrand did not augur well. This relationship was so personal that it even extended to their families. Among the people who benefited from this personal relationship were Christophe Mitterrand, Doctor Levasseur, Habyarimana’s son and other members of Akazu . Dr Levasseur was a Doctor in Paris to whom sick Hutus were referred for medical treatment. I got to know him when I was serving as Secretary to our Embassy in Bangui. When I fell sick, I was referred to him for treatment. He was a great friend of President Habyarimana. The relationship between Christophe Mitterand and the Habyarimana family had also exceeded the normal formal diplomatic sphere. He used to come to Rwanda and would be received by Séraphin Rwabukumba without the knowledge of a diplomat of my level. It is during this period that rumours started circulating that there were cannabis plantations in Nyungwe Forest. People said that these cannabis was sold by Mitterrand’s son and Habyarimana through the “Office des Cultures Industrielles au Rwanda” (OCIR), packaged as if it was tea. I was not able to ascertain this information but the dark nature of these relationships continued.”



5. Ananie Habimana

Mr Habimana is a former RPF officer who was captured by the FAR at Kinigi in the North of the Country (volcanic region) in February 1991, and was imprisoned. When he was freed as a result of an exchange of prisoners by belligerents, he rejoined the RPF. At the end of the war, he was demobilised. The Commission heard his testimony in camera as a factual witness on 12th April 2007.

His testimony was in regard to the extent of the torture he was subjected to by the Rwandan and French soldiers in Ruhengeri at the Communal Offices of Kinigi. Here, he was interrogated by the French with the help of the Chief of Staff of the National Police Force, Lt. Col. Ndindiriyimana, and Anatole Nsengiyumva, head of the military intelligence service. This is what he had to say:

“I was captured by the FAR in February 1991, at the edge of the Volcano National Park. I was then taken to the Communal Offices of Kinigi to face the Chief of Staff of the National Police Force, Col. Ndindiriyimana and Lt. Col. Anatole Nsengiyumva, head of the military intelligence services. Rwandan and French soldiers were camped there together. The French took photographs of me and interrogated me. They wanted to know the position of the forces, the way we were organised as an army, the types of weapons we had, their origin, etc. I was then put in a prison cell where I found other prisoners of war, some of whom belonged to my unit. We were later transferred to Ruhengeri prison and subsequently taken to “Camp Kigali”. A week after our arrival, two French men came to see me and asked me questions relating to our weaponry and the number of RPF soldiers. I never got to know their names but I heard that they were advisers in the Officer of the President.”

On the way from Ruhengeri to Kigali, this witness was tortured:

“At the end of the first day in prison in Ruhengeri, the white soldiers discussed with their Rwanda counterparts and they decided to send me to Kigali. They forced me to lie down in the pickup that was taking us and they put two bags of potatoes on me, each weighing 50 kg. They stopped at Mukungwa Bridge. Peasants came to see and they were told that I was Inyenzi. The soldiers gave a stick to an elderly woman and they asked her to hit me with it. She gave me such a big blow that I immediately started bleeding. I arrived at “Camp Kigali” around 18 hrs, my hands and feet still tied. I spent one night there and the next day Ndindiriyimana and Nsengiyumva came to interrogate me.”

A week later, the French too came to interrogate him twice, sometimes resorting to torture tactics. This is what the witness reported:

“During the course of the interrogation, the French beat me every time I gave an answer that did not match their expectations. They asked me questions about my life (my educational background, my nationality, the conditions in which we lived while in exile, etc.), where I was captured, the real reasons why the RPF started the military campaign, sources of arms and ammunitions, the types of weapons and vehicles we use, etc. Those who were interrogating me had a Rwandan interpreter.

After another week, the same French people came back. They asked me about the weapons which had been captured by the FAR at Ryabega. When I told them that those weapons had been abandoned by the Zairian forces a few days before, the French men became furious and started to hit me everywhere. In the end, the ICRC and some European MPs came to visit us in the Kigali Prison. We complained about the bad treatment we had received and the serious shortage of food in our prison. As a result, the prison authorities improved the quality of food and the bad treatment we had been subjected to ceased. And from that time, French soldiers never came back.”

6. Agnès Mukabacondo

Agnes Mukabacondo is a former teacher from Kagabiro Sector in the Western Province, where she was living during the genocide. She is a Hutu but was married to a Tutsi man. Her family was under constant threat and her house was destroyed by the Interahamwe during the genocide. Her members of the family had been forced to flee. The husband went his way and the wife and children took refuge at the house of the wife’s brother. Her testimony was heard by the Commission on 20th December 2006, and it relates to the failure of the French to assist people in danger in Bisesero, deprivation of water and food to the survivors of Bisesero as well as the support given to the former Rwandan soldiers and courage to the population to flee into exile.

“We saw the French around the 24th June 1994, as they came from Kibuye to Gishyita but I never got to know their final destination. We saw them every morning in a blue Daihatsu pick-up which carried killers, who would come from Kibuye on their way to Bisesero. Those killers were armed and they dressed in banana leaves. They went around singing and vowing that they would exterminate all the Tutsis hiding in the forests. In the meantime there were widespread rumours that the French had come to save the Hutus. As a result, the population applauded them wherever they went. That led me to doubt their humanitarian mission, more especially that the Tutsis were being killed everyday and the French were not doing anything to avert that or stop the killers from going to Bisesero to carry out the massacres. I could see smoke and hear gun shots from Bisesero Hill. And people were asking themselves why the French had decided to remove Tutsi refugees from “Ecole Normale Technique de Kibuye” (ENT) to take them to Nyarushishi if they had come to protect the Hutu.

In my view, the French mission was lacking in three respects:

1) The people in danger expected the French to help them but when the former arrived they decided to side with the killers by accepting their cheers and applause and by giving free passage to Bisesero where the Tutsi survivors had gathered.

2) I noticed that the French had sided with the Interahamwe to quickly kill Tutsis of Bisesero, given that within four days after the arrival of the French, the numbers of killers had greatly increased. I also noticed that during this period the killers were taking much longer to carry out their macabre business: they left at six o’clock in the morning and came back at six o’clock in the evening. Previously, they would go to kill in Bisesero around eight in the morning and come back around four o’clock.

3) Before the return of the French in the night of 30th June, the number of flights in the neighbourhood of Bisesero increased and so did the number of vehicles on the road from Gishyita to Bisesero. Although I cannot remember the exact dates now, from where we were we could see that the area was being bombarded. As a result, Tutsis were coming out of their hiding places in big numbers. I am of the opinion that the French were working closely with the authorities of Gishyita Commune, especially the former burgomaster Sikubwabo, who was leading the massacres in the area. He had probably asked the French to allow him time to exterminate the survivors of Bisesero or at least reduce their number greatly. In any case, it is during those four days that the killings of the Tutsis in Bisesero intensified.

I wonder why the French went around asking people from Gataka, notably teacher Athanase Gafirita, where Bisesero was located. Yet they had with them such equipment as binoculars and helicopters and could easily hear gun shoots and see smoke in the Bisesero forests. Surely, these could not have been ordinary bush fires. The French only pretended that they were not aware of what was happening. They were helped by Gafirita who did everything to misdirect them. It was worrying to see massacres carried out despite the presence of French soldiers. I was horrified to hear that on June 28th, the grandchildren of an old man residing in Kizibaziba were killed. The old man was related to the former burgomaster of Gishyita but he failed to save them. It is at this time that I decided to approach the French and seek the protection of my children whom the militia had vowed to kill from the time their father had been killed.

I decided to ask my brother for advice but he dissuaded me from seeking help from the French, “because”, he said, “the French were assembling all Tutsis so that they may be exterminated before the burial of Habyarimana.” He promised that he was going to try and protect us himself. I did not know from whom my brother had got the information but I did not react. So, I did not heed his advice, instead I decided to write to the French and tell them that if they had really come to save lives, they should come to me and see for themselves my predicament and act accordingly. I gave them details of my identity and my residential address. I also explained to them that I had married a Tutsi and that after his death; I was left with the children.

Before concluding the letter, I indicated to them that there were many other Tutsis in various hiding places who needed to be saved if the French had really come on a humanitarian mission. I asked a Tutsi woman married to one of my relatives to inform me if she saw the French come from Kibuye, at a time when my observation post would be oriented to the direction of Gishyita. Nonetheless, I was the first to see their vehicle coming. I waited for them around the Nyirakarama corner, far from the crowds. When the vehicles approached, I jumped into the middle of the road and they stopped. They pointed their weapons at me and I just gave them my letter without a word. They opened the letter, read it and simply made signs to me to say I should clear the road. I went back to the crowds on the slope facing my brother’s drinking place (cabaret) and people started asking me what I had been saying to the French.

Not long after, the French came back and stopped at the crowds. Four soldiers came looking for me and they asked me to go and show them the children. But because I was afraid of the people around, I asked them to come another day. They refused. I then took them to my brother’s house where the children were hiding. The French were in two groups: one was in military uniform and the other group behaved like journalists. They were taking photographs and filming things that interested them. They even took photographs in my brother’s house when they went to look for my children. They forced their way in without even waiting for me to prepare the children. Before they left, I asked them if they could go and look for my sister-in-law who was in a similar predicament and, luckily, they accepted. On my return from Gataka centre, many Hutu women at Gataka brought me their Tutsi children so that I take them with me. They could not dare come with me but they keenly followed the fate of their children.

Back from my sister-in-law’s house, I realised that my children had been put in another vehicle. It suddenly dawned on me that I many never see them again. Up to our arrival in Bisesero that night, I did not have any news about my children. I was surprised to see survivors that I knew. They included Bernard Kayumba, Eric, Jean Damascene, the Vice-Mayor of Rutsiro, and Jean Baptiste. I also found my children there, but I was shocked that the French always saw the killers and there was hardly any protection to the people in danger. On the contrary the ex-Rwanda Army seemed to be more meticulous in their stop and search. They had erected a roadblock next to our huts built in sorghum stalks. Their weapons were also stocked there, in front of the survivors, a sight they could hardly bear. The weapons would be placed there the whole day and they were only removed in the night. The good relationship between the killers and the French, as well as the stock of weapons in front of the people in danger of extermination was, in my view, psychological torture.”

Agnes Mukabacondo, also alluded to denial of medical care and food, to the extent that two people were murdered when they had ventured out in search of food:

“One day, two men decided to go out to look for food and they were killed by Interahamwe at Mubuga. We could not even reveal this to the French because we did not want them to know that some people were leaving the camp for personal reasons. The French soldiers used to give us a few biscuits and sardines but refused to give us water. This they did, despite the fact they could easily obtain water. They simply lacked the will to do it. The day after I arrived in Bisesero, we were all very cold. Every morning we would all go to look for some water to drink and bathe. I once drank water from a stream only to discover latter that a dead body had decomposed at the source of the stream. In fact, there were corpses everywhere in the bushes and in the streams, some fresh and others decomposed.”

With regard to the involvement of the French on the battlefront, she confirmed the following:

“French soldiers used to come to ask me news about my children and one day they told me that they were going to fight the Inkontanyi. When they came back I noticed that they had wounds all over their body. From that time they developed hostility. They asked the survivors to make a list of those who wanted to remain in “Opération turquoise” zone and those who wanted to go to the Government side. All the survivors chose to go the Inkontanyi. When the French saw this, they decided to stop the food rations they were giving us. Fortunately, my name already appeared on the first list of people who were supposed to go to Rambura where the RPF would take care of us. When I went to bid them farewell, they asked me why I was going to the Inkotanyi side, the people who were killing the Hutus like me. I asked them how that was possible, given that the Government was mixed. The French man with whom I was discussing hurled back furiously that the majority of the people in Government were Tutsis. I then asked them which other country they wanted me to go to. In the end they took us to the RPF-controlled zone in their lorries. When we arrived at Gishyita, we started to meet many Hutu refugees who were coming from Kibuye going to Cyangugu. The survivors started to mock them, saying that it was now their turn to flee. The French did not like this attitude of the survivors of genocide. They therefore decided to hermetically close the canvas cover, to the extent that there was no more air or light entering.”

She concluded her testimony thus: “It is clear that the French soldiers did not come on a humanitarian mission. When the survivors told them of other hiding places where the genocide survivors were holed, they did not bother to go to look for them.”

7. Augustin Nzabahimana

Augustin Nzabahimana is from Karama, Nyamagabe District in the Southern Province. He came across the French soldiers of the “Opération turquoise” many times at a roadblock they had erected in his village – Cyanika – where he still lives today. The Commission heard his testimony behind closed doors on 18th July 2007 as a factual witness.

His testimony is about the murder of three people suspected of being Inkotanyi at the roadblock in his village, and about the training of the militia, as well as the disappearance of other people. He says:

“The French soldiers arrived in our place, Karama, in June 1994. There, a roadblock was erected and anyone who was not known in our area was arrested. The French soldiers worked very closely with Councilor Callixte Munyankindi. They told the militia that it was necessary to put a roadblock in that particular place because that was the only route that the Inkotanyi, who were already in and around Nyanza would eventually take. One day, at this roadblock, three young men coming from Nyanza were killed by militiamen Fishi and Nteziryayo, who were manning the roadblock. The order to kill them was given by Councilor Munyankindi and a French soldier who was always with him. Those three young men were killed simply because they were tall and because they did not have any identity on them. This was enough for the killers to take them for Inkotanyi.”

And he goes on to say:

“I also remember that as soon as the French arrived in Karama, they started to train young men so that they may go to defend the Nyanza area which was about to fall to the Inkotanyi. Also, I will never forget three other people: a young boy and two girls, who had come from Nyanza and who were brought to our village by French soldiers. Their arms and legs were tied as soon as they arrived at about 15hours; they were then put in bags, thrown onto a helicopter and taken to a place no one knew. It was 17h30 when the helicopter flew away and nobody in our village ever knew either their destination or their fate.”

8. A. T.

Mrs A. T. is from Rutsiro District in the Western Province, she is a survivor from Bisesero. Her testimony was heard on 11th July 2007.

It shows the extent to which the survivors from Bisesero were subjected to sexual violence by French soldiers.

“The French did not do anything positive for us. In fact, they had come to help Habyarimana’s army. I first fled to the Gatwaro Stadium; from there I went to Karongi after refugees there were systematically shot dead in an attempt to exterminate us. But we were pursued even there and chased away. In the end I found myself in Bisesero, where we fought a pitch battle with the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and the Interahamwe. The French soldiers had come to fight Inkotanyi. When they realized that this was going to be an uphill battle given that Inkotanyi had liberated a big part of the country, they started saving a few people from Bisesero so that they have something positive to show for at the end of their mission. When they arrived we shunned them and ran away from them. We took them for our enemies and we did not expect protection from them. In fact, we though that they had come to kill us.

It is during this period that girls and women were used as sexual slaves by the French soldiers. Instead of helping us, they were abusing us. In fact, their behaviour was in no way different from that of Interahamwe. They were raping girls and older women and they could not give us anything without forcing us to sleep with them. Neither did they attempt to be discreet. They led us to their tents openly and publicly. We even had to sleep with them in order to get a biscuit from them. We did not have a choice: we did not have anything to eat, we did not have anywhere to go, and we were not even sure that we were going to survive for much longer. The first time they raped us they gave us water in exchange. Five of us went through that sexual slavery: one whose name is E. and three others whose names I do not remember. We were even forced to wash their clothes. We were exactly like their domestic workers and they took turns to rape us exactly as did Interahamwe.”

9. Balis Walter (Colonel)

Balis Walter is a retired colonel from the Belgian Army. He retired in 1997. He was one of the Belgian soldiers in UNAMIR. The Commission heard his testimony in public on 23rd April 2007.

In his testimony he explains why, as early as the first week of his mission, he knew that UNAMIR’s mission was not going to be easy. He mentions the training of Interahamwe by the French soldiers and the presence of the DAMI French soldiers in Rwanda after December 1993. He also describes the prevailing conditions of the RPF soldiers who were stationed at CND from 6th April 1994 after the crash of the plane that was carrying the President, up to 11th April. He closes his testimony with a personal analysis of who was responsible for the crash of the plane and the reasons why the French intervened in Rwanda.

“I was sent to Rwanda on short notice. I was going to replace a Belgian officer who, for some reason was no longer going to be part of the mission. This is to say that before coming here, I knew nothing. I was thrown into the deep-end and I had to swim or sink. What I was told before leaving was that I was going on an easy mission because the peace accord existed. What was necessary was to help the Rwandan people in its application. So I came here with a lot of optimism. But already the second morning, I heard someone that I did not know say on the national radio that “We did not want the Arusha accord; it was imposed on us, and we will never accept it.” I then had the impression that this was some bizarre person, who did not know what he was saying. I later on got to know that in fact this was the Chairman of MRND, a certain Mathieu, whose family name I can’t remember. This was a sure sign that things were not going to be that easy.

Then came another sign: I once found a communiqué on my desk from the newspaper “Le Flambeau” whose editor-in-chief was announcing loud and clear the final solution for all those who were opposed to the government, and complained that Minister Gatabazi alone was not going to stop the work of the extremists. The third sign was that a few weeks later, Gatabazi was assassinated. From this it was clear that the UNAMIR mission was not going to be easy at all.

Also there were declarations by a certain Jean Pierre who I did not meet personally. He communicated with our intelligence officer, Capt Claes. This was not a good omen either. All I know is that the intelligence information collected led Gen Dallaire to send the famous fax requesting for more soldiers and a change in the mission’s mandate. As we know, the response he received was negative, and he was not able to do anything. But there were also other small incidents. One day I wanted to go to the airport. On our way we were stopped at a kind of roadblock which had been erected with big homemade mud bricks. On the side was a dead drunk man. We came out of our jeeps and we asked him what he was doing there. He replied “I am going to kill all the Tutsis.” He was clearly very drunk and he was not totally aware of what he was saying. Nonetheless his response brought to light the idea that was widespread amongst many people.

Similarly, at an end of the year reception organized by a Tutsi family, a Hutu neighbour came. Someone whispered to me that the man was dangerous. “He always tells us that they will come and kill us all”. Yet another sign! And I have to acknowledge that at the end of a few more weeks I was convinced that the UNAMIR mission was going to be very difficult to accomplish. In fact, General Dallaire kept telling the UN all these difficulties but they paid no attention and they did not change UNAMIR’s mandate or increase the number of the soldiers as requested. And in the meantime we learnt that weapons were being distributed, and when General Dallaire suggested that he go to look for those weapons, he was refused permission to do that.

We also knew that there were death squads and that the presidential guards were implicated in that. We also knew that both the Interahamwe and the death squads were under the command of a certain Bagosora, at the Ministry of Defense. On my arrival, a few days after the others, there were lots of rumours. I took time to learn a few things and one the things I learnt was that Col Bagosora, number two in the Ministry of Defense, was in charge of the Presidential guards and the Interahamwe. Of course, he was not stupid; he did not do that openly. Confirmation of that came when General Dallaire said that things were going to be all right because Col Bagosora was now in power. People laughed at him and said “You must be joking. The death squads are under his command.” That said, I still never saw him openly giving instructions to the Interahamwe or other killers. Everyone knew though that both the Interahamwe and the death squads were under his command. Then we learnt about the Akazu and again everyone said “Don’t be mistaken, they will never surrender power to anyone else”.

We had quickly understood that our rules of engagement were absolutely inadequate. As a soldier that has served in that capacity my entire career, I could not understand how a military unit, of whatever origin, sent to carry out a mission, could fail to be in control of the situation it found. If they tell you to go to that church because there are refugees, you should go and be in control of the situation and the rules of engagement should allow you to protect the people you find there. In fact, I was forced to rewrite the rules on the 11th or 12th of April because General Dallaire had come to the conclusion that we could not continue to operate as we were, i.e just watch what was unfolding in Kigali and the whole country. I am convinced that General Dallaire was concerned and he kept informing New York, but in vain.”

With regard to the training of the Interahamwe, this is what he said:

“We also knew that there was a big number of Interahamwe and their numbers increased all the time. There were several training sites where the French would train them in combat tactics. We knew that the national bus company, I can’t remember the name, transported them to their training sites. One of these sites that we discovered from inside information was to the north of the airport of Kigali. There is a flat area suitable for the training in basic tactics and of a size big enough for a company of infantry. We decided to monitor the activities in that area but as soon as the Belgian soldiers were seen there, we never saw anything else there. I was never there in person, but I understand that some kind of semi-military training was held there: how to use machetes, elementary tactics, motivation etc. This is of course only hear-say because no member of UNAMIR ever saw a training session of the Interahamwe.”

As for the presence of members of DAMI after their official departure, this is what he says:

“We noticed that some French soldiers, who were supposed to have left the country around mid-December, if I remember well, were still there and continued their work but disguised themselves as civilians. We saw them here and there and we assumed that they were doing what they used to do, this time dressed as civilians. Of course we never caught them red handed as they say. In any case they were in Kigali and so they probably went on with their business. It certainly was dubious, if not, it was bizarre. Information about their activities came from our intelligence cell i.e. from Capt Claes and from a Senegalese captain by the name of Dembe, if I remember well. Both were responsible for collecting information and at daily briefings, they always said that they had seen DAMI soldiers in Kigali. This made Gen Dallaire mad. “What are all those beasts still doing here?” he would say. Clearly he was not amused at all. We once saw one of them at Meriden Hotel but we were not in a position to do anything. Knowing General Dallaire’s systematic way of working, I was sure that he was reporting this to Koffi Anan in his daily briefings without any reaction. They never said, “Arrest them and ask them what they are doing in Kigali.” What this meant was that we could see everything, hear everything, but do nothing. That was the nature of the UNAMIR mission.”

He also says something about the events of 6th April:

I was comfortably seated at a table at Hotel Méridien, when we heard a huge explosion at twenty two minutes past eight, and this time I am certain. We were accustomed to small daily explosions. This one was strong and it made me jump out of my skin. Those of us who were at the Méridien Hotel, thought that it was an explosion of the ammunitions depot at the airport. Later on, I tried to go to the airport to collect colleagues who were supposed to arrive from their leave at quarter to nine or nine o’clock. When I reached the Méridien roundabout, I was stopped by members of the Presidential guard who were clearly agitated. Fortunately, I had removed my military uniform. I was dressed in civilian clothes and not in a uniform that would have shown that I was a Belgian soldier. I pretended that I did not understand what they were saying. There is no doubt that if I had been in a Belgian military uniform that evening, I would not be alive today.

