Mucyo report - The role of France in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide

[XXPANTHAXX]

Mucyo report- Report of an independent Commission to establish the role of
France in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. This is the full report

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS i
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1
1. Creation and historical background of the Commission 1
2. How the Commission understood its terms of reference 1
3. Methodology for the collection of information 2
3.1. Sources of information in Rwanda 2
3.2. Collection of information abroad 2
3.3. Access to public documents 3
3.4. Information Processing 4
3.5. Research stages 4
INTRODUCTION TO THE REPORT 5
1. Foreign involvement in Rwanda’s conflict and in the genocide 5
1.1 Historical background 5
1.2. Recent international interventions (1990-1994) 8
1.2.1. Belgium 8
1.2.2. United States 9
1.2.3. United Nations Organisation (UNO) 10
1.2.4. An attempt at international redress? 13
1.3 Process of the recognition of the genocide 14
1.3.1 Initiatives of the United Nations Human Rights Commission 14
1.3.2 Procrastination in the recognition of the genocide in the Security Council 15
PART I: FRANCE’S INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA BEFORE THE GENOCIDE 17
1. Historical background and legal framework of cooperation between France and Rwanda 17
1.1. Aspects of the civilian cooperation 17
1.2 Elements of military cooperation 18
1.2.1 Contents of the Special Military Assistance Agreement of 1975 18
1.2.2 Amendments of the 1975 Agreement 19
1.2.3 Increased military aid effective from 1989 20
1.3. Structure of the French military intervention (October 1990 – April 1994) 22
1.3.1 Context of the October 1990 war 22
1.3.2 Description of the different elements of France’s intervention according to the official version 25
1.4 Official justification of the French intervention: building a legitimacy 30
1.4.1. Public statements during the events 31
1.4.2 Non confidential internal position 31
1.4.3 Posteriori statements 34
1.5. Criticisms of the French intervention within France and abroad 35
1.5.1. Criticisms at the time of the events 35
1.5.2 Posterior criticisms 39
ACTS FRANCE IS ACCUSED OF 41
1. Contribution to the perpetration of the war 41
1.1. Support in military intelligence and telephone tapping 41
1.2. Strategic advice and tactical support 45
1.2.1. Attending the meetings of evaluation and strategic planning 45
1.2.2. Direct participation in fighting: 1990-1993 48
2. Involvement in the training of Interahamwe militia and village vigilantes (civilian self-defence) 54
2.1. The Interahamwe 54
2.2. Early stages of the village vigilantes « civilian self-defence » 55
2.2.1. Gabiro camp 57
2.2.2. Nyakinama University Campus 64
2.2.3. Gako camp 65
2.2.4. Mukamira camp 67
2.2.5 Bigogwe camp 69
2.3. Additional information 71
2.3.1 In 1992-1993, Interahamwe committed acts of genocide 73
2.3.2. Intensification of the training of the Interahamwe in preparation of the genocide of 1994 77
3. Criminal Investigation Department 79
3.1. The action of the French gendarmes in the centre for criminal investigation and documentation (CRCD) 79
3.1.1. Training in techniques and professional ethics of Criminal Investigation 80
3.1.2. Conduct of investigation 80
3.1.3. The computerisation of the central database 83
3.1.4. Was the computerisation of the central database used for making lists of the people to be killed? 83
4. Acts of violence on roadblocks 88
4.1. Ethnic segregation and arbitrary arrests 89
4.2. Disappearance of arrested people 92
4.3. Physical intimidations and violence 94
4.4. Sexual assault and rape 95
4.5. Participation and assistance in the killings 98
4.5.1 In military camps and other places in Kigali 98
4.5.2. In the other prefectures 101
5. Acts of violence away from the roadblocks 104
5.1. Ethnically based physical or verbal violence 104
5.2. Rape and sexual assault 107
5.3 Support and assistance in perpetration of violent acts 109
6. Violent interrogation of RPF prisoners of war 110
6.1 Threats and ill treatments 110
6.2 Execution of prisoners of war 115
7. Support for a policy of mass murder 116
7.1. The Internal French Reports 122
7.2. Reports of Non-Governmental Organisations 123
7.3 Reports by the Rwandan civil society 124
7.4. UN Reports 125
7.5 The repeated perpetrations of massacres and the reinforcement of French military support 125
8. Diplomatic support for the Rwandan regime 128
8.1. Actions alongside Belgium and African States 128
8.2. Partiality in the peace talks 131
8.3. Contribution to the ethnic radicalisation of the conflict 133
8.3.1. Justification of ethnic based speech 133
8.3.2. Support to ethnic radicalism 136
8.4. Attempts to implicate western powers 138
8.5. Attempt at manipulating the UN 140
PART II: FRANCE’S INVOLVEMENT DURING THE GENOCIDE 142
I France’s involvement during the genocide, before Opération Turquoise 142
1. Official justifications of Opération Amaryllis 142
1.1. Protection of the French, European nationals, and other foreigners 142
1.2 The proclamation of the decision of non-intervention in the ongoing massacres 144
2. The facts blamed on France 145
2.1 Political support to the organizers of the genocide 145
2.1.1 Involvement in the training of the interim government 146
2.1.2 The targeted evacuations 150
3. Diplomatic support 160
3.1 Collaboration with the interim government 160
3.2 Contact with the President of the interim government 161
3.3 Protection of the interim government at the Security Council 162
3.4 Collusion with the UN Secretary General and his Representative in Rwanda 162
4. French military support during the genocide 164
4.1 Presence of French soldiers in Rwanda during the genocide 164
4.2 High level contact between FAR officers and French officers 169
4.3 Delivery of arms and ammunitions during the genocide and their use 171
4.4 Distribution of arms delivered by France to Interahamwe during the genocide. 174
II. OPÉRATION TURQUOISE 177
1.1. The decision-making process 177
1.2 Disagreement at the level of the French executive on the objectives and modalities of the intervention 179
1.3 Orders of operation, composition and progress 182
1.4. Impressive human and material means 183
1. CYANGUGU 186
1) The Opération Turquoise, shield of the FAR in Cyangugu 188
2) Collaboration between the French soldiers and the Interahamwe in the continuation of the assassinations of Tutsis 189
3) Nyarushishi displaced persons camp 201
4) Rapes 206
5) Pillaging carried out by the French soldiers and their failure to intervene in the pillaging and destruction of infrastructure by Rwandans 210
6) Inciting the populace to flee the country 213
KIBUYE 215
BISESERO 216
1) Abandonment 216
2) Refusal by Captain Marin Gillier to end the Bisesero massacres 222
3) Colonel Rosier wanted to sacrifice the Bisesero survivors 231
RUBENGERA 240
III. KIBUYE TOWN 247
GIKONGORO 249
I. Distinctiveness of Murambi camp 251
II. Acts committed by the French soldiers at Gikongoro 252
1. Delivery of Tutsi to militiamen and inciting ethnic murders 252
2. Freedom granted to militiamen to continue murdering genocide survivors 255
3. Direct involvement of French soldiers in acts of murder 259
4. Cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 264
4.2 Throwing people off board at the edge and outside Nyungwe forest 268
4.2.2 Throwing people off board at Sheke 269
4.2.3 Throwing people off board at Shaba 271
4.2.4 Throwing people off board at Rusebeya 272
4.2.5 Throwing people off board at Nyakizu 274
5. Cases of rape and sexual slavery 276
6. Insufficient distribution of food and medical care to the survivors of the genocide 287
7. Inciting people to flee the country 289
8. Looting of public property 292
PART THREE: 303
INVOLVEMENT OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AFTER THE GENOCIDE 303
1. Political support to the interim government and military support to former FAR and Interahamwe after July 1994 303
1.1 Official contacts with the interim government in exile 303
1.2 Supply of arms and covering their delivery by Turquoise 304
1.2 Restructuring, re-arming and re-training of FAR and Interahamwe 306
1.2.1 Supporting FAR and Interahamwe in Zaïre. 306
1.2.2 Training FAR and Interahamwe in Congo Brazzaville and in Central Africa 316
2. Constraints to the efforts of reconciliation in Rwanda from July 1994 319
2.1 Blocking aid funds for the improvement of the situation posterior to genocide 319
3. France as a turf for denial and revisionism of genocide 322
3.1 The revisionism and the denial of the French authorities and institutions 322
3.1.1 French Political leaders 322
3.1.2 Contamination in schools 323
3.1.3. Legal manipulation 324
3.3 Mobilization of ex-Soldiers of Turquoise 325
3.4 Support of French politicians in revisionist or denial propaganda 326
4. Obstacles to the judgment of the presumed perpetrators of the genocide 327
4.1.1 Reopening the case of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka 327
4.1.2 Other pending cases 329
5. Frustrating Judge Brigitte Raynaud’s investigation 332
6. Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) with the aim of favouring the interests of genocide suspects 334
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 336
General Conclusion 341
RECOMMENDATIONS 349







GENERAL INTRODUCTION



1. Creation and historical background of the Commission

In 2004, Cabinet adopted the draft law establishing the Independent National Commission responsible for the collection of evidence indicating the role of the French State in the preparation and implementation of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, hereinafter called “The Commission.” Its creation was made public through a communiqué on 1st August 2004. Organic Law No. 05/2005 of 14th April 2005 established the Commission and gave it a six-month mandate that could be extended by a Presidential Order.

The Cabinet proposed members of the Commission on 5th April 2006 and they were confirmed by Presidential Order No. 19/01 of 16th April 2006 which senate adopted in its session of 21st April 2006. The Order set the date on which the Commission would start its work on 16th April 2006 and the end of its mandate on 16th October 2006. The mandate was renewed twice in October 2006 and April 2007. Therefore the Commission carried out its work over a period of 18 months.

2. How the Commission understood its terms of reference

Considering the terms of reference as stated in the Organic Law establishing the Commission, especially Article 5, the general mission of the Commission was to bring out the role the French State played in the preparation and implementation of the genocide committed in Rwanda in 1994. Specifically, the Commission was required to collect and examine documents, hear testimonies and any other evidence showing the involvement of the French State in the 1994 genocide as well as its role in the period after the genocide. This was particularly in the area of politics, diplomacy, media, judiciary and military. From its inception, the Commission reflected on the content of its mission and how it would fulfill it in accordance wit the aforementioned Organic Law.

The Commission realised that the Law put emphasis on the collection of evidence and examining it without however explicitly going into investigations or research. Given the importance and sensitivity of its mandate and based on the fact that the Law stipulates that collected evidence should be examined, the Commission concluded that the purpose of its mandate was to scientifically establish the facts and analyse them. It then decided to carry out its research and investigations meticulously and only retain substantiated facts, which it deemed well founded and verifiable.




3. Methodology for the collection of information

The Commission used different methods of gathering information both in Rwanda and abroad. It consulted public and private sources, carried out field investigations, and organised both camera and public hearings of witnesses. Members of the Commission also travelled abroad to consult records and interview witnesses who were unable to come to Rwanda.

In exercising its mandate, the Commission came across several types of totally new sources of information and compared them with what was already published; evidence of former soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) who had worked with French soldiers; persons who claimed that they were direct victims of French soldiers’ acts; Rwandans and foreign observers who witnessed actions of the French soldiers in Rwanda or who were at the scenes of massacres (journalists and humanitarian workers); University research findings; expert reports; and finally various investigation reports.

3.1. Sources of information in Rwanda

The Commission obtained written documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and the Office of the President. The Commission was also able to access private archives belonging to individuals and associations. At the beginning of its work, the Commission received numerous unsolicited calls from individuals from various circles who declared their readiness to voluntarily give information either in writing or verbally. This shows the interest and the expectations of the people in the Commission.

The Commission formed teams of investigators and gave them the responsibility of examining such individuals in order to verify the relevance and seriousness of their calls, while trying at the same time to locate other potential witnesses. Thus, these preliminary investigations enabled the Commission to select witnesses for examination. Altogether, the Commission interviewed 698 persons, but selected only 66 for hearings, 53 in public and 13 in camera.

The Commission went around the country and paid special attention to the scenes of France’s civil and military intervention: institutions, in which French civilian and military personnel worked, combat zones and “Zone Turquoise”. In order to verify the alleged acts, the Commission visited these scenes several times in order to verify with witnesses the alleged acts. In trying to identify such scenes of crime, the Commission took topographical sketches and aerial pictures to verify whether indeed such witnesses were able to witness the alleged acts. Such verification was particularly necessary to reconstruct the background of the massacre that occurred at Bisesero after Lieutenant Colonel Duval’s visit.

3.2. Collection of information abroad

Members of the Commission visited the following countries, where they were differently received: Belgium, France, Germany and Tanzania.

In Belgium, owing to the duty of non-disclosure, the Commission was unable to obtain evidence or to take any statements from individuals still serving in Government or those still answerable to the Executive. The Commission was also denied access to official documents that it had requested. However, it received the cooperation of Parliamentarians and individuals who were no longer bound by the duty of non-disclosure. Some gave documentary evidence while others accepted to testify publicly in Rwanda.

In France, the Commission’s request for cooperation with authorities was turned down. However, it should be noted that at the time the request was made, diplomatic relations between the two countries had been severed.

On the other hand, members of the Commission met with several personalities in their private capacity and were able to obtain highly invaluable information. Additionally, members of the Commission were able to meet some Parliamentarians in their private capacity. Finally, they had access to archives in the Embassy of the Republic of Rwanda in Paris.

In Germany, members of the Commission were able to interview various witnesses.

In Tanzania, members of the Commission (including the Chairman) met with the following authorities of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR): the Prosecutor, the Registrar and the President of the Tribunal. They were allowed access the Tribunal’s records.

3.3. Access to public documents

The Commission, which was established thirteen years after the genocide, managed to obtain relatively well established information, notably within the framework of investigations already carried out by national, international or private authorities. These included: the Commission of Inquiry of the Belgian Senate in 1997, the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry(MIP) in France in 1998, investigations carried out by the United Nations Organisation in 1997 and the Organisation of African Unity in 2001, reports by Human rights Organisations such as African Human Rights of London and Human Rights Watch of Washington, the report of the Commission d’enquête citoyenne in France ( Citizens’ Commission of Inquiry), numerous newspaper articles and a number of other Publications.

It should be noted that work devoted specifically to the role of the French in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, was often done by French intellectuals, journalists and researchers - some of whom are of great reputation-, humanitarian workers and human rights activists. Generally, these investigation reports presented particularly damning analysis of France’s acts in Rwanda.

Undoubtedly, there are a few contrary opinions in a limited number of publications, but the vast majority of the existing publications and especially those which go into depth all tend to lead to the presumption that France had a role in the 1994 Rwanda genocide.

Without ignoring the body of information available, the commission wanted to carry out a new inquiry which would be as comprehensive as possible, giving priority to field research. Earlier work was used for contextual explanations to supplement available information that was considered still insufficient and to substantiate facts and interpretations which were particularly sensitive. It is worth noting that earlier writings are far from showing the whole scope and gravity of France’s involvement in Rwanda. The report of this Commission itself falls short of exhausting this particular issue.

3.4. Information Processing

Testimonies collect by the Commission were not of the same quality. Some lacked coherence and accuracy. For instance a number of witnesses pointed out quite correctly to the Commission that they had not kept a record of what they had seen or heard. In fact it had never occurred to them that there would ever be an inquiry into the 1994 genocide. It was therefore imperative to work within this context of blunted memories, forgetfulness, and loss of documents in some archives which had not been well kept and even in some cases, pure fabrication.

This critical assessment of sources does not mean that all the testimonies were discarded. The Commission heard from many witnesses who could well remember their experiences as well as incidents and facts they had witnessed. The constraint of lapse of time prompted the Commission to carry out further crosschecking of the evidence and facts and to carry out a careful selection of what to retain and what to discard.

3.5. Research stages

The stages of the research were as follows:

From May to July 2006, the Commission began preliminary field investigations. Members of the Commission with researcher assistants interviewed potential witnesses from different military training areas and combat zones where French soldiers were seen.

From August to October 2006, the Commission improved on the results of its preliminary investigations through more systematic interviews with selected witnesses. Thereafter, public and in-camera hearings were conducted.

From November to December 2006, a second series of hearings were conducted. A number of Rwandans and foreigners were interviewed by the Commission.

From January to March 2007, the Commission spent most of its time abroad in pursuit of its mission.

From May to July 2007, the Commission organised the last public hearings specifically for foreign witnesses.

During public hearings, interviews and desk research work continued particularly from archives.


INTRODUCTION TO THE REPORT



1. Foreign involvement in Rwanda’s conflict and in the genocide

One of the characteristics of Rwanda’s conflict and the genocide is the extent of foreign involvement. This involvement must be viewed in the context of its duration, from the colonial period until the time the genocide occurred. Foreign actors involved were Germany, Belgium, Missionaries, The League of Nations and subsequently the United Nations Organisation during the colonial period.

With regard to the period between 1990 and 1994, the main foreign actors were France, Belgium, the United Nations Organisation and the United States. The review of foreign involvement in Rwanda’s conflict and in the 1994 genocide should enable us to show the specific role of France in relation to that of the rest of the international community. This can serve as an introduction, based on the available facts and on facts gathered before the launch of this Commission.

1.1 Historical background

Whenever the question of conflicts in many African countries has arisen, the role of colonisation has always been a subject of heated debate. Rwanda’s case has been no exception.

Whereas some argue that the Belgian colonial administration was mainly responsible for the emergence of Rwanda’s conflict, coupled with the role of missionaries who were in joint administration of the country, generally the proponents of this view also tend to present the pre-colonial period as an era devoid of any serious conflicts. Others defend the colonial era and the missionary influence, arguing that the colonizers and the missionaries played a modernizing social and political role, notably by introducing democracy.

From studies carried out, it appears that before colonisation the Rwandan society experienced a serious political and social crisis. The crisis was characterized by famines that repeatedly ravaged the Rwandan population. It was also characterised by political tensions that were aggravated by increasing political control over previously autonomous lineage groups that particularly wanted to monopolise their land in peripheral regions. Also, in central Rwanda, there was a hardening of the situation of patronage relations, which was becoming more and more exploitative and less and less dependent upon trade relations. Finally, there was a serious political instability owing to the conflict at the top of the State hierarchy between a centralizing and modernizing but unstable monarch who sought the renewal of the elite of the country, and an aristocracy anxious to preserve and develop its interests in a changing social context .

In spite of these tensions, there were no conflicts of identity between Hutus and Tutsis. The Rwandan society had a multiplicity of identification levels, the most important of which was the clan. The clan grouped Hutus, Tutsis and Twas together. In addition, the region had an identification level along the so-called ethnicity groupings, which groupings shared fundamental cultural attributes such as the language, religious and social rites, as well as the process of social rise based on merit, which considered mainly bravery and hard work. Conflicts and tensions existed among all social classes, among aristocratic Tutsis just as they existed among other social classes: Tutsi, Hutu or Twa .

However, the process of ethnic identification, which was introduced by colonialists and missionaries, is well documented. Inspired by racist theories prevailing in Europe in the 19th Century, they adopted and introduced a position which turned Rwandan socio-identity groups into hierarchical races. Belgian colonial administration implemented this position through political, social and administrative mechanisms. The Belgians thus excluded all Hutus, Twas and women out of posts of responsibility, preferring to use a small group of lineages close to the royal family to control the rest, and thereby making the new system of governance particularly oppressive .

The second stage in the development of Rwanda’s ethnic conflict was during the process of decolonisation. Whereas Belgian administration and the Catholic Church had succeeded in winning the royalty of the Tutsi aristocracy by the use of force during the entire colonial period, at the beginning of 1950s part of the aristocracy started showing signs of unruliness under the influence of the emerging anti-colonialist movements, demanding the right to self-rule. The Belgian administration and the Catholic Church reacted by changing their policy and forming alliances with a rising Hutu elite against the Tutsi aristocracy.

With their racist way of thinking, Belgians did not make any distinction between their political enemy, lumping the Tutsi aristocracy and the Tutsi population together. Yet a majority of the Tutsi population shared the same living conditions as their Hutu compatriots . Also, Belgians blamed the Tutsi aristocracy for acts of injustice and abuses while it was they themselves who had put them in place. However, the aristocracy had done nothing to distance themselves from ethnic divisions and the oppressive governance for which they were accused and which they had adopted in collaborating with the colonial administration. Only King Rudahigwa, who is considered by many analysts as a reformist, is credited with attempting to address these ills.

The Belgian administration and the missionaries instigated an ethnic revolution which they got other people to implement. In so doing, they chose to support the most extremist of the Hutu revolutionary leaders, the future President Kayibanda. In turn, Kayibanda chose to ignore the difference between the “small Tutsis” and the aristocracy .

The process of deposing the monarchy and politically, socially and culturally marginalising the Tutsis was carried out through terror and massive crimes. From 1959 to 1962 – the year of independence – part of these acts were committed when Belgium was the administrative power of the country. Rwanda was a Trust Territory, under the terms of the United Nations Mandate.

In December 1963 and January 1964 in Gikongoro Prefecture, acts of genocide were committed against ordinary Tutsi peasants in blind reprisals of targeted attacks carried out by a handful of Tutsi guerrillas. The guerrillas had come from outside the country and attacked an area at tens of kilometres from Burundi, in the region of Bugesera. These massacres, genocidaire in their intention as clearly expressed by President Kayibanda, were admittedly condemned by some journalists and intellectuals, but they did not raise any reaction from the international community. Newspapers talked of genocide, and the philosopher Bertrand Russel qualified the killings as “the most horrible and most systematic massacres we have witnessed since those committed by the Nazis against the Jews”. Jean Paul Sartre and Vatican Radio had similar views, mentioning and qualifying these massacres as genocide . A Swiss volunteer, Mr Vuillemin, who was teaching at Groupe scolaire d’Astrida, resigned from his post and made a written public statement which was widely disseminated outside Rwanda, as a way of showing his opposition to the genocide, according to his own statement.

The third stage marking foreign involvement in Rwanda’s conflict is seen in the legitimisation of, and assistance to, the Habyarimana regime accorded by the international community from the end of the 1970s to the beginning of the 1990s. This regime was characterised by an official and strict policy of ethnic and regional discrimination through what it called the balancing policy. Its governance was marked by a total political and social control and a refusal to find a solution to the situation of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi refugees living mainly in the neighbouring countries. Still, it received generous development aid from many western countries and international institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, the European Community, the Catholic Church and NGOs, especially those of Catholic allegiance. None of these countries and institutions ever criticised this deeply discriminatory policy. Most of them accepted the ethnic faith of this regime which claimed to be the legitimate representative of the Hutu majority

1.2. Recent international interventions (1990-1994)

1.2.1. Belgium

In the first days of the war launched by RPF in October 1990, France, Belgium and Zaire sent contingents to Rwanda. On 5th October 1990, Belgium sent a contingent of 500 soldiers to ensure the security of its 1600 nationals living in Rwanda. It also delivered part of the ammunitions which had been ordered by Rwanda before the start of the war. However, in the light of contradictory information regarding the nature of the war, the fake attack by RPF in Kigali on 4th October 1990, the ensuing wave of arbitrary arrests and the massacres and abuses committed by FAR, Belgium quickly changed its attitude towards the regime. On 12th October, it suspended its military aid to Rwanda by cancelling particularly the second delivery of ammunitions. On 1st November 1990, Belgian soldiers were repatriated. Belgium then called for the democratisation of the regime and a negotiated solution to the armed conflict. This u-turn by Belgium dampened its relations with the leadership of Rwanda. Subsequently, Belgium’s interventions were done within a multilateral framework.

Within the group of Rwanda’s donors, Belgium played a part in bringing pressure to bear on President Habyarimana so that he may open his government to the internal opposition and opt for the process of peace. This earned Belgium the hostility of the extremist circles inside the regime who kept on reviling it regularly on radio RTLM. Belgium was also among the countries which sent observers to the Arusha peace process (July 1992 – August 1993). It supported the Arusha Peace Accords by sending 450 men and contributing equipment to strengthen UNAMIR which had 2500 soldiers. The Belgian contingent constituted thus the backbone of UNAMIR both in terms of the quality of its troops and its equipment. A few months before the genocide in February 1994, following the worsening of the security inside the country due to the multiplicity of massacres, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote a letter to the United Nations Secretary General, recommending a stronger mandate for UNAMIR.

When the news of the death of President Habyarimana was announced in the evening of 6th April 1994, Radio des Milles Collines (RTLM) spread a rumour, accusing Belgium of having shot down the presidential plane. It was in this climate that ten Belgian blue helmets were assassinated by Rwandan soldiers in Camp Kigali in the morning of 7th April. On the following day, the Belgian Government announced the withdrawal of its troops from UNAMIR, unless its mandate was expanded and the number of its soldiers boosted by non-Belgian troops. However, it appears that this decision was taken after the Government learnt that three permanent members of the Security Council had spoken against this expansion of the mandate . On 12th April, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Willy Claes, explained to the Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, that the entire UNAMIR should be suspended and withdrawn from Rwanda. On the same day, a telegram was sent by the Belgian representative at the UN announcing that “USA shares the view of the countries which contributed troops and which wish to withdraw them”.

On 13th April, Boutros Ghali wrote to the Security Council referring to his conversation with the Belgian Minister and informing them of Belgium’s withdrawal from UNAMIR. He then requested the Security Council to draw the necessary conclusions from this. The Belgian representative also wrote to the President of the Security Council, informing him about the withdrawal of the Belgian troops from UNAMIR. On the same day, the Belgian Cabinet met and recommended that efforts be intensified so that the entire mandate of UNAMIR is suspended. On 19th and 20th April 1994, the Belgian blue helmets left Rwanda. On 21st April, the Security Council passed a decision to withdraw UNAMIR, leaving a symbolic international military presence of 270 men in Rwanda.

Following the killing of its ten blue helmets and despite knowing the scale of the massacres being perpetrated, the Belgian Government decided not only to withdraw its troops – thus depriving UNAMIR of its substance – but it also carried out a very active diplomatic campaign aimed at obtaining the total withdrawal of the Mission in order to tone down its responsibility of abandoning Rwandan victims. This campaign by the main provider of troops for the total withdrawal of UNAMIR clearly made the task of those countries within the Security Council, which wanted the same thing, easy.

1.2.2. United States

Contrary to the accusations levelled by the Habyarimana regime or by French officials that the war waged by RPF was an Anglo-Saxon plot, fomented by the United States through Uganda and RPF against France’s sphere of influence, the United States was not involved in Rwanda’s conflict. There is no proof of any clandestine or official intervention of the United States. The American Deputy Under Secretary of State from April 1989 to April 1993, Herman Cohen, explained to the French Parliamentary Fact-finding Mission that Rwanda was in no way within the strategic or political sphere of interest of his country .

The United States was among the group of Rwanda’s donors who had been putting pressure on President Habyarimana about the situation of human rights, democratisation and seeking a negotiated solution to the armed conflict with RPF. The United States was also an observer in the peace negotiations between RPF and the Government of Rwanda in Arusha.

Two days before the United Nations Security Council voted on whether UN should send troops to Rwanda in order to secure the implementation of the Arusha Peace Accords, American soldiers were killed in Somalia. This was one of two factors that should explain why the United States was in favour of setting up a UNAMIR with a reduced number of soldiers and mandate. There was first the trauma caused by the failure of the UN mission in Somalia. Then, the United States owed huge arrears of contribution to the UN budget and to the peace keeping operations. It thus exerted pressure so as to get the nature of the mandate of the Arusha Peace Accords to UNAMIR amended. UNAMIR’s mission was to be limited to peace-keeping not in the whole country, but only in the capital, Kigali. Moreover, it did not have the mandate of looking for arms caches or dismantling armed groups. Its role was restricted to that of an observer .

During the genocide, the United States’ influence was felt in the Security Council in terms of encouraging that no action should be taken about the genocide. On 15th April, the day of the debate on what stance to take in relation to the massacres and to the resumption of the hostilities by the warring parties, the United States was very resolutely opposed to the continued presence of UNAMIR and proposed its immediate withdrawal and the facilitation of negotiations between RPF and the interim government which was then orchestrating the genocide .

In a press communiqué dated 22nd May, after calling on the Rwandan army and RPF to observe a ceasefire, the White House asked specifically, by name, four officers of the national army to put an end to violence. This was one of the rare attempts by the United States to put pressure on the organisers of the genocide. However, this initiative was accompanied with a call for a ceasefire and an encouragement to negotiations through diplomatic contacts. Finally, on 1st May 1994, the American authorities officially asked their employees not to use the word “genocide” because this could require the American Government to have “to do something” .

As the major world power with a very important capacity of political, military and logistic influence enabling it to be quite easily present anywhere in the world, the United States carries a big responsibility for lack of action by the international community in the Rwanda genocide, to the extent that it encouraged this stance of inaction.

1.2.3. United Nations Organisation (UNO)

UNO ordered an investigation about its action in Rwanda before and during the genocide. In its report, the Independent Commission of Inquiry concluded by denouncing the total failure of the Organisation in its peace keeping mission in Rwanda. The Commission denounced in particular the inability of the Organisation, which had a force of 2500 men, to stop or contain the massacres. The most illustrative act of this failure by default is the decision taken unanimously on 21st April 1994 by the Security Council of withdrawing the UNAMIR contingent, leaving behind a symbolic force of 270 men, at the time when the massacres were at their highest intensity.

According to the Commission, the responsibility for this failure falls on the entire system, the Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretariat, in particular the Assistant Secretary General in charge of peace keeping operations, Kofi Annan, the Security Council, UNAMIR and the Member States.

While it is true that the member countries of the Security Council and the UN showed collectively little political will to prevent stop or reduce the scale of the genocide once it was under way, the UN institutions and their leaders carry a significant part of the responsibility at every stage of this failure.

Three examples can be cited to show the significance of the UN responsibility. The first concerns the drawing-up of the mandate and the composition of the international neutral force, UNAMIR, which was supposed to ensure the implementation of the peace agreements, signed in August 1993 between RPF and the Government of Rwanda. The UN employees proposed a classical peace keeping mission based on an overly optimistic political and security analysis of the peace process. The Organisation did not take into consideration the alarming information which was easily available concerning the nature of the acts of the Government of Rwanda and its security forces.

Only one week after the signing of the Peace Accords in August 1993, at the very time of the preparation of UNAMIR, the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations on Extrajudicial Executions, Waly Bacre Ndiaye, published a report depicting a very bleak and alarming situation of human rights in Rwanda. This report showed that in the overwhelming majority of the cases, the victims of those massacres were Tutsis who were targeted only because of their ‘ethnicity’. The report explained that there was the risk of a genocide aimed at the Tutsi community. This report and other information of this nature were not taken into consideration by the department in charge of peace keeping operations. Still concerning the establishment of UNAMIR, General Dallaire, who was tasked with making proposals after an inspection visit to Rwanda, had recommended the formation of a force of 4500 men. The Secretary General decided by himself to significantly reduce the number of soldiers requested by proposing to the Security Council a force of 2548 men, and this proposal was adopted.

On 11th January 1994, General Dallaire, the head of UNAMIR, sent a telegram to the UN headquarters in which he revealed the information he had obtained, showing that the entourage of President Habyarimana was planning the extermination of Tutsis in Kigali whose names appeared on an exhaustive list. This information revealed the existence of a militia of 1700 men capable of killing 1000 Tutsis in twenty minutes. The telegram mentioned also a strategy of provoking the Belgian soldiers which would lead to the assassination of some of them in order to make the Belgian contingent withdraw and UNAMIR collapse. Finally, the message pointed out also the existence of an arms cache.

General Dallaire informed the UN headquarters that he intended to raid the arms cache in order to show UNAMIR’s resolve to thwart this plan. The Head of the Department of Peace keeping operations, the Assistant Secretary General Kofi Annan, basing himself on a restrictive interpretation of the mandate of the UN force which is still subject to debate, prohibited Dallaire from carrying out the raid on the arms cache.

He instead suggested that Dallaire and the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, should see President Habyarimana and pass on this information to him. This was done, and President Habyarimana promised to carry out an investigation. But nobody put pressure on the President to make him take any possible action. In New York, the telegram was not communicated to the Secretary General and, of course, the Security Council was not informed. According to the information received from Dallaire, the only action taken after these revelations was the acceleration of the distribution of arms to the militia.

The third example of the responsibility of the UN internal organs concerns the withdrawal of the bulk of UNAMIR. In his telegram to Dallaire and Booh-Booh on 9th April, Kofi Annan declared that it was impossible for UNAMIR to fulfil its mandate under the existing conditions. In this connection, the UN Commission of Inquiry wrote: “The instinctive reaction in the Secretariat seems to have been that of doubting the feasibility of an effective reaction of the United Nations, instead of rather examining actively the possibility of strengthening the operation in order to meet the difficulties on the ground. ”

Despite the on-going genocide which was set in motion in Kigali on 7th April under the watch of these two representatives, Booh-Booh and Dallaire, the former as well as the Secretary General insisted that this genocide was nothing but the resumption of hostilities between two warring parties who should be made to see sense and negotiate a ceasefire. The Independent Commission observed “that the minutes of the meetings held between the members of the Secretariat, including the Secretary General, and the leaders of what was called the Interim Government (which orchestrated the genocide), show that the will to install a ceasefire was given priority over the increasingly deep moral indignation which was aroused in the international community ”. It was only three weeks after the systematic killings of the Tutsi community in the whole country, which had already claimed about 20,000 lives, that the Secretary General proposed to change direction and make the cessation of massacres of civilians a priority, in his letter of 29th April 1994 to the Security Council,.

During the first three weeks of the genocide, the employees of the General Secretariat systematically failed to inform the members of the Security Council about the on-going massacres . Non-permanent members of the Security Council maintained that it was through information received from NGOs that they came to learn about the genocidaire nature of the massacres which were being perpetrated in Rwanda. During the month of April 1994, the President of the Security Council, the New Zealander Colin Keating, openly asserted later: “With better information [...] the Council might have proceeded quite differently” .

Finally, although the United Nations was facing the most serious human crisis of its history, its Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, refused to return to New York, preferring to continue with his European tour of three weeks which he had barely started, and his colleagues could not understand such a leadership failure. This offhand manner and his many serious failures during this crisis fuelled the suspicion of a deliberate will not to put too much pressure on the regime which was committing genocide since he was an ally of France. It is the same France which seems to have been his main supporter during his election to the post of United Nations Secretary General and, later, following his failure to have his mandate renewed, to that of Secretary General of La Francophonie.