In the meantime, I heard the 730 plane going back and I decided to back to the Hotel. I was not sure what to do next. Rumours about the crash of the presidential plane started going around. By instinct, I put on the military uniform this time and decided to go to find out what was happening. I started with the CND building which housed the RPF contingent. I wanted to see the reaction of the RPF soldiers to these rumours. I first went to introduce myself to the authorities. I told them that I was Lft. Col. Balis from UNAMIR and requested to stay with them at the CND building for a while. About 11 o’clock in the evening, General Dallaire called me. He wanted to know where I was. “I am at the CND building”, I told him. He said, “Excellent idea”, adding that I should stay there and serve as liaison should there be the need to exchange messages. He added that I should not allow the RPF soldiers to go out of the CND building.

The night of 6th to 7th was quiet. I had not received any messages to relay to the military authorities. Then came the 7th of April. At about 13h00, we got the news that the Belgian para commandos had been murdered. It was first thought that 13 had been killed and then we learnt that it was 10.

It was obviously a shock to us but it was not surprising, given that RTLM was shouting loud and clear that the Belgians should be killed. In fact the death of the Belgian soldiers was part of a strategy. I have always said that their murder was not carried out by soldiers who were enraged that their president had been killed. That may have been the case with the people who did the actual killing, but certainly not those who disarmed them and took them to “Camp Kigali”. As far as I am concerned, it was premeditated murder. The killers knew that the cold-blooded murder of the Belgians would induce the Belgian government to withdraw its troops. Then, assuming that the FAR won the war, there would no longer be any military presence of the Belgians in Rwanda. And I think that was the ultimate goal of the extremist Hutus, in addition to the aim of committing genocide.

On 7th at about 13h00 the message about the death of the Belgians came but the atmosphere remained calm until about 4 o’clock. I had first given the following instructions to the liaison officer, Kamanzi: “General Dallaire would not like you to go out of the CND building”. I repeated the same message to the commandant of the battalion, Kayonga. As I was in the process of saying the same to Jacques Bihozagara, he laughed at me and then I turned and saw about one hundred and twenty men ready with weapons and ammunitions just as they were about to go out of the CND building. It is then that Bihozagara said to me: “I hope Colonel that you are not going to try to block their way with your jeep, because that will not help matters”. I said to him: “I have done my duty. I reiterate that General Dallaire would not like you to go out of the CND building”. And that was the end of the story.

So, they went out. It was surprising nonetheless because there were shots coming from all directions. I wondered why they had not done it before given that the CND building was like a trap. The soldiers that came out naturally took on strategic positions and controlled the access roads and now had space enough to keep an eye on the presidential guard who they did not trust at all. They occupied the perimeter that covered the areas from Hotel Méridien to the roundabout, and the King Faycal Hospital up to the Amahoro stadium. This they covered at about 16h00 and installed observation posts. These were not combat positions, but rather positions that enabled them to control the area and be in a position to react quickly, should that prove to be necessary.

All this time there were no signs on the radio that I kept on all the time, or any reports from the Ghanaian battalion or from the military observers based in Uganda of any major troop movements. Around the night of 7th to 8th, at about 2 o’clock in the morning, General Dallaire rang me. He gave me a message to send to General Kagame. In summary the message said: “”I hope that order will be maintained; please do not attempt anything in the meantime”. I sent it to Seth Sendashonga through the transmission centre. Just about an hour later I received a response from General Kagame. And this is what he said: “I promise you that I will not do anything without informing you first. For now, however, my immediate concern is to send another battalion to Kigali”.

That battalion must be the one I saw arriving at the CND building the night of 8th to 9th. It was dark when they arrived; I was therefore not able to count them. They were a significant number all the same. They only stayed at the CND building for a few hours. When I asked what they were going to do, no one was willing to tell me. I guess they went to Kigali in order to save the few that they could still save, according to Colette Braeckman.

[…] Battles were raging all the time. Another detail: in the morning of 9th if I remember well, the 9th or 10th, I went to the Hotel to change and put on something clean. On arrival I discovered that one set of my uniforms (boots, trousers, shirt and vest) had gone! At the time I said to myself that that was not surprising, given that we were in the middle of a war. I did not think about it again until 1995 when I got a telephone call from a certain Venuste Nshimiyimana, who was UNAMIR’s press attaché. We talked for a while and then he said: “Be careful, Colonel. There are people among the extremist Hutus who believe that it is you who brought down the presidential plane”. That is all he told me. I immediately replied: “You must be joking! I was at Méridien Hotel having my dinner. How could I bring down the plane? That must be madness!”

As I have just said, because I was having dinner at my hotel, and because I could not be in two places at the same time, I took that for a joke and never thought about it again. It is only a long time later that I remembered that some other Belgian soldiers had lost their military uniforms, that I remembered what a witness had seen in Masaka. That was it! The place from which the missiles were launched! Some soldiers were seen there dressed in Belgian army uniforms but with French caps. And, because it is impossible to read the name of the bearer of a uniform in the dark unless a torch is used at 50 cm, I was convinced that the man who was wearing my uniform must have been known. I was convinced that my uniform had been given to him at least two days before and he must have been close to those who wanted to shoot down the plane. You can be sure that it was not me. I remained at the CND building for a while, gun shots coming from all directions until Monday, April 11th.”

10. Be M.

Mrs. Be M.’s testimony was received on 28th August 2007. In it she describes how her house was taken over by the French soldiers and how she was subjected to rape and sexual abuse by these French soldiers.

“[…] our property had been taken over by soldiers of the Republican Guard. They pretended that my husband was an accomplice of the Inkotanyi and that he had had correspondence with them. For that reason he had been arrested, tortured and imprisoned. When he was released he was killed in an ambush. Two days after his death French soldiers came and pitched camp in our garden. They occupied the principle house and the one attached to it. In those two houses they stored their ammunitions and food. They also put cartridges, boots, combat helmets in the smaller house. They used one room in the principle house as a store of their food and they put their tents in the compound. Some of these soldiers slept in tents, others in the main house, while others were on guard or on patrol. They made a big bed that some shared but their head took over my room and forced me to share the bed with him.

When they first arrived my children were frightened and they scattered. Some ran to Gisozi, some others went to Kacyiru and others to Nyamirambo. I had six goats and about a hundred chickens. I had also grown tomatoes and cabbages. The French took everything; there was nothing left when they eventually went away. We also had fish ponds. They would go fishing and use our forest for firewood. I was petrified; so much so that I was not able to retain any of their names. My son G. C. Mu did not want to leave me alone. He always asked me if there was anything he could do but I advised him to simply leave the place and he eventually went. He is still alive today. If he had stayed they would not have raped me in his presence. They would have killed him first.”

She also told us the circumstances in which she was raped:

“On Sunday, the day they arrived, the French soldiers put their weapons in our compound. They then started raping young girls and women who were going to church. Because they were living with me, we used to go shopping together. I would then cook food for them. We even used to buy beer. They were many, and among them were blacks. One of them took me for his wife without my consent. He did everything he wanted with me; he used to rape me as he pleased. Sometimes he would penetrate me, some other times he would force his penis in my mouth or anus. I had no choice; whenever I tried to refuse he would threaten me with death. And he was not the only one to rape me. Whoever came first went ahead and the others ensured that I would not escape. All those who raped me were whites. Whoever wanted slept with me. They did a lot of harm to me; I will never forget. Can you imagine a man’s penis in the mouth? It was the first time I was subjected to such a thing and I still shudder when I think of it. You have not helped me by letting me go through the ordeal. They tortured me and only doctors can tell you the ordeal I went through.

I was not the only one who was raped by French soldiers. Many other women were raped but they are dead now. I remember the case of Muka who was my neighbour. She too had become like their wife. Sometimes the French soldiers would also send an Interahamwe by the name of Muriro to look for young girls for them. He would bring them by force. This man was a renowned Interahamwe and he killed many people. He is now in prison.

Before having sex with me in the evenings, these French soldiers would take tablets which changed them completely. They would be energetic and would not ejaculate, as if they had taken drugs. At some stage, I contracted a disease from them. They gave medicine to take and when I took it I nearly lost my sight. I only recovered from the effects of this medicine a long time after. I had to be treated for the effects of this medicine and the multiple rapes. My mother also treated me with warm water and I eventually managed to recover.

They were many and they went on patrol the whole night. Only a few stayed behind to guard the weapons that they had installed in our compound and to guard their leader. They stayed there for a long time.”




11. B. M.

Mrs. B. M. is from Nyaruguru District. She was heard by the Commission on 13th December 2006 and on 27th September 2007. Her testimony revolves around the roadblock manned by the French soldiers at Giticyinyoni in 1993. Because she also had personal contact with the French during the “Opération turquoise” in August 1994, she also accuses them of failing to come to the rescue of people in serious danger.

This is what she says:

“At the roadblock at Giticyinyoni, the French soldiers checked identities of people who were passing there. They would separate the Tutsis from the Hutus. On the basis of some information supplied by their Rwandan counterparts, they maltreated the Tutsis seriously.”

With regard to her personal contact with the French, this is what she reports:

“When the genocide started, I entrusted my children to Hutu friends. At the end of June, beginning of July 1994, a neighbour told me that he had seen my children in the camp for internally displaced people at Kibeho. So, I went to look for them. This was in the Turquoise zone, controlled by the French, after the liberation of Kigali and other areas by the RPF. The RPF soldiers actually tried to dissuade me from going, given the level of insecurity that still characterized the Turquoise zone. I insisted and went. On my arrival I was immediately threatened by the Interahamwe who recognized me. When I reached Gikongoro, many militia came to me and started asking me questions, wanting to know who I was. A woman, who was my former neighbour also recognized me and went to inform the French soldiers who were drinking in a nearby bar. Two of them came and put me in one of their jeeps. They took me to their quarters at SOS (Save our Souls).”

Ms B. M. then narrates how she was raped in the presence of a French soldier:

“They took me to a tent and I was forced to lie down. In the night a Rwandan came to my bed and started asking me questions regarding my presence there. Then he started removing his clothes as though he was going to sleep with me. I quickly rose and ran to the French soldier who was guarding the area. I told him what I had just experienced. He kicked me hard with his leg and I fell on by back. The Rwandan then dragged me to the tent. He insulted me and called me all kinds of names. He then said that he was going to rape me and then kill me. I could not do anything to defend myself. He undressed me and raped me. The French soldier was there watching and laughing. He later on went away.

I woke up quietly in the middle of the night and left the man sleeping. I went to the spot where the French soldier had been posted. He was no longer there. I then went down close to where there was a water tap which was about 50 meters from where they had put me. There I saw another French soldier who wanted to know what I was doing there. I told him that I had come to drink water. I then washed my hands and started drinking water. Then I decided I was going to stay there until the next morning. I did not care if they killed me there. During the night I heard cries of another woman called E who was in another tent. She told me the next day that she had been subjected to rape by French soldiers. The next day the French soldiers took me first to Kibeho where my children were, and then they took me to Mwogo, where they handed me to the Inkotanyi, saying that they had brought them other Tutsis.”

Ms B. M. concludes thus: “Today what I find most disturbing is how a person can be raped in the presence of another one watching, and we are not in a position to have them prosecuted.”

12. Bernard Kayumba

Bernard Kayumba is is a student survivor from Bisesero, who was on holiday at the time of the genocide. He is originally from Kagabiro, in the former Commune of Gitesi, in the Western Province. He still lives there today. He is currently the Mayor of Karongi. The Commission got his testimony on 5th January 2006. It is about the presence of the French soldiers in the area, failure to assist survivors who had taken refuge there, and about the French’s participation on the battle front and on roadblocks.

“French soldiers arrived first on 27th June 1994, and then they came back on 30th June 1994. They came in military trucks. When we first saw them, we thought they had come to our rescue. But their attitude towards us was hostile. We had left our hiding places and went to them thinking that they would help, only to be told that they could not do anything for us because they were few and they did not have the necessary equipment. In my view, that was just a pretext because they were many and they even had heavy weapons. They went back to Kibuye and said that they would return in three days. In fact, their departure signaled that the killers, who were lurching in the neighboring hills, could go ahead and kill us. The fact that Twagirayezu, who was the leader of the militia, had come with the French was a sign of what was to follow if the French did not protect us.

As I could speak French, I beseeched them. I asked them to either help us or kill us themselves. They just left and insisted that nothing was going to happen to us.

Contrary to what they were saying, before their return, there were many massacres of the Tutsis carried out by the Interahamwe, the gendarmes, and civilians. When they came back on the 30th, they grouped us and took away our knives which we were using to protect ourselves but allowed the militia and the Rwandan soldiers to keep their weapons. We found this most worrying. They paved a way for them to go to Nyungwe Forest where they could go to regroup. This was an indication that the French were supporting the genocidal government.

When we rebelled and complained, they disarmed the militia and the Rwandan soldiers but distributed the same weapons to the Kibuye gendarmes, who were part of the killing machinery. Another sign that the French were giving support to the militia is that when we decided that we wanted to go to the area controlled by the RPF, they got angry and decided to stop giving us food despite the fact that there was plenty. Besides they transported survivors to the RPF zone in bad conditions. The trucks were hermetically sealed so much so that some people suffocated. The French were also angry that one of their colleagues had been wounded in one of the battles with the RPF in the Gikongoro area.

In my view, the French supported the genocidaire government. It was them that intervened first when the RPF attacked the very first time in 1990. They took part in battles with the RPF, they carried out patrols in town and manned roadblocks at all access roads to Kigali. One such roadblock was near Ruliba brickyard. They also trained the Interahamwe and helped the militia in the massacres of the Tutsis, they entrenched ethnic discrimination, and protected the militia in the Turquoise zone. They also helped in the looting of property and enabled the militia to flee the country.”

13. Bernard Munyaneza

Bernard Munyaneza is a former member of the Rwanda Armed Forces (FAR) and the Rwanda Patriotic Forces (RPA). He joined the forces in 1992 and underwent military training at the Training Centre of Gako. He served in the Rwanda Armed Forces from July 1992 to July 1994, and with the Rwanda Patriotic Forces (RPA) from 1994 to 2002, when he was demobilized. Today he is a trader at Huye market. The Commission heard his testimony behind closed doors on 4th May 2007.

His testimony is about the role of the French soldiers in the training of Interahamwe, their participation on the battle front, on barricades, rapes and massacres. This is what he says:

“As part of our training at Gako, we went to Kibugabuga site for the baptism of fire. At about a hundred meters from there, we could see tents and other trainees as well as jeeps with French soldiers moving around. In the evening, a cousin of mine by the name of Stanislas Nkurunziza, who was quartered at Gako barracks, came to visit me. I asked him what the French were doing at Kibugabuga. He told me that they were training Interahamwe and added that those were just a small group; the others were trained at Gabiro. A few days later massacres of the Tutsis on a big scale took place in Kanzenze Commune. These massacres were unleashed by the same Interahamwe who had been on training in Kibugabuga and then the work was left to the Hutu population to complete. This was well known to the French soldiers.

Bernard Munyaneza goes to say: “After my training at Gako, I was deployed with the 61st Battalion in Miyove. During one of our offensive attacks on 8th February 1993, we were pushed back by the Inkotanyi. We retreated to Rushashi where we found French soldiers with cannons 105, shelling Nyamugabe and Cyumba hills which had been taken over by the RPF. We stayed there for two days. We then left Rushashi and went to take positions at Kirenge in Shyorongi Commune. Our battalion occupied the left side of the Ruhengeri - Kigali road and we erected a roadblock at the junction with the road that leads to Muhondo and Tare. As for the French, they occupied and placed their heavy weapons on the right side of the road in a quarry. From there they shelled the Ecole Technique de Tumba and the neighbouring areas. Because of the noise of cannon fire and other explosions, the people from Mbogo panicked and fled to our side and continued on to Muhondo.

Because the people were coming to us in big numbers, the French soldiers came to help us check people at the roadblock. Here they committed many atrocities. I remember the case of one girl who was arrested and then raped by these French soldiers. She had a brother called Habyarimana (with a nickname of Kinani because he had the same name as the President) who was a sergeant in our battalion. When he got to know that his sister had been raped he was very angry. To show his anger, he started shooting in the air, which cost him a few days in a prison cell. The French soldiers, who had committed such a terrible crime, however were never worried. They were very vicious people and they were capable of doing anything. The girl eventually died in a camp of internally displaced people because the wounds from the rape were never properly treated. When the brother got to know of her death he shot himself in the head and died.”

Munyaneza also reports the follwing:

“I later on contracted malaria and I was sent to Kanombe Hospital where I was admitted. When we reached the top of Kanyinya in Shyorongi Commune, our vehicle was stopped on the roadblock controlled by French soldiers and Rwandan gendarmes. The person in charge of that roadblock was a French sergeant. Although the stretcher bearer tried to convince the French that I was a FAR soldier and that I was going for medical treatment, we spent 30 minutes there. Because I look like a Tutsi, the French took me to be an RPF soldier and had decided that they would not allow an enemy to go for medical treatment. A Rwandan gendarme by the name of Munyaneza Gaspard who was with the French and who knew me very well is the one who convinced them that I was really a soldier with the FAR and they eventually let me go.

The last time I saw French soldiers was at Sovu near the confectioner’s of Gisovu (CONFIGI) on the road Butare – Gikongoro as I was fleeing the war with the people of Butare. I had been shot in the leg in the battle for Kigali and I was, therefore, walking on crutches. The French soldiers and Interahamwe manned a roadblock near CONFIGI and were checking identity cards. Not a single Tutsi could survive there. As soon as he/she was discovered, he/she would be given to the Interahamwe to be killed immediately. The bodies would then be thrown into the marshland near the road. The French only left the place when the Inkotanyi shot at them. They then moved further and set up another roadblock at Kizi in Maraba Commune. We then continued towards Gikongoro. There I was arrested and but later managed to come back and join the RPF.”

14. Bernard Surwumwe

Bernard Surwumwe is an ex-corporal of the FAR. In July 1994 he fled to DRC but returned to Rwanda in 1997. When he returned, he joined the RPA. The Commission heard his testimony behind closed doors as a factual witness on 1st August 2007. His testimony is about the training of the militia by the French soldiers, their support to the FAR on the battle front and also about military training in the DRC with the support of the French.

Here is his story:

“In February 1994 I was based at Muhoza camp in Ruhengeri. While there, I heard that the French soldiers were training the militia at Nyakinama and at Bigogwe. They were teaching them how to fight without weapons and how to use firearms.”

With regard to the help given to the FAR in military operations, this is what he says:

“I was present when the French were fighting alongside the FAR at the time when the RPR were trying to capture Ruhengeri. We had fled to Gisenyi and when we reached the top of Mukamira, General Bizimungu encouraged us to stay put and resist because the French soldiers had already arrived and they were going to help us. In actual fact the French were indeed there and they had placed their heavy weaponry on the hills of Bigogwe from where they were shelling the positions of the RPF who were pursuing us. This indeed slowed down the advance of the RPF, which enabled us to free ourselves and go towards Kibuye and then Cyangugu where our leaders thought we would be able to regroup and resist.

All along the way, it was the French who were protecting us. They had installed roadblocks on a number of sites such as Gishyita and Ntendezi. When we arrived in Cyangugu, we stayed in the buildings belonging to the “Mouvement pour le Rassemblement National et de Development”, the President’s political party. The French even helped to transport our weapons as we crossed to Bukavu. They took the weapons to Mpanzi military camp where General Bizimungu joined us by helicopter with Prime Minister Kambanda and two French people.

After the defeat of the ex-FAR I fled to the DRC with other solders. We settled in Mugunga Camp. The French soldiers continued to train us together with some civilians for a period of two weeks. The training used to take place in the evenings, close to the Lake by the headquarters. This is the time that some of us were sent to infiltration missions in Rwanda. They also gave us M6 guns and ammunition for our own guns. The M6 guns were small they could be folded, which made it easy to carry during our infiltration. Our leader in Mugunga Camp was General Bizimungu and the one in charge of security was Colonel Marcel Bivugabagabo. I had been given the mission to infiltrate the areas around Mukura, Ramba, and Kivu. But the Inkotanyi destroyed our route which was through Iwawa. It subsequently became impossible to cross the border. In any case shortly after, the refugee camps were destroyed and I came back to Rwanda with other refugees.”

15. Callixte Gashirabake

Callixte Gashirabake is originally from Sanza Murundi Sector, Karongi District, in the Western Province. He saw French soldiers of the “Operation Turquoise” arrive in the former Kavumu Commune. He is in Mpanga prison today for his crimes in genocide. His testimony was given in public as a factual witness on 8th December 2006.

His testimony concerns assassination cases, activities at the barricades and the disappearance of some people. This is what he says:

“I saw French soldiers at Kavumu in June 1994. They were there as part of “Operation Turquoise”. With the help of some FAR soldiers and some members of the police, they erected a roadblock near the Commune. They then organized a meeting with people who had been displaced from Isanza and told them that they had come to protect them and if necessary secure them safe passage to exile, otherwise they were in danger of being killed by the Inkotanyi. At the roadblock, they checked identities very rigorously. They were anxious that no Inkotanyi should infiltrate and join the displaced people. Even I was arrested when I tried to pass there without my identity papers. I would have been killed if it hadn’t been for the Commune Counselor, Ndaryemera, who intervened. It is exactly at this roadblock that a woman by the name of Beatrice, nicknamed Nyamunini and clerk of the court, was killed with her husband. She was singled out from the crowd, taken to the bushed nearby and killed. The French saw all that but they did nothing to stop it. She was suspected of being an accomplice of the Inkotanyi.

The French soldiers always advised the Rwandan soldiers to be rigorous in their checking so that not a single Inkotanyi should escape. That is why everybody that passed there had to show their identity papers. When a certain Nyamanswa tried to pass there, they asked him to show his papers and they found that he was a Tutsi. Even the crowd who knew him confirmed that. They said that he had been absent from the area for a long time. This was an indication that he had gone to join the Inkotanyi. We never saw that man again.

Later, on our search for Inkotanyi, we came across another roadblock manned by French and Rwandan soldiers. They arrested four people from our group and told the rest of us to continue on our way. We never got to know their fate. We spent a month there. The French were telling us that they would go to Zaire to prepare for our refuge and that they would come back to take us. In the end we were taken to Nyarushishi camp and then on to Zaire. On the Ntendezi bridge, the Interahamwe arrested a young man thought to be Inkotanyi and killed him there. When they asked him for papers, he simply said to them: “I don’t want you to aks many questions; I am a Tutsi!” he was immediately stabbed to death. The French were seated on the bridge watching all that but they did not react.”

16. Cassien Bagaruka

Bagaruka Cassien is a former fireman who worked at Kanombe airport from 1986, and continued to work as fireman during the genocide, but this time at Kamembe airport. He now lives in Kicukiro District, in Kigali City. The Commission obtained his testimony as part of their research on 23rd and 13th July 2007. It is about the presence of French soldiers in Cyangugu during the genocide, the training they gave to the ex-FAR, their participation on the battle front and failure to come to the rescue of people in danger during the “Operation Turquoise”.