The United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry concluded its report by designating the people who were responsible for the United Nations’ failure in preventing or stopping the genocide as follows: “the Secretary General, the Secretariat, the Security Council and the member State(s) of the Organisation”. The report goes on: “This international responsibility justifies that the Organisation and the Member States concerned should make unequivocal apologies to the people of Rwanda.”

1.2.4. An attempt at international redress?

Each of these three international actors, namely Belgium, United States and the Unites Nations Organisation, recognised its responsibility in terms of lack of action by the international community about the genocide while they were highly involved in the management of Rwanda’s crisis. While passing through Rwanda in March 1998, President Bill Clinton recognized the responsibility of the international community and that of his government for their passivity with regard to the genocide. During the sixth commemoration of the genocide in Kigali on 7th April 2000, Belgium, through its Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, apologized to the Rwandan people for his country’s behaviour during the genocide.

During the 10th commemoration of the genocide on 7th April 2004, an emissary of the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, who was the Head of the Peace Keeping Department during the genocide, read a message in which Kofi Annan admitted that “the international community did not live up to the situation in Rwanda” and that “this will remain a source of bitter regrets and constant grief for us”. Further to these words, these three international actors did not interfere with efforts of reconstruction and national reconciliation of the country. On the contrary, they supported them at varying degrees. New international actors, who had been allies of Rwanda prior to this, became also involved in this post-genocide reconstruction and its international dimensions.

Even though the international actors, whose action has just been reviewed, have a collective responsibility in terms of international lack of action with regard to the genocide, their responsibility cannot be analysed at the same level as the role of France. Many studies carried out prior to the Commission’s inquiry and the work of this Commission show that France’s action is fundamentally different in terms of its scale and nature.
1.3 Process of the recognition of the genocide

The establishment of facts and the recognition of the genocide of Rwandan Tutsis by the United Nations were characterised by a delay in the qualification and a refusal to act in order to put a stop to the massacres, despite the scale and abundance of available information . However, once the process of qualification was completed, the reaction of the United Nations and several involved actors tended generally towards the recognition and the acceptance of their responsibility.

1.3.1 Initiatives of the United Nations Human Rights Commission

The United Nations Human Rights Commission was active in setting in motion the process of establishing facts and qualification of the genocide, under the leadership of the High Commissioner, José Ayala Lasso, who took office on 5th April 1994 . On 14th April 1994, he wrote a memorandum to the United Nations Secretary General, suggesting that urgent measures be taken in order to prevent the worsening of the human rights situation in Rwanda . On 4th May 1994, he called for the urgent convening of a meeting of the Human Rights Commission, with a view to considering the situation in Rwanda .

On 11th and 12th May, he travelled to Rwanda and, after this mission, he proposed to the Human Rights Commission during its meeting held on 24th and 25th May the appointment of a Special Rapporteur for Rwanda responsible for studying all the aspects of the human rights situation, particularly the primary causes of and responsibility for the atrocities. The appointment was made at the end of the meeting . Pursuant to this resolution, Mr René Degni-Segui was appointed Special Rapporteur for Rwanda for an initial period of one year and given the order to travel immediately to Rwanda and report to the members of the Commission within four months.

On 28th June 1994, Mr. René Degni-Sgui submitted his first report indicating the perpetration of large scale massacres organised and carried out by Hutu militia, the victims of which were mainly Tutsis and Hutus considered moderate . The report established that “the qualification of genocide must already be recognised with regard to Tutsis” and that “it is a different case concerning the killing of Hutus ”. He concluded by highlighting the responsibility of Hutu militia and the Government of Rwanda.

1.3.2 Procrastination in the recognition of the genocide in the Security Council

The analysis of the first resolutions and official statements of the Security Council reveals some confusion between the genocide and the armed conflict which was then pitting FAR against RPF. From April 1994, these resolutions and statements insisted on the need for a ceasefire between the warring parties on one hand, irrespective of earlier reports such as the one by Bacre Waly Ndiaye which should have inspired the Security Council to quickly recognise the exact nature of the on-going massacres. On the other hand, they condemned the massacres of civilians by using legal terms which define genocide, without necessarily naming it explicitly.

On 30th April 1994, the President of the Security Council declared: “The Security Council is appalled to learn that massacres of innocent civilians are continuing in Kigali and other regions of Rwanda and that new massacres are allegedly being prepared. [...] Attacks against helpless civilians have been launched in the whole country, particularly in the areas under the control of the members or partisans of the Armed Forces of the Rwandan Interim Government. [...] The Security Council condemns all these violations of the international humanitarian law in Rwanda, in particular those committed against the civilian population, and reminds the persons who foment these acts or who participate in them that they are individually held responsible for them. In this context, the Security Council reminds them that the elimination of the members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying it completely or partially is a crime under the international law ”.

The same caution is reflected in Resolution 918 of 17th May 1994 where the Security Council does not mention the word genocide but uses once again terms which correspond to its legal definition: “Recalling in this context that killing members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying it totally or partially is a crime under the international law”. It was not until Resolution 925 of 8th June 1994 that the Security Council used the term “genocide” for the first time. In the wording of this resolution, the Council notes “with the greatest concern that acts of genocide had been committed in Rwanda” and reminds “that this was a crime under the international law”.

This recognition did not translate into any acts of immediate assistance to the victims yet there were many threatened civilians who could be saved at that time. One month later, on 1st July 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 935 by which it asked the Secretary General to urgently set up an impartial commission of experts with a wider mandate of investigation to check on the findings of the Special Rapporteur and come up with a report within four months on elements of proof concerning the serious violations of the international humanitarian law committed on the territory of Rwanda, including any possible acts of genocide.

The appointed experts submitted their report on 4th October 1994 in which they qualified the massacres of the Tutsis as “genocide” in terms of Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. The experts emphasized at the same time that they did not come across any proof indicating that Tutsi elements had committed acts with the intention of destroying the Hutu ethnic group as such in terms of the 1948 Convention on Genocide . Finally, the Commission recommended to the Secretary General to either establish an international criminal tribunal for Rwanda, or expand the jurisdiction of the international criminal tribunal for former Yugoslavia to include crimes committed in Rwanda in international law.

After considering these corroborating reports in terms of both facts and findings, the Security Council ended up by sanctioning the recognition of a genocide committed in Rwanda against the Tutsis, crimes against humanity and the violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12th August 1949. At the same time, through Resolution 955 of 8th November 1994, it decided to set up an international criminal tribunal responsible for “trying persons presumed responsible for acts of genocide and other violations of the international humanitarian law committed on the territory of Rwanda, and Rwandan citizens presumed responsible for such acts or violations of international law committed on the territory of neighbouring States between 1st January and 31st December 1994 ”.
After four years of operation, this tribunal handed down its first sentence on 2nd September 1998 against Jean-Paul Akayesu, in which the perpetration of the crime of genocide against the Tutsis was established as a judicially recognised fact. This verdict was also the first criminal conviction of an individual for genocide since the adoption of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on 9th December 1948. Concomitantly with this recognition of the genocide, some States showed the will to try criminals residing on their soil and initiated trials which culminated in criminal convictions.
Still in the context of international justice, ICTR concluded that the genocide of Rwandan Tutsis was “public knowledge” and was part of the history of humanity which did not need any proof . This was in two judgements passed on 16th June and 2nd December 2006 in the trial of three national leaders of the former President’s political party, Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement (MRND). This Commission is also of the same opinion


PART I: FRANCE’S INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA BEFORE THE GENOCIDE


1. Historical background and legal framework of cooperation between France and Rwanda

According to the observation of the Parliamentary Fact-finding Mission, cooperation between France and Rwanda started timidly and late, compared to France’s cooperation with its former colonies. It was launched by General de Gaulle following the suggestion of Jacques Foccart, on the grounds that Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi were French-speaking countries and France felt it should establish its presence in all of them. To France, Rwanda was of special interest because it could “in the years to come, contribute efficiently to the development of French influence. Due to its geographical position, it is capable of serving as a bridge between Madagascar and French-speaking Africa ”.

1.1. Aspects of the civilian cooperation

Civilian cooperation between France and Rwanda started on 20th October 1962 with the signing of the general agreement of friendship and cooperation in cultural, technical and economic fields. On 4th December 1962, three definite agreements were signed, specifying the nature of the French intervention in each of these fields. This intervention had been varying as decades went by. During the 1960s and the 70s, the French-Rwandan cooperation financed various development projects but lacked a clear political dimension compared with the former French colonies . It was not until the mid-1970s, under President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, that France defined a clear geopolitical vision based on the conviction that Americans were gaining ground in French speaking Africa and that it was necessary to strengthen the francophonie in order to fend off this competing influence .

All along the 1980s and the 1990s, cooperation between France and Rwanda was in line with this new doctrine and became increasingly significant with the presence of about a hundred French aid workers and volunteers, working mainly in the sectors of education, vocational training, culture, health, agricultural and rural development, infrastructure, transport and communication, information, upgrading Kanombe airport, as well as maintaining a French crew of the Presidential plane. All these were at a value of 60 million French francs per year. All in all, France’s financial commitments to Rwanda in development aid amounted to about 250 million French francs per year, and this included particularly budgetary aid to administration.

From the beginning of the hostilities between RPF and Rwandan Armed Forces on 1st October 1990 up to the onset of the genocide, France increased its support to Rwanda in terms of civilian and military cooperation. Between 1991 and 1993, it was one of the leading partners and granted Rwanda substantial quick-disbursing support to meet its financial needs under the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), particularly with regard to the balance of payments and budget deficit. In 1991, France granted Rwanda 70 million French francs from the French Central Fund for Economic Cooperation to finance part of its balance of payments .

In view of the financial needs resulting from the war efforts which had increased Rwanda’s budget deficit, France decided to allocate an annual direct budget support of about 100 million French francs to Rwanda to enable it to meet war related expenses, with effect from 1990 . In 1992, France allocated an additional grant of 15 million French francs to Rwanda’s National Television project. In the same year, Rwanda further received a debt relief amounting to 448.7 million French francs . From the figures available for 1993, France was the leading donor to Rwanda, and the actions of the aid workers represented 232 million French francs

We cannot end this part without mentioning the existence, besides bilateral cooperation, of another form of aid called “decentralised cooperation”, whereby French local communities maintained partnership relations with several communes and prefectures in Rwanda.

1.2 Elements of military cooperation

Military cooperation between France and Rwanda officially began on 18th July 1975 with the signing of a “Special Military Assistance Agreement” between the two states. This agreement was restricted expressly to cooperation with Rwanda’s gendarmerie and did not mention at all any possible involvement of France in Rwanda’s army as a whole. In practice, however, France’s military assistance went beyond this framework and was regularised only a posteriori.

1.2.1 Contents of the Special Military Assistance Agreement of 1975

Under the Agreement of 18th July 1975, military cooperation between France and Rwanda consisted of organising and training Rwanda’s gendarmerie along the French gendarmerie model . The Agreement provided that French soldiers shall be designated by France and proposed to Rwanda for acceptance. These soldiers shall remain under the French jurisdiction and shall serve “in French uniforms according to the traditional rules of use of their arms or service in the ranks they hold . In the fulfilment of this mission, the Agreement defined the limits by stipulating that “they may in no case be involved in the preparation or execution of warfare operations, public law and order maintenance or restoration”.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement, France met the needs of the gendarmerie in three aspects: technical assistance, training and specialisation of the personnel, and direct equipment aid. Concerning technical assistance, France provided technicians for training policemen. French soldiers who were involved in this task were posted at Ruhengeri National Police College (EGENA), at Jali Mobile Gendarmerie Training and Retraining Centre, at the Technical Service Group and in the Health Department.

Concerning training and specialisation of the Gendarmerie personnel, France offered scholarships for courses and study and information tours in French or inter-African schools sponsored by France. While in France, Rwandan gendarmes were particularly trained at the Ecole supérieure de guerre interarmées, the Ecole supérieure de la gendarmerie nationale, the Ecole d’Etat-major de la Gendarmerie nationale. With regard to direct equipment aid, France allocated a special annual budget whose size has never been revealed , for the acquisition of equipment and spare parts.

1.2.2 Amendments of the 1975 Agreement

This Agreement was amended twice, in 1983 and 1992, at key moments in the political history of Rwanda . The first request for amendment was addressed to the French authorities on 22nd March 1983 by the Government of Rwanda and was accepted on 20th April of the same year as submitted. The amended article was Article 3 of the Agreement, and it stipulated that henceforth, French soldiers “shall serve in Rwandan uniforms with the ranks they hold or, as appropriate, their equivalent within the Rwandan Armed Forces”. According to MIP, “this amendment was justified by the fact that French technical military assistants could be called upon to occupy alternating posts in the Rwandan Gendarmerie”.

It should be noted however, that in the French Army tradition, wearing local uniform was “a political concession and a strong military sign which should not be abused ”. This means that the proposed amendment by Rwanda in 1983 and accepted by France was in line with a strategy for the strengthening of the relations between the French and Rwandan gendarmeries. A confidential letter from the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs, reference No. 268 of 23rd November 1990, confirms the zeal showed by French officers involved in the war against RPF, which stems partly from these strengthened relations between the two armies.

“The Government of Rwanda recognises the worth of the contribution of France’s military assistance to Rwanda. It appreciates the moral, technical and tactical support that the French officers, in particular the Head of MAM, Col. Galinié and Lt Col. Canovas, have provided to their Rwandan comrades since their arrival on the Rwandan soil, especially during the war of October 1990 imposed on the people of Rwanda by attackers from outside. These officers have strengthened the friendly and brotherly relations with the officers of the Rwandan Armed Forces for the benefit of our two peoples and have earned their total trust. The army and all the people of Rwanda are happy to count on true friends and are grateful for this”.

The second amendment of the 1975 Agreement was made on 26th August 1992 following a diplomatic telegram dated 31st July 1992 from Ambassador Martres to the French authorities. In this telegram, Georges Martres pointed out that the terms of the 1975 Agreement had been amended by the existing situation on the ground. In fact, the military cooperation as provided for initially was confined to the gendarmerie, while it had been extended de facto to the whole Rwandan Armed Forces, without authorisation of this extension by any endorsement. In view of this unlawful situation, the Rwandan authorities, with the official support of Ambassador Martres, requested for the regularisation of this situation so as to align the text of the Agreement with the reality on the ground . France accepted the proposed amendment and endorsed it on 26th August 1992 as indicated above.

1.2.3 Increased military aid effective from 1989

By the end of the 1980s, France had increased its military aid to the Rwandan government. This increase corresponded with the period when the possibility of the launching of an armed conflict was no longer a secret for the Rwandan authorities. Rwanda’s secret services knew then that war was imminent and they were getting prepared accordingly .

According to a former employee of the French Cultural Centre in Kigali, Venuste Kayijamahe , shortly before October 1990, France was well informed about the preparations of war and had even devised a support strategy to the Government of Rwanda and its armed forces in case of an attack.

“On 9th November 1989, Ambassador Martres organised a party to welcome new French aid workers to which I was unexpectedly invited. I was very surprised to find many French soldiers clad in ceremonial uniforms in this party. What surprised me in Martres’ speech was that after talking about cooperation, he introduced the soldiers who were present and said: “the reason for their presence is that the country is going to be attacked by people from outside who do not love Rwanda. They will come to destroy what we have built through the development aid we provided to this country. These officers I am showing you have the duty to help Rwanda in case of an attack to ensure that this country does not fall in the hands of invaders. We will not accept that Rwanda suffers this fate”.

As the table below shows, compared to the preceding years, arms deliveries by France to Rwanda increased in 1989, one year before RPF’s attack on 1st October 1990.

Agreements of French arms exports to Rwanda by CIEEMG in millions of FF.

Year Value of arms export authorisations in millions of French francs Value of direct free-of-charge transfers of arms
1987 50 _
1988 19 _
1989 116 _
1990 191 0
1991 48 1.3
1992 122 14.9
1993 44 8.4
Sub- total 590 24.6
Grand Total 632,8

Source: French Ministry of Defence in MIP PDF, p. 179

According to the information from MIP, it was compulsory to obtain the approval of the Inter-ministerial Commission for carrying out studies for the export of warfare equipment before arms deliveries were made, be it in the case of sales by the French State or by private dealers, and it was the same with free-of-charge or expensive direct transfers taken from the stocks of the French Army. There is, however, nothing to assert if no unauthorised exports were delivered because, as we shall see further in this document, different documents show that arms deliveries by France to Rwanda during the genocide, i.e. in 1994, had a value well beyond the figures presented above.

These official figures show that arms deliveries more than doubled in 1989 and continued to increase in 1990, these being the years when the Rwandan Ministry of Defence started an unusual recruitment drive in the army and gendarmerie. This doubling of arms deliveries and the mass recruitment are strong signs which support the idea that Rwanda and France were aware of the possibility of the launching of the armed struggle by RPF and that the two countries were ready for this . The other peak was in 1992, the year in which RPF showed clearly its military superiority. Concerning the years showing a decline in arms deliveries, one may suppose that for 1991, the accumulation of the previous years was sufficient and that for 1993, it was the year of the peace negotiations (Arusha in August 1993).

1.3. Structure of the French military intervention (October 1990 – April 1994)

This part deals with the French military intervention starting from 3rd October 1990 up to the eve of the genocide on 6th April 1994. France’s action during this period has been written about by many independent researchers, but it was also one of the major topics investigated by the French Fact-finding Parliamentary Mission.