“French soldiers guarded Kanombe airport from 1990 where they also gave “Gazelle” helicopter flying lessons. When they were not in the air, these helicopters were parked in the shelter that used to house the “Caravelle” plane which had been moved near the old control tower. Their antiaircraft and other weapons, which they alone used until 1994, were kept in the terminal building. Also, the French soldiers used the Gazelle planes to remove the Inkotanyi from Umutara. They also used mortars placed at Shyorongi to dislodge them from Tumba. The mortars had been brought by the French in the context of their war support and participation.

During the “Operation Turquoise”, the French soldiers arrived in Cyangugu on 22nd June 1994. They were warmly welcomed by the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR who were singing and waving the French flag. They were happy that these French soldiers were going to help them to defeat the Inyenzi. At Kamember airport, they installed a radio transmitter under the control of Corporal Thierry and Sergeant Galant Olivier. Other items were also stored there. These included vehicles which had come by helicopter or “Transall” planes of the type Hercule 730. Soon after, the French soldiers attended a meeting organized by the local authorities, including Colonel Kabiligi, Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho, Tharcisse Muvunyi, and Sylvère Ahorugeze.

After all this, helicopters started to carry the Interahamwe in the morning and bring them back in the evening. In actual fact, the French soldiers worked very closely with the Interahamwe. I saw French soldiers bringing Tutsis tied onto the airfield and then carry them by helicopter and drop them in Lake Kivu. These Tutsis would generally come from Bisesero or Ntendezi, and they would have been given to them by the Interahamwe. Similarly, one of the firemen by the name of Gratien, was chased by the killers and he ran to the French military camp at Kamembe for help. He was pursued and killed in the eyes of the French soldiers and they did not protect him, which they could have done. In my view, the French had come to protect the genocidaires and help them to cross to Zaire, which they controlled.

We can connect all these cases to another massacre at Nyarushishi camp where Tutsis had taken refuge. The French soldiers, who were meant to protect them, separated them instead and handed them over to the Interahamwe. It is safe to assume that they handed them over to have them killed; they had nowhere else to go.

At the end of “Operation Turquoise”, the French soldiers summoned a meeting before their departure from the “Turquoise” zone. The French soldiers and the local authorities asked all the people to flee and they even put helicopters at the disposal of those authorities. It is in this regard that they airlifted authorities’ cars, including that of Eliezer Niyitegeka, former Minister of Information in the interim government and that of Colonel Kanyamanza. When a certain Bihembe, former commandant of Kamembe airport asked what would happen to the people who wanted to join the new Government in Kigali, he was regarded as an RPF accomplice. Fortunately, he managed to escape in good time.

The French soldiers were also involved in looting. First, they had employed all the firemen were paying them twenty dollars a month, a salary they did not pay us because they said we were no longer employed. But also they had become traffickers. They crossed the Rusizi with Rwandan cars bearing Rwandan number plates. They also took the Daihatsu pickup that belonged to the Airport Management, as well as their generator. They were unable to take the fire extinguishers because I had tampered with their starter systems. Besides, when the administration buildings of Cyangugu Prefecture caught fire and the firemen went to extinguish the fire, the French soldiers stopped them, saying that the firemen were only wasting water and yet they were burning other things.”

17. Charles Bigirimfura

Charles Bigirimfura is a former soldier in the FAR and he served with the para commando battalion from 1992 to 1994. He worked closely with the French instructors in his unit and generally witnessed many of the actions of the French soldiers. He was demobilized and he is now involved in agribusiness and animal husbandry. The Commission first heard him in Butare on the 3rd of October 2006, and then in an open session as a factual witness on the 12th of December 2006.

His testimony is about the roadblocks manned by the French and their involvement in the stop and search actions, torture and assassinations of the “Ibyitso” in the military camps, the training given to the militia and civilians in Bigogwe Camp, as well as dropping people from helicopter in Nyungwe forest.

“I joined the Rwandan army in 1981 in the CI Bugesera. In 1982 I went for training at the Bigogwe Camp where I obtained a commando’s certificate. Thereafter I was deployed to the Para commando battalion at Kanombe Camp. In July 1993, I went for another training course at ESO Butare and came back to the Para commando battalion at Kanombe in February 1994. I stayed with the French soldiers before 1990. They had a department that trained us in parachute jumping up to 1990. Between November and December 1990, the French played a big role in the stop and search of the “Ibyitso”. They put up barricades at Kanombe airport and they went with the ex-FAR on patrol. When they arrested the Tutsis, they took them to the Nyamirambo regional stadium and to prisons. The French soldiers would picked out girls from the people arrested and take them to the airport where they stayed. But because we were their subordinates, we were not allowed to get close to the French. I am, therefore, not in a position to say exactly what they did with those girls.

The French soldiers controlled identity papers with the ex-FAR on the roadblock of Karuruma and that of Shyorongi. They determined who was a Tutsi with the help of an instrument they used to measure the nose of a Tutsi and that of a Hutu. I saw them doing this at the roadblocks. We passed there on our way to the battle front in Ruhengeri. The Rwandan and French soldiers suspected that all Tutsi provided information to the RPF or made money contributions to them. Between 1991 and 1993, the French carried out major stop and search missions. As a result, many Tutsis were arrested and then killed. They were then damped in a mass grave within the perimeters of Kanombe military camp.

I remember a Rwandan captain by the name of Karanganwa from Runyinya who had been unjustly sacked from the army. He was arrested on a roadblock near the airport and was later killed at the Kanombe military camp by the French soldiers with the help of a Rwandan warrant officer nicknamed Gasutamo. I also know the case of a certain Munyakayanza who was arrested from his home in the neighbourhood of Kanombe. He was brought to our military camp and he was killed by the Rwandan Para commandos in the presence of the French who did nothing to stop them. He was buried in the same forest. There many cases like that. I cannot remember them all.

In 1991, the French created platoons within the Rwandan army called CRAP, the DAMI and the “Commando de Chasse”. These groups worked with the death squads in the assassination of the Tutsis and moderate Hutus. They also trained the Interahamwe at the Bigogwe Camp and at Gabiro. I saw myself civilians being trained at the Bigogwe Camp by the French who lived at Mukamira Camp. In December 1993, some of the French soldiers went home, sad that it was because of the Tutsis that they were obliged to go back, ye they had come to help the Hutus. For them, all the soldiers of the Habyarimana regime were Hutus. And they said that the shortest among them were the Twas. In many ways they were racists. Of course not all French soldiers went back. Those who were in charge of the Para commando centre stayed behind. They were considered technicians, within the context of military cooperation between the two countries.

In April 1994, President Habyarimana’s plane was downed. At the time we were at Kanombe Camp, watching a football match. Suddenly, we saw that the whole sky had turned red. We went out to see what had happened. Captain De Saint Quentin, nicknamed Serukweto Etienne, Colonel Baransaritse, Major Ntabakuze and Major Nubaha went to the crash site. Major Ntabakuze came back crying and saying that Habyarimana had died and that, therefore, every Tutsi must die. Immediately the platoons that had been created together with the death squads started killing people. This had been their occupation anyway. I later learnt that De Saint Quentin had gone to Goma with the other soldiers of the “Operation Turquoise”.

When Kigali was taken, I decided to go to Kibuye, Gikongoro and Cyangugu. This was still during the “Operation Turquoise”. In Gikongoro, French soldiers with the help of Captain Sebuhura tied refugees and then placed them in two helicopters, one a Gazelle and the other Puma. They took them up to Nyungwe Forest and dropped them when they reached a place called Uwasenkoko. I saw them because I was in a car which was taking me to Cyangugu. Even while I was still in Gikongoro, I had seen French soldiers and Major Sebuhura tie people and take them away in helicopters.”

18. Christine Bazarama

Christine Bazarama is a genocide survivor from Joma, in Kavumu Cell, Kadabu Sector, Nyamagabe District. She was witness of the activities of the French soldiers in her village during the “Operation Turquoise”. The Commission heard her behind closed doors as a factual witness on 10th January 2007.

Her testimony is about the assassination of a young man called Paulin Karemera by French soldiers, the beating her father, Jean Rukwekweri, was subjected to and the humiliating treatment she was subjected. This is what she reports:

“In June 1994, in the middle of genocide, an old man by the name of Rukwekweri, who lived in Joma, took me and my two children to hide in his home. There we found his young son Paulin Karemera, his daughters, his two sons-in-law and his grand sons. Paulin Karemera had served in the FAR but was later demobilized. One day this young went put to chase away people who had been displaced by the war who used to steal their crops in the fields. As soon as he got behind their house, people started shouting, saying, “There comes an Inkotanyi!”

The French soldiers, who had a post at Kaduha, came to see what was happening. When they reached the area, they got out of their vehicles and came to our place on foot. They shot Paulin, first in the arm and then in the chest and the boy fell on the ground. They came closer and discovered that he was not an Inkotanyi. He was a Hutu. His only crime was that he belonged to a family which had hidden Tutsis. They tried to bring a helicopter to take him to hospital but the boy died in their arms.

According to what people said, the French continued to shoot in the air and eventually came to Rukwekweri’s home. They ransacked the house because they thought that the Inkotanyi were hiding there. While the shots were getting closer, we all ran out of the house and fled. Only the old man decided to remain in the house. The French tied him with ropes and took him to their post in Murambi. On the way they kicked him all over his body with their boots; they even kicked him on the chest. When they arrived in Murambi, they buried him halfway, alive. Only his head and shoulders were visible. The old man suffered so much that he requested them to finish him off rather than keep him in pain to that extent. He was lucky in the end that a young girl passed by who recognized him. She told the French that the man was not a Tutsi but a Hutu; that he could not be an Inkotanyi. He was released. The people who had fled his house when the French soldiers attacked it were killed by the people who were there. They knew brought them out of the forests where they had gone to hide and killed them.”

19.CM

Ms CM was born in 1976 and she lives in Rusizi District, in the Western Province. During the 1994 genocide, she fled to Kamarampaka Stadium in Cyangugu, and she was later transferred to Nyarushishi. She gave her testimony in an open hearing on the 13th December 2006.

Her testimony is mainly about the rape she was subjected to:

“At the beginning of genocide, I fled to Gashirabwoba. One day Prefect Bagambiki came with Interahamwe to kill all those who had taken refuge there. When they started shooting some people fell on others. The killers then came to see if there were survivors and they would finish them off with spears. I was lucky that I was not discovered. My baby and I were the only survivors in my family. I left Gashirabwoba but continued to hide in the surrounding banana plantations and bushes. In the end I decided to go to Cyangugu. On my way there I was stopped by the Interahamwe who were at Kadashya roadblock. They took me to the tea factory where I found six other women. The killers had decided to burn us alive. As they were making the fire to use, they hear a loud noise from other Interahamwe who had seen other Tutsis who had been hiding in the tea plantation. Our tormentors ran to help the others. We immediately took to our heels and escaped.

I took the road to Kamembe again. The Interahamwe had taken away all my clothes and I was completely naked. I was carrying my baby in a small piece of cloth. When I got to the Kamembe roundabout, there was another roadblock under the control of an Interahamwe who had the nickname “Tourner”. Once again I was arrested. The Interahamwe were about to kill me when the gendarmes who were hanging about in the shop nearby came to see me. I told them that the father of my son, Jean Baptiste, was also a gendarme. They knew him and they even told me that he had been transferred to Butare. They said that they would nonetheless take care of me. They also took me and gave me food because I was starving. But because I had spent a long time without food, I collapsed. They resuscitated me and helped me to continue on my journey.

Before reaching the Cyangugu Stadium, one of the militia found me in the bushed and raped me. In the end I reached Cyangugu three days after the Gashirabwoba slaughter. I stayed there, hiding. During that time the Interahamwe would come and take people to the slaughter house. Among us was a Hutu boy who pretended that he too was hiding but, in actual fact, he was spying for the Interahamwe. He once told us that we should go to hid very early in the morning, at about 4 o’clock in the morning. He then went and told the Interahamwe, who waited and attacked us on the way. 362 people were killed that day. The survivors returned to the stadium but even there, Prefect Bagambiki gave orders that we should be attacked with grenades. It is only when the members of the ICRC from Bukavu begged Bagambiki to spare us that we were taken to Nyarushishi.

A few days later, the Interahamwe came to attack us again at Nyarushishi. They were stopped by members of the ICRC again. The latter also went to see Colonel Bavugamenshi to tell him about our predicament. He decided to bring some gendarmes to protect us. He said that he was going to ensure that we were safe and added that in a few hours the French soldiers would come to protect us also. The French soldiers arrived that afternoon and Bavugamenshi asked us to show our warm welcome by dancing for them. These French soldiers went around the tents in the camp and took photos. In three days they knew where girls were staying. On the fourth day, the one who had identified the location of the girls came back with others and they took the girls inside their tents and raped them.

They would first give us liquor and cigarettes and they would also take some. They would then take pictures of us and show us. Then they would undress us. I think I had the worst experience of the rape we were subjected to. After undressing me, four would rape me at the same time or one after the other. One would put his penis in my mouth, another would penetrate me or in my anus, while the others caressed my breasts. At the same time they would take pictures of the act which they would show me. They even said that they would show them to their wives. Those who were waiting for their turn would also be there, watching. They told us that their French wives were different from us, that our sexual organs were different from theirs and that they had even learnt the names of the different parts of our sexual organs in Kinyarwanda. They touched them and mentioned the names in Kinyarwanda.

After the turn of the first ones, another group would start the same thing. This was done in a savage manner. After the two rounds they would pause for a few minutes. During this pause, they would give us liquor and cigarettes again and they would take some also. As their tents were scattered, they shout out to their colleagues and say: “Come here, we have beautiful girls. Come and see the difference between our women and Tutsi women”.

They would take us at about 4 o’clock in the morning and only release us the next day. Sometimes they would come to pick us in the morning and release us in the evening. When we tried to hide, they would they would set up a group to look for us everywhere until they found us. Whenever we passed close to their tents on our way to fetch water, they would call us. And if we tried to run they would point their guns to us and we would be obliged to stop. Among those soldiers who tormented us was a colonel. And sometimes after the ordeal, they would give us some of their rations or some biscuits.

This situation did not change for as long as the French were at Nyarushishi Camp. In the end I became pregnant. But because they never stopped to rape me, I had a miscarriage. An elderly lady used to come to massage me with salted warm water because my sexual organ had been infected.

When they came back during that week, I explained to them what had happened. They only waited six days and then they resumed their rape sessions. Sometimes they would spread their sperms on my back, on my belly, or even in my mouth and they would force me to swallow. At one time, the one who called himself colonel told the others that they should leave me for him alone and to look for other women. This colonel kept me for two days and then it was the end of “Operation Turquoise”, and they left. Because of these constant and savage acts, I developed gynecological complications: I had a very painful infection in the uterus. And whenever I thought that they were adding to what I had been subjected by the Interahamwe, I nearly committed suicide. The only thing that kept me from doing that is my baby who was born after all that. I tried to seek medical treatment but I still have back aches and irregular menstruation cycles.”

20. Colonel Evariste Murenzi

Colonel Evariste Murenzi is a former officer in FAR and worked especially within Bn Para before serving in the Presidential Guard battalion (Bn GP). After the defeat of FAR in 1994, he took refuge in Zaire where he became member of DFLR. In 2004, he returned to the country and was integrated in RDF (Rwanda Defense Forces). Today, he is Deputy Commandant of the 501 Brigade of the Rwandan Defense Forces in the South-West of the country. The commission heard him in an open hearing as a witness on 30/10/2006.

His testimony touches on French military cooperation before October 1990, the training and the supervision of the Rwandan army from October 1990, the involvement of French soldiers on the front on the side of FAR as well as the relationship between the command of Turquoise stationed at Goma and the FAR in exile. He declares:

“Up to October1990, the French soldiers were in Rwanda in the framework of normal military cooperation. One found them as instructors at “Ecole Superieur Militaire” (ESM), at the National Gendarmerie School (EGENA) at the Transmission Company, at the Aviation, at the Reconnaissance Battalion and at the Para Commando Battalion. They were also at the Presidency of the Republic as pilots or mechanics of planes and as advisors to EMGDN. Among them I remember Major Refalo, head of French instructors at the Para-Commando Battalion in 1990. He was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Gregoire De St Quintin This one would remain in Rwanda up to 1994.

Starting from October 1990, with the attack of RPF, the number of French soldiers present on Rwandan territory increased considerably. Their actions were not limited to advising the high command, but included the training FAR units before going to the front, visiting them on the battle field and advising the commandants on the conduct of operations. In this way, on 30/10/1990, while I was on the front with my unit at Kagitumba in the extreme North-East of Rwanda., I saw Major Rafalo, head of French instructors team at the Para commando Battalion, in the company of officers from the Ministry of Defense. Later he would come regularly to visit our unit during our operations. I remember also Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Canovas, then advisor to the high command of FAR, who created within the Para Commando Battalion, a big unit of troops called CRAP and whose mission was to look for intelligence and take action within enemy lines.”

As regards the involvement of French soldiers in fighting, he declares:

“In the month of June 1992, the RPF attacked and occupied during some days the town of Byumba. My unit was part of the forces that retook the town. But before the attack the artillery had first to pound the area and the French were present. They used the 105 mm canons. Even after the attack, they used the same armament to chase Inkotanyi from the hills of Mukarange and Kivuye where they had withdrawn to. Most of the commandants of companies were at first surprised by the type of weapons used ( because they were not in the Rwandan arsenal) before learning that they were 105 mm canons used by the French.

Moreover, when I was transferred to the Presidential Guard in October 1992, I found there Major Denis Roux, a French gendarme officer from the National Gendarmerie Intervention Group (GIGN). He was in charge of training the Group for Security and Intervention of the Presidential Guard (CSIGP). This unit regrouped about a hundred soldiers, all coming from the Presidential Guard, especially in charge of the security close to the President. It is the same group which trained Interahamwe at Gabiro in the company of French soldiers. CSIGP soldiers later were going to play a notorious role in the massacres which were committed near the camp “Presidential Guard” (Camp GP) after the death of President Habyarimana.

During the Genocide between April and July 1994, a European in the company of the commandant of the Presidential Guard, Major Protais Mpiranya came to visit Camp GP. Major Mpiranya told me that the man in question was a French soldier who had entered Rwanda through Zaire with a team of ten other soldiers mission and one of sons of the late President, he informed me that the latter( the soldiers) had stayed at Bigogwe military camp situated in the North-West of the country. Their mission, according to Major Mpiranya was to set up, in collaboration with the Rwandan army an operation codenamed “Insecticide Operation” without giving any other precision. This French officer in civilian attire wanted to know the different positions of RPF in the city of Kigali. Certain rumours were saying that the individual in question was Captain Barril.

After the installation of FAR in the refugee camps of Zaire, the chief of Staff, Major General Augustin Bizimungu received regularly at his headquarters at Mugunga camp French officers of Operation Turquoise, among them Lt Col Gilbert Canovas and Gregoire de St Quintin who were in Rwanda several months before. Following this, from 1995, the command of FAR in exile launched an infiltration operation inside Rwanda in order to carry out guerrilla actions of sabotage. This operation will coincidently have as code name “Insecticide Operation” which will be the base for all infiltration operations and sabotage carried out in Rwanda by the ex-FAR as well as by Interahamwe from 1995 to 2001. These attacks would be known by the generic name of “Abacengezi war” or “War of Infiltration”.

Certain French leaders, be it political or military, put forward the existence of a military treaty between France and Rwanda as an explanation for the support of their country to FAR. “I do not know if such a treaty existed really. But even if it existed, this could in no way justify the help even less the collaboration with the genocidaires. Moreover, countries such as Belgium, Germany, China which had also good military cooperation with Rwanda did not take sides as much and they even stopped their cooperation at the start of the conflict.”

The witness ends his testimony by affirming the following: “I can not finish without underlining that the French soldiers had the same position as the FAR concerning the enemy they had to fight. In fact at the time of the Arusha negotiations, French officers, sometimes even those who had just arrived for the first time on the Rwandan soil, continuously warned their Rwandan colleagues by telling us that the Tutsi were malicious and dangerous people and that if we were not careful, they would exterminate us. Besides the role of France in the genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda is without any doubt because its government and its army supported and collaborated with a government which prepared the genocide and then with the next which carried it out.”

21. Colonel Martin Ndamage

Colonel Martin Ndamage is a former officer of the Rwanda Armed Forces (FAR). He was on the front during the war of 1990, worked in several operational sectors. A short time before the capture of Kigali by RPF, he disassociated himself from FAR, in the company of officers including the present minister of defense General Marcel Gatsinzi. He did not stay long in Zaire where he had been forced to flee in the month of July 1994, for he returned to the country the next month.

[XXPANTHAXX]

50. Jean-Claude Murejuru Tuyishime

Jean Claude Murejuru-Tuyishime is a business man who survived the genocide. He hails from Nyamata in the East. He recounts the acts of the French soldiers in Bugesera region. He was heard by the Commission during the investigations conducted on 5th January and 10th August 2007. He mainly relates how the French soldiers set up roadblocks and trained militia in Gako region.

“I saw the French soldiers come to Gako Camp in 1992 and set up roadblocks. The roadblock was manned by a Rwandan and a French soldier. The Rwandan would interpret for the benefit of the French soldier. The latter asked for my identity card. When he realised that I was a Tutsi, he shouted: “Tutsi!” As a result, the Rwandan soldier asked me for my mandatory community work card “Umuganda”, as well as a receipt for payment in support of the FAR. The French soldier read the documents. When he read “Umuganda” he confused it for “Umugande” which in Kinyarwanda means “Ugandan” and immediately demanded that I be imprisoned at the military camp. I tried to plead with the Rwandan soldier to explain to the Frenchman that I was innocent but he would not listen to me.

As I approached the confinement area, I met a Rwandan soldier called Alphonse Ngezamaguru who was a childhood friend. He approached me and I explained my problem. He promised to assist me but asked me to be patient. I was then detained. There were many civilians who had been detained there for several days. They told me that every day, those who were to be killed would be selected. At about 4h30 my friend Alphonse got me out of the confinement area and showed me how I would leave the camp. I ran and was able to escape the fate reserved for the others.

[…] When I met Alphonse Ngezamaguru again at his home during his leave, he told me that I had been lucky because all my co-detainees had been killed after I had fled. More specifically, it was the French soldiers that stopped and interrogated civilians at the roadblock in Gako, and also decided whether the latter would be detained or not.

The Rwandan soldiers only intervened when those stopped on the roadblock did not speak French.

The French would select persons first based on appearance, then their identity cards. They would be lined up then the French would choose those that they would retain, based on these criteria. I watched the acts of these soldiers keenly when I got into the Gako Camp. I even saw machetes, spades and rifles being unloaded from a lorry that had arrived at the camp. On my way to Gichanga, I crossed another roadblock established by the French in Rulinda, but this time they did not ask me for anything. In my opinion, the French cannot deny their participation in the genocide, because they had acted publicly, and because their roadblocks were set up on the road in the open.

[…] With regard to the training of militia, the Interahamwe from Bicumbi and Bugesera trained in Ruyenzi. They were trained by French and Rwandan soldiers. I never went to the training grounds because I could not access them. But they would pass in front of me. In addition, one of my young neighbours called Kayinamura trained with them. […] They would train during the day and return home in the night. Most of them were young and aged between 18 and 20 years or 25 years; there were also men who were still relatively strong, aged about 30 or 35 years old. I would often see them. They stopped training in 1993.

[…] The next time I met the French soldiers was during the genocide. They carried out all their acts in the company of the ex-FAR, such that for every ten ex-FAR men, there were four French soldiers. For example, two French soldiers and an ex-FAR Colonel, the son-in-law of Ndamage, came to Kabgayi centre where I had sought refuge.”

51. Jean Karengera

Jean Karengera is a farmer who survived the attacks in Bisesero, Karongi District in the West. He was heard by the Commission during the additional enquiries held from 7th to 9th June 2006 and 2nd August 2007. His testimony recounts how the French soldiers left the survivors in the hands of the killers in Bisesero, as well as the excessive amputations that the Basesero were subjected to in Goma.

“After the death of President Habyarimana, we saw houses being burnt in Gishyita and we thought that it was perpetrated by bandits, but the fires spread on to Gisovu and Bisesero. Thus, the Tutsis from Gishyita, Gisovu, Karongi and Kagabiro went into hiding in the hills in Bisesero. We were about 50.000 of us. Among us, there was a Birara who had fought during the 1973 events and taught us how to attack the Interahamwe in groups, dressed like them in order to camouflage our appearance. This is why the Interahamwe were not able to infiltrate us despite the fact that from time to time, some of our people were killed. Around 27th June 1994, we noticed a convoy of vehicles led by a vehicle covered in a flag and we thought that the occupants had come to our rescue.

Some of us went to stop them in order to see who was in the vehicles, and having noted that they were French soldiers, requested them to save us. These soldiers then asked how many we were and who were the killers. Our companions explained to them that the killers were Hutus and even pointed at Twagirayezu, who accompanied these soldiers, as being among the group of killers. The French asked us if there were any corpses or wounded persons. We showed them two corpses that were still fresh, as well as some wounded people. After this, they abandoned us, promising us to return in three days’ time. We entreated them not to abandon us, demonstrating to them that the killers lurked in the vicinity. They hardly listened to us, replying that they were not ready at the time but that they would return in three days.

After the departure of the soldiers, the militia then intensified the attacks in the three days that preceded the supposed return of the French. Many people perished. The killers attacked us with grenades, guns and edged weapons. It is during this period that I was wounded by a bullet in the leg. The French soldiers finally returned after 3 days as promised, as we were still hiding in a bush, and spread out in different hiding places on the mountain. Their vehicles passed by Bisesero where we were hiding; we had noticed that they must have made an about-turn after a while. The survivors who were still in good health ran to stop them. I had a deep wound, and my companions helped me to approach these soldiers. Upon the sight of my wound, they took us to Goma by helicopter in order to treat those who were seriously wounded. We arrived there during the night.

Immediately upon our arrival we were mistreated. The French had cut up our clothes with scissors and had thrown them into the dustbin. Thus they stripped everybody; children, men and women of all ages. Later on they made for us some clothing from bed sheets. We also suffered from hunger and each time we requested for food they put us on some drip, saying that the sick should not eat, especially since we were waiting to undergo surgical operations.

They told us that each wounded person would have to be operated on. When they started to treat the wounds, I realised that everybody returned with their members amputated. This was the case of Antoinette whose arm was amputated, yet the wound was not so serious. When it was my turn, they anesthetised the lower part, the upper part being intact.

When I saw that they were going to amputate my leg, I stood up in order to resist. Since I did not speak French, I made signs to enable them to understand me. I would stand up to resist, then three white men would hold me down on the bed. In the meantime they made a few incisions on the wound on my leg and I stood up to ensure that it was not the whole leg that had been cut off. Finally, they reassured me that they would not amputate it. Hence they left the leg alone and made a simple dressing for me. The French were annoyed that I had refused to be amputated and immediately transferred me to the camp of Gituku, very close to Lake Kivu. Some others such as Munyankara, wounded on the knee and Adrien, also refused to be amputated, and their wounds eventually healed.”

52. Jean-Loup Denblyden

Jean Loup Denblyden is a Belgian working in Switzerland and a former reservist Lieutenant Colonel in 1994. Having graduated from the Royal Belgian Military Training School, he was recalled by the Belgian Army as a volunteer in Operation “Silver Back” and was appointed as Liaison Officer in the French Detachment of Operation “Amaryllis”. The public hearing during which he appeared was held on 18/12/2006.

His testimony focuses primarily on the conduct of those who manned this operation towards Rwandans intending to flee from the genocide at the time expatriates were being evacuated. He also mentions the relationship between FAR (Rwandan Armed Forces) and the French soldiers.

“After the 6th, 7th and 8th of April, I was in Geneva. I was requested to confirm the number of soldiers killed. There was information to the effect that eleven and not ten Belgian soldiers had been killed. I had been asked questions from the time I was in Brussels; therefore it had become my responsibility. I had been told to be on stand-by. I arrived in Brussels on the 8th of April, and on the 9th we left for Rwanda. We arrived at Kanombe in the afternoon of 10th April.

On reaching there, I was requested to be the Liaison Officer with the French Detachment, namely ‘Opération Amaryllis’. It is in this capacity and within the scope of responsibilities entrusted to me that I shall give my account. In the reception area at Kanombe Airport (the same building that is used today), there were French soldiers, and Belgian soldiers as well. A huge number of journalists had arrived in Belgian planes.

The first problem occurred. I was approached by a French soldier holding lists in his hand who told me: ‘This is not good. We have a problem at hand!’ He said this because he was sorting people out and the Rwandans had been pushed back towards the roadblock. This roadblock was right at the entrance to the current parking area, as you enter the airport grounds. These Rwandans clearly did not want to go past the roadblock and the soldier was saying that there was a problem.

I went up the floor where Colonel Poncet who was commanding the operation ‘Amaryllis’ was located. I mentioned the problem to him and he shrugged his shoulders. Colonel Maurin from UNAMIR who was next to him, told me not to get involved in that matter. I immediately contacted Colonel Roman as well as the operations Officer [...], the Belgian Officer. I told them about the issue. Colonel Roman simply gave me free rein to settle the issue as I deemed it appropriate. I returned downstairs, contacted a soldier and at that moment a non-commissioned French Officer interrupted, saying that the Belgians had nothing to do with that matter, adding that it was an issue for the French to handle. This was the third day of Amaryllis, the evacuation operation, and therefore the trucks were coming to the airport loaded with both expatriates and Rwandans. There were cars that had slipped into the convoys.

[...] I went up above the airport on the platform to see whether from that vintage point I could spot the roadblock. There were some corpses below, on the right side of the airport. I remember that there was more vegetation at that time and I should have some pictures of that area. People had crossed the roadblock, they were at the airport and the French were saying, we are not taking you and they were taking them back towards the roadblock. And we were saying no, we shall in any event go ahead and take them and place them in the Belgian zone.

The decision was to tell the French that any Rwandan or any other person that they would not take with them could be transferred to the Belgian ‘zone’. By that time the airport had already been divided up into different areas of responsibility. These people were traumatised, so I contacted the first group and escorted this first group to the Belgian zone to show them the way. That is when we encountered a practical problem. There was a full Belgian battalion that was separate from UNAMIR and therefore it was the second para commando battalion, KIBAT II. It had not yet reassembled at the airport at that point and we had a Belgian parachute battalion located at the old airport on the other side of the runway. Furthermore, we had pushed many people backwards, informing them that they could not remain in the area since the FAR Presidential Protection Unit and the parachute battalion were moving around in the airport. Everyone could see that, we were afraid of that, we were being watched and so we told the people to move on.

To compound the situation even further, there were some mothers who were together with their children. We instructed them to move on. We then took them to the other side where we attached them to the parachute battalion that would afford them some protection, then we opened the offices and hid them in the Aviation pilots’ offices, which were under Rwandan soldiers at that time and we hid them. And then, Belgian diplomats encountered difficulties. First they needed to handle the evacuation of expatriates that were in the mission. There were still some people to evacuate, and we were also getting orders from Brussels to evacuate even more people. There was a group of adopted children, some of whom were handicapped, who received a lot of media coverage. We had to collect them and bring them over together with those accompanying them.

There were many initiatives taken by Belgian diplomats and military staff to evacuate these people from Kanombe. Therefore as far as we were concerned, our mission was to offer them some kind of refuge. However, we could not, on the other hand, leave them behind. “At the time, we were no longer in the Belgian Platoon’s zone which was at theEcole Technique Officielle (ETO) and which was receiving orders from the UN to evacuate the area, since this was an order from Belgium or the UN. We only had “Silver Back” remaining at our disposal. As it was under the responsibility of the Belgian Government, we did have a free hand in executing our activities. Many people took their own initiatives. To my knowledge, no Rwandans remained at the airport.

The Rwandan group that was turned back by the French were taken up in the Belgian area, and this created logistical problems since we did not know what to do. In fact, the orders from the Belgian Government were to the effect that only expatriates were to be evacuated. An example of the cheating carried out is the fact that we boarded people during the night. I need to mention that members of the presidential forces and the para commando battalion were moving around among us and they could see what we were up to. They were even attending coordination meetings. Therefore in the evening we would play tricks on them. We would set up spotlights, bring in the Europeans, and then through small hidden doors in the aeroplanes we would board the Rwandans. We faced another challenge: ordinarily we drew up passenger manifests for those boarding, and naturally the Rwandans were quiet hesitant to have their names recorded on the manifest. So we boarded people without listing their names, or we would instruct them to write any name on the list. The names were probably not important; it was simply in order to ensure their security.

I must say that on the ground, things were relatively easy given that Belgian diplomats that were in Kigali and those arriving from Brussels to provide support were very cooperative in seeking to solve the problems of the Rwandan nationals; this includes the soldiers. In actual fact we cheated with regard to carrying out orders from the Belgian Government. We by-passed these orders and did our best to find motives enabling us to board them into the planes, Bear in mind, however, that this expatriation was on military aircraft flying to Nairobi and once in Nairobi there was another selection carried out for those who would proceed to Europe on commercial aircraft. All these planes were Belgian; there were also Canadian and Italian planes. This gave rise to a mixture of nationalities. In Nairobi this immediately posed a problem to the Kenyans who were witnessing the arrival of persons that could not proceed to Europe. Consequently there were protests from Nairobi. For five days, we were faced with these very difficult problems that were not easily solvable.

Humanely speaking, the height of the crisis was no doubt at the moment when mortars were fired at the airport by FAR. At the exact spot where planes currently taxi to a stop, one would alight from the plane using the stairs whereupon a mortar was suddenly fired! There was a general panic especially among the French, specifically on the part of Colonel Maurin who was extremely agitated.

On the side of the Belgian officers I would get teased and pushed about with mischievous comments such as: ‘You see what happens when you board Negroes on the plane’, which actually meant: ‘Stop doing this. You will impress neither the diplomats nor the other officers. Therefore we carried on right up to the end’. As far as I know no Rwandans were left in this part of the airport that actually served as a zone of refuge. I could cite witnesses to what I have just related; the journalist Collette Braeckman who witnessed the entire episode; and on the Rwandan side, maybe one of the most well known personalities would be Birara. This is the first account that I could give regarding Amaryllis.

Still within the same context, while at the airport we were embarrassed because the telephone exchange was out of order and they did not know this in Brussels; calls were functioning only in one part of Kigali. At the CND/Airport zone, there was no longer any telephone connection. Colonel Roman asked me to try and see if the line could be repaired. I went to the Control Tower but it was being guarded by the French therefore I had no access to it. I was accompanied by Colonel Pierre Musette who was a Belgian Air Force officer and who therefore had every reason to be in contact with, I am talking about the events of the first day, 10th April. Colonel Musette is currently number two in the Belgian Intelligence Service; he could confirm this to you. He told me over the phone, a few months ago, that he was able to access the Control Tower shortly afterwards.

At some moment the people down below called me saying that there was a technician who had a car and was available, and that he was specialised in telephone matters. The latter took me on his bike to the telephone exchange. I could not locate the area myself as I was too preoccupied by the radio. At the location of the telephone exchange covering the CND-Kanombe area, there were French soldiers too. These are facts that I witnessed myself.

Thirdly, I can inform you of some conversations held by French officers. We were speaking of the security of ‘Mille Connines’ [hotel], and of people who were about to go to ‘Mille Collines. They were telling us that there was no problem at the ‘Mille Collines’ because there was a communication unit there. I do not know; I had reserved a suite on the fifth floor; I did not go to the Mille Collines; I did not see any French unit. I can say that some French Officers at Kanombe spoke of this. And one would ask oneself, “Is the Mille Collines really a zone of refuge?” This is just an assessment; we wondered about the regular visits of General Bizimungu to the ‘Mille Collines’, and whether he had access to communications. However, this is just an assessment.

[…] We discussed among ourselves. In the same manner, we spoke just about any other gathering place. The ‘Mille Collines’ was one location among others, why was it being specially preserved? This sounded bizarre; it was as if nobody dared to touch ‘Mille Collines’? […] The comment that I retained was, “We have a communication unit”; a Frenchman had said. I think it was Colonel Maurin, but cannot confirm this. As for the reason why I vividly remember this, if you see the film about the “Mille Collines” Hotel, I got the impression that someone was telling a story that did not correspond to what I had noticed myself. This is an assessment; I therefore did not see this unit, and I did not go to the ‘Mille Collines’.

The fourth point that I brought out; in Rwanda at the time, there was a military technical cooperation that had been there for several years. There were some officers serving in the North within the Camp of Bigogwe, and during the days of ‘Silver Back’, an operation was undertaken to evacuate these people. This is termed as “exfilter” in military terms. Consequently, a plane carrying 730 Belgians landed in Gisenyi and evacuated these officers who could not enter into Zaїre. These officers therefore returned here to the airport. They did have some usefulness, as they knew the country and had been working in the same country. At that time, the person in charge was Commander Biot. He shared with me his views regarding what he understood to be happening. In Bigogwe, the Belgian soldiers possessed antennae with data link capability; that had immediately been sabotaged. When I say “immediately” I’m not sure if it was the evening of the 6th or 7th April. I’m simply saying he told me that the antennae were immediately sabotaged, and that he had understood that the situation was quite grave.

Following this conversation he told me that there had been Belgian officers present in Bigogwe at the time of the massacre of the Bagogwe in 1992. They certainly saw French officers or soldiers operating in the area. I had been alerted to this because I knew Bagogwe families that had survived the operation, who wanted me to reveal what, had happened. I informed Senator Philippe Mahou in Belgium, and he told me that the said period was not under the scope of the inquiry led by the Belgian Commission. The Belgian Commission therefore, never inquired about these events.

[…] Belgian officers were continuously posted to the area, and I believe that a relatively large number, 4 or 5, of Belgian officers or non-commissioned officers were present in Bigogwe on a continuous basis from the 1970s onwards. It is therefore obvious to me that these people can speak; maybe they will say that nothing happened there, or that no French soldier intervened. The only comment I may cite is that of one of the officers who, when I mentioned the subject to him, told me, “Oh! Ils n’y ont pas été par le dos de la cuillère, and we made reports.” From this statement I gather that the French were indeed present, and I believe that this would be corroborated by the testimony of the survivors!

In any case, within the literature about the massacre of the Bagogwe, and statements made to me by survivors of the massacre of the Bagogwe there is an expression of despair to the effect that these massacres could be forgotten or ‘camouflaged’ by the impact of the genocide that followed. Therefore the only thing that I could say, believing that there are reports written to this effect, is that the French soldiers were present. […]The conclusion is that the officers said that they had established reports, and professionally they were required to do so. I do therefore believe that in Belgium there are reports written by the officers who were present, during that period, in the camp were these interrogations were being held.

I have a fifth and last point to add […] the genocide did take place, and in the months that followed; the journalist Collette Braeckman, as she edited the newspaper “Le Soir”, presented me with a report that had been distributed in various locations. It was a report about the visit of Colonel Ephrem Rwabarinda to General Quesnot in Paris. She asked me why there had been no reaction from the Belgian side, from a military or political point of view yet she had broadcast this live and she had cited it in the newspapers. I informed the main officer at the military operations centre, a Russian admiral, and his response was, “There are too many problems as it is, we don’t need any additional problems with France.” For your information, if you follow the Russian admiral’s career, you’ll note that afterwards he became the military attaché in Paris.

I passed this on to Senator Philippe Mahou and he took note. Obviously there was no reaction from the Belgian side. Being quite frustrated with this, I informed a friend posted in Washington, Brigadier General André Desmet, who told me, “Send me a copy of this report.” The report is known; it has been annexed to several books published by commissions, and it strongly demonstrated that during the genocide, contacts had been maintained with the French government at the highest level. I especially remember this problem of communication, and the radios/walkie-talkies that had been distributed. General Desmet had told me that he would meet the American official responsible for Central Africa as well as the French Military Attaché during a reception that evening; I believe it was being held at his home. To my great surprise, he called me the followed day, saying that the French officer had reacted very badly upon seeing the report. The day after this, he called me saying that Brussels had contacted him to instruct him to stop interfering in other people’s affairs.

In the meantime, I tried to contact Collette Braeckman who informed me that she had located the report right here. I tried to call Goma because I had been informed that Rwabarinda was in Goma, so I telephoned through Caritas. The Caritas official responsible for Caritas institutions in Goma was Lieutenant Colonel de Martre who is now retired and is also a para commando. I talked to people whom I did not know on the line, as all I knew was the telephone number. I asked them if they could ask Lt. Colonel Ephrem Rwabarinda to contact me. To my great surprise, he called back almost the day after, and asked for help in evacuating his family. I told him that I did not know him well enough. He insisted, saying that he was not present during the genocide and that he could prove it. He sent the report by fax, […]. It is true that he was proving that he had been in Paris at the time, but I did not know much more than that.

[…..]In this report, the emphasis laid on the communications issue called to mind what I had said; the antennae immediately cut off on the Belgians’ side, the cutting off of telephone lines and the guarding of the telephone exchange by the French, the communication unit at Hotel Mille Collines and no doubt the murder of the two non-commissioned officers who were also communications specialists. There is much mention of direct communication between France at presidential level, and Rwanda. This is what I wanted to point out. Whoever had read this report would have realised this.

[ …] Actually, I was shocked, as Collette Braeckman was, that such an important report had not had any repercussions on the Belgian military, or parliamentary side. It is for this reason that I spoke to a friend, asking him, “What are they doing?” It is this friend who proposed this initiative. The Belgian authorities openly snubbed him by means of Canal France then called him again the next day instructing him to stick to his own business.

53. Jean-Marie Vianney Nzabakurikiza

Originally from Musanze District, Northern Province, he studied at the Ecole de la Gendarmerie Nationale (EGENA) throughout 1991 and consequently served in various units of the Gendarmerie including the Groupe Mobile in Kigali, the Grouping of Gendarmerie in Butare and the Grouping of Gendarmerie in Kibuye. Following a short stay in Bukavu where he had fled in 1994, he returned to Rwanda where he was integrated into the Rwandan Patriotic Army. He was demobilised in 2001. He is currently an employee of KK Security, one of the security agencies in Kigali. The Commission heard him in camera, in his capacity as witness to the events, on 12th September 2007.

His testimony relates to the establishment of roadblocks accompanied by murders as well as the distribution of arms to the Interahamwe in Kibuye. With regards to the establishment of roadblocks, he states the following:

“I first saw the French when I was a student at EGENA. However, it’s during Opération turquoise that I was able to witness their actions in the field. When they arrived in Kibuye in June 1994 they erected roadblocks mostly in front of the headquarters of the former Gitesi District, at the junction of the roads leading to the Guest House and the Hospital of Kibuye. At this roadblock they stopped and sorted out persons based on their ethnic identity. They allowed Hutus to pass, but arrested Tutsis before leading them either to the Ecole (School) in front of the Gendarmerie de Kibuye, or at the Ecole Technique Officielle de Kibuye (ETO).

I remember two Tutsi women and one small boy who came to hide at the home of Major Jean Jabo, Commander of the Gendarmerie of Kibuye, who had a Tutsi wife. The Interahamwe chased them up to the camp and demanded that they be delivered to them, but in vain. Then these Interahamwe went to complain at the quarters of the French and towards 16h00, the latter came into the camp. They took the 3 individuals out of the camp and ordered the gendarmes to guard them till they returned to take them away. Towards 20h00, the French soldiers arrived and instead of protecting them, they beat them to death. Then they picked up the corpses and loaded them in trucks in order to transfer them to an unknown destination.”

Regarding the distribution of arms, he said, “In Gasura near the Hospital of Kibuye I saw French soldiers distribute percussion grenades to the Interahamwe. Afterwards, when I was in Rubengera, I witnessed a dispute among the Interahamwe caused by the fact that some had received firearms from the French, while others had not.”

54. Jean Ndihokubwayo

Jean Ndihokubwayo is a cultivator and a repentant prisoner under temporary release from custody, who comes from the former Préfeture (Province) of Cyangugu. He was a ‘militia-dealer’ at the Rusizi I border in Cyangugu. He currently resides in Rusizi District, Southern Province. He was heard by the Commission on 14th December 2006 in his capacity as a direct witness to facts relating to acts of the French soldiers before and after the 1994 genocide.

“The French soldiers arrived in Rwanda in 1994 having crossed Rusizi I border, Cyangugu, from Zaїre. These soldiers arrived in two different stages. The first time, a group of three French soldiers came up to the Rwandan border (Rusizi I). They spoke to the head of immigration who they informed that they had come for purposes relating to the Zone Turquoise, saying that they would cross that same day. The second time, a group of French soldiers arrived the next morning. They met Colonel Simba and Member of Parliament Hon. Kayondo. After their discussion, the French soldiers explained to us that they had come to save the Hutu who were under the risk of extermination by the Tutsi.

They then asked us to summon the soldiers of that area. I called 6 of them, and we all left with Simba and the group of Frenchmen. We went to a house belonging to Simba, slightly on the outskirts of the town. The house was surrounded by a thick bush. The French soldiers drove their trucks into the driveway of the house. Within the compound, we placed ourselves perpendicularly to one of the trucks. The French soldiers then started to distribute arms, insisting that we clear the bushes or burn the vegetation in the surrounding area so as to avoid any infiltration by elements of the RPF or their accomplices. Through Simba, they told us in so many words, “We are going to give you firearms and machetes for clearing the bushes so that the Tutsi do not fire upon us.”