1.3.1 Context of the October 1990 war

Rwanda’s political, economic and social context at the time of the attack by RPF on 1st October 1990, which was the source of a lot of dissatisfaction, is well documented. It has been the subject of many studies . According to these studies, in the 1990s, Rwanda was characterised by a persistent institutionalised policy of ethnic and regional discrimination, a type of governance that tended towards political and social control by the single party MRND, a serious economic and social crisis, rampant corruption and political violence fuelled by murders of persons considered politically dangerous. All these elements contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of political deterioration and deep economic and social anxiety.

The external dimensions of this context are less known . This lack of knowledge enabled the Habyarimana regime and its French supporters to portray the armed struggle launched by RPF as an aggression by Uganda, an English-speaking country trying to encroach upon the French-speaking world. Succinctly, this description of the context tends to bring some clarifications concerning these external forces.

On 1st October 1990, RPF launched a large-scale attack from Uganda against the Rwandan Armed Forces, leading to the armed struggle. According to the statements issued by RPF, the aim of this struggle was to establish the rule of law in Rwanda, put an end to the institutionalised policy of ethnic and regional discrimination and enable the return of the refugees who were scattered in the Great Lakes region and around the world, some of them for thirty-five years. This attack was the culmination of several years of mobilisation of the refugees’ communities throughout the world starting from the mid 1980s: in Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Senegal, Switzerland, France, the United States or elsewhere. The Rwandan refugees’ communities got organised and started to define a protest platform calling for the end of the policy of ethnic and regional discrimination and their right to return to their country. Two trends then appeared: the first, radical, felt that the ideological regime of Hutu supremacy did not have the capacity of reforming itself and that there was therefore need to fight it politically and militarily; the second, collaborationist, recommended dialogue and the search for a humanitarian type of arrangement. Five events prompted the acceleration of the process of mobilisation and radicalisation of the refugees’ communities.

In October 1982, Rwandan refugees and the Kinyarwanda-speaking people living in Southern Uganda were hunted out by a military contingent and the youth of the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) of President Milton Obote. Rwandans were accused of collaborating with the guerrilla war launched by Yoweri Museveni, from the Hima tribe who are related to the Tutsis. According to some sources, it is claimed that more than a hundred people were killed; 35000 people tried to find refuge in the old refugee camps where they found themselves besieged; another 40000 tried to run away towards the Rwandan border. Those who managed to cross were kept inside camps on the Rwandan side of the border, but a group of between 8000 and 10000 were trapped in a strip of land forming a no man’s land between the Rwandan soldiers on one side and the UPC militants on the other . Rwanda closed its border in November 1982 . Aged refugees who could not tolerate seeing their country refusing them asylum preferred committing suicide. . Others remained in no man’s land for months, dying a slow death from infectious diseases and despair

As a result of the events of 1982-83, many Rwandan young refugees joined the ranks of Museveni’s guerrilla movement, and the small group of Rwandan refugees started an insurrection alongside him with the ultimate aim of “liberating” their own country. In January 1986, Museveni’s troops seized Kampala with some thousands of Rwandan refugees among them. Among these were the first leader of RPF, General Fred Rwigema, and the future president Paul Kagame, who occupied high posts in the victorious army.

In July 1986, with the growing pressure from the refugees’ communities who were demanding political change in Rwanda and their right to return to their country more and more insistently, the Habyarimana regime through the MNRD Central Committee rejected this claim of their returning home under the pretext that the country was overpopulated. This position was accompanied with the promise of considering in a discretionary manner requests from individuals who had the means of meeting their needs once they were allowed to return. But the preferred option was for these refugees to settle permanently abroad .

In August 1988, the collaborationist trend close to the Kigali regime organised a world congress, which was to bring together the representatives of the refugees and the Government of Rwanda to discuss the refugees’ issue. The radicals, though sceptical, decided all the same to attend so as to give dialogue a chance. The Kigali regime boycotted the meeting. At the end, the congress adopted strong resolutions demanding the right to return and ended by rallying almost all the participating communities around the radical agenda, without however mentioning explicitly the armed struggle.

Faced with growing pressure, Rwanda formed a “Special Commission on the problem of Rwandan emigrants” in February 1989, which was tasked with studying independently the solutions to be adopted on the problem of refugees, who were referred to as emigrants for this purpose. After two years spent doing nothing, the Commission proposed at its third meeting held in June 1990 that the Government should send delegates to Uganda to select candidates who would be repatriated starting from November.

Gerard Prunier maintains that this proposal may have pushed RPF to act quickly to avoid being beaten to it. But he also adds that the Government of Rwanda, faced with the growing internal political protests, chose not to negotiate the question of refugees seriously, in the hope that an armed conflict it was expecting would enable it to rally the population behind it and thwart its internal opponents . Finally, President Museveni, under the pressure of the criticisms of born and bred Ugandans who were opposed to the big number of Rwandan refugees holding civilian and military leadership positions, was forced to dismiss some of them by the end of 1989 such as General Rwigema, who was dismissed from his post of Deputy Minister of Defence.

The confrontation between the refugees’ communities and Rwanda’s secret services, which had existed since the 1960s, increased by mid-1980s. It took the form of abductions of refugees from neighbouring countries, manipulation of political groups aimed at fuelling resentments against the refugees, as was the case in Zaire for example. Later, the hostility of Rwanda’s secret services against the refugees shifted and was aimed at restricting students from these communities to getting entry into some West African countries. Blackmails were also launched against refugees working in international organisations.

In addition, with the worsening economic crisis in Africa, more particularly in Rwanda’s neighbouring countries sheltering big refugees’ communities, there were increased xenophobic tensions aimed particularly at Rwandan refugees’ communities, who were considered as having been very successful economically and sometimes being politically threatening. Ethnic attacks against Rwandans increased in secondary schools, discriminatory policies aimed at Rwandan refugees were applied in public services, but more particularly, young refugees failed to get education because of the introduction of restrictive legal or de facto quotas. The feeling among the second generation of refugees who were born in exile in all the countries of the region, with the exception of Tanzania and Uganda, from 1986, was that the future was totally closed, no matter the efforts and sacrifices they were prepared to make. In the end, the right to return to Rwanda became an imperative perspective. The armed confrontation between RPF and the Government of Rwanda in October 1990 can be explained by this entire set of causes – the radicalisation of the refugees’ communities during the second half of the 1980s, the decline of the regime of President Habyarimana, the economic crisis which hit the country very hard from 1987, the exacerbation of the policy of ethnic and regional exclusion, the rising corruption and political violence fuelled by the killing of opponents.

1.3.2 Description of the different elements of France’s intervention according to the official version

1.3.2.1 Opération Noroît

In its early days, RPF’s attack was immediately successful. It managed to seize Gabiro military camp and pushed 60 km inside the country. On 2nd October 1990, the son of President Mitterrand, Jean-Christophe, head of the African cell at Elysée, received a telephone call from President Habyarimana in the presence of the researcher Gerard Prunier. President Habyarimana was asking for France’s military intervention . According to General Maurice Schmitt , chief of staff of the French Army, President Mitterrand, who was then visiting Saudi Arabia, decided shortly before lunch on 4th October to send troops to Rwanda. This decision was taken after a brief council of defence held with his assistants who were with him.

On the same day, the first soldiers of Opération Noroît from the Central African Republic landed in Kigali. Quite strangely, although Opération Noroît was sanctioned by President Mitterrand on 4th, the mission of the operation was published the previous day on 3rd, through message 3782 from the General Staff . Another strange occurrence: a few hours after the arrival of the French troops in Kigali in the evening of 4th October 1990, the Rwandan Armed Forces simulated an attack of the city, firing in the air the whole night of 4th and 5th. The MIP report states in this connection: “Nonetheless, this staging of the imminent fall of Kigali failed to convince the French authorities to provide President Juvenal Habyarimana with all the aid in arms and ammunitions he was asking for, but the situation was deemed quite risky for French nationals to justify the dispatching of Opération Noroît on 4th October” .

There is obviously a problem in the official presentation of the sequence of events leading to the dispatching of Opération Noroît. It seems that the staging of the attack farce was done with delay . These contradictions support the assumption that the preparation of the French military intervention was done long before the attack by RPF on 1st October 1990, as suggested by the high increase in the deliveries of French arms to Rwanda in 1989 and the arrival in the same year of French soldiers to prepare the defence of the country, as we will see further in this document.

Opération Noroît had three officially declared objectives: (1) to protect the French Embassy, (2) to protect French nationals and (3) to ensure their possible evacuation. This protection was to be extended to all the Europeans and implied the control of the airport in case of evacuation. According to Admiral Lanxade, these troops were in no way to meddle in the maintenance of law and order .

Officially, these troops consisted of a tactical staff and two companies, totalling 314 soldiers. They were initially composed of the 2nd REP and the 8th RPIMA. According to Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, these two units from the 11th Parachutist Division, Combat Division, were specialised in clandestine operations . The other contingents included in Opération Noroît and the Military and Instruction Assistance Detachment (DAMI) such as the 1st RPIMA were attached to the new Special Operations Command created on 24th June 1992.

The mission of the Noroît detachment consisted particularly in the control of the area surrounding the city of Kigali through patrols and putting in place checkpoints run by French soldiers, especially on all the main roads leading into the city and to the airport. But this French military support for the protection of the city of Kigali, its surroundings and the airport was quickly found inadequate in view of the attacks by RPF, which highlighted the weakness of the Rwandan Armed Forces every time they happened. Noroît companies were asked “to adopt a discreet attitude” because we should avoid creating “the feeling that we are fighting alongside the Rwandan Armed Forces ”.

MIP tried to find out the reason why Opération Noroît was given an ad hoc command instead of remaining under the Defence Attaché and the Head of the Military Assistance Mission in Kigali. On 19th October 1990, the Chief of Staff appointed a commander, Col. Jean-Claude Thomann, who was directly answerable to the Chief of Staff . When he was interviewed by MIP, General Thomann “admitted before the Mission that this question tied in with both a problem of doctrine and a special problem related to this operation. He stated that his appointment as operation commander by the Chief of Staff had aroused a debate which he qualified as quite bitter between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the Ambassador feeling that in view of the situation, it belonged to the Defence Attaché to ensure the commandment of the operation ”.

Likewise, during the situations of crisis resulting from RPA’s attacks in June 1992 and February 1993, all the French troops in Rwanda were put under an ad hoc command, which was directly answerable to the Chief of Staff.
Analysts see in this rather a way of bypassing official channels in order to shorten the process of decision-making to execute a clandestine war . There was Lt. Col. Gilbert Canovas from 1st RPIMA who was in charge of putting in place structures that were supposed to facilitate this war. He was appointed advisor to the Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces, with the mission of strengthening their operational capacities. This appointment was initially to run from 11th October to 26th November 1990, and then for the first three months of 1991. The decision-making process brought together Lt. Col. Gilbert Canovas, Chief of Staff Admiral Lanxade – formerly Chief of Staff of President Mitterrand (April 1989 – April 1991) – General Quesnot, Special Chief of Staff of President Mitterrand (1991-1995), General Huchon who, having been the deputy of General Quesnot at Elysée since April 1991, was head of the military cooperation mission in April 1993

During his first mission as advisor at the end of 1990, Lt. Col. Canovas made the Rwandan Armed Forces adopt three strategic proposals: (1) putting in place operational sectors along the Rwanda-Uganda border of 200 km; (2) recruitment of many non-commissioned men and mobilisation of reservists, which increased the number of Rwandan Armed Forces from 11000 to 20000 between October 1990 and January 1991; (3) reduction of the period of initial training of soldiers which would be limited to the use of individual arms from the unit equipment. Finally, in order to overcome the strategic problem raised by a border “with Uganda which stretches over 200 to 250 km in the north” which facilitates infiltrations and other hit-and-run attacks , Lt. Col. Gilbert Canovas proposed “the establishment in sensitive areas of small groups in civilian clothes, disguised as peasants, so as to neutralise the rebels who are generally isolated [our emphasis]” [source?]

This advice brings to mind the subsequent formation of the civilian self-defence militia who would be used later in the mobilisation of civilians during the genocide. At the end of the mission of Lt. Col. Gilbert Canovas, a permanent advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces was appointed.

After its crushing defeat at the end of October 1990, RPF adopted a low profile and redeployed in the north of the country in the region of the volcanoes, where it got reorganised and adopted a guerrilla strategy. On 23rd January 1991, it launched a surprise attack on the town of Ruhengeri in the north and set free the main political prisoners from Ruhengeri special prison. As a result of this attack, a new stage in the French military intervention in Rwanda was set to complement Opération Noroît.

1.3.2.2 The DAMI

After the RPF offensive on Ruhengeri and in reaction to the pressing demands of President Habyarimana who passionately wanted to see France’s direct aid in the fighting, the latter decided to provide its support in the form of advice, assistance and instructions to enable the Rwandan Armed Forces to face RPF. On 15th March 1991, Ambassador Martres was asked to inform President Habyarimana of France’s decision to provide Rwanda with a Military and Instruction Assistance Detachment (DAMI). In its conclusion, the diplomatic telegram underlined: “We do not intend to announce the establishment of DAMI officially. You will tell President Juvenal Habyarimana that we would like him to do the same”. Later, the Ambassador reported that President Habyarimana had expressed “his deep satisfaction” .

Three types of DAMIs were established. Panda DAMI, which was established on 20th March 1991, was the most important. Its main duty was to train and retrain the units of the Rwandan Armed Forces engaged in operational sectors. A DAMI Gendarmerie was also established and within it, a section of the DAMI Judiciary Police was established in 1992. And to cap the operation, a third DAMI in charge of the training of the Presidential Guard was put in place. Contrary to the military advisors, DAMI soldiers lived in military camps with their recruits and operated close to the military operations terrain. On the other hand, Panda DAMI was reinforced by an artillery component in 1992 and an engineering component in 1993.

According to Lt. Col. Chollet , who was the first commander of DAMI, the mission consisted of receiving a Rwandan battalion either newly created or composed of heterogeneous soldiers from existing companies for a period of four to five weeks. It was supposed to be turned into an organised and structured army of soldiers capable of controlling its territory, so that when the Rwandan authorities went to Arusha, they would be in a balanced position in relation to RPF. During this training, the battalion commanders received tactical training and learnt how to organise their units in light of the types of arms made available to them. This training was done in class but also on the field.

When Panda DAMI arrived in March 1991, there were about fifty French technical military men in all, including DAMI staff. The increase of DAMI personnel brought the number of military forces from 80 to 100, and this increase followed closely the curve of the military evolution on the ground. The DAMI operation was strengthened in two instances following the RPF military pressure, one in the summer of 1992, the other in the autumn of the same year. On 20th June 1992, RPF managed to seize and occupy a strip of land 10 km deep from North West to North East, necessitating a vigorous reaction of French support to the Rwandan Armed Forces. To this end, the commanding officer of the 1st RPIMA, Col. Rosier, future head of the Special Operations Command, took command of the French military forces in Rwanda from June to November 1992.

Just after the widespread offensive of RPF on 8th February 1993, which brought it to about thirty kilometres from the capital Kigali, the French Army launched “Opération Chimère” from 22nd February to 28th March 1993. Col. Didier Tauzin was sent to the field with a score of officers and specialists from 1st RPIMA. He had under him all the DAMI soldiers totalling 69 men. The Chimère detachment brought thus together Panda DAMI which was already present, and the detachment which came as reinforcement with Col. Didier Tauzin. “According to the documents obtained by MIP, the objective of the detachment was to supervise indirectly an army of about 20000 men and provide it with an indirect command ”.

The French military support operation to Rwanda was not quantitatively insignificant with, according to official figures, an increase to 688 soldiers for the Noroît contingent and 100 men for the DAMIs at the time of the widespread offensive of RPF in February 1993. One analyst explained that in fact, through the game of the rotation of men, nearly 1000 French soldiers were deployed in Rwanda during part of 1993 . The deployment of French soldiers in Rwanda is distinguishable especially from the quality of the troops and the officers involved on one hand, and also by its diversity and operational locations. The troops that were deployed, be it under the Noroît contingent or the DAMIs, were elite troops, different regiments of parachutists of naval infantry, with a predilection for the 1st RPIMA or the 2nd Parachutist Foreign Regiment (REP).

While the Noroît detachment was responsible for the protection of the city of Kigali, its neighbourhood and the airport, Panda DAMI supported military operations through training and operational advice near the scene of the hostilities. Subsequently, the DAMI artillery and engineering detaches were directly involved in the fighting. Finally, on the strategic front, the French counsel of the Chief of Staff provided strategic support to the war efforts of the Rwandan Armed Forces. MIP came to the conclusion that the duty of the French counsel was “to advise discreetly the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces in all matters concerning the conduct of operations, but also in the preparation and training of forces ”.

The DAMI Gendarmerie trained the police in the maintenance of law and order and participated in intelligence collection, particularly through the DAMI Judiciary Police. We should mention that the Gendarmerie Chief of Staff had also a French advisor who was totally concealed by the official description of MIP. Finally, with every large scale offensive of RPA, the French Army sent reinforcements to Rwanda, led by the cream of the commanders of its elite units, such as Col. Rosier who was sent to combat RPA between June and November 1992. At that time, he was the commanding officer of the 1st RPIMA, and immediately after his mission in Rwanda, he was appointed to command the operations of the Special Operations Command of the French Army (COS) in June 1992.

Colonel Tauzin, commander of Opération Chimère, made a proper summary of the nature of the French military action in Rwanda, and his words raised questions from the Parliamentarians of MIP, who wrote: “The conclusion he draws from his experience, however, gives food for thought. The overall cost (financial, human, media) of this operation of indirect strategy seems extremely low compared to the results obtained and to what would have been the cost of the direct engagement against RPF ”.

The issue here seems to do with an indirect strategy of confrontation between the French Army in Rwanda and RPF. A war about which General Quesnot (Special Chief of Staff of the French President between April 1991 and September 1995), one of its principal strategists, declared: “[ ] it was a real war, total and very cruel.” And Patrick de Saint-Exupery wrote that “[the French military support went] further. Much further. France took the reins of the Rwandan Army.” Périès and Servenay added: “Unaware, the French were at war. An invisible war to their eyes, too far in the heart of Africa. A black war.”

While analysing the French military support to the Rwandan Armed Forces between 1990 and 1994, MIP points at the key question raised by this intervention:

"To carry out training operations, to provide military technical assistance in time of peace does not pose any special problems in principle. To intervene on the basis of a defence agreement or under a political commitment with a State to which another State wishes to provide support in case of an external aggression does not pose any ethical problem either. This is a classical game of alliances in the context of this or that political balance. But when the aggression cannot genuinely be established as being external, when the country which is the victim of such an aggression is itself the perpetrator or the accomplice of serious abuses against its own people in retaliation of the offensives threatening it, the situation then becomes much more complicated”.

1.4 Official justification of the French intervention: building a legitimacy

How did the French political authorities justify the military involvement of their troops in Rwanda between October 1990 and December 1993, the date of their withdrawal?

The authorities gave different explanations as the deployment of the troops progressed. The official public declarations changed according to the development of this intervention and the situation on the ground. In addition, the intervention continued to give rise to curiosity and questions, particularly from journalists.

There were also internal statements, found in correspondence within the French State apparatus, be it in diplomatic telegrams from the Embassy in Kigali, in meetings of political decision makers, or in memos of President Mitterrand’s advisors. This internal position also went through an evolution, which should be highlighted.

Finally, there were a posteriori justification statements made by individuals handling the Rwandan issue, in particular when they were asked to appear before the MIP. It is worth noting that the big part of this mystery lingers on today because none of the explanations given has been able to justify the scale and seriousness of the French involvement.

1.4.1. Public statements during the events

Like every time when France intervenes militarily in Africa, the first justification given to the public and which the latter accepts readily is the national duty of protecting its nationals living in the concerned countries.

In the first days of Opération Noroît, this protection was carried out through evacuation. Ten days after the launching of the French military intervention in Rwanda, President Mitterrand explained it as follows during a press conference: “France has dispatched two companies which facilitated the evacuation of French nationals and a number of foreigners who sought our protection. In this, we collaborated with the Belgians who did the same. That is all. These troops have no other mission than this, and once this mission is accomplished, they will of course return to France.” This message was repeated tirelessly by all the Ministers and officials when asked to justify Opération Noroît, including Prime Minister Michel Rocard and the Minister of Defence, Jean-Pierre Chevèvment.

As time passed without the withdrawal of the French troops, the justification of the intervention became more general: it was now a matter of ensuring Rwanda’s security, protecting French nationals and other expatriates so that they may remain and continue working for the development of the country. In February 1993, after two years of the French military presence in Rwanda, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, R. Dumas declared: “The presence of the French soldiers reassures the population and it is also thanks to this protection that many expatriates can continue fulfilling their mission which is essential to the economy of the country.”

It is in this way mainly that the French military intervention was publicly justified, and this intervention lasted three years.

1.4.2 Non confidential internal position

In the internal communications among politicians and diplomats in charge of handling the Rwandan issue, the justifications were quite different. At the beginning, however, during a Cabinet meeting held on 17th October 1990, President Mitterrand used the same argument of protecting French nationals: “We must protect our fellow countrymen. We should not meddle in ethnic fighting”.

However, the first significant justification of the French military intervention in its early days makes one think of the necessity of defending a President who is an ally of France and a victim of an external aggression. Three days after the launching of the war by RPF, a telegram with the subject “Situation in Rwanda” expressed concern about the fate of the regime of President Habyarimana:

“The telephone call I have just received and which is the subject of my diplomatic telegram 510 shows that President Habyarimana feels incapable of bringing the situation under control single handed. The aggression he is facing can be considered as foreign in as much as it comes from a neighbouring country ”.

The country referred to was Uganda. Those who launched the conflict were not yet identified clearly nor were the reasons of the war. In the early days, the issue of the nature of the conflict launched by RPF was of capital importance. While RPF declared that it was a Rwandan conflict motivated by internal political problems, President Habyarimana maintained categorically that it was an aggression by Uganda. The thesis of an external aggression portrayed Rwanda as a victim and justified the intervention of France as well as other countries such as Belgium and Zaire, which came to its aid. Finally, this thesis enabled President Habyarimana to evade internal political deadlocks that were denounced by both RPF and internal opposition. In his telegram dated 25th October 1990, Ambassador Martres urged the Rwandan president to put further emphasis on the external aggression argument:

“I availed myself with the opportunity to stress the need for Rwanda to highlight to the media the character of external aggression which the armed invasion from Uganda was increasingly taking on. The arms seized during the fighting are all of Russian or Chinese make, coming probably from the Ugandan Army . At the same time, the country is in the hands of a legal government. France, I told the President, will find it easy to help him if it is clearly demonstrated to the opinion of the international community that this is not a civil war ”.

Subsequently, when the international community recognised the Rwandan nature of the conflict, internal French justifications became increasingly determined by the ethnic vision of the conflict and pro-Hutu ethnic bias. This bias was justified by the fact that the Hutus represented the big majority of the country’s population. After the first attack of Ruhengeri in January 1991, which was more than three months after the beginning of the war, President Mitterrand made his views known in the following words:

“Ugandan Tutsis are coming to conquer Rwanda, this is disturbing. I suggest we make representations to Uganda. It is not in our interest to see Rwanda’s front yield. If this is a tribal war, we say nothing; if it is an aggression, we must intervene and free the French who are held by the Tutsis. [...] We should not restrict our presence. We are at the boundary of the English-speaking front. Uganda should not be allowed to do everything it wants. Museveni should be told; it is not normal that the Tutsi minority should try to impose its law to the majority” .

The ethnic and generalising fear of the Rwandan conflict and the anti-Tutsi bias came to light clearly in the personal documents of President Mitterrand which were handed to the judge who was hearing the complaint for complicity in the genocide against the French Army in July 2007 .

The geopolitical concerns of containing the influence of the United States and the English-speaking world in general as well as those related to the preservation of France’s prestige and authority in the eyes of other African presidents attached to France were also visible in internal communications. One month after the major offensive of RPF on 8th February 1993 and the dispatch of French reinforcements to Rwanda, President Mitterrand explained to his Ministers: “The other African countries are watching us, wondering whether France is going to abandon ”. But these two dimensions will be highlighted more emphatically during the justifications and revelations made a posteriori.

Once the Rwandan Armed Forces with the support of the French military intervention proved to be unable to kick RPF out over the country’s borders, especially after the important offensive of June 1992, French decision makers found peace negotiations inevitable. France assigned itself the duty of preventing the collapse of the Rwandan Armed Forces and supporting them firmly so that the Government of Rwanda was able to appear to be in a strong bargaining position during the negotiations. This is how the officials interpreted the “stabilizing” role that the French military intervention was supposed to play.

MIP quotes, without mentioning the date, a note from the Directorate of African and Malagasy Affairs expressing “the unacceptable character [...] of a military solution to the Rwandan crisis”. One can safely think that this is about a military solution in favour of RPF. In a note dated 12th May 1992, Paul Dijoud, Director of the African and Malagasy Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote: “For the sake of the balance of power in the region and in view of the negotiations, it is essential that Rwanda does not find itself in a weak military position ”. This vision was clarified by the note by Dominique de Villepin, who was then Deputy Director for African and Malagasy Affairs at Quai d’Orsay, dated 24th July 1992:

“The action of France in Rwanda is guided by a will to bring stabilisation and a concern of appeasement. It consists of a diplomatic and military component. Through the first, we have been encouraging the process of openness in Rwanda and supporting regional peace efforts and dialogue between the warring parties. [...] Through the second, which complements the first, we have dispatched soldiers to Rwanda in order to protect our nationals and strengthen our military cooperation with the Rwandan Army. If Rwanda became destabilised, this would in fact sound the death knell of the process of democratisation in a context of exacerbation of community tensions ”.

It was in this context that the French Government continued to ensure that “the best way of avoiding bloody fighting between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority” was to maintain some units of their army in Rwanda. At the same time, the massacres of Tutsi civilians orchestrated by the regime continued without having any impact on the French military support or arousing the least criticism from France.

1.4.3 Posteriori statements

Posterior statements on the motivations and justification of the French military intervention in Rwanda are found especially in the MIP report wherein public hearings of political, diplomatic and military leaders involved in the Rwandan case were made.

The aspect which most of them put forward was the stabilising, moderating and reconciling role of the French initiative. One thing that came out is that, compared with the statements made during the events, different speakers concealed the military aspect of this stabilising strategy, as they did with the moderating role played by France during the massacres which punctuated the period of the French military intervention between October 1990 to December 1993 .

In a more open manner, President Mitterrand’s geopolitical concerns of containing the American influence in Africa were clearly brought out by his officials including the Military executive assistant, Admiral Lanxade, Roland Dumas, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and even by the former Minister of Cooperation, Bernard Debré. During his testimony before MIP, Debré said that President Mitterrand “felt that the Americans, who were openly helping both Ugandans and RPF, were harbouring hegemonic intentions over this region and perhaps over Africa, and he was not wrong either. Subsequently, the role of the Americans has become increasingly clear. We also should not forget that they are the ones who have trained the Ugandan Army and RPF Army. It is also probably true that they gave them arms . Simply let it be stressed here that the American Deputy Secretary of State in charge of African Affairs at the time, Herman Cohen, who also appeared before the MIP, said that “he was astonished to hear the theory of an Anglo-Saxon plot against the interests of France which did not correspond to any reality ”.

Roland Dumas and Bernard Debré underlined also clearly the importance which President Mitterrand attached to defending the policy of French influence in Africa .

Posterior statements made by French political leaders were characterised by parsimony of revelations and little questioning of the intervention of France in Rwanda. In fact, the three types of statements mentioned earlier are not enough to explain the scale and seriousness of the French political and military engagement. One way of explaining France’s drift well before the genocide can be found when one combines two analyses: the will to have a fight with RPF which comes out in some of the justifications described in this document; the ethnic-based interpretation of the Rwandan crisis and the anti-Tutsi bias adopted by French officials, particularly President Mitterrand. In their headlong rush, the French political and military authorities allowed their ally, President Habyarimana, to repeatedly commit massacres of Tutsi civilians.

1.5. Criticisms of the French intervention within France and abroad

The official justifications put forward about the French military intervention in Rwanda did not convince everybody at the time. A number of criticisms were made from various circles by members and institutions of the French Socialist Party, and even by one Minister in President Mitterrand’s government, and some of them were acerbic. At that time, these criticisms concerned essentially the repeated concomitance between ethnic massacres schemed by the Habyarimana regime and the reinforcements of the French troops sent to support this regime.

After the genocide, criticisms were levelled especially by French journalists, researchers and human rights activists, through numerous newspaper articles and published works. Posterior criticisms were deeper, thanks to the accumulation of facts which were not known at the time of the events and, as said earlier, many of them revolved around the possibility of complicity in the genocide by the French Army.

1.5.1. Criticisms at the time of the events

Before the genocide, not many analysts and observers in France or abroad raised any public criticisms or strong protests against the French intervention in Rwanda. Sometimes, journalists in the written press published articles which raised questions, but nothing of substance. The tone and contents seemed to adapt to what was known as “the Yalta order”: the division of the world in the zones of influence and in this context, the feeling was that by its military intervention in Rwanda, France acted “normally”.

Outside France, the press sometimes asked genuine questions on the need, the reasons, the effectiveness and the consequences of the various French military interventions.




Criticisms or reservations in the French and international press

Although in France reports were quite regular in the written and audiovisual press, particularly on Radio France Internationale, the prevailing information transmitted the same ethnic cliché: atavistic hatred, ancestral resentment, a minority thirsty of seizing power in order to enslave the majority, foreign aggression, so many hackneyed themes, as already pointed out, from different personalities in charge of the French policy in Rwanda.

Most French newspapers generally reported some of the disturbing acts attributable to the Government of Rwanda such as the mass roundups in the early days of RPF attack, the cramming of crowds of innocent people at Nyamirambo stadium in October 1990, arbitrary imprisonment, cases of human rights violations or suppression of individuals, massacres of the Bagogwe or in Bugesera. But the real scope of the suppression aimed at Tutsis as a group was in a way trivialised under the excuses mentioned above (atavistic hatred, etc.).

Between 1991 and 1993 and during the whole period of negotiations in which more or less observed ceasefires and the resumption of hostilities alternated, the French press reported regularly about the development of the situation, but without really dwelling on the engagement of France and its consequences, except from time to time in Libération or L’Evénement du Jeudi. In general, therefore, the impression left was that on this precise point, the national press remained rather discreet. Le Monde was particularly considered as defending the official theories.

The other country which showed great interest in the situation prevailing in Rwanda was naturally Belgium. The Belgian press quickly distanced itself from the Habyarimana regime in particular, and from the French military intervention in general. Even though at the beginning of the war dailies in Brussels carried titles on topics which were almost close to those found in the French newspapers – “The Tutsi want to return to their country by all means” ; “The arrival of Belgian and French paratroopers reassures Kigali” ; “Tension goes down in Rwanda” ” – the analysis of the information maintained some balance by presenting different points of view – that of RPF, its representatives or its sympathisers; that of the Government of Rwanda and its supporters; and that of foreign powers which intervened to help the regime of President Habyarimana. Belgian newspapers and the public opinion started also quite early to raise serious questions as to the essence of the involvement of foreign powers in the Rwandan conflict, causing a radical change in Belgium’s policy in relation to the regime of President Habyarimana

There were other sections of the international press which wrote very harsh criticisms against France.

“Helicopters simply fly low over banana plants and land patrols of young men with shaven heads and camouflaged uniforms in broad day light as if that was their right. In the complex political game in East Africa, France has been privately heaping the responsibility on Uganda where RPF was based before launching the attack in 1990, accusing Kampala of having failed to restrain the rebels. By extension, France accuses Great Britain of having failed to put pressure on Uganda to do so. It would appear that French decision makers have not understood that the rules of the game have changed and that the old spheres of influence are not longer what they used to be .”

Criticisms by different groups or personalities

Very many warnings were issued and protests aired by different groups and individuals: personal meetings with national elected personalities (Members of Parliament, Senators), open or confidential letters to politicians, including the President of the Republic and his wife. These critical reactions came out in February 1993. In view of the repeated massacres of Tutsi civilians, an International Commission of Inquiry mandated by the International Federation of Human Rights based in Paris visited Rwanda between November 1992 and January 1993. Just after its departure, large scale massacres were committed in the north of the country. On 8th February, RPF launched a widespread offensive which broke through the lines of defence of the Rwandan Armed Forces. A few days later, France sent two companies to fight RPF.

On 23rd February 1993, the section of « Fédération des Français à l’étranger » in Burundi, which was affiliated to the Socialist Party, addressed a motion to the national leadership of the Socialist Party. This motion read as follows:

“February 1993: Ten months after, carnage is raging in Rwanda as never before. International organisations have exposed several mass graves. The militia of General Habyarimana are at it again, killing Tutsis with total impunity. (...) It thus appears that the intervention of France in Rwanda has failed to prevent massacres and restore peace in the region. Worse still, it appears today that the presence of French soldiers in this country has especially enabled Habyarimana to order the well known atrocities under the cover of international protection ”.

On the eve of the visit of the Minister for Cooperation to Rwanda on 28th February, the International Secretariat of the Socialist Party sent the following statement to Agence France Presse which was signed by Gérard Fuchs:

“I fail to understand the decision of sending additional French troops to Rwanda while human rights violations by the regime of General Habyarimana are still on the increase. I hope that our Minister for Cooperation will find in Kigali convincing reasons for a military presence which is seen today as helping a dictatorial regime in dire straits, or else he will put an end to this presence”.

A few days earlier, a French right wing party, the Parti républicain, had expressed its concern in a communiqué dated 23rd February 1993, as follows:

“ While we understand the pressing need of protecting the integrity of French nationals, the Republican Party is worried about some missions which might be seen as political which are entrusted to the French Army, and it is worried particularly of the spiral in which the French Government is locking itself in by sending more and more troops day after day. [...] The Republican Party draws the attention of the French Government to the fact that it would be detrimental to the image of France in Africa to help maintaining a regime which is undemocratic, under the excuse of the security of French nationals”.

A section of the French political class was therefore aware of the totalitarian drifts of the regime and considered the risk of France sliding into the Rwandan crisis. But it was powerless before the determination of those who decided the French policy at the time.