They then delivered to us three rifles, as well as some grenades and machetes. The machetes were inside the large cases that the French themselves opened from within their vehicle for distribution to us. We spread out in different directions in the area surrounding the house and started to search in the bushes. We flushed out two Tutsis who we immediately killed, one of them by machete. The other tried to flee and one of us, a soldier named Masunzu shot him. We were using the arms received by the Frenchmen. Further on, near the prison, we discovered five others who were able to elude our shots. We returned to report on the operation and they paid us 700 FF. I kept 200 FF and my companions shared the rest among themselves. They then asked us to remain at their disposal in order to assist them. It is within this context that after consulting with the French, Simba sent us to seek reinforcements. I was able to bring 3 other youths who in turn received weapons including grenades. They too, summoned some other reservists. Concerning this, I heard about a group of reservists from Murangi who received from the French soldiers some rifles and grenades with which they killed about 7 people.

The French soldiers also raped some young girls who they had found in the town of Cyangugu. I surprised them twice in the process of raping the young girls aged 14 to 15 years. The first time was when I had returned after changing money for them. When this group of soldiers heard the sound of the motorbike that I drove, one of them came forward, pointing his gun in my direction. However this did not prevent me from seeing from afar how the other soldiers had disrobed the little girl. I cried out to denounce what I was seeing; one of the watchmen guarding the Carmelites just next door fled to the rescue, but returned when the soldier pointed his gun towards him.

The second time, I was looking for some French soldiers who had given me false banknotes. I fell upon a jeep parked in a forest and saw a group of six soldiers with three girls. I saw with my own eyes three Frenchmen, one of whom had lowered his trousers; two others held the girl and the other three guarded the two other girls who begged me to get help for them since the French soldiers were raping them. They were crying, covered in wrap cloths and I was able to recognise one who recognised me too. I later met this girl in Zaïre and she told me how she had escaped from these soldiers, but that nobody else had survived them. What really happened is; some gendarmes were passing by the area where the French soldiers were raping the girls. The latter cried out, and when the French soldiers attempted to conceal their actions, the girl took advantage and fled.”

With regards to the looting of public property, he affirms the following:

“When I arrived at the airport of Kamembe, there were 3 new Toyota Corolla saloon cars, without owners. The cushions were covered in dust and blood. A son of Colonel Simba, who was always with the French, revealed to me that the vehicles had been taken to Zaїre by helicopter. Following this, they passed at least 100 vehicles through the border in my presence. I even became one of the commission agents in Zaire, for the sale of these vehicles looted and which were parked in several sites that displayed between 5 and 10 vehicles for sale. I sold about 10 vehicles at various prices; $3,000, $2,500 or even $1,500. I received a commission of $20 or $30 for each sale.”

With regard to the distribution of arms in the camps, Ndihokubwayo explains the following:

“The French soldiers assembled all the arms of the ex-FAR together before the latter crossed the Rwandan border to Zaïre. Once the refugees had finished settling in the camp of Kavumu, the French soldiers brought to the ex-FAR their arms. This was revealed to me by the ex-FAR themselves, in particular by Col. Gasarabwe, as he undertook the recruitment of new soldiers. Apart from the transportation of arms, the French soldiers also trained new recruits and distributed new weapons to them. The French soldiers reassembled all the arms of the FAR before they crossed the border into the Congo. Once the settlement of the refugees was completed, the French returned these arms to the ex-FAR. Colonels Gasarabwe and Ndahimana arrived to carry out recruitment in the refugee camp of Nyangezi and to assure us that the French were well disposed to assist us and to supply us with arms so as to enable us to regain our country.

With this objective in mind, we received training at night on the hills of Bulonge. After Bukavu, the same training continued in Tingi-Tingi, Kisangani and in Congo-Brazzaville at a camp named Biroro. In this camp, we received M16 guns transported in detachable pieces within cartons of maize or biscuits. A Rwandan Colonel who supervised us explained to us that these arms came from France and that the French supported us, but that they could not express their support openly. Afraid of being discovered, he said, they had arranged with NGOs working in Zaïre to bring in the arms from Bulgaria.”

55. Jean-Paul Gasore

Jean Paul Gasore is a former refugee who fled from Rwanda in 1959 and sought refuge in Uganda. He became part of the Ugandan army until the moment he decided to forcefully return to his country of origin in 1990 with other comrades, assembled under the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Captured by the FAR, he became a prisoner. He was freed in 1993 under a prisoner-exchange agreement between the two protagonists and rejoined the RPF. He is currently demobilised. The Commission heard him behind closed doors in his capacity as witness to the events, on 23rd January 2007.

His testimony recounts the torture inflected on him during interrogations by Rwandan and French officers during the time when he was prisoner of war. He declares the following:

“Towards the end of 1990 when its first conventional offensive was countered, the Rwandan Patriotic Army decided to change tactics, opting for guerrilla operations. A few units withdrew to the Akagera Park to organise themselves better and to undertake guerrilla warfare. As we prepared to attack the region of Kayonza, I fell into an ambush mounted by the FAR that captured me and took me to Kigali for interrogation. On the way there, we met a group of French soldiers at Lake Ihema, still within Akagera Park. These French soldiers were in a truck carrying small boats which they used on their lake patrols. They subjected me to a short interrogation.

I then spent the night at Hotel Akagera where they sought to interrogate me for the second time. At that moment, an order from Kigali forbade that I be interrogated by anyone, stressing that I should be driven to Kigali very early in the morning. In Kigali I was received by Lieutenant Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, Head of Military Intelligence. The latter then interrogated me and was always assisted by a female Rwandan officer of the gendarmerie, as well as a French gendarme officer. During the interrogations, I underwent torture several times. These interrogations were continued for one month and a half.”

Jean Paul Gasore describes the torture he was subjected to while detained at Camp Kigali in the following terms:

“They would suspend me with my head on the ground and my legs in the air. Then they would hit my limbs with a club. During the interrogations, whenever they received an unsatisfactory response, Lieutenant Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva or the French Officer with him would call the Rwandan soldiers who waited outside. The latter would then take me out for a beating. Afterwards, they would return me to the room for continuation of the interrogation. Each time I returned from a beating I was in a very bad state, and those who interrogated me acted as if everything was normal.”

With regards to interrogations at the prison in Kigali, he relates, “In the prison, one of the French gendarmes who had interrogated me at Camp Kigali came to see me three times in order to ask me the same type of questions as before. The last time he came to see me, we quarrelled after I asked him why the French intervened in Rwanda despite the fact that the country had neither been colonised by the French, nor under its zone of influence. With this, the Frenchman became very angry and never returned. Finally, after the Arusha Accords that included an agreement to exchange prisoners of war, I was freed and driven to Mulindi which was then held by the RPF. After the liberation of the entire country I was demobilised. I am currently doing personal business.”

56. Jean Paul NTURANYENABO

Jean Paul Nturanyenabo is originally from Nyamyumba in the former Province of Gisenyi. Formerly a Sergeant in the FAR, he went for Artillery courses and was thus part of the teams that handled support arms notably the French 105 mm guns. He was condemned to 12 years in prison for genocide and is incarcerated in the prison of Rubavu. The Commission heard him testify in his capacity as a witness to the events during a public session held on 11th December 2006. His testimony includes assistance and training given to the ex-FAR and Interahamwe by French soldiers, their participation in combat as well as their supply of arms and ammunition. He declares the following:

“After my training at the Ecole des Sous-officiers in May 1991, I went with my comrades to undertake a 3 months’ training course at Bigogwe at the end of which we received the “commando de chasse” certificate of competence. Our instructors were French soldiers from the DAMI Company. The training in Bigogwe was based on tactics and combat without arms. During the lessons the French also laid emphasis on the fact that we needed to know our real enemy, namely the Tutsis. They said the enemy was among us. This training ended in July 1991. It had taken 3 months. Afterwards, together with the French soldiers we participated in training recruits who were to form the 63rd and 64th Battalion. I joined the latter immediately after the end of the said training. Please note that the same Battalion marked itself out during the looting of Gisenyi Town, this resulted in some deaths. After these events, the 64th Battalion was simply disbanded and the soldiers transferred to other units. I was then transferred to the 65th Battalion, in Umutara Province.”

He continues, “While I was in the 65th Battalion, the top commanders of the FAR asked all Battalion commanders to send non-commissioned officers to Mukamira, for training on the handling of the 105 mm gun and the 81 mm gun recently introduced to the FAR by the French. I was one of the non-commissioned officers selected. On the way to Mukamira, we had a short stop-over in Gabiro where we spent the night. This was in March 1992. In Gabiro we found some Frenchmen in the process of training members of the FAR, as well as Interahamwe militia dressed in civilian clothing. It was the same kind of training that was dispensed in Bigogwe. The next day we continued to Mukamira where the French awaited us.

To my surprise I also met some civilians, some of whom were familiar to me, who were receiving military training from the French. Among them I remember Mabuye who was an employee at the Brasseries et Limonaderies du Rwanda (Rwanda Breweries), Perusi, Munyagishari, Nisengwe and Uzabakiriho alias Kijumba, these were Interahamwe sent by the MRND and CDR parties, and they would eventually distinguish themselves by carrying out horrible acts during the genocide.” At the end of their training, these militiamen returned to their districts of origin. We continued with our training on the handling of 105mm hand guns and 81 mm mortars up to May 1992. Upon completion of training, we returned to our original units. In July 1992 I was assigned as platoon chief to the Company responsible for commanding the sector. I remember that at the time, the French from DAMI often came to see the commander of the operational sector, Colonel Augustin Bizimungu in order to undertake a joint study of the tactical problems within the sector.”

He affirms: “When I was at the command post of the operational sector, I was asked to deliver reinforcements to the sous-préfecture (sub-province) of Kirambo where the FAR were fighting with Inkotanyi. The French soldiers were there with their support weapons. We deployed twelve 105 mm guns. Each piece was manned by 7 persons: 4 Frenchmen and 3 Rwandans. I was responsible for the 5th canon. I had a French assistant who was at the same time the gun-layer. His role consisted of introducing into the aiming and shooting sections the necessary data that I communicated to him such as distance, angle, etc. 3 French ammunition handlers were responsible for preparing the shell and introducing it into the canon while ensuring that the mechanism was well grilled-up. Two Rwandans assisted them. There was also a senior French Army officer who communicated, by means of radio, orders to fire and corrected us basing himself on the impact on the target (CFR, RAPPORT, P50). Reinforcements having been given, I returned to my Company in Ruhengeri. Not far from there, in Nyakinama, the French soldiers from DAMI continued to train Rwandan soldiers as well as militia, this occurred in Bigogwe. On 8th February 1993, the RPF launched a huge offensive throughout the entire front. They became very threatning, as they took over a base, located 40 km from Kigali. Towards the North there was fierce fighting right within Ruhengeri aimed at dislodging Inkotanyi. Once again, the DAMI Company deployed in Nyakinama near the FAR gunners, deploying 120 mm guns as well as 105 and 122 mm guns. On this occasion, I too was asked to provide reinforcements. I was part of the 105 mm-canon teams.”

Lastly, he evokes the supply of arms by French soldiers: “At the end of July 1994, the operations commander of Ruhengeri, Lt. Colonel Marcel Bivugabagabo went to Gisenyi to receive the French soldiers that were part of Turquoise. I left with him, being head of the protection unit. Some of the French soldiers established themselves and their weapons in the stadium of Gisenyi, while the rest (their commanders) took rooms at the Hotel Méridien. Two days after, some young militiamen undergoing military training at the Umuganda stadium of Gisenyi were requisitioned to go and unload arms and ammunition in Goma. Upon their arrival in Gisenyi, some of the arms and ammunition were distributed in Camp Gisenyi, others at the Umuganda stadium, and others at the MRND party headquarters on the shores of Lake Kivu. Some of these arms were used during the last battle of Mburabuturo in Kigali. Others were deployed during the last attacks on Bisesero. Lastly, others were used to increase the number of weapons already in the hands of the Interahamwe in the various districts surrounding Gisenyi.”

57. Jean-Pierre Martin

Jean Pierre Martin has been a journalist at RTL-TVI since 1984. This is the most prominent private television channel serving the French-speaking community in Belgium. He is in charge of international politics and mostly deals with Central Africa (Rwanda, Congo and Burundi) and the Near East (Israel, Palestine and Libya). He came to Rwanda for the first time in 1983 during his military service. From 1985 onwards, he came to Rwanda at least once a year as a journalist. In 1994, he came 5 or 6 times. He was heard by the Commission during its public session held on 17th April 2007.

His testimony gives an account of the situation that prevailed before the genocide, as well as its precursor signs. He also speaks of the intervention of French soldiers on the side of the FAR before and during the genocide. He however declares that he did not witness events that occurred within the “humanitarian zone” created by Opération turquoise.

“After the RPF offensive in October 1990, I arrived as soon as I could. I realised the brutality of the Habyarimana regime on one hand, and its manipulations which had hoodwinked the international community, on the other. At the time, however, I believe Belgium had understood to some measure since it had refused to maintain a contingent that would help the then President Habyarimana, who had nevertheless made a specific request to King Baudouin. This was probably the most intelligent decision taken by my country. It probably explains, at least partly, the subsequent resentment of Belgium as well as the anti-Belgium propaganda that led to the deaths of 10 Belgian peacekeepers.

We were in 1990; I shall now return your attention to this period. […] I never met French soldiers except here as they arrived in November 1990. I immediately understood that the attack on Kigali was simply a ploy. Furthermore, apart from the brutality of the repression of the minority of the population, I was surprised at the French army’s attitude that was not only complacent but also participative. Whereas the Belgians, who had stayed for quite a short period, had a very clear mandate; that of evacuating expatriates, it was immediately clear that the French had intervened militarily on the side of the FAR. I went to the Akagera region, and went up to the border with Tanzania. However, I and my friend Jacques Collet were obliged to return since we had been practically under fire from Mobutu’s soldiers. Therefore, I did not witness the presence of the French soldiers at the Rwanda-Uganda border in 1990. I know that others saw them; apparently the RTBF saw some French soldiers. I think that Jean- François Bastin displayed these pictures of French soldiers on the side of FAR, in 1990.

However, I concentrated myself on the events in Kigali. I tried to inquire about the rampant brutality, the roundups, since the prisons were becoming full. I mostly witnessed what was happening at the former stadium of Nyamirambo. In fact it is the pictures that I took, after slightly opening up the gate of the stadium that went round the world during that time. They paved way for questions to be asked about the Habyarimana regime, and probably led to Belgium’s decision not to continue the operation.

Concerning the role of the French, the only thing that I can say is that on three occasions I witnessed some roundups, as well as physical attacks on Rwandan civilians. On three occasions I saw French soldiers observe these acts without intervening. This was at the roundabout next to the Army Headquarters, near Chez Lando, and at the main roundabout in Kigali town centre. The victims were either forced to climb into a truck, or into a jeep in the presence of the French soldiers. I gave these images to the Television in 1990. Hence this brutality inflicted on Rwandan citizens, and the increasing number of people thrown into jeeps or trucks occurred in the presence of French soldiers. This is what I can say about 1990.

[….]At the Airport in Kigali, it was obvious that while the evacuation of the expatriates was organised simultaneously with the arrival of the French and Zairian forces, the general impression was that the French were organising all operations, dictated the law and commanded the larger operation as a whole. When the roundups occurred in Kigali, when trucks full of people some of them with bound wrists passed in front of the French soldiers; when some persons were arrested and beaten up about 2 or 3 metres away; I say “beaten” because I do remember two cases whereby two persons were beaten with FAR rifle butts just next to some French soldiers. One would simply wonder about the attitude of these soldiers who obviously stood there without turning a hair!

[ …] You do remember that in 1990, in order to get the support of as many Western armies as possible, Habyarimana had spread the lie of an attack on Kigali. Today, it is known that this attack was simply a manipulation of events, and this manipulation was probably staged by the French. Very quickly, the French sent men to Kigali who I believe had mostly come from Central Africa, but also included parachutists and legionnaires too. What I do know is that they had taken control of the whole town. There was a Frenchman just next to each of the crossroads, as well as every strategic location within Kigali. At every 100 metres there was a Frenchman. I also believe that this stemmed from the desire to create some tension and to spread fear among the population. This was a success since thanks to this fear Habyarimana’s Special Services, the Police and the Gendarmerie were able to roundup thousands of persons and imprison them, when they were not summarily beaten up.

[ …]Due to the difficulties of obtaining a visa I was not able to return to Rwanda easily. I was only able to return at the beginning of the establishment of the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR, then more frequently in February and March 1994. I was with my colleague Jacques Collet between February and March 1994; all the evidence of preparation for genocide was there. One would have to be a bogus ambassador or military attaché to be oblivious to it. Right from the beginning, my colleague often accompanied me to Rwanda because he speaks Kinyarwanda and it was more or less the only way to access good information. During this period I never again saw the French soldiers, but I know that later on, others witnessed the continuous presence of the French soldiers, and that the Belgian soldiers themselves were convinced of this fact.

For me, February was an extremely crucial date because I was present at the time of the murder of Gatabazi and during the massacres in Kigali. I remember, at the mortuary alone, on 28th February, I think that together with Jacques Collet we had counted at least 100 corpses within the mortuary of CHK hospital. I also remember that other journalist colleagues whom I begged to go and see this evidence refused because they did not believe me. Nonetheless we had photographs that had many repercussions during that time, and that enabled me to knock on the door of the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs to inform them that something very, very serious was about to occur. One of the Belgian authorities we met had told me that they had taken careful note of this information and that it tallied with the information they already had. Furthermore, the Belgian soldiers of the First Battalion were not fooled at all. They told me of the anti-Belgian Propaganda, ‘Radio Television Mille Collines’, the weapons being circulated, their complete inability to disarm the Interahamwe and also, off-camera, the presence of French Army instructors in Kigali, which I did not witness.

After this extremely worrying period, premonitory on one hand, and the last general preparation before genocide in my opinion, I arrived within the first days that followed the explosion of violence, on the 9th and accompanied by Jacques Collet as usual. We found it quite difficult to circulate in Kigali; note that Jacques Collet, Marie France Cross of the ‘Libre Belgique’ and myself were totally unwanted in this country. The last time that the Ambassador of Belgium met Habyarimana, on 17th March, and asked him to close the ‘Radio des Milles Collines’, or at least stop it from preaching hatred of the minority and of Belgium, President Habyarimana simply retorted, “Close the RTL in Belgium.”

According to what I was told; it appears that our names had been regularly mentioned on ‘Radio des Mille collines.” Therefore it was not easy for us to circulate freely. One should also remember that Belgian journalists were not welcome. When foreign journalists were asked for their passports, only French journalists were accorded a hero’s welcome. I saw this and can prove it since I witnessed it. In April 1994 they could go wherever they wanted, and this was not the case for BBC or Belgian journalists. We could not. It was a question of life or death.

[ …] The French journalists acted like they were soldiers, and the French soldiers acted as if they were journalists. There were even officers specially appointed to be responsible for the media. There was total osmosis. This is not in Belgian tradition, where we have a long tradition of independence from any kind of power. The Belgian journalists were simply marginalised. They could not even eat; they found it difficult to find a place where they could lay down their sleeping bags. It was not prudent for Jacques Collet and I to venture by ourselves into the town, given the threats that hung over us. We therefore remained at the airport with some other journalists including Collette Braeckman. The French journalists and officers drank quite a lot. They had officers responsible for the media. This is a special unit within Defence, I forget the name. They went as far as breaking into the duty-free shop on the first floor of the Airport so as to obtain alcoholic drinks. This is just one detail, which however has some importance.

This demonstrates the attitude that they had. They turned away Belgian journalists that they didn’t trust. At least, some of them with the exception of Frédéric François. They were wary of all journalists that paid no allegiance to France, and left them out of all relevant missions. Since this happened after the death of the 10 peacekeepers, the Belgian soldiers were afraid that a new offensive could be launched against them, some dirty trick on the part of the FAR. We were cornered, to some extent, since missions to the most distant locations, i.e. those that were the most revealing, were only done in the company of the French. We ourselves had no access to these areas, because there was mistrust from all sides. At the airport, we could do anything in collaboration with the Belgian soldiers. We could climb into the planes, make return trips between Nairobi and Kigali, and entrust the passengers or team members with our cassettes. Everything was transparent. In contrast, we could never film those entering into the French planes, and this normally happened in the evenings.

[ …] During the trips that I made, accompanied by Belgian soldiers each time they went to seek out for expatriates for evacuation, I was able to see what was happening on the roadblocks. I was frightened by the sight of thousands of corpses that I was able to see. Two events were indelibly etched in my mind: one took place on the runway of the airport of Kanombe. At the end of the runway, on the section leading to town and parallel to the right side of the runway, with a clear view of the working-class section of Kigali – this area whose name I did not know, at the foot of the stadium, at 200 metres from the building used by the VIP, together with the former control tower, there were one or two anti-aircraft batteries that were not used as anti-aircraft batteries; on the contrary they were used to directly shoot at the town.

Additionally, I remember very well having interviewed a Rwandan gunner of the FAR. Having recorded the radio communications, he told me, “It is the French who are guiding us and they tell us where exactly we should shoot.” [ …] In my opinion this battery was still in place but it had been reactivated and used for other purposes other than that of a normal anti-aircraft battery. The soldiers shot directly at the target, I witnessed this. I saw them aim at the town, and I can assure you that they were guided by the French; it is the gunners of the FAR themselves that confirmed this to me. This took placed towards the 10th or 11th April 1994.

[ …] It is true that in 1994, I saw some images that will always remain indelibly etched in my mind. I will never forget mostly this pregnant woman that they disembowelled 100 metres from me, and there was a jeep and two French soldiers who laughed at the sight. They laughed and they were at a 50 metres distance from where it was happening. Finally it was the two Belgian soldiers who were with us that put the Interahamwe or the killers to flight. [ …] It is at the exit from the airport, when one enters the road leading to town; once one has bypassed the depression on the road and one is driving towards the stadium, this is where it all happened. Myself, I was inside the depression on the road knowing fully well that I was in a jeep of Belgian soldiers who had more or less come to my rescue because they were afraid; then we witnessed this scene where a pregnant woman was disembowelled. Between me, the jeep of the Belgian soldiers and the killing there was a jeep inside which two French soldiers were laughing, and who did not react. They watched the scene as if it were a film [ …] They were 50 metres away from me and I was 100 or 120 metres away from the scene. They were between me and the scene of the murder. This must have taken place between the 9th and 18th April 1994. I stayed in the country for 9 more days, and then took the second-last Belgian plane that left the country.