During the entire period of French intervention in Rwanda, all members of the Government remained discreet, even silent before the public. But this did not mean that they were in total agreement with the policy of the day as we will see later, when they were invited to testify before the Parliamentary Fact-Finding Mission. There were particularly two Ministers, the former Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, and the former Minister of Defence, Pierre Joxe: the first kept a distance, while the second was harshly critical. Concerning Pierre Joxe, he had officially taken a position right from the beginning of 1993. In a note dated 23rd February 1993, to the President of the Republic, he expressed his reservations about the French policy in Rwanda in no uncertain terms:

“I am concerned about our position in Rwanda and the role which our 690 soldiers may find themselves drawn into since, in reality, the Rwandan army is no longer fighting. [...] I do not see how RPF will give up victory which is so near and which does not certainly require a general offensive. I do not see either how we will bring Museveni back to better feelings since we do not have any significant ways of exerting pressure on him. As for Habyarimana, after sending him two additional companies following many other displays of support, he must be considering himself as one of the best protected African leaders by France. This is not the best way of bringing him to make the necessary concessions. And yet, through his political intransigence and his inability to mobilise his own army, he is largely to blame. If RPF makes some advances again, our soldiers may find themselves facing the rebels after a few hours. To me, excluding direct intervention, the only slightly strong means of pressure still available to us on him seems to be the possibility of our disengagement”.

The most remembered statement in France is certainly the one made by Jean Carbonare, a member of the International Commission of Inquiry, on his return from Rwanda. On 24th January 1993, during the 2000 hours news bulletin on one of the biggest French television stations, France 2, together with the news reader Bruno Masure, he castigated the French policy in Rwanda pathetically and very strongly.

Finally, Rwandans were not found wanting. On 16th February 1993, a group of 24 Rwandan intellectuals living in Nairobi, Kenya, wrote an open letter to François Mitterrand . Having recalled the numerous massacres committed by the regime in Kigali since October 1990, the signatories of the letter raised some issues:

“We, Rwandan intellectuals, would like to ask you some questions to which we have failed to find logical and coherent answers. How can a country like France, which is renowned as the country of human rights, continue protecting a dictatorship which kills its own people, throwing them into extreme misery against all morals? How should we understand the role of the French troops in Rwanda when we know that the successive massacres which have been committed in our country were done under the cover of the discretion of these troops?”

1.5.2 Posterior criticisms

Criticisms against the French military intervention in Rwanda which began just after the genocide were thorough. Starting from 1994, books were being published in France, accusing the latter of complicity in the genocide or of actions constituting complicity of genocide. Titles of such books included: in 1994, François-Xavier Verschave wrote Complicité de génocide? La politique de la France au Rwanda (Complicity of génocide? France’s policy in Rwanda); in the same year, Pascal Krop published, Le génocide franco-africain – Faut-il juger les Mitterrand? (The Franco-African genocide – Should Mitterrand and company be tried?); in 1997, Medhi Bâ wrote Rwanda, un génocide français (Rwanda, a French genocide); in 1998, Jean-Paul Gouteux published Un génocide secret d’État – La France et le Rwanda, 1990-1997 (A State secret genocide – France and Rwanda, 1990-1997); still in 1997, Michel Sitbon wrote Un génocide sur la conscience (A genocide on the conscience); in January 1998, Patrick de Saint-Exupéry published a series of very critical articles in Le Figaro; on 9th April 1998, Sam Kiley wrote in The Times of London “A French hand in genocide – On the role played by Paris in Rwanda”; even Le Monde published on 17th December 1998, Rwanda: comment la France s’est trompée (Rwanda – How France went wrong); in 2004, Patrick de Saint-Exupéry wrote L’inavouable, la France au Rwanda (Shameful, France in Rwanda); in 2005, the association Survie with other intellectuals and human rights activists wrote L’horreur qui nous prend au visage, l’État français et le génocide rwandais ”

After publication of a series of articles by Patrick de Saint-Exupéry in a daily newspaper which could not be suspected of being antimilitarist, namely Le Figaro, the French authorities, led by Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, decided officially to try and explain this issue. The Parliamentary Fact-finding Mission (MIP) wrote on 3 March 1998, “On military operations carried out in Rwanda by France, other countries and UN between 1990 and 1994”. In carrying out its mission, MIP tried to find satisfactory answers. Even though its general conclusion falls short with regard to the seriousness of the acts which are particularly catalogued in the annexes to its report, MIP recognised in the end that the French State made “a misjudgement”.

On the international scene, the report commissioned by the OAU on the Rwandan crisis and genocide devoted a whole chapter on the role of France in Rwanda. Those who carried out the investigation wrote that “it is impossible to understand events which happened in Rwanda during the last decade without mentioning the role of France”. They highlighted the following points: France remained the closest ally of the Government of Rwanda militarily, politically and diplomatically; France has been one of the major creditors of Rwanda and one of its major suppliers of arms; the 1983 revised military cooperation agreement which was used to justify the French military assistance at the time of RPF’s offensive had no legal basis; in supporting Rwanda in international forums, the French Government generally refuted the increasingly numerous testimonies on human rights violations committed by the Rwandan Government; the French authorities did not accept publicly that Rwanda was in a civil war in order not to compromise their intervention in favour of Habyarimana.

The OAU report pointed out that “the significance of the role of France can never be sufficiently underlined” and that its “public support strongly discouraged the radical faction of Akazu from making concessions or considering a compromise”. And it was with a lot of irony that they wrote: “President Mitterrand may make speeches on democracy and human rights, but on the ground in Kigali, the real priorities of the French Government are patent”.

“It was not possible for France not to know the prevailing situation in Rwanda, and it was therefore in full knowledge of the facts that it decided to maintain its support to the Habyarimana regime ” [mention the page of the quotation]

In the following chapters, in making its observations, the Commission refers to many facts which are today increasingly better known. Even though they were quite conversant with the above mentioned literature concerning the action of France in Rwanda, the members of the Commission were no less surprised by the seriousness of the facts revealed by their inquiry as presented in the following pages.



ACTS FRANCE IS ACCUSED OF



1. Contribution to the perpetration of the war

The Commission’s inquiry revealed that, contrary to official declarations, France’s military aid in the perpetration of the war was multifaceted and often direct, like in the case of the collection of military intelligence, strategic and operational supervision of the war, contribution in artillery or in the laying of mines by French soldiers.

1.1. Support in military intelligence and telephone tapping

Between 1990 and 1994, France’s military and political aid to Rwanda was intense and visible. However, in other respects, it was discreet and clandestine, thanks to the close collaboration between the intelligence services of the two States and to the support given by French senior officials such as Paul Dijoud. In August 1991, Paul Dijoud promised to the Government of Rwanda, “that France is going to dispatch rapidly a discreet high level mission to carry out investigations on the exact location of RPF .

Documents show that starting from the end of 1992, there was a stronger high level cooperation between the French General Directorate of External Security, DGSE, and the Rwandan Directorate of External Security . Within the framework of this cooperation, Rwanda received the support of Col. Didier Tauzin (alias Thibault), who was a former employee of DGSE and who, from 1990 to the end of 1991, was a military advisor to President Habyarimana . This cooperation was also enhanced by the very close relations between the Head of the military assistance mission in Rwanda, Col. René Galinié, and the Head of military intelligence in Rwanda, commanding gendarme, Pierre-Claver Karangwa

French journalists and witnesses saw DGSE employees in Kigali between 1991 and 1993, at the time when the French Army was intensely training and arming the Rwandan Armed Forces . A French priest residing in Kigali in 1994 testified as follows:

“Some French who were here in 1994, I would like to see them again one day. (...) Particularly one Ambassador who obviously knew what was being prepared. The genocide had been planned! It is not possible that this Ambassador, the army officers and guys from the intelligence department did not know. (...) At the time, nothing could be done in Kigali without French employees being put in the picture by one or other person, even without them working behind the scenes ”.

General Jacques Rosier who commanded DAMI and who was the commanding officer of 1st RPIMA from 1990 to 1992, admitted to the presence of DGSE officers beside the Rwandan Armed Forces, but not frequently: “The first ones who came with wiretapping equipment in 1992 did not stay long. At the time when I was there, they were technicians who had come to strengthen the wiretapping capacities of the Rwandans ”.

The active presence of French intelligence officers in Rwanda was confirmed by Augustin Iyamuremye, former Director of Rwandan Intelligence Services from 1992 to 1994. He told the Commission that “the French increased their support to the Government of Rwanda as RPF’s military pressure intensified. Much can be said about this French support during the war. France helped the Rwandan army in acquiring arms and ammunitions, training and collection of military intelligence. This latter activity was carried out by men who were working with DAMI ”

In practical terms, the collection of military intelligence for the Rwandan Armed Forces was carried out by officers from the 11th shock paratrooper’s regiment, the armed wing of DGSE, who were integrated with the staff of Noroît, as well as “members of the commando unit of the 13th regiment of dragon paratroopers (RDP)”. That should enable one “to appreciate the nature of the aid given by this country to RPF fighters ”. These officers trained and supported the Rwandan Armed Forces in the techniques of infiltration. They entered deep into the Ugandan territory behind the lines of RPF and intercepted radio communications of Ugandan and RPF regiments .

The intelligence services of the Rwandan Prime Minister reported in their Bulletin quotidien as follows:

“This morning 17 February 1993, RFI announced the findings of an investigation carried out by the French intelligence services in Uganda on the Rwandan crisis. According to this radio, these services are convinced that several Ugandan army units are behind the recent offensive of the guerrillas; they estimate that ten battalions deployed by the Rwanda Patriotic Front exceed largely the capacity of the Front since its forces are estimated at about 2500 men . In addition, the same services declared that the guerrillas are probably getting artillery support through the forest between Rwanda and Uganda”.

The French support was also through the provision of communications audio equipment to the Rwandan Army, namely two systems of radio monitoring , two TRC 195 radio direction finders, radio tactics and radio monitoring equipment , three radio monitoring equipment . According to Pierre Péan, this equipment enabled them to pick up RPF’s secret communications which were nevertheless considered as much protected:

“Other French soldiers broke through some secrets of Inkotanyi through the communications intelligence system installed on 2 March 1993, which complimented the taps provided every morning to Col. Maurin by Anatole Nsengiyumva, head of G2, the Rwandan military intelligence department. [...] The French stayed well informed of the activities of RPF through interceptions by the Rwandan Armed Forces up to the date of the assassination of the President ”.

Bernard Debré confirmed the existence of communications taps of RPF, but he said that this was done by a Ministry which he did not mention . A note by the Belgian intelligence dated 28 December 1993, contained additional information that “French advisors who remained in Rwanda after the withdrawal of Noroît [...] organised a campaign of denigrating the Belgian blue helmets (...)” and explained that two of them “put taps on the Kigali telephone exchange” more particularly “telephones in Embassies ”.

In reality, the deciphering of RPF communications was done by warrant officers Didot and Maîer, two French specialists who were training the Rwandan Armed Forces in the maintenance of the army’s radio stations and transmission techniques, including of course communications tapping. Didot and Maîer lived near CND where the RPF battalion was living, and some sources maintained that these two soldiers had chosen this place of residence in order to be able to tap better RPF communications coming from CND

French military technicians were also involved in analysing the war equipment seized from RPF during the fighting in order to help the Rwandan Army to identify them and know them better and enable the Rwandan Armed Forces to buy appropriate arms for destroying those used by RPF. French soldiers were equally involved in teaching the Rwandan Armed Forces the techniques of mining and trapping. In this connection, Col. Canovas taught them how “to make use of the terrain by laying traps at cross roads, thawed confluences and possible crossing points of the enemy”. This action was carried out “with the participation of the Noroît detachment” in the operational sectors of Byumba and Rusumo .

The other type of support offered by the French authorities to the Government of Rwanda was the perversion of military information obtained by the French Military Observers (MOF) . This event explains the nature of the conciliation efforts by France in the conflict, and yet this task required a minimum of neutrality from France.

MOF visited Rwanda and Uganda from 26 November 1991 to 10 March 1992. It was received by the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and the Minister of Defence on 28 November 1991, with Ambassador Martres in attendance. While there is nothing abnormal that representatives of a State speak in the defence of the policy practised by their government, the most astonishing thing was the bias shown on this occasion by Ambassador Martres who, instead of showing neutrality, adopted rather the language of each of the two Rwandan Ministers. Minister Bizimungu gave an account of the position of Martres as follows:

“ In the same vein, the French Ambassador to Rwanda confirmed also to his fellow countrymen that President Museveni was very cunning and that he was certainly going to try and show to the French military mission traces of his own army on the Ugandan soil to make them believe that those traces belonged to the Rwandan Armed Forces who violated his territory, or that he was going to show RPF fighters on the Ugandan soil and make the mission believe that this was the Rwandan soil that RPF had seized. Mr Georges Martres told the head of the French military observers mission that the French Ambassador to Uganda had already gone to see all these scenarios and that he was well informed of the bad faith of RPF and the complicity of Uganda in the conflict ”

Ambassador Martres continued to show his bias by violating the secrets contained in MOF inquiry reports, revealing them to the Government of Rwanda. The principle adopted when MOF was established was that its reports would in the first place be reserved for the French Government. The latter would then analyse them and, if necessary, convene a meeting of Rwanda and Uganda under the auspices of France. It was in such meetings that the findings of the investigations carried out by MOF would be communicated in order to contribute to the restoration of peace .

In the same style of secret operations, the French secret services helped the Habyarimana regime in infiltrating Hutu members of RPF to convince them to join the Presidential camp. These services undertook especially an operation for hijacking and abducting a well know Hutu opponent in Germany, Shyirambere Jean Barahinyura, who was a member of the Executive Committee of RPF and its first spokesperson in Europe in 1990. The team of specialists for this abduction operation consisted of Pierre-Yves Gilleron, former employee of the “anti terrorist cell in the President’s Office ”, his body guard Pierre Massé who also worked in the President’s Office, and his friend and associate, Pierre Péan . But the scheme was foiled thanks to the rapid intervention of the German police, the BKA of Frankfurt who had been alerted by Barahinyura himself. The French Rwandan journalist, Gaëtan Sebudandi who knew about this incident closely, told it in these words when he met the Commission in Born on 14 February 2007:

“I was told this incredible story during a private conversation with Shyirambere Jean Barahinyura himself towards the end of October or the beginning of November 1990, in Frankfurt. He told me that two French agents had come to abduct him. At that time, I did not believe him much until ten years later when I read the same story in the book by Paul Barril with real names. Their mission was to hand him to Habyarimana. In order to convince him to follow them and leave RPF, they gave him a huge documentation of DGSE on RPF, containing the well known theories of Black Khmers, and they dissuaded him from cooperating with a movement of that type”.

It is true that Shyirambere Jean Barahinyura was a very important opponent of the Habyarimana regime to the extent that the Rwandan intelligence services and the Rwandan Ambassador in France and Germany had tried to approach him and proposed him huge sums of money so that he joins the government and gives Rwanda all the copies of his book in which he denounced the scandals of the regime

1.2. Strategic advice and tactical support

1.2.1. Attending the meetings of evaluation and strategic planning

At the beginning of the war, meetings were held regularly at the headquarters of the Rwandan Army. They were attended by more than ten officers, sometimes less, including the Belgians and the French. On reading some of the minutes of these meetings , one finds that French officers were often invited to attend. They were for example invited to the two meetings held on 31 October 1990, and to those held on 2nd, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th November 1990.

Judging by their frequency, these meetings looked like true crisis meetings. They were all devoted to the evaluation of the military situation on the ground: advances or withdrawals of the “enemy forces”, i.e. RPF; the recapture of locations or towns by the “friendly forces” whose composition was not mentioned; miscellaneous problems.

Under “miscellaneous problems”, it was stated for example in the minutes of the meeting of 31 October 1990, that “the friendly forces are continuing the search operation” in the combat zones .

The frequency of these meetings dropped with the brief lull on the various fronts after RPF withdrew and the Rwandan Army seemed to have won a momentary victory at the end of November 1990. They resumed with the resumption of the hostilities in February 1991, but this time at the headquarters of the Gendarmerie, and they assumed a more pronounced strategic and operation orientation. They were regularly attended on the Rwandan side by: Col. Pierre Célestin Rwagafilita, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie and chairman of the meetings; Lt. Colonels Pontien Hakizimana, Jean Ngayinteranya, Laurent Rutayisire from G3, G1 and G2 respectively at the Gendarmerie headquarters; and Commanders Jean-Baptiste Nsanzimfura and Christophe Bizimungu; on the French side, the most frequent at different periods were Col. Galinié, Lt. Colones Canovas and Ruelle, and Major Robardey.

As an example of the topics discussed at these meetings, the discussion which Col. Galinié had on 13 February 1991, with the officers from the headquarters of the Gendarmerie and the units of the camp of Kacyiru (stronghold of the Gendarmerie) was about “the priority mission of the National Gendarmerie [which] consists in fighting the ENI , Col. Galinié is ready to provide to the National Gendarmerie technical and material assistance to strengthen the operational capacity of the Corps”

It was also stated in the minutes that:

“With the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie and the Branch Heads, he [Galinié] spoke of the problems and the difficulties the National Gendarmerie was encountering in the fulfilment of its missions of security, defence and fighting for which it is not adequately prepared due to carrying out its normal duties, and he proposed a MAM assistance to meet this challenge which cannot be understood nor tolerated by the public opinion [our emphasis]. [...] It is recommended that the defence of the city of Kigali be entrusted to the National Gendarmerie, and he undertakes to do everything possible to have this implemented efficiently if the defence plan for the capital he intends to propose is accepted. [...] This material and technical assistance will not however be restricted to Kigali city alone. It will be extended to the other camps and units”.

The themes of the meetings of the chiefs of staff attended by French officers included the psychological state of particular units and the morale of the Rwandan Army as a whole, tactics and public security. The meeting held on 5 March 1991, dwelt much on the question of the insufficient number of the forces. “In this connection, Lt. Col. Canovas stressed that this insufficiency should be compensated by concentrating the defence around collective arms, the establishment of a decentralised intervention reserve force, the use of motorised patrols and patrols on foot, as well as observation and tapping posts”

At the end of 1991, a strong delegation visited Rwanda, consisting of Admiral Lanxade, Head of delegation, General Pidance, Principal Private Secretary, Colonel Delort from the Department of External Relations, and Commissioner Dechin. The mission called on the President of the Republic and the Headquarters of the Rwandan Armed Forces where the Ministry of Defence (which, as indicated earlier, is headed by the Head of State), and explained that “the presence of Colonel Chollelt, the commander of DAMI, is desirable”

Shortly after, a letter from the Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the French Embassy in Rwanda that “with effect from 1 January 1992, Lt. Col. Chollet, Head of the Military and Training Assistance Department, will combine the duties of advisor of the President of the Republic, Commander-in-chief of the Rwandan Armed Forces, with those of advisor of the Army Chief of Staff”. As advisor of the Head of State, his duties were the organisation of the defence and the functioning of the military institution, while with the Chief of Staff, his duties were to advise him in the organisation of the Rwandan Army, the instruction and training of units and the use of the Forces .

The news about the appointment of Lt. Col. Chollet to these two posts spread very rapidly, raising a strong controversy. The Defence Attaché in Kigali tried to put this event into perspective by stating first that Chollet was to go back to France in March 1993, then by minimizing the importance and scope of a petition submitted by one of the big political organisations from the unarmed opposition, the Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR), which had issued a strong protest, calling for a “final end to colonisation”

On 3 March 1992 (which was a few weeks only after the momentary capture of the town of Ruhengeri by RPF fighters), Lt. Col. Chollet was replaced by Lt. Col. Jean-Louis Nabias at the head of DAMI, and soon after, Jean-Jacques Maurin was appointed operational deputy to the Defence Attaché, as advisor of the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army, among other duties. When he was interviewed by the Fact-finding Mission in 1998, Maurin explained “that in this capacity, he participated in the preparation of daily fighting plans and in decision-making”

Another French officer, Col. Didier Tauzin, told the Fact-finding Mission that “French soldiers had to remind the Rwandan Army High Command the most elementary methods of tactical reasoning, teaching them how to make a synthesis of information, helping them to restore the logistics chain for food supplies to the troops, to prepare and give orders, to establish maps” .

According to many witnesses who saw him on the combat scenes, Lt. Col. Canovas appears to have been involved in the field most often, or at least he was the most clearly identified. Interviewed by the Fact-finding Mission, he admitted that he had suggested “the establishment in sensitive zones of small groups dressed as civilians and disguised as peasants, in order to neutralise the generally isolated rebels” and “to make use of the terrain by setting traps at crossroads” .

The involvement of French officers in strategic, operational and tactical supervision of the Rwandan Armed Forces started with the war. In a Note Verbale to the French Ambassador to Rwanda , the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs said that he appreciated “the moral, technical and tactical support which French officers, especially the Head of MAM, Col. Galinié and Lt. Col. Ganovas, have provided to their Rwandan comrades since their arrival in Rwanda, particularly during the October 1990 war.”

Besides the Head of MAM, other French officers who acted as advisors at different periods were: Lt. Colonel Canovas for the Rwandan Army, Lt. Colonel Ruelle for the National Gendarmerie, Major Robardey for the National Gendarmerie (Judicial Police), Major Marliac for the Air Force, Major Refalo in the paratroopers units, and Capt. Caillaud at the National Gendarmerie College.

1.2.2. Direct participation in fighting: 1990-1993

The issue of French soldiers participating directly in fighting in a country with which France had no defence pact but only military cooperation agreements raises the question of the legality of such an intervention. And when one knows the criminal nature of the acts carried out by the regime being supported which moreover jeopardised the life of French citizens, the issue then takes on a moral dimension. A big number of former soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces explained that for them, the contribution in terms of strategic, operational and tactical advices as well as material support were as important as an occasional presence on the field of the French allies when they realised that the Rwandan Armed Forces were unable to contain RPF offensives.

As far as the Commission is concerned, these episodes of direct participation in fighting must be viewed in the larger scheme of the French military intervention and one should consider the complementary nature of the various components of this intervention. This direct participation in fighting was systematic at each one of the important offensives by RPF. It was seen in October 1990, in January 1991, from June to September in 1992 and in February 1993.

a) October 1990

There are strong assumptions showing that at the beginning of the war in October 1990, French pilots were flying combat helicopters which, according to French sources, must have contributed greatly to the crushing defeat of RPF. During his interview with MIP, Ambassador Martres, “pointed out that on 4th or 5th October 1990, a combat helicopter of the Rwandan Army destroyed more than ten RPF vehicles and four or five trucks carrying petrol and that, according to reports by French soldiers, this operation had been carried out by a Rwandan pilot, and that this pilot had been trained by the French. The instructor was moreover quite proud of the success of his student” .

General Varret was clearer as he explained that: “pilot instructors were on board Gazelle helicopters sent in combat zones with Rwandans and that they did not participate. Their presence was only to give instructions in shooting while flying. He further asserted that French troops did not stop RPF offensive in October 1990”.
One justifiably wonders whether the shelling of supply columns of an enemy who had attacked three days earlier and about whom it was not known whether he had anti aircraft missiles constitutes really a favourable context for dispensing instructions.

b) RPF attack on the town of Ruhengeri on 23 January 1991

After its defeat at the end of 1990, RPA got reorganised by withdrawing mainly to the volcanic region overlooking the whole northern part of the country. On 23 January 1991, RPA launched a surprise attack on the town of Ruhengeri and controlled it for a few hours before withdrawing, after freeing prisoners from Ruhengeri prison, some of whom were the main opponents of President Habyarimana. Two sections of Noroît then came to evacuate 300 persons from the town, 185 of whom were French. Ambassador Martres recalled the evacuation exercise in the following terms:

“The unit led by Col. Galinié did not go beyond the mission it had been assigned and intervened in the residential area as soon as the Rwandan paratroopers had retaken control of the town. The respect of the instructions given did not exclude some daring acts shown by the French paratroopers during the last two hours before the fall of the night. The expatriate population was in such a state of shock that it could no longer put up with another night of an armed clash”

Here again, taking into consideration the text as a whole, one may justifiably suppose that this “daring” referred to the direct engagement of French soldiers. The dispatching of a DAMI was decided after RPA’s raid.

c) Battles of Byumba: June – August 1992

The first of the two big offensives to which the French Army reacted by a heavy direct engagement was the battle of Byumba in June 1992. This was the first large scale offensive of RPF since October 1990. On 5th June, RPA occupied the town of Byumba for a few days. The Rwandan Armed Forces proved unable to respond to the offensive and through a series of infiltrations, RPA managed to seize a strip of land of about ten kilometres in the zone of Byumba, thus linking its positions in the North West and North East.

On 10 June 1992, a company of about 150 French soldiers based in Central African Republic was dispatched to Rwanda. Officially, this was meant “to prevent any threat against the foreign community”. From 11 to 16 June, a French military evaluation mission was sent to Rwanda.

Between June and October 1992, Noroît was reinforced by troops from the 8th RPIMA, DAMI was reinforced through the establishment of an artillery DAMI which came with 105 mm batteries. This artillery was composed of soldiers from the 35th RAP. From June to November, it was Col. Rosier who at that time was the commanding officer of the 1st RPIMA who took charge of the Noroît contingent and DAMI.

General James Kabarebe, currently Chief of Staff of the Rwanda Defence Forces, in an interview with David Servenay, explained how RPA had noticed the direct engagement of French soldiers in the battle of Byumba:

“Personally, the first time I had contact with the French was in 1992 in Byumba. They had brought a new 105 mm artillery battery. They were using it. It must have been a new weapon which we had never come across since 1990. This new weapon was supposed to finish off the Rwanda Patriotic Army. (...) They came directly to the Byumba frontline. They shelled us all along this frontline from Ruhengeri to Mutara. They were very near the frontline because we could hear their communications. They shelled our trenches. When the French felt that they had shelled us enough, the Rwandan Armed Forces would advance to finish off the work. But to their big surprise, when the Rwandan Armed Forces advanced, we would be waiting for them quite close to their trenches and we would fire at them from the rear at close range. Many lives were lost. Those who escaped were often wounded. They withdrew to the place where the French were waiting. And there, I remember, the radio which the French and the Rwandan Armed Forces were listening to was just beside me: they told them off... They were very harsh, calling them weak, useless. They were saying [in French]: “The Rwandan Armed Forces are weak, weak, how can you fail after such a heavy shelling?”[...] The French had invested, organised and commanded these forces; they brought this system of weapons. They have done all they could: and the Rwandan Armed Forces have failed to play their role. But the angry tone of the French commander who was speaking on the radio, this anger....showed that he felt more concerned than the Rwandans themselves. That was his business”

According to Colonel Murenzi, a former member of the Rwandan Armed Forces, it was after the RPF assault on Byumba in June 1992, when they showed their military superiority over the Rwandan Armed Forces that the French became resolutely engaged. The French advisors from the “field artillery” which was usually stationed at Kanombe camp took part in the battle of Mukarange against the RPF positions. “For the first time in the history of the Rwandan Army, we used 105 mm canons. [...] We did not have this type of weapons. […] » During the battles of Mukarange and Kivuye, these weapons helped us », added Murenzi. Concerning the battle of Byumba in 1992, the current General Rwarakabije of former Rwandan Armed Forces confirmed the evidence of Colonel Murenzi. Between June and August 1992, the French took position in the region of Rukomo on a site of Amsar Company. There, they fought with their own weapons.

The participation of the French in the various battles fought in Byumba prefecture was confirmed by an official Rwandan report. During the same Byumba battle, but this time more eastward in Mutara region, a note by the intelligence unit commander, Augustin Iyamuremye, to the Prime Minister on the development of the military situation on the front, gave clear details on the French direct military engagement:

“Our soldiers, with the support of the French firepower, liberated commune Bwisige on 19 July well before the beginning of the truce. But the enemy was still present in Mukarange, Cyumba and Kivuye communes and in Cyonyo sector of commune Kiyombe. In the course of 20th July, battles were reported in Mutara in the communes of Ngarama, Cyonyo, Kibali, Bwisige and Mukarange. In Mutara, our soldiers who were near Muhambo centre were flushed out in the afternoon of 20th July 1992 by enemy shelling. The enemy managed to take Ngoma bridge located between Muvumba and Ngarama communes, and it was feared that he could advance up to the offices of Ngarama sub prefecture, 10 km away from this bridge. The French intervention helped us to drive away the attackers on 22nd July 1992”.

Still in the east, Mwumvaneza , who is currently a Member of Parliament and was at that time a communal counsellor, tells of the circumstances in which he saw French soldiers intervene in the battle of Ngarama (seat of the commune with the same name) in July 1992. RPF and the Rwandan Armed Forces fought there for six hours. When the latter suffered heavy human losses, the French intervened to help them to recapture their position.

“These were young people who appeared to have hardly come out of their adolescence. They positioned their canons at Gituza on a football field, not far from the dispensary. There were eight canons. When the soldiers of Habyarimana had recaptured their position, the French soldiers advanced towards Kanero and once again positioned their canons at a place called Mashani, which is the trading centre of Kanero. If my memory is good, I think that there were eight canons firing in the direction of Muvumba commune”.

Nkurunziza Elias, municipal counsellor also of Muvumba commune in 1990, differentiates indirect evidence with what he can relate as an eyewitness. First of all, he had heard soldiers bragging in their conversation: “henceforth, we are going to fight Inkotanyi [RPF]. They will no longer be able to drive us away from our positions since we have the French with us” . This is how, he added, he and others had learnt that the canons that had been shelling RPF positions in 1992 in the various combat zones in Byumba prefecture were operated by the French.

d) February 1993

On 8th February 1993, RPF launched a widespread offensive from all its positions and within a few hours, it had captured a big section of the northern part of the country. They had even reached about thirty kilometres from the capital Kigali.

On 8th and 9th, France proceeded with the reinforcement of Noroît which comprised then a tactical staff (EMT), three companies of the 21st RIMA, one company of the 8th RPIMA, Chimère and Rapas detachments and a reinforced (engineering) DAMI. On 23rd February 1993, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that two additional companies of French soldiers had been dispatched “urgently” to Rwanda “to guarantee the security of French nationals and other foreigners”. These consisted of one company of the 6th battalion of marine infantry (BIMA) based in Libreville and one company of French soldiers for operational assistance (EFAO) based in Bangui, all with a total of about 240 men. Officially, the number of French soldiers rose to some 600 elite soldiers (for about 400 expatriates) .

Regarding the February 1993 battle, General Rwarakabije explained that the French engagement was even more determined than in June 1992. The advance of RPF up to the surrounding areas of Kigali, made people fear that the capital was falling. When RPF troops arrived at Tumba, the French were deployed at Ruyenzi and Shyorongi, linking up with the soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces to drive back their enemy. “The French distributed weapons and provided support firepower”.

A former corporal of the Rwandan Armed Forces explained that he had served directly under the command of French soldiers along with other French soldiers during the battle of February 1993. That he had even operated pieces of the 105 mm artillery together with the French.

“The French with us at Kirambo used 105 mm guns. They had about fifteen guns and we had been trained on how to use them. We were usually seven men operating one gun: four French and three Rwandans, including a leader called “detachment commander”. This type of equipment had been brought by the French. It was new to us. […] I was the « 15 detachment commander » and I received instructions from a French officer who, together with Colonel Serubuga , were in command of the operations. I would take notes and forward them to a French corporal who, since he was conversant with the weapon, would adjust it, then another French would open the cover and a French together with a Rwandan (called “purveyor”), would push in the shell, and lastly a fourth French would activate the shooting device. All the guns fired almost simultaneously. The fired shells dug huge holes in the ground, which is why we called them “dimba hasi” (meaning approximately: dig deep in the ground) .

François Nsengayire was transferred to Jali Gendarmerie camp at the beginning of 1993. There, he found a section of French soldiers from the 8th RPIMA and severed as an interpreter. During the RPA’s attack on 8th February 1993, its fighters came very close to the French position at Jali. He shortly described the event as follows:

“ The soldiers of the 8th RPIMA who had among them field artillery soldiers fired 105 and 122 mm mortars and took position at Shyorongi from where they started shelling the enemy positions. I was with a group of French soldiers in an area called Kimaranzara in Mbogo, in a shrub. We were acting as advance observers guiding artillery fire from Shyorongi. I was with the French acting as an interpreter. But on a hill a little further, there were RPA fighters who I suspect had seen them. These [RPF] fighters had recoilless guns. They fired three shells and three French died on the spot and two others were seriously wounded.”

On 20 February 1993, RPF soldiers declared a unilateral ceasefire while just 30 Kilometres from Kigali. From 25th February to 2nd March, opposition parties sent a delegation to meet RPF representatives. At the end of the meeting, a joint communiqué was issued, calling for a lasting ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the resumption of the Arusha negotiations.

After considerable efforts in supporting the Rwandan Army, its defeat on 8 February 1993 totally indicated the emptiness of the French support operations as evidenced from October 1990 and subsequently reinforced just after the RPF offensive from 5th June 1992.

On 19 February 1993, General Quesnot wrote to President Mitterrand informing him of France’s remaining three options in the wake of the RPA offensive on 8th February: “(1) evacuation of French nationals in the coming days if RPF maintains its intention of taking over the capital [...]; (2) immediately sending at least two companies to Kigali [...]. Even if it does not solve the substantial problem, this action would help to save time; (3) sending a more sizeable contingent to prevent the effective taking over of Kigali by RPF and enabling the Rwandan units to re-establish their positions at least along the previous cease fire line. [...] However, this would signal an almost direct involvement”

The second option was adopted and, as we saw earlier, it led to the direct involvement of French soldiers in the fighting. In light of the failure of the French support strategy to the Rwandan Armed Forces and the diplomatic pressure against RPA, France and its ally President Habyarimana were finally resigned to accept the departure of the French troops from Rwanda, to be replaced by a UN peace mission demanded by RPF as a condition for peace.

The military defeat of the Rwandan Armed Forces despite the French support certainly played an important role in the alternative choice of a genocide as a resistance strategy to political change. Given the significance of the French military engagement and assistance to the Rwandan Armed Forces, one wonders if France did not feel the defeat of the Rwandan Armed Forces as its own defeat and to what extent it might have contributed to the adoption of this genocide alternative.

2. Involvement in the training of Interahamwe militia and village vigilantes (civilian self-defence)

2.1. The Interahamwe

One of the most serious accusations levelled against France was its input in the training of Interahamwe militia who spearheaded the implementation of the genocide. Initially, this militia was a youth movement without any legal status which was affiliated to the Presidential party, MRND. It started gaining prominence just after the introduction of multi-party politics in June 1991. Very rapidly, inter-party competition became intense and violent more or less all over the country. Different political parties formed youth movements used as “shock troops” during meetings, demonstrations and rallies, intimidating supporters of rival political organisations or compelling the inhabitants in surrounding areas to come to their meetings or demonstrations. In Kigali, there was a territorial war amongst different militia for protection of zones of influence. In rural areas, militia carried out flag wars and intimidated some burgomasters (mayors) of communes and made them run away. They even appropriated land from public land for cultivation in disregard to laws and procedures.