[ …] I believe that, for the work of the Commission, this is the clearest contribution that I can give. With regards to the rest, like you I believe that the French have a huge responsibility in all this. This is the fruit of my own conviction, of a series of presumptions resulting from readings, indirect testimonies, interviews that I was able to carry out during the last 10 years, all of which, unfortunately, are not the fruit of what I actually saw. Effectively, I lack the required personal experience. I was not present during “Turquoise”. I was not able to enter the Zone Turquoise. All that I was able to do between April and the liberation in July was to follow the Patriotic Front notably through Bugesera, and throughout the East and South of the country. However I never got into contact with “Turquoise”. Neither did I enter the refugee camps, for personal reasons. This is because the military operation that had been launched from Zaїre had deeply revolted me and for one or two months I could not sleep. I was outraged by what I was hearing and by the development of the entire pseudo-humanitarian operation.

58. Joachim Hategekimana

Joachim HATEGEKIMANA was born in 1952 in Ruhashya, Huye District, Southern Province. He was the Sous Préfet of Kaduha from September 1990 to October 1994. He is currently incarcerated in the Central Prison of Nyamagabe. His hearing took place on 11th January 2007.

His testimony mostly relates the evacuation of survivors from Kaduha, the distribution of arms to civilians, the appointment of administrative authorities, the dropping of persons into the forest of Nyungwe by helicopter as well as killings.

“During the first days of July, before the 5th, the French soldiers coming from their base in Gikongoro arrived in Kaduha in 3 beige pick-ups. There were about 10 of them. They found me at my home near the post office. They wanted to know where and how to find the survivors. They told me that they had come to secure the region. They took about 60 survivors who were at the school of nursing; about 30 who were at the agro-veterinary school, and another 30 who were at the health centre. We did not know where they were taking them, nor for what reasons. Later on, four other survivors who had learnt that the French had evacuated the others came to wait for them at my home. The first day, they were taken in two shifts, in their pick-ups. A certain Gahamanyi who was Director of the Ecole Agro-Veterinaire and Immaculée Kayitete who was the deputy director of the health centre could give you more information about this.

After the flight of certain burgomasters from districts within the préfeture of Gikongoro, the French appointed others to replace them. They also appointed some policemen without consulting me, yet these administrative entities were part of the sous préfeture of which I was responsible. This is the case with the appointment of Siméon, as Burgomaster of Musange, Rwabarinda, as Burgomaster of Rwamiko and Ndahayo Emmanuel, as Burgomaster of Muko. They also proceeded to distribute guns to the burgomasters and policemen. In areas where there were no policemen, the French were entrusted with the task of recruiting them. These guns were later on captured by the RPF.

The French soldiers killed people and dumped others from a helicopter. I saw them kill a reservist in Joma with a bullet. They placed the victim on board a helicopter. When, by chance, the French soldiers captured members of the RPF, they executed them on the spot. Thus I was told of the case of 6 soldiers of the RPF that the French captured, disarmed a few metres from Munyangoga, within Nkore Cellule near the bridge, and then killed them. Similar incidents frequently occurred in Kaduha, Kinyamakara, Runyinya and Kibeho. I saw Katasi lying down in a truck belonging to the French soldiers. He was lying inert, and covered with some sheeting, but his legs were visible.

Subsequently, I received information that he had been thrown from a helicopter into the Nyungwe Forest. Nobody ever saw him again. I saw Laurien Rugira upon his return from Nyungwe, where the French soldiers had thrown him from a helicopter. He collected his belongings and said, “I am going home. If the French want to kill me, they can come and look for me.” The question of throwing people from helicopters was brought up during a meeting that we held with the French towards the end of July or beginning of August, at the SOS centre. They were asked if they were indeed throwing people into the Nyungwe forest. The response was in the affirmative, with the explanation that there were people who were very dangerous, who had to be put away. This declaration was made by a French major whose name I do not know. All the burgomasters, myself as a sous-préfet and various other authorities were present at this meeting.”




59. John Mbigizembishaka

John Mbigizembishaka lived at the SOS centre of Gikongoro, where he worked as a messenger and storekeeper. He was heard by the Commission on 23rd November 2006, among witnesses to the events, as well as at Nyamagabe on 18th December 2007 and on 11th October 2007. Mbigizembishaka talks of his experience and his contact with the French; that enabled him to witness the throwing of survivors and other troublemakers from helicopters, the close collaboration of the French with local authorities of the time, as well as the raping of girls.

“From May to June 1994, the staff and the orphans who lived in the Save Our Souls (SOS) centre had left the centre. Since I kept some keys during the genocide, I came to live in the visitors’ quarters with my entire family. When the French soldiers arrived in Gikongoro, I was living in the premises of the SOS centre. The children and employees of the centre had been evacuated to Bukavu. The French soldiers kept me and entrusted me with their washing. I remained with them till they left. This is how I was able to see their actions from a close distance. Once, towards 18h00, a military plane landed on the football field of the centre, it had brought a person with arms bound, and guarded by an armed Rwandan and 3 French soldiers. Towards 18h45 they first introduced him to the head of the French soldiers, before taking him on board the helicopter towards Cyangugu.

Upon their return 15 minutes later, we only saw the Rwandan and the two French soldiers who accompanied him. I learnt that this man had come from Kibuye and had lied that he was not Tutsi, and this was the reason for which he had been brought before the French soldiers. A certain Jean Marie who understood French and who was often in the company of the Frenchmen told us that he had been thrown off the helicopter. The soldiers were in the habit of throwing people into the Nyungwe forest. They inflicted this treatment on survivors and any other trouble makers. The survivors were first of all beaten up and bound before being thrown off the helicopter, while the others were tied up.

During this time, I noticed that certain soldiers including the chiefs slept with women and kept them there on a permanent basis. During the night, they lighted fire and sent me to bring for them some hemp as well as girls. A young man named Jean Marie did the same task for the French. We brought girls to them and they paid us with food rations. The French chose the most beautiful girls and sent back the others. Usually we chose from among those that originated from Kibuye. The chiefs slept with the girls in the rooms, while the other soldiers raped them behind the buildings. Among them, I remember M.D. who was originally from Kigembe district.

She regularly slept with a French second lieutenant in the premises of SOS. Sometimes I acted as the intermediary for organising their appointments. There were also some girls who I would say slept with the Frenchmen for pay. This is the case with A who lived in Nzega, another named Cy who lived near Majyambere’s, as well as another called Co. With them, the French had sexual relations in the open air on the grass as if for amusement.”

With regards to the close collaboration between the French soldiers and the local authorities, he indicates, “several meetings with the authorities were held at the SOS centre, after which these leaders received guns for their own use. Among these leaders, there was an assistant director of SOS, the sous-préfet Biniga as well as Mushinguzi.”

60. John Yankurije

John Yankurije was a soldier in the Rwandan Patriotic Front before being demobilised in 2001. He is a trader who comes from Muteke, in Gicumbi District in the Northern Province. The Commission heard his testimony, in his capacity as witness to the events, during a public hearing held on 17th July 2007. His testimony is about the establishment and manning of the roadblocks as well as the participation of the French soldiers in combat.

Concerning the roadblocks, he declares the following: “In 1992, the French soldiers together with the Rwandan gendarmes established roadblocks in Nyabugogo and Nyacyonga. They asked all passers-by for identity cards. One day, I went to Kigali in order to sell some charcoal, as I usually did. Upon my return I was arrested by the French and Rwandan gendarmes on the Nyacyonga roadblock. A Rwandan gendarme asked me to show my identity card. I immediately presented my identity card. He then went up to a French soldier and they spoke for some minutes. Then he told me to wait by the side of the road with a group of other people who had been arrested. They beat us up and we remained there throughout the day under the heavy rainfall. They freed us late in the evening and I immediately mounted my motorbike and decided that I would never return to Kigali.”

Regarding the participation of the French on the front, he affirms, “From end of 1992 to beginning of 1993, at the time when the war was raging in the regions of Ruhengeri and Byumba, I saw the French soldiers take the Kigali-Byumba road several times in their jeeps accompanied by trucks that towed along support weapons.”

61. Joseph Ngiruwonsanga

Joseph Ngiruwonsanga was born in 1965 in Murangi, Rusizi district, Western province, he is a survivor of the genocide, at the time he was in the camp of Nyarushishi. His hearing occurred on the 8th August 2006.

In his testimony, he talks about the arrival of the French soldiers of Opération turquoise in Nyarushishi and explains the circumstances of his being beaten.

“At the beginning of the genocide in April 1994, we fled to the Catholic parish of Cyangugu, then to the stadium of Kamarampaka. From there we were evacuated by the ONATRACOM bus which took us to the camp of Nyarushishi. At the beginning, this camp was guarded by gendarmes, and then by the Interahamwe who had lists of Tutsi and would pass by regularly in order to seek for Tutsi to kill. Sometime later, after June 1994, these gendarmes were replaced by French soldiers coming from Zaїre. At the time, Interahamwe’s positions were located around the camp, in the tea plantations of Shagasha Rwamiko, Mutimasi and on the slope of a mountain, within the tea plantation. During the period when the camp of Nyarushishi was guarded by the French soldiers, the Interahamwe did not stop killing people in the proximity of the camp. For example, a certain Anselme who came from Gihango, a lady and her baby carried on her back were killed when they left the camp in order to search for firewood.

[…] Four days after the arrival of the French in the camp of Nyarushishi. They learned that I had not participated in night patrols. They asked the leaders of the camp quarters to seek me out. They brought me before the residence of the camp’s commander, whose first name was Marcel. The coordinator of the Red Cross who came from Kibuye described my case. They then beat me up thoroughly and left me for dead. They threw me into a pit approximately 1.80m deep from which I could not pull myself out. My fingers and my mouth were bleeding. Towards 18h00, students coming from Kibuye saw me and informed a white man from the Red Cross who in turn called a certain Sade, the coordinator of the Red Cross. Assisted by the students, Sade pulled me out of the pit and returned me to the camp. I spent 8 days in bed under the treatment and care of the staff of the Red Cross. Throughout this period, I urinated blood. Today, I still suffer from the after-effects of the beatings, to such an extent that I regularly go to see a doctor. The French tortured many people within the camp; however we did not know them sufficiently to learn their names.”

62. Laurien Twagirayezu

Laurien Twagirayezu comes from Gicumbi, in the Northern Province. He was able to closely observe the activities of the French soldiers. He is an employee of the Prosecutor in Byumba where he has worked as messenger since 1988. The Commission heard him in camera, on 18th July 2007 in his capacity as a witness to the events.

His testimony is about the establishment of a roadblock by French soldiers at the entry of the military camp of Byumba and at that of the prosecution office in Byumba, the participation of French soldiers in combat, as well as the training of the FAR.

With regard to the manning of the roadblocks, he says the following: “In June 1992, the Inkotanyi attacked the town of Byumba. However, the FAR counter-attacked and repulsed them. In the meantime, we fled the town, towards Buyoga and after 4 days we returned to our homes. Upon our return, we noted that a roadblock had been established on a small street leading to the military camp and to the prosecution office in Byumba. This roadblock was still guarded by French and Rwandan soldiers. They rigorously checked everybody who wanted to go to the ‘Parquet’ or military camp. I myself was checked several times whenever I went to the ‘Parquet’ to work. The French themselves checked the identity cards. The roadblock remained at this location for about 5 months.”

As regards the assistance given to the Rwandan army on the front, he affirms, “Very near my residence in Kageyo, precisely at the primary school of Kageyo, the French had installed a powerful support weapon and were firing towards the positions held by Inkotanyi in Mukarange. Furthermore, they had other support weapons behind the Byumba stadium, within a quarry, and they shelled the positions of the RPF in Kivuye and Cyumba.”

Finally, he talks about the training of the FAR soldiers at Rwafandi in this way: “In Rwafandi, located in the former Rutare District, the French would train Rwandan soldiers along the road leading to Byumba, near Gaseke market. They trained them on the use of support weapons. Each time I passed by that area on my way to collect food from the Rusine IDP Camp, I would see them training.”

63. Luc Pillionel

Luc Pillionel, a Swiss national, was born in 1959 and is married to a Rwandan. He came to Rwanda in July 1994 to collect his in-laws who had sought refuge in Nyarushishi Camp. He gave his testimony to the Commission during a public hearing held on 14/6/2007.

His testimony focuses on the contact he had with the French army during his trip to Rwanda, as well as events that he witnessed.

“I had never been to Africa. My first visit was in July 1994 under peculiar circumstances. If my memory serves me right, on 25th June 1994 my wife and I were watching news on television, specifically on “Antenne 2”. There was a news feature on the arrival of French troops in Nyarushishi and my wife recognised her mother between two armoured vehicles, just between two tents where people had sought refuge. In the days that followed, I decided to go to look for my mother-in-law. I contacted Professor Jean Pierre Chrétien, a renowned French historian, to get whatever information I could get. He informed me that he was unable to assist but forwarded my request to his colleague Gérard Prunier. The latter called me a few days later and told me that he had organised some help for me from the French army and that I was to proceed as follows: take a commercial flight to Bujumbura and head to the French base in Kavumu on Monday 18th or Tuesday 19th, 1994; then hire a taxi from Bujumbura, which I did.

I arrived in Bujumbura on Wednesday 13th and I met the military attaché at the French Embassy on Thursday 14th. He had a copy of a fax from the Kavumu base and confirmed that the French soldiers at this base were expecting me on Monday or Tuesday of the following week. On Saturday 16th July, I began my journey to Kavumu base using the ‘Corniche’ via the Zairian customs in Uvira. I arrived there late afternoon on the same day.

I entered the base and briefly met the French who requested me to return on Tuesday morning at around 9h00. I then left the base for Bukavu. I would like to make comments on what I saw there. There was a Zairian watchman posted just outside the base which was surrounded by barbed wire. There were also discontinuous trenches. All around the base, there were mortar and machine gun posts, as well as massive petrol tanks to the left of the entrance to the base facing Lake Kivu. I was a little bit surprised to see that the petrol tanks were not protected. They were simple tanks made of rubber and could carry up to tens of thousands of litres. They were placed on the grass, a little bit to the side.

I had deduced that this base was considered as being extremely safe. Should it have been otherwise, the petrol reserves would have been tightly guarded. I also noted the good organisation, quantity and quality of the French military equipment. There were mortar posts, helicopters and Transall planes on the runway. I returned to Bukavu on Saturday evening. I spend three nights there, Saturday 16th, Sunday 17th and Monday 18th.

On the morning of Tuesday 19, 1994, there was a Rwandan clergyman who wanted to drive to Bujumbura in his car but had no fuel. He needed 20 dollars for petrol. I, on the other hand, had been unable to obtain a taxi to Kavumu. So we made a small deal and he took me to Kavumu at around 8h30 or 9h00 in the morning. Upon my arrival, I reported to the sentry at the French base. He showed me in and I briefly met a French soldier. On his uniform, I saw the name Hogard. He was of average height, slightly shorter that myself, suntanned, energetic and in his 50s. On the left of the uniform on his chest, there was a kind of small cord to which was attached a small lamp and on his belt, there was a pistol in a holster. We talked a bit. He went to his office where there was a radio and fax. He went through his fax file and found the fax that contained the information about me. He asked me to sit on a bench nearby and that he would let me know when I would proceed to Rwanda by helicopter.

I recall that it was during the dry season. I waited patiently for about an hour, or slightly more, I think. And then suddenly, I saw several turnarounds of helicopters, Super Pumas and Transalls which were unloaded in front of me. To my right as Lake Kivu; my back was facing Bukavu. Before me was the runway, tarmac and right at the end of the tarmac, slightly to the left were petrol tanks. The Transalls would land 300m from where I was; the Super Puma helicopters also landed opposite where I was seated. Those are the two kinds of aircraft I recall seeing. On several occasions, I saw Super Pumas land, and French soldiers disembark from them.

I noticed that these soldiers were not wearing the usual French army boots. They had hiking boots that were light, beige or black in colour, the kind frequently worn by civilians in Europe. They did not sport any badges on their uniforms and were not armed as usual with FAMA assault rifles of the French army. Generally, they were in groups of two or three, as they disembarked from helicopters and passed me as they went to Colonel Hogard’s office. They were well-equipped and their uniforms were slightly stained with dust and some had a beard, one or two days old. They carried a large amount of arms which surprised me a little, given the recent developments in Africa, in previous years.

From time to time, I would buy the French military review, RAIDS, in which such situations were often described. Political analyses had been conducted on the events in Rwanda. There were also articles on the uniforms and organisation of various armies in the world and Africa. One of the two partners in the buddy system would always carry on him a machine-gun pistol fitted with a silencer. On his chest and hips, he had at least 20 or 25 magazines which are on the higher side considering the six magazines that army officers in Kavumu base carried or the number of magazines that French soldiers had for their operations in Rwanda, for example. The second partner in the said system would have an M16 gun, probably with a barrel that was slightly heavier for precision shooting and specialised sighting equipment. They also had equipment that would enable them to carry a large number of magazines and grenades. For me, it was obvious that these people were returning from the battlefield and that they had used their weapons.

While there, I saw many soldiers arrive, while some of them subsequently left for Rwanda. Suddenly, Colonel Hogard appeared a few metres from me. He asked me, “Does this Swiss civilian luggage belong to you?” I had a big rucksack, suitcase with straps, and a small bag. I ran towards the helicopter. Some French special troops were ahead of me. It took me one or two minutes to get into the helicopter. They were already impatient to take off. A French soldier grabbed me by the belt - even as I carried my big rucksack on the back - with one hand, and practically carried me with the other hand, tossing me into the cabin. I was surprised since I weighed at least 80 kilos and had 30 kilos of luggage with me.

I found myself in a French helicopter with a team of soldiers who were conducting a final check before going into the battlefield. The pilots checked their equipment, survival kits, and small radios in the life jackets, to ensure that all was in order. They checked their magazines and pistols, etc. We travelled to Kavumu in this Supa Puma helicopter. Initially, we flew at a low altitude to Kivu and then to Rwanda. The flight lasted a few minutes then we landed at the Kamembe French base. The helicopter landed next to a large iron hangar enclosed within a field fortified with sandbags. I entered the base. I recall meeting a French officer, Captain Guillaume Ancel, who told me that we would soon leave for Nyarushishi.

I waited for about an hour in a small area hemmed in by sandbags within the base’s hangar. Shortly afterwards, at approximately 11h00-11h30, Captain Guillaume Ancel came to tell me, “We are now ready to go.” He informed me that we would walk and wanted to know if I was willing to take a number of risks. He told me that he was willing to evacuate my wife’s family from Nyarushishi and transport them to a place that we would agree upon. I told him that I preferred to travel with them because my presence would be a guarantee that the evacuation would be carried out to the best of their interests.

I am not sure whether it was at this point or earlier at the Kavumu military base when the French proposed to evacuate me all the way to Europe in their Transall plane. I was rather taken aback by this proposal, which was most welcome as I would be able to safely and quickly travel with my family to Europe. Captain Guillaume Ancel and I reached an agreement. We left the base in a 4-wheel drive jeep with a driver, including Captain Guillaume Ancel and myself. I was seated in the passenger seat at the back. The Jeep was armed with a machine gun and a more or less traditional 308 NATO gun. Behind us, there were two big 4-wheel drive trucks each of them bearing 4 driving wheels and huge tyres. Each truck had a team of six men, officers from the second regiment of the foreign legion infantry. In it there were 3 ordinary soldiers, I believe. There was a sharpshooter, a machine gun, a 12-7 gun on a small metallic turret above the driver across the front of the truck.

At the time we were located to the side of the base, along the runway. I cannot recall on which axis of the runway we were located, but given the direction of the sun I believe we were located in the southern section, upon the runway centre line. To my right, there was a French bunker, and on the inside of the field, the big metallic hangar. We left the post with the vehicle and drove along the runway with the sun at our backs. It was around 11h30. I remember that the vehicles were moving slowly in the well manicured lawn the borders the airport. After approximately 100 m or 200 m, we came across half a dozen fresh corpses.

We continued along the southern part of the runway and arrived at the level of the control tower from which there was a slope to the left; it was to the right of this very location that the corpses lay. My attention was particularly drawn to the almost decapitated head of a corpse. I could see the pinkish flesh of the corpse. Furthermore, there was a pool of blood on the ground, which had not yet dried up. The sky was reflected in it as clearly as in a mirror, just as if it were a drop of mercury. The French passed on the side without any reaction whatsoever. For me there is no shadow of a doubt that these were persons that had fled the genocide weeks ago. This was obvious due to the emaciated face of the male person. In the dust next to me, with a beard that had obviously been several weeks old. He was extremely thin and wearing dirty clothes.

These corpses were within proximity of the runway, a few metres away from the runway, i.e. between 150 and 200 metres into the extremely well-guarded French positions, to be precise. To me, it was impossible to imagine that Rwandans in civilian clothing, in my opinion in a relatively bad state of health and having gone hungry for a long time being in flight, could have attempted any military action whatsoever. Moreover, there was no weapon or any such tool. Furthermore, this brought to mind the question of how they had reached this location. […] There was a fortified position in the same location. The area facing the corpses, next to the buildings located at the entry and the exit of the base were all fortified positions.

In my opinion, the entire perimeter was permanently secured and furthermore, given the nature of the area that bore short grass and had no bushes, without anything that could be termed as being in a functioning state, it was flat. The few persons who entered this location, mostly during the day, were immediately sighted. They could not have access to this area without the permission of the French. […] I understand that if they had sought to penetrate this base, they could never have managed to hide themselves. It’s a flat terrain; it was daytime and it was 11h00 in the morning. Therefore in my opinion, there was a closed perimeter and the corpses that I found within close proximity of the landing section of the runway, along a tiny end of the makeshift road that had been created by the to-and-fro movements of the French vehicles that drove along the runway to finally veer off in the direction of the exit area. The corpses that I saw to my right as I left the area were within the perimeter of the French army, between two positions and two fortifications of the company occupied by numerous French personnel whereby there were several guards positioned on a permanent basis, day and night.

[…]I’ve established several theories; these are not facts that I am relating. This said, in my opinion either the French allowed them to enter the base, and I think that the base was organised in such a way that there could only be one entry. Second theory; they were brought there by the French. Therefore if they allowed them to enter, where were they going in the first place? From the existing gateway, they had crossed the runway so as to reach the location of the French. In this case, they had been allowed to enter so that they could be killed by the Interahamwe or maybe by the French themselves. I know nothing of this, however.

[…] We went towards the exit of the base where there was a roadblock a bit similar to the level crossing in Europe, red and white. I had no sense of direction at this point. I was nevertheless in a slightly particular situation, operating with foreign soldiers. It was anticipated that we would go to Nyarushishi. We descended the airport road, which was tarmacked. I believe we turned towards the left in order to travel towards Nyarushishi, and then the radio began to crackle frequently. The subsequent impression was one which I did not understand at all, since there were many parasites and they spoke in a slightly coded language. Additionally I had the impression that I was something of a burden to them; that the French soldiers could not do what they wanted to do because of my presence.

We were supposed to go to Nyarushishi, but at some moment Captain Guillaume Ancel told me that their vehicles were to go and assist a small number of their soldiers who were operating in the field and needed their support. He didn’t say anything further. We were sitting in three vehicles armed with a light machine-gun and two heavy machine-guns as well as 12 men 2 of whom had sharpshooter 308-calibre guns. With good support, a trained soldier can shoot at someone located 600 metres away with no problem at all.

“He then told me, “Listen, I shall return you to the base at Kamembe or to the Bishop’s place in Cyangugu.” I had indicated that my cousin Epaphrodite Kayinamura, a Rwandan clergyman, was there. He was a bursar, I believe, with the grade of vicar. I then asked him about the security at the Bishop’s place, because there was nevertheless an unstable situation around us, with frequent gunshots. Several times I spotted corpses on roadsides, fresh corpses or stale corpses that really stank. Some had even lost most of their clothing and were decomposed into skeletons with just a little dried-up flesh.

He told me that it was true, that there were 3 legionnaires who guarded the base, and that the latter were not the target of the combat, and that at the limit it was just a few looters who went there. He stated that the soldiers nevertheless were in control of the situation. At this point we made a U-turn and arrived at the Bishop’s place soon after the end of the midday meal. It must have been about 13h00, maybe even 14h00. Here, I discussed with Kayinamura, my cousin. I asked if I could remain there, and of course he accepted, and the French went away saying that they would inform me about the ensuing operations. I spent the afternoon with the French while discussing a bit with the soldiers, then simply watched the time pass by. At some point, as I was seated in front of the parish building, there were shots fired by automatic rifles to our right, and with bullets that were sent towards our direction at about the height of an adult male.


Night time arrived. I remained there with the members of the parish, then went to spend some time outside while drinking some coffee that the French had brewed on the small gas cooker. When it was time to retire for the night, the Rwandans had fastened all the grilled doors and windows of the Bishopric. I was at the window when one of the Frenchmen told me, “Yeah! You may spend the night with us at our post. We could give you a sleeping bag as well as a little camp rug since in any case we do not sleep. We are there to keep watch.” The night then started to take its course. At that moment, some men; I believe they were 5 or 7 legionnaires, came as reinforcements for the night because the situation had possibly become more dangerous, and in the case whereby looting would eventually occur. In addition, there were French personnel present. If it had been during an operation in Rwanda in the daytime, this would enable them to rest, to have access to water, to the toilets, … During the discussion, a French soldier from the Antilles – I recognised him from his French accent – said that it was the “Khmers noirs” (black Khmers) meaning the RPF, who were perpetrating the genocide. He added that they themselves were there in order to intervene in this situation. It obviously did not tally with the reality on the ground; even for someone who had his eyes open, he was repeating something that he had simply heard without asking questions and without studying the reality that was unfolding all around him. I told him that it was not fair, and that it was not true, adding that my brothers-in-law had been assassinated in genocide.

The night took its course without any incident. I nevertheless remember having heard some gunshots, as well as some grenade explosions once or twice. I mostly remember at one point, having heard an absolutely chilling scream that still chills me to the bones. Towards the right down below, possibly at a 200 or 300m bird’s eye view, I heard a voice that was possibly that of a woman who, having been raped, was probably killed, cut up or had her throat slit, something like that. It was abominable. Then the French soldier, as he discussed, drew out a large black briefcase that was hidden in the depot, and removed a weapon dismantled in two parts and weighing about 15 kg.

From what he told me, it was a heavy gun, a 50-calibre with a semi-automatic rifle bearing loaders. He mounted it and placed a battery on top of the little kiosk situated to the left of the Bishopric. On top, he placed a special universal gunner’s sight then showed me a jerry can floating on Lake Kivu that he had sighted during the day. He told me that it was situated at a distance approximately farther than 1 km away, and that he was capable of shooting it even in the prevailing conditions. He did not use his weapon. This is in order to explain a little bit about the sophisticated arms that the French had with them.

In that area there were some very close shots. Afterwards they sounded again for a while, nevertheless not in our own direction; these were not shots in combat, the way I saw it. They were rather evidence of looting, of victims that were to be executed. With regards to other gunshots, they did not give the impression that there was combat, because if this was the case, we would have heard some return shots. Within the zone, who was present? Turquoise, obviously. Furthermore this was a rather ‘airtight’ zone, with the presence of the French. Who else was there? Those who executed the genocide and to my knowledge there was no RPF personnel. In addition, we know that the victims of the genocide, the Tutsis, were unarmed. Therefore in my opinion the overwhelming majority of the gunshots could have been none other than the Interahamwe. These were the gunshots that I identified as being from Kalashnikovs. Then there were the French soldiers who I imagine were firing those I identified through the rhythm of the shots.

The next day at around 14h00, 14h30 or towards 15h00, i.e. during the afternoon – this was on Wednesday 20th July – I was dozing off on the bed, in a room within the white building to the left of the Bishopric. Captain Hogard arrived and said, “Where is the Swiss civilian?” I said, “I’m here, I’m coming.” He told me, “Listen, your family is inside the truck, we went to look for them in Nyarushishi. You have 30 seconds in which to say your goodbyes then join us at the lower end of the road.” I went to the lower end of the road leading towards the Bishopric, where the French military trucks had been covered with tarpaulin, i.e. those that contained 11 members who were my in-laws. I lifted the tarpaulin, it smelled foul inside. It smelled of and excretion. My family were in a really pitiful state.

I then introduced myself. I had a photograph where I was with their sister, i.e. my spouse. I did not know them, and I told them, I am your brother-in-law and I came to collect you. We are going to Bukavu and I hope things will be better there. They were all very shocked, and their eyes were haggard. There was only my brother-in-law Dieudonné Niyibizi, at the time 23 years old and a survivor of the events, with his mother and his two children, a sister and a brother, all survivors of the stadium of Cyangugu. They were in a group of 4 and were coming from Nyarushishi. There was also a second group of family members including my mother-in-law Anna Kankera, my sister-in-law Marie and 4 of her children who had survived the massacres of Mibilizi parish.

Captain Ancel now said he wanted to drop me off at the Customs, on the little metallic bridge that served as the border between Rwanda and Zaïre. I said, “Listen, this is not right. Initially you proposed to take me up to Europe, and you did not do it. This is not a problem. However, I had anticipated, in my initial plans to go to Bugarama.” This was a place that swarmed with militia but I had a cousin there, Martine, whose husband was an official in CIMERWA. With them I could hope for a good arrangement. In the meantime, he had told me that we could not go to Bugarama, we would go to Bukavu. I said, “Alright. You have seen that in Bukavu there are Interahamwe everywhere. You cannot leave me in a street just like that, without means of transport; we would surely be killed.” I therefore told him that he should take me to the UNHCR, a location which I knew to be in Bukavu. He accepted, and told me that he had no authority to go into Zaïre, but given that the Zairian soldiers had, on a large scale, looted from the Rwandan refugees fleeing into Zaïre, and seeing that the latter had definitely had a lot to drink, they would be calm on that afternoon since their pockets were full of money. He was still a bit tense. He told me that we would have to act a bit faster.

He ordered his men to be as discreet as possible, to avoid exhibiting their arms in an open manner. We took the road to the border at Rusizi and crossed the bridge. We then arrived at the UNHCR office in Bukavu, in the front compound. Inside of this compound, there was a very large number of Rwandans waiting for their right of asylum and who were obviously fleeing perpetrators of genocide, some of them accompanied by their families. Captain Guillaume Ancel asked the driver of the truck carrying my in-laws to reverse and position the back of the truck against the gate of the UNHCR. He descended from the truck; then pushed forward the Zairian guards who guarded the small door so that they moved inside the metallic door, over to the other side. There were some exclamations of surprise. He equally appeared to push forward the staff responsible for ensuring security and forcefully opened the door. The truck reversed slightly into the interior grounds of the UNHCR, and my family descended from it. I took my luggage, took my leave of the French, and then the Zairian guards bolted the doors once again. This was the end of my contacts with the French army.

After that, on Wednesday evening I went to a working-class district of Bukavu, in Cyayi, situated at the time just in front of the military camp of Panzi. I had to spend two days in Bukavu in order to find a bus so that we could leave the area with all 11 persons with whom I had arrived, and meanwhile tensions had arisen in a very sensitive manner in Bukavu due to the arrival of several thousands, or tens of thousands of Interahamwe, who were reassembled by the Zairian army in the Panzi camp.

[XXPANTHAXX]

end of their training, these militiamen returned to their districts of origin. We continued with our training on the handling of 105mm hand guns and 81 mm mortars up to May 1992. Upon completion of training, we returned to our original units. In July 1992 I was assigned as platoon chief to the Company responsible for commanding the sector. I remember that at the time, the French from DAMI often came to see the commander of the operational sector, Colonel Augustin Bizimungu in order to undertake a joint study of the tactical problems within the sector.”

He affirms: “When I was at the command post of the operational sector, I was asked to deliver reinforcements to the sous-préfecture (sub-province) of Kirambo where the FAR were fighting with Inkotanyi. The French soldiers were there with their support weapons. We deployed twelve 105 mm guns. Each piece was manned by 7 persons: 4 Frenchmen and 3 Rwandans. I was responsible for the 5th canon. I had a French assistant who was at the same time the gun-layer. His role consisted of introducing into the aiming and shooting sections the necessary data that I communicated to him such as distance, angle, etc. 3 French ammunition handlers were responsible for preparing the shell and introducing it into the canon while ensuring that the mechanism was well grilled-up. Two Rwandans assisted them. There was also a senior French Army officer who communicated, by means of radio, orders to fire and corrected us basing himself on the impact on the target (CFR, RAPPORT, P50). Reinforcements having been given, I returned to my Company in Ruhengeri. Not far from there, in Nyakinama, the French soldiers from DAMI continued to train Rwandan soldiers as well as militia, this occurred in Bigogwe. On 8th February 1993, the RPF launched a huge offensive throughout the entire front. They became very threatning, as they took over a base, located 40 km from Kigali. Towards the North there was fierce fighting right within Ruhengeri aimed at dislodging Inkotanyi. Once again, the DAMI Company deployed in Nyakinama near the FAR gunners, deploying 120 mm guns as well as 105 and 122 mm guns. On this occasion, I too was asked to provide reinforcements. I was part of the 105 mm-canon teams.”

Lastly, he evokes the supply of arms by French soldiers: “At the end of July 1994, the operations commander of Ruhengeri, Lt. Colonel Marcel Bivugabagabo went to Gisenyi to receive the French soldiers that were part of Turquoise. I left with him, being head of the protection unit. Some of the French soldiers established themselves and their weapons in the stadium of Gisenyi, while the rest (their commanders) took rooms at the Hotel Méridien. Two days after, some young militiamen undergoing military training at the Umuganda stadium of Gisenyi were requisitioned to go and unload arms and ammunition in Goma. Upon their arrival in Gisenyi, some of the arms and ammunition were distributed in Camp Gisenyi, others at the Umuganda stadium, and others at the MRND party headquarters on the shores of Lake Kivu. Some of these arms were used during the last battle of Mburabuturo in Kigali. Others were deployed during the last attacks on Bisesero. Lastly, others were used to increase the number of weapons already in the hands of the Interahamwe in the various districts surrounding Gisenyi.”

57. Jean-Pierre Martin

Jean Pierre Martin has been a journalist at RTL-TVI since 1984. This is the most prominent private television channel serving the French-speaking community in Belgium. He is in charge of international politics and mostly deals with Central Africa (Rwanda, Congo and Burundi) and the Near East (Israel, Palestine and Libya). He came to Rwanda for the first time in 1983 during his military service. From 1985 onwards, he came to Rwanda at least once a year as a journalist. In 1994, he came 5 or 6 times. He was heard by the Commission during its public session held on 17th April 2007.

His testimony gives an account of the situation that prevailed before the genocide, as well as its precursor signs. He also speaks of the intervention of French soldiers on the side of the FAR before and during the genocide. He however declares that he did not witness events that occurred within the “humanitarian zone” created by Opération turquoise.

“After the RPF offensive in October 1990, I arrived as soon as I could. I realised the brutality of the Habyarimana regime on one hand, and its manipulations which had hoodwinked the international community, on the other. At the time, however, I believe Belgium had understood to some measure since it had refused to maintain a contingent that would help the then President Habyarimana, who had nevertheless made a specific request to King Baudouin. This was probably the most intelligent decision taken by my country. It probably explains, at least partly, the subsequent resentment of Belgium as well as the anti-Belgium propaganda that led to the deaths of 10 Belgian peacekeepers.

We were in 1990; I shall now return your attention to this period. […] I never met French soldiers except here as they arrived in November 1990. I immediately understood that the attack on Kigali was simply a ploy. Furthermore, apart from the brutality of the repression of the minority of the population, I was surprised at the French army’s attitude that was not only complacent but also participative. Whereas the Belgians, who had stayed for quite a short period, had a very clear mandate; that of evacuating expatriates, it was immediately clear that the French had intervened militarily on the side of the FAR. I went to the Akagera region, and went up to the border with Tanzania. However, I and my friend Jacques Collet were obliged to return since we had been practically under fire from Mobutu’s soldiers. Therefore, I did not witness the presence of the French soldiers at the Rwanda-Uganda border in 1990. I know that others saw them; apparently the RTBF saw some French soldiers. I think that Jean- François Bastin displayed these pictures of French soldiers on the side of FAR, in 1990.

However, I concentrated myself on the events in Kigali. I tried to inquire about the rampant brutality, the roundups, since the prisons were becoming full. I mostly witnessed what was happening at the former stadium of Nyamirambo. In fact it is the pictures that I took, after slightly opening up the gate of the stadium that went round the world during that time. They paved way for questions to be asked about the Habyarimana regime, and probably led to Belgium’s decision not to continue the operation.

Concerning the role of the French, the only thing that I can say is that on three occasions I witnessed some roundups, as well as physical attacks on Rwandan civilians. On three occasions I saw French soldiers observe these acts without intervening. This was at the roundabout next to the Army Headquarters, near Chez Lando, and at the main roundabout in Kigali town centre. The victims were either forced to climb into a truck, or into a jeep in the presence of the French soldiers. I gave these images to the Television in 1990. Hence this brutality inflicted on Rwandan citizens, and the increasing number of people thrown into jeeps or trucks occurred in the presence of French soldiers. This is what I can say about 1990.

[….]At the Airport in Kigali, it was obvious that while the evacuation of the expatriates was organised simultaneously with the arrival of the French and Zairian forces, the general impression was that the French were organising all operations, dictated the law and commanded the larger operation as a whole. When the roundups occurred in Kigali, when trucks full of people some of them with bound wrists passed in front of the French soldiers; when some persons were arrested and beaten up about 2 or 3 metres away; I say “beaten” because I do remember two cases whereby two persons were beaten with FAR rifle butts just next to some French soldiers. One would simply wonder about the attitude of these soldiers who obviously stood there without turning a hair!

[ …] You do remember that in 1990, in order to get the support of as many Western armies as possible, Habyarimana had spread the lie of an attack on Kigali. Today, it is known that this attack was simply a manipulation of events, and this manipulation was probably staged by the French. Very quickly, the French sent men to Kigali who I believe had mostly come from Central Africa, but also included parachutists and legionnaires too. What I do know is that they had taken control of the whole town. There was a Frenchman just next to each of the crossroads, as well as every strategic location within Kigali. At every 100 metres there was a Frenchman. I also believe that this stemmed from the desire to create some tension and to spread fear among the population. This was a success since thanks to this fear Habyarimana’s Special Services, the Police and the Gendarmerie were able to roundup thousands of persons and imprison them, when they were not summarily beaten up.

[ …]Due to the difficulties of obtaining a visa I was not able to return to Rwanda easily. I was only able to return at the beginning of the establishment of the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR, then more frequently in February and March 1994. I was with my colleague Jacques Collet between February and March 1994; all the evidence of preparation for genocide was there. One would have to be a bogus ambassador or military attaché to be oblivious to it. Right from the beginning, my colleague often accompanied me to Rwanda because he speaks Kinyarwanda and it was more or less the only way to access good information. During this period I never again saw the French soldiers, but I know that later on, others witnessed the continuous presence of the French soldiers, and that the Belgian soldiers themselves were convinced of this fact.

For me, February was an extremely crucial date because I was present at the time of the murder of Gatabazi and during the massacres in Kigali. I remember, at the mortuary alone, on 28th February, I think that together with Jacques Collet we had counted at least 100 corpses within the mortuary of CHK hospital. I also remember that other journalist colleagues whom I begged to go and see this evidence refused because they did not believe me. Nonetheless we had photographs that had many repercussions during that time, and that enabled me to knock on the door of the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs to inform them that something very, very serious was about to occur. One of the Belgian authorities we met had told me that they had taken careful note of this information and that it tallied with the information they already had. Furthermore, the Belgian soldiers of the First Battalion were not fooled at all. They told me of the anti-Belgian Propaganda, ‘Radio Television Mille Collines’, the weapons being circulated, their complete inability to disarm the Interahamwe and also, off-camera, the presence of French Army instructors in Kigali, which I did not witness.

After this extremely worrying period, premonitory on one hand, and the last general preparation before genocide in my opinion, I arrived within the first days that followed the explosion of violence, on the 9th and accompanied by Jacques Collet as usual. We found it quite difficult to circulate in Kigali; note that Jacques Collet, Marie France Cross of the ‘Libre Belgique’ and myself were totally unwanted in this country. The last time that the Ambassador of Belgium met Habyarimana, on 17th March, and asked him to close the ‘Radio des Milles Collines’, or at least stop it from preaching hatred of the minority and of Belgium, President Habyarimana simply retorted, “Close the RTL in Belgium.”

According to what I was told; it appears that our names had been regularly mentioned on ‘Radio des Mille collines.” Therefore it was not easy for us to circulate freely. One should also remember that Belgian journalists were not welcome. When foreign journalists were asked for their passports, only French journalists were accorded a hero’s welcome. I saw this and can prove it since I witnessed it. In April 1994 they could go wherever they wanted, and this was not the case for BBC or Belgian journalists. We could not. It was a question of life or death.

[ …] The French journalists acted like they were soldiers, and the French soldiers acted as if they were journalists. There were even officers specially appointed to be responsible for the media. There was total osmosis. This is not in Belgian tradition, where we have a long tradition of independence from any kind of power. The Belgian journalists were simply marginalised. They could not even eat; they found it difficult to find a place where they could lay down their sleeping bags. It was not prudent for Jacques Collet and I to venture by ourselves into the town, given the threats that hung over us. We therefore remained at the airport with some other journalists including Collette Braeckman. The French journalists and officers drank quite a lot. They had officers responsible for the media. This is a special unit within Defence, I forget the name. They went as far as breaking into the duty-free shop on the first floor of the Airport so as to obtain alcoholic drinks. This is just one detail, which however has some importance.

This demonstrates the attitude that they had. They turned away Belgian journalists that they didn’t trust. At least, some of them with the exception of Frédéric François. They were wary of all journalists that paid no allegiance to France, and left them out of all relevant missions. Since this happened after the death of the 10 peacekeepers, the Belgian soldiers were afraid that a new offensive could be launched against them, some dirty trick on the part of the FAR. We were cornered, to some extent, since missions to the most distant locations, i.e. those that were the most revealing, were only done in the company of the French. We ourselves had no access to these areas, because there was mistrust from all sides. At the airport, we could do anything in collaboration with the Belgian soldiers. We could climb into the planes, make return trips between Nairobi and Kigali, and entrust the passengers or team members with our cassettes. Everything was transparent. In contrast, we could never film those entering into the French planes, and this normally happened in the evenings.

[ …] During the trips that I made, accompanied by Belgian soldiers each time they went to seek out for expatriates for evacuation, I was able to see what was happening on the roadblocks. I was frightened by the sight of thousands of corpses that I was able to see. Two events were indelibly etched in my mind: one took place on the runway of the airport of Kanombe. At the end of the runway, on the section leading to town and parallel to the right side of the runway, with a clear view of the working-class section of Kigali – this area whose name I did not know, at the foot of the stadium, at 200 metres from the building used by the VIP, together with the former control tower, there were one or two anti-aircraft batteries that were not used as anti-aircraft batteries; on the contrary they were used to directly shoot at the town.

Additionally, I remember very well having interviewed a Rwandan gunner of the FAR. Having recorded the radio communications, he told me, “It is the French who are guiding us and they tell us where exactly we should shoot.” [ …] In my opinion this battery was still in place but it had been reactivated and used for other purposes other than that of a normal anti-aircraft battery. The soldiers shot directly at the target, I witnessed this. I saw them aim at the town, and I can assure you that they were guided by the French; it is the gunners of the FAR themselves that confirmed this to me. This took placed towards the 10th or 11th April 1994.

[ …] It is true that in 1994, I saw some images that will always remain indelibly etched in my mind. I will never forget mostly this pregnant woman that they disembowelled 100 metres from me, and there was a jeep and two French soldiers who laughed at the sight. They laughed and they were at a 50 metres distance from where it was happening. Finally it was the two Belgian soldiers who were with us that put the Interahamwe or the killers to flight. [ …] It is at the exit from the airport, when one enters the road leading to town; once one has bypassed the depression on the road and one is driving towards the stadium, this is where it all happened. Myself, I was inside the depression on the road knowing fully well that I was in a jeep of Belgian soldiers who had more or less come to my rescue because they were afraid; then we witnessed this scene where a pregnant woman was disembowelled. Between me, the jeep of the Belgian soldiers and the killing there was a jeep inside which two French soldiers were laughing, and who did not react. They watched the scene as if it were a film [ …] They were 50 metres away from me and I was 100 or 120 metres away from the scene. They were between me and the scene of the murder. This must have taken place between the 9th and 18th April 1994. I stayed in the country for 9 more days, and then took the second-last Belgian plane that left the country.

[ …] I believe that, for the work of the Commission, this is the clearest contribution that I can give. With regards to the rest, like you I believe that the French have a huge responsibility in all this. This is the fruit of my own conviction, of a series of presumptions resulting from readings, indirect testimonies, interviews that I was able to carry out during the last 10 years, all of which, unfortunately, are not the fruit of what I actually saw. Effectively, I lack the required personal experience. I was not present during “Turquoise”. I was not able to enter the Zone Turquoise. All that I was able to do between April and the liberation in July was to follow the Patriotic Front notably through Bugesera, and throughout the East and South of the country. However I never got into contact with “Turquoise”. Neither did I enter the refugee camps, for personal reasons. This is because the military operation that had been launched from Zaїre had deeply revolted me and for one or two months I could not sleep. I was outraged by what I was hearing and by the development of the entire pseudo-humanitarian operation.

58. Joachim Hategekimana

Joachim HATEGEKIMANA was born in 1952 in Ruhashya, Huye District, Southern Province. He was the Sous Préfet of Kaduha from September 1990 to October 1994. He is currently incarcerated in the Central Prison of Nyamagabe. His hearing took place on 11th January 2007.

His testimony mostly relates the evacuation of survivors from Kaduha, the distribution of arms to civilians, the appointment of administrative authorities, the dropping of persons into the forest of Nyungwe by helicopter as well as killings.

“During the first days of July, before the 5th, the French soldiers coming from their base in Gikongoro arrived in Kaduha in 3 beige pick-ups. There were about 10 of them. They found me at my home near the post office. They wanted to know where and how to find the survivors. They told me that they had come to secure the region. They took about 60 survivors who were at the school of nursing; about 30 who were at the agro-veterinary school, and another 30 who were at the health centre. We did not know where they were taking them, nor for what reasons. Later on, four other survivors who had learnt that the French had evacuated the others came to wait for them at my home. The first day, they were taken in two shifts, in their pick-ups. A certain Gahamanyi who was Director of the Ecole Agro-Veterinaire and Immaculée Kayitete who was the deputy director of the health centre could give you more information about this.

After the flight of certain burgomasters from districts within the préfeture of Gikongoro, the French appointed others to replace them. They also appointed some policemen without consulting me, yet these administrative entities were part of the sous préfeture of which I was responsible. This is the case with the appointment of Siméon, as Burgomaster of Musange, Rwabarinda, as Burgomaster of Rwamiko and Ndahayo Emmanuel, as Burgomaster of Muko. They also proceeded to distribute guns to the burgomasters and policemen. In areas where there were no policemen, the French were entrusted with the task of recruiting them. These guns were later on captured by the RPF.

The French soldiers killed people and dumped others from a helicopter. I saw them kill a reservist in Joma with a bullet. They placed the victim on board a helicopter. When, by chance, the French soldiers captured members of the RPF, they executed them on the spot. Thus I was told of the case of 6 soldiers of the RPF that the French captured, disarmed a few metres from Munyangoga, within Nkore Cellule near the bridge, and then killed them. Similar incidents frequently occurred in Kaduha, Kinyamakara, Runyinya and Kibeho. I saw Katasi lying down in a truck belonging to the French soldiers. He was lying inert, and covered with some sheeting, but his legs were visible.

Subsequently, I received information that he had been thrown from a helicopter into the Nyungwe Forest. Nobody ever saw him again. I saw Laurien Rugira upon his return from Nyungwe, where the French soldiers had thrown him from a helicopter. He collected his belongings and said, “I am going home. If the French want to kill me, they can come and look for me.” The question of throwing people from helicopters was brought up during a meeting that we held with the French towards the end of July or beginning of August, at the SOS centre. They were asked if they were indeed throwing people into the Nyungwe forest. The response was in the affirmative, with the explanation that there were people who were very dangerous, who had to be put away. This declaration was made by a French major whose name I do not know. All the burgomasters, myself as a sous-préfet and various other authorities were present at this meeting.”




59. John Mbigizembishaka

John Mbigizembishaka lived at the SOS centre of Gikongoro, where he worked as a messenger and storekeeper. He was heard by the Commission on 23rd November 2006, among witnesses to the events, as well as at Nyamagabe on 18th December 2007 and on 11th October 2007. Mbigizembishaka talks of his experience and his contact with the French; that enabled him to witness the throwing of survivors and other troublemakers from helicopters, the close collaboration of the French with local authorities of the time, as well as the raping of girls.

“From May to June 1994, the staff and the orphans who lived in the Save Our Souls (SOS) centre had left the centre. Since I kept some keys during the genocide, I came to live in the visitors’ quarters with my entire family. When the French soldiers arrived in Gikongoro, I was living in the premises of the SOS centre. The children and employees of the centre had been evacuated to Bukavu. The French soldiers kept me and entrusted me with their washing. I remained with them till they left. This is how I was able to see their actions from a close distance. Once, towards 18h00, a military plane landed on the football field of the centre, it had brought a person with arms bound, and guarded by an armed Rwandan and 3 French soldiers. Towards 18h45 they first introduced him to the head of the French soldiers, before taking him on board the helicopter towards Cyangugu.

Upon their return 15 minutes later, we only saw the Rwandan and the two French soldiers who accompanied him. I learnt that this man had come from Kibuye and had lied that he was not Tutsi, and this was the reason for which he had been brought before the French soldiers. A certain Jean Marie who understood French and who was often in the company of the Frenchmen told us that he had been thrown off the helicopter. The soldiers were in the habit of throwing people into the Nyungwe forest. They inflicted this treatment on survivors and any other trouble makers. The survivors were first of all beaten up and bound before being thrown off the helicopter, while the others were tied up.

During this time, I noticed that certain soldiers including the chiefs slept with women and kept them there on a permanent basis. During the night, they lighted fire and sent me to bring for them some hemp as well as girls. A young man named Jean Marie did the same task for the French. We brought girls to them and they paid us with food rations. The French chose the most beautiful girls and sent back the others. Usually we chose from among those that originated from Kibuye. The chiefs slept with the girls in the rooms, while the other soldiers raped them behind the buildings. Among them, I remember M.D. who was originally from Kigembe district.

She regularly slept with a French second lieutenant in the premises of SOS. Sometimes I acted as the intermediary for organising their appointments. There were also some girls who I would say slept with the Frenchmen for pay. This is the case with A who lived in Nzega, another named Cy who lived near Majyambere’s, as well as another called Co. With them, the French had sexual relations in the open air on the grass as if for amusement.”

With regards to the close collaboration between the French soldiers and the local authorities, he indicates, “several meetings with the authorities were held at the SOS centre, after which these leaders received guns for their own use. Among these leaders, there was an assistant director of SOS, the sous-préfet Biniga as well as Mushinguzi.”

60. John Yankurije

John Yankurije was a soldier in the Rwandan Patriotic Front before being demobilised in 2001. He is a trader who comes from Muteke, in Gicumbi District in the Northern Province. The Commission heard his testimony, in his capacity as witness to the events, during a public hearing held on 17th July 2007. His testimony is about the establishment and manning of the roadblocks as well as the participation of the French soldiers in combat.

Concerning the roadblocks, he declares the following: “In 1992, the French soldiers together with the Rwandan gendarmes established roadblocks in Nyabugogo and Nyacyonga. They asked all passers-by for identity cards. One day, I went to Kigali in order to sell some charcoal, as I usually did. Upon my return I was arrested by the French and Rwandan gendarmes on the Nyacyonga roadblock. A Rwandan gendarme asked me to show my identity card. I immediately presented my identity card. He then went up to a French soldier and they spoke for some minutes. Then he told me to wait by the side of the road with a group of other people who had been arrested. They beat us up and we remained there throughout the day under the heavy rainfall. They freed us late in the evening and I immediately mounted my motorbike and decided that I would never return to Kigali.”

Regarding the participation of the French on the front, he affirms, “From end of 1992 to beginning of 1993, at the time when the war was raging in the regions of Ruhengeri and Byumba, I saw the French soldiers take the Kigali-Byumba road several times in their jeeps accompanied by trucks that towed along support weapons.”

61. Joseph Ngiruwonsanga

Joseph Ngiruwonsanga was born in 1965 in Murangi, Rusizi district, Western province, he is a survivor of the genocide, at the time he was in the camp of Nyarushishi. His hearing occurred on the 8th August 2006.

In his testimony, he talks about the arrival of the French soldiers of Opération turquoise in Nyarushishi and explains the circumstances of his being beaten.

“At the beginning of the genocide in April 1994, we fled to the Catholic parish of Cyangugu, then to the stadium of Kamarampaka. From there we were evacuated by the ONATRACOM bus which took us to the camp of Nyarushishi. At the beginning, this camp was guarded by gendarmes, and then by the Interahamwe who had lists of Tutsi and would pass by regularly in order to seek for Tutsi to kill. Sometime later, after June 1994, these gendarmes were replaced by French soldiers coming from Zaїre. At the time, Interahamwe’s positions were located around the camp, in the tea plantations of Shagasha Rwamiko, Mutimasi and on the slope of a mountain, within the tea plantation. During the period when the camp of Nyarushishi was guarded by the French soldiers, the Interahamwe did not stop killing people in the proximity of the camp. For example, a certain Anselme who came from Gihango, a lady and her baby carried on her back were killed when they left the camp in order to search for firewood.

[…] Four days after the arrival of the French in the camp of Nyarushishi. They learned that I had not participated in night patrols. They asked the leaders of the camp quarters to seek me out. They brought me before the residence of the camp’s commander, whose first name was Marcel. The coordinator of the Red Cross who came from Kibuye described my case. They then beat me up thoroughly and left me for dead. They threw me into a pit approximately 1.80m deep from which I could not pull myself out. My fingers and my mouth were bleeding. Towards 18h00, students coming from Kibuye saw me and informed a white man from the Red Cross who in turn called a certain Sade, the coordinator of the Red Cross. Assisted by the students, Sade pulled me out of the pit and returned me to the camp. I spent 8 days in bed under the treatment and care of the staff of the Red Cross. Throughout this period, I urinated blood. Today, I still suffer from the after-effects of the beatings, to such an extent that I regularly go to see a doctor. The French tortured many people within the camp; however we did not know them sufficiently to learn their names.”

62. Laurien Twagirayezu

Laurien Twagirayezu comes from Gicumbi, in the Northern Province. He was able to closely observe the activities of the French soldiers. He is an employee of the Prosecutor in Byumba where he has worked as messenger since 1988. The Commission heard him in camera, on 18th July 2007 in his capacity as a witness to the events.

His testimony is about the establishment of a roadblock by French soldiers at the entry of the military camp of Byumba and at that of the prosecution office in Byumba, the participation of French soldiers in combat, as well as the training of the FAR.

With regard to the manning of the roadblocks, he says the following: “In June 1992, the Inkotanyi attacked the town of Byumba. However, the FAR counter-attacked and repulsed them. In the meantime, we fled the town, towards Buyoga and after 4 days we returned to our homes. Upon our return, we noted that a roadblock had been established on a small street leading to the military camp and to the prosecution office in Byumba. This roadblock was still guarded by French and Rwandan soldiers. They rigorously checked everybody who wanted to go to the ‘Parquet’ or military camp. I myself was checked several times whenever I went to the ‘Parquet’ to work. The French themselves checked the identity cards. The roadblock remained at this location for about 5 months.”

As regards the assistance given to the Rwandan army on the front, he affirms, “Very near my residence in Kageyo, precisely at the primary school of Kageyo, the French had installed a powerful support weapon and were firing towards the positions held by Inkotanyi in Mukarange. Furthermore, they had other support weapons behind the Byumba stadium, within a quarry, and they shelled the positions of the RPF in Kivuye and Cyumba.”

Finally, he talks about the training of the FAR soldiers at Rwafandi in this way: “In Rwafandi, located in the former Rutare District, the French would train Rwandan soldiers along the road leading to Byumba, near Gaseke market. They trained them on the use of support weapons. Each time I passed by that area on my way to collect food from the Rusine IDP Camp, I would see them training.”

63. Luc Pillionel

Luc Pillionel, a Swiss national, was born in 1959 and is married to a Rwandan. He came to Rwanda in July 1994 to collect his in-laws who had sought refuge in Nyarushishi Camp. He gave his testimony to the Commission during a public hearing held on 14/6/2007.

His testimony focuses on the contact he had with the French army during his trip to Rwanda, as well as events that he witnessed.

“I had never been to Africa. My first visit was in July 1994 under peculiar circumstances. If my memory serves me right, on 25th June 1994 my wife and I were watching news on television, specifically on “Antenne 2”. There was a news feature on the arrival of French troops in Nyarushishi and my wife recognised her mother between two armoured vehicles, just between two tents where people had sought refuge. In the days that followed, I decided to go to look for my mother-in-law. I contacted Professor Jean Pierre Chrétien, a renowned French historian, to get whatever information I could get. He informed me that he was unable to assist but forwarded my request to his colleague Gérard Prunier. The latter called me a few days later and told me that he had organised some help for me from the French army and that I was to proceed as follows: take a commercial flight to Bujumbura and head to the French base in Kavumu on Monday 18th or Tuesday 19th, 1994; then hire a taxi from Bujumbura, which I did.

I arrived in Bujumbura on Wednesday 13th and I met the military attaché at the French Embassy on Thursday 14th. He had a copy of a fax from the Kavumu base and confirmed that the French soldiers at this base were expecting me on Monday or Tuesday of the following week. On Saturday 16th July, I began my journey to Kavumu base using the ‘Corniche’ via the Zairian customs in Uvira. I arrived there late afternoon on the same day.

I entered the base and briefly met the French who requested me to return on Tuesday morning at around 9h00. I then left the base for Bukavu. I would like to make comments on what I saw there. There was a Zairian watchman posted just outside the base which was surrounded by barbed wire. There were also discontinuous trenches. All around the base, there were mortar and machine gun posts, as well as massive petrol tanks to the left of the entrance to the base facing Lake Kivu. I was a little bit surprised to see that the petrol tanks were not protected. They were simple tanks made of rubber and could carry up to tens of thousands of litres. They were placed on the grass, a little bit to the side.

I had deduced that this base was considered as being extremely safe. Should it have been otherwise, the petrol reserves would have been tightly guarded. I also noted the good organisation, quantity and quality of the French military equipment. There were mortar posts, helicopters and Transall planes on the runway. I returned to Bukavu on Saturday evening. I spend three nights there, Saturday 16th, Sunday 17th and Monday 18th.

On the morning of Tuesday 19, 1994, there was a Rwandan clergyman who wanted to drive to Bujumbura in his car but had no fuel. He needed 20 dollars for petrol. I, on the other hand, had been unable to obtain a taxi to Kavumu. So we made a small deal and he took me to Kavumu at around 8h30 or 9h00 in the morning. Upon my arrival, I reported to the sentry at the French base. He showed me in and I briefly met a French soldier. On his uniform, I saw the name Hogard. He was of average height, slightly shorter that myself, suntanned, energetic and in his 50s. On the left of the uniform on his chest, there was a kind of small cord to which was attached a small lamp and on his belt, there was a pistol in a holster. We talked a bit. He went to his office where there was a radio and fax. He went through his fax file and found the fax that contained the information about me. He asked me to sit on a bench nearby and that he would let me know when I would proceed to Rwanda by helicopter.

I recall that it was during the dry season. I waited patiently for about an hour, or slightly more, I think. And then suddenly, I saw several turnarounds of helicopters, Super Pumas and Transalls which were unloaded in front of me. To my right as Lake Kivu; my back was facing Bukavu. Before me was the runway, tarmac and right at the end of the tarmac, slightly to the left were petrol tanks. The Transalls would land 300m from where I was; the Super Puma helicopters also landed opposite where I was seated. Those are the two kinds of aircraft I recall seeing. On several occasions, I saw Super Pumas land, and French soldiers disembark from them.

I noticed that these soldiers were not wearing the usual French army boots. They had hiking boots that were light, beige or black in colour, the kind frequently worn by civilians in Europe. They did not sport any badges on their uniforms and were not armed as usual with FAMA assault rifles of the French army. Generally, they were in groups of two or three, as they disembarked from helicopters and passed me as they went to Colonel Hogard’s office. They were well-equipped and their uniforms were slightly stained with dust and some had a beard, one or two days old. They carried a large amount of arms which surprised me a little, given the recent developments in Africa, in previous years.

From time to time, I would buy the French military review, RAIDS, in which such situations were often described. Political analyses had been conducted on the events in Rwanda. There were also articles on the uniforms and organisation of various armies in the world and Africa. One of the two partners in the buddy system would always carry on him a machine-gun pistol fitted with a silencer. On his chest and hips, he had at least 20 or 25 magazines which are on the higher side considering the six magazines that army officers in Kavumu base carried or the number of magazines that French soldiers had for their operations in Rwanda, for example. The second partner in the said system would have an M16 gun, probably with a barrel that was slightly heavier for precision shooting and specialised sighting equipment. They also had equipment that would enable them to carry a large number of magazines and grenades. For me, it was obvious that these people were returning from the battlefield and that they had used their weapons.

While there, I saw many soldiers arrive, while some of them subsequently left for Rwanda. Suddenly, Colonel Hogard appeared a few metres from me. He asked me, “Does this Swiss civilian luggage belong to you?” I had a big rucksack, suitcase with straps, and a small bag. I ran towards the helicopter. Some French special troops were ahead of me. It took me one or two minutes to get into the helicopter. They were already impatient to take off. A French soldier grabbed me by the belt - even as I carried my big rucksack on the back - with one hand, and practically carried me with the other hand, tossing me into the cabin. I was surprised since I weighed at least 80 kilos and had 30 kilos of luggage with me.

I found myself in a French helicopter with a team of soldiers who were conducting a final check before going into the battlefield. The pilots checked their equipment, survival kits, and small radios in the life jackets, to ensure that all was in order. They checked their magazines and pistols, etc. We travelled to Kavumu in this Supa Puma helicopter. Initially, we flew at a low altitude to Kivu and then to Rwanda. The flight lasted a few minutes then we landed at the Kamembe French base. The helicopter landed next to a large iron hangar enclosed within a field fortified with sandbags. I entered the base. I recall meeting a French officer, Captain Guillaume Ancel, who told me that we would soon leave for Nyarushishi.

I waited for about an hour in a small area hemmed in by sandbags within the base’s hangar. Shortly afterwards, at approximately 11h00-11h30, Captain Guillaume Ancel came to tell me, “We are now ready to go.” He informed me that we would walk and wanted to know if I was willing to take a number of risks. He told me that he was willing to evacuate my wife’s family from Nyarushishi and transport them to a place that we would agree upon. I told him that I preferred to travel with them because my presence would be a guarantee that the evacuation would be carried out to the best of their interests.

I am not sure whether it was at this point or earlier at the Kavumu military base when the French proposed to evacuate me all the way to Europe in their Transall plane. I was rather taken aback by this proposal, which was most welcome as I would be able to safely and quickly travel with my family to Europe. Captain Guillaume Ancel and I reached an agreement. We left the base in a 4-wheel drive jeep with a driver, including Captain Guillaume Ancel and myself. I was seated in the passenger seat at the back. The Jeep was armed with a machine gun and a more or less traditional 308 NATO gun. Behind us, there were two big 4-wheel drive trucks each of them bearing 4 driving wheels and huge tyres. Each truck had a team of six men, officers from the second regiment of the foreign legion infantry. In it there were 3 ordinary soldiers, I believe. There was a sharpshooter, a machine gun, a 12-7 gun on a small metallic turret above the driver across the front of the truck.

At the time we were located to the side of the base, along the runway. I cannot recall on which axis of the runway we were located, but given the direction of the sun I believe we were located in the southern section, upon the runway centre line. To my right, there was a French bunker, and on the inside of the field, the big metallic hangar. We left the post with the vehicle and drove along the runway with the sun at our backs. It was around 11h30. I remember that the vehicles were moving slowly in the well manicured lawn the borders the airport. After approximately 100 m or 200 m, we came across half a dozen fresh corpses.

We continued along the southern part of the runway and arrived at the level of the control tower from which there was a slope to the left; it was to the right of this very location that the corpses lay. My attention was particularly drawn to the almost decapitated head of a corpse. I could see the pinkish flesh of the corpse. Furthermore, there was a pool of blood on the ground, which had not yet dried up. The sky was reflected in it as clearly as in a mirror, just as if it were a drop of mercury. The French passed on the side without any reaction whatsoever. For me there is no shadow of a doubt that these were persons that had fled the genocide weeks ago. This was obvious due to the emaciated face of the male person. In the dust next to me, with a beard that had obviously been several weeks old. He was extremely thin and wearing dirty clothes.

These corpses were within proximity of the runway, a few metres away from the runway, i.e. between 150 and 200 metres into the extremely well-guarded French positions, to be precise. To me, it was impossible to imagine that Rwandans in civilian clothing, in my opinion in a relatively bad state of health and having gone hungry for a long time being in flight, could have attempted any military action whatsoever. Moreover, there was no weapon or any such tool. Furthermore, this brought to mind the question of how they had reached this location. […] There was a fortified position in the same location. The area facing the corpses, next to the buildings located at the entry and the exit of the base were all fortified positions.

In my opinion, the entire perimeter was permanently secured and furthermore, given the nature of the area that bore short grass and had no bushes, without anything that could be termed as being in a functioning state, it was flat. The few persons who entered this location, mostly during the day, were immediately sighted. They could not have access to this area without the permission of the French. […] I understand that if they had sought to penetrate this base, they could never have managed to hide themselves. It’s a flat terrain; it was daytime and it was 11h00 in the morning. Therefore in my opinion, there was a closed perimeter and the corpses that I found within close proximity of the landing section of the runway, along a tiny end of the makeshift road that had been created by the to-and-fro movements of the French vehicles that drove along the runway to finally veer off in the direction of the exit area. The corpses that I saw to my right as I left the area were within the perimeter of the French army, between two positions and two fortifications of the company occupied by numerous French personnel whereby there were several guards positioned on a permanent basis, day and night.

[…]I’ve established several theories; these are not facts that I am relating. This said, in my opinion either the French allowed them to enter the base, and I think that the base was organised in such a way that there could only be one entry. Second theory; they were brought there by the French. Therefore if they allowed them to enter, where were they going in the first place? From the existing gateway, they had crossed the runway so as to reach the location of the French. In this case, they had been allowed to enter so that they could be killed by the Interahamwe or maybe by the French themselves. I know nothing of this, however.

[…] We went towards the exit of the base where there was a roadblock a bit similar to the level crossing in Europe, red and white. I had no sense of direction at this point. I was nevertheless in a slightly particular situation, operating with foreign soldiers. It was anticipated that we would go to Nyarushishi. We descended the airport road, which was tarmacked. I believe we turned towards the left in order to travel towards Nyarushishi, and then the radio began to crackle frequently. The subsequent impression was one which I did not understand at all, since there were many parasites and they spoke in a slightly coded language. Additionally I had the impression that I was something of a burden to them; that the French soldiers could not do what they wanted to do because of my presence.

[Sourakhata]

Must Read. If you still don't understand to what extent yt colonialism is killing us, just read the Mucyo report.