But besides these ordinary Interahamwe, another smaller group of Interahamwe with some military training started appearing in 1992, and one of its tasks was to carry out massacres and assassinations. Massacres, killings and assassinations between March 1992 and April 1994 within Government controlled areas were wholly or partly attributed to Interahamwe.

During the genocide, in the areas of Kigali, Kigali Rural, Kibungo, Byumba, Ruhengeri, Gisenyi and parts of Cyangugu prefectures, where MRND had influence, Interahamwe and their associates largely had a hand in the genocide. Subsequently, they spread into the prefectures where MRND had lost influence following the introduction of multiparty politics such as Gitarama, Butare, Kibuye. These are prefectures which had a sizeable Tutsi population and killings had moderately started.

2.2. Early stages of the village vigilantes « civilian self-defence »

Besides the existence of well trained Interahamwe, another process of military training and arming of civilians appeared; it was called the organisation of village vigilantes (civilian self-defence). Initially, this was a paramilitary training programme for Hutus living in areas neighbouring the front line in the north east of the country. Its mission was to patrol these areas in order to prevent infiltrations of RPF fighters and to oversee Tutsi civilians living in such areas and, as we will see in this document, also to kill them at an appropriate time. After the first few weeks of the genocide, this village vigilante programme became systematic and was used as the structure through which the local administration completed the implementation of the genocide. Interahamwe were integrated in this scheme as a striking power .

At the end of April 1991, two events necessitated the involvement of civilians disguised as soldiers in the defence of the country. The first was the speech of President Habyarimana on 28th April 1991 and the second was the advice given to the Rwandan Army by a French senior officer. While in Rwanda, Lt. Col. Canovas undertook an inspection tour of all the military operational units in 1991. In Ruhengeri, in order to find a lasting solution to the insecurity of the population living south of the Volcano National Park caused by RPA infiltrations, he proposed “the creation in sensitive areas of small groups in civilian clothes disguised as peasants, in order to neutralise the generally isolated rebels” . What was recommended here was to use soldiers disguised in civilian clothes and not civilians with military training. The suggestion was therefore to use people who looked like civilians in the armed conflict.

Effective from the end of August 1991, the plan for revival and development of the village vigilante (civilian self-defence) commenced. On 25th August 1991, the security council of Ngarama sub prefecture in Byumba prefecture met in the office of Muvumba commune. On the agenda, among other things, was an item on the village vigilantes called “people’s self-defence”. The meeting was attended by the commander of Mutara operational sector, Col. Deogratias Nsabimana, who later became the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces. From the onset, Colonel Nsabimana raised the problem of lack of resources in terms of firearms and lack of Military supervision for such a programme .

In a letter to the Ministry of Defence dated 29th September 1991 on “People’s self-defence”, Colonel Deogratias Nsabimana referred to the proposals made during a meeting held at the sub prefecture of Ngarama on 26th September 1991. The proposal was about the creation of a structure of a “people’s self-defence which would trickle down to the smallest administrative unit” called ‘Nyumba kumi’ . Members had to be at least 25 years old and not more than 40, preferably married and prove to be of “good” morals, be sufficiently patriotic, sociable and courageous. These civilians were to be trained by the army. Based on 10 weapons per cell, the four communes where the programme was to be launched needed 350 weapons for Muvumba, 580 for Muhura, 530 for Ngarama and 300 for Bwisige. The minutes of the report ended by stating that “(...) the participants recognise that the needs expressed above are very high and they are aware of the small size of the national budget” .

On 7th February 1992, during the meeting for Byumba prefecture security council held in the office of Muvumba commune, attendants were informed of the progress made in regard to the issue of civilian self-defence in Mutara region after the Ministry of Defence had made available 300 weapons (without specifying the type). These weapons were distributed as follows: 76 for Muvumba commune, 40 for Kivuye commune, 40 for Kiyombe commune and 24 for Cyumba commune. About Muvumba commune, a group of 250 persons chosen from its inhabitants at the discretion of the burgomaster and his communal council in charge of security were sent for training at Gabiro from 29th January to 5th February 1992, to learn how to operate firearms

It appears that the French Military Attaché in Kigali, Colonel Cussac, was closely following this issue. MIP published an extract from a diplomatic telex dated 22nd January 1992, in which he explained in detail the above scheme of distributing arms to civilians. He mentioned the areas to be covered, the selection criterion for members and confirmed the number of weapons as 300. He also explained that majority of these weapons were MAS 36 and expressed his concern on the risks of drifts in such a project .

Before the genocide, it was not easy for one to draw a line of distinction between village vigilantes/civilian self-defence and members of the Interahamwe. Individuals who received military training under the scheme of village vigilantes/ civilian self-defence used to refer to themselves – and were described by others – as Interahamwe. In both cases, it appears that the task assigned was to fight the Tutsi enemy, starting with Tutsi civilians in their vicinity. However, a distinction should be made between Interahamwe “shock groups” who essentially were physically fit young men, peasants or town dwellers without any specific professional employment, who could go for training far from their areas of residence and in the end be deployed elsewhere in other parts of the country, and Interahamwe who were given local training , including a number of few civil servants who could not easily be differentiated from members of the village vigilantes/“civilian self-defence”.

Finally, there were two types of accusations levelled against French soldiers in the training of Interahamwe. The first series of accusations maintain that French soldiers really trained these militia, but they exempt them partly on the ground that they did not know that they were training civilians, that in the training camps, it would not been easy to distinguish the civilians from the military recruits . The other type of accusation maintains that French soldiers knew that the civilians they were training belonged to the Interahamwe movement .

The evidence involving French soldiers in the training of Interahamwe covers different training camps from Gabiro camp to Nyakinama University, Mukamira camp, Bigogwe camp and Gako camp. The only training which was linked to the village vigilante/“civilian self-defence” scheme was that of the inhabitants of Muvumba commune and the one carried out at Nyakinama University. Elsewhere, witnesses simply mentioned the training of Interahamwe.

2.2.1. Gabiro camp

Gabiro camp was located in the eastern part of the country in a savannah region which is almost desert. It is adjoined to Akagera National Park.

a) Village vigilantes/Self-defence in Muvumba

Despite reservations of Colonel Cussac expressed in his message of 22nd January 1992, concerning the training of civilians in the village vigilante/“self-defence” scheme , various testimonies maintain that French soldiers were involved in the initiation of the programme for residents of Muvumba commune and that the training was carried out at Gabiro camp.

Mumvaneza was at the time a communal counsellor in charge of one of the sectors of Muvumba commune which had launched the village vigilante/civilian self-defence scheme. He had his first contact with French soldiers in the office of the Muvumba commune during a meeting of all the communal counsellors in charge of the sectors. French soldiers had come to see burgomaster Rwabukombe Onesphore .

“When I saw them, I did not know that they were Frenchmen. I saw white men in military uniforms who were strolling at the communal office. They were four. Three of them had smeared their faces with some black material. This could have been shoe polish or charcoal. Only one of them did not have his face smeared. That was their chief, and I later on learnt that his name was Captain Jacques. I was told so by Lt. Kadali, a friend of mine who often spoke to him.

I found them in the communal office chatting with the burgomaster. I wanted to enter the office but was told that the burgomaster had visitors. We had come for a meeting of all the counsellors. I waited. When they finished their discussion, they came out and left. There was that white man Captain Jacques, commander Ntirikina who was based at Gabiro, and Colonel Rwabukwisi.

After their departure, we had our weekly meeting of counsellors held every Friday. The burgomaster told us that those French and Rwandan soldiers wanted to train the inhabitants in self-defence in order to fight the threat of infiltrations by Inkotanyi in the countryside, because these people were distributing weapons to their Tutsi relatives for killing the population. That it was therefore necessary to adopt a strategy of training the inhabitants in the use of weapons so that they may defend themselves when it becomes necessary to kill these people, be they accomplices or Inkotanyi. We took note of this and the burgomaster told us that he had been offered 252 places for the entire population of Muvumba. These places were divided among the communal counsellors. I was given 16, one of which was personally mine. A week later, we gave reports on the groups of people who would go for training, each counsellor presenting his own list. We left for Gabiro in several buses, and each counsellor had a list of his men.

We found Frenchmen at Gabiro. They were not more than four; they hid and had their faces covered. They did not want to be seen by the civilians. But for us counsellors, it happened that we sometimes went into the office of the commander, or when we were discussing with high ranking soldiers such as lieutenants or chief sergeants, they told us that those were our white friends who had come to help us. We stayed there for one month or one month and a half. (...) Those white men and the captain often came to see us at about 1000 hours. Our instructors were supposed to know French, but I did not speak French myself. At times, Captain Jacques came with burgomaster Gatete, and at other times with Ntirikina or Rwabukwisi, and so on”.

On how the training was organised, the former counsellor explained that they slept in tents near Gabiro camp and that in the morning; they would go to a valley about 5 km away. They would leave on foot very early in the morning with other people. They would reach the training venue at about 0900 or 1000 hours, and would practise shooting until around 1400 hours. They would then go back to the camp for lunch. At around 1600 hours, they would attend “theoretical” classes. These lectures were given most of the time by Commander Ntirikina who was in charge of them.

“[They explained to us that] the weapons you have been trained to operate are to be used to fight Inkotanyi. Inkotanyi like to hide, they like to go behind the lines of our soldiers and infiltrate the countryside, in your own sectors. They hide weapons in the homes of their Tutsi relatives. With those weapons which we are going to give you, you must fight these Tutsis who live in the countryside. If you hear that these Inyenzi have brought weapons to the population, there is no other solution but to shoot at these peasants or kill them; they do not outnumber you”.

The counsellor explained that in his administrative constituency, there were 21 Tutsi out of 7900 inhabitants in his sector.

During theoretical classes, “the French would pass by briefly from time to time. Lt. Kadali would act as an interpreter because the Frenchmen did not understand Kinyarwanda. In the field, they would come to see if our shots went to the target. They would take a white sheet of paper, draw a circle inside which we had to shoot. When one shot accurately inside the target, the spot would be marked with a cassava ball so that it is not confused with the next or the preceding shot.”

The witness then explained that in fact, they did not sleep in the real camp, but their tents were pitched outside, very near the camp. He also explained that in their group, they were only civilians and that it was not possible to confuse them with the soldiers because they were dressed in civilian clothes.

When asked about the role of the French soldiers in the request to the burgomaster of Muvumba to provide civilians to train, the counsellor replied:

“[The burgomaster] told us that these white men supported us in the war we were fighting and that they wanted us to help them...the food we ate while at Gabiro, it was them who gave it to us [...] I am saying that it was the French who gave us food because we were asked to state precisely the maximum number of people which should not be exceeded. [The burgomaster had told us] Bring a small number of people because these white men told us that if we exceed the number, food will not be enough. You should come with the number of people agreed upon, do not exceed”.

The counsellor of Karama commune in Muvumba commune, Elias Nkurunziza , who was examined at Nyagatare prison by the Commission, confirmed the presence of French soldiers at the time of requesting local leaders for people to train in the use of firearms. He was referring to the same episode as the one mentioned by the preceding witness, the meeting of counsellors in the office of Muvumba commune.

“In 1992, we were called to go to the commune and told to bring strong young men who were going to be taught how to use weapons. Not all sectors were selected for this scheme. In regard to my sector, I was asked to provide 50 people. […] We arrived at the commune at 0900 hours. The burgomaster had a meeting with the soldiers first. Colonel Muvunyi was among them. There was also a French soldier who had come in a Suzuki Jeep with two other white soldiers who had smeared their faces with shoe polish. [..] On the agreed day, we met at the communal office. We went into buses which had been hired by Castar Nsabimana. We first went to Nyagatare and then to Gabiro where we stayed for ten days. We spent the nights at Gabiro. In the morning, we would be given sorghum porridge and would then go to a place called Rwangingo. There was an airstrip which was no longer in use; this is where we were taught to use guns.

Munyandinda Sylvestre was a farm instructor living in Muvumba commune, which was then governed by burgomaster Onesphore Rwabukombe. The counsellor of the sector where Munyandinda Sylvestre, Kayijamahe Domitien lived was called to the communal office for a meeting in which sector counsellors were asked to make a list of men of good reputation who were to go for training in how to use weapons. Around June 1992, Munyandinda Sylvestre was called to go to the commune. Eight to ten people had been called from each commune. Together, they were all more than a hundred who were to go to Gabiro to be trained in use of weapons. They went by bus. When they reached Gabiro, political parties representatives opposed the training because they did not want civilians to be trained in how to handle weapons. After three days of negotiations, an understanding was reached and the training started. Two Rwandan non commissioned officers were introduced to them, and they were told that these would be their instructors. They lived near Gabiro camp, but they received their training about seven kilometres away from the camp, at a place called Rwangingo. Munyandinda Sylvestre explained how he met French soldiers at Gabiro:

“In the evening, [Rwandan] high ranking soldiers would come to see how the day had been, how things were, and on other days, these high ranking officers would be with our instructors, asking them whether we were responding well to the training. Our instructors would tell them that things were not going well, that they had been given incapable recruits. [...] Sometimes, these high ranking officers would come with two white men and sometimes with people who were neither whites nor Rwandans. [...] There were people who looked black and used to come with the white men [...]. They were stout in build. There was one Whiteman who came often with high ranking officers to see how the situation was. [...] When they came, they discussed with our instructors. There was one young man who was said to be the best shooter. The instructors introduced him to the white men. They wanted to know whether he had been a soldier; he denied and said that he just did it like that, naturally”.

There was thus a long incubation period during which a number of Rwandan military and political leaders saw the need to put in place a “civilian self-defence” scheme but it could not be implemented because of lack of resources. According to different testimonies heard by the Commission, French soldiers played a decisive role in translating this idea into practice. They contributed to its launching through logistical support, provision of food, and in training civilians in shooting skills, as well as through discreet monitoring of the programme. In its early stages, the aim of the village vigilantes/“civilian self-defence” programme was to carry out patrols in zones near the military operations in order to thwart infiltration attempts by RPF fighters, but later, there emerged a scheme of massacres.

b) Training Interahamwe

Another witness, Jean-Baptiste Dushimimana , was a full time Interahamwe who was trained towards the end of 1993, with the assistance of French soldiers. He explained that at the time, some MRND leaders living in areas of Gatenga, Kicukiro commune, started to contact young men belonging to this party. They told them that even if they were part of the MRND youth groups which participated in the demonstrations and meetings, this role had been overtaken by events considering the period to which the country was heading with the imminent arrival of RPF representatives in the Government. That is how Jean-Baptiste had received paramilitary training. He was first trained in a building called Technoserve located in a residential area close to the city centre of Kigali. But since the training was being done in the open, peoples’ attention made it necessary to shift and we were subsequently moved to Felicien Kabuga’s building located in Muhima residential area. Even there, rumours started circulating, and we were moved again to Kimihurura, in the house of General Ndindiriyimana, near Kigali night club.

In Kimihurura, those who trained them told them that they should be strong enough to fight the enemy by learning how to use weapons because peace negotiations would yield nothing, and that in any case, they will have to fight the enemy who was becoming increasingly strong every day. At that time, they were asked to give their full personal particulars in order to be sure about their origin. Young people with blood relations with Tutsis or Hutus from Nduga (the centre and south of the country) were sent away. Others were told that they were being taken to Gabiro to be taught how to use weapons and that this should be kept absolutely confidential. Jean-Baptiste Dushimimana and his comrades boarded buses and were driven to Gabiro.

“On our arrival, we were received by guards, who told us that they worked for the Rwanda Tourism and National Parks Office (ORTPN) and that they were going to train us as park wardens. [...] The uniforms we wore had been given to us by the French through ORTPN so that junior soldiers or any of us don’t understand the source because at that time, UNAMIR had started checking. [...] Another thing, during the “cross” training which we called “petit matinal”, French soldiers would drive in a jeep along with us so that if one of us felt too tired, they would take him back to the camp. [...] In fact, the programme was well established because when we arrived there, we replaced other young men who too had come from the city of Kigali, but from Muhima residential area. We found Frenchmen there. They wore military uniforms. In Kigali, we knew French soldiers; there was no way we could be mistaken about them, because they had unique uniforms. [...] It was not possible to confuse us with new military recruits. In that camp, there were three distinct groups of people being trained: Burundian Hutus, soldiers who were to go to the frontline to fight, and MRND Interahamwe whose mission was to protect their party leaders in a new government that was about to be formed”.

On their return to town, Jean-Baptiste Dushimimana and his group were assigned different duties according to their shooting skills. Jean-Baptiste Dushimimana was given the task of protecting a close relative of President Habyarimana, Séraphin Twahirwa, who was the leader of Interahamwe in Kigali city. Shortly before the genocide, his group was given weapons, grenades and even vehicles.

Jean-Baptiste Dushimimana did not remember the exact dates of this training at Gabiro where French soldiers were involved. He however gave some temporal landmarks such as the arrival of RPF in Kigali in view of forming the broad based transitional government and the early stages of the UNAMIR’s presence. In this way, it is possible to place the date of his training at between 8th October 1993 – arrival date for General Dallaire in Rwanda as UNAMIR commander and 15th December 1993, the departure date of the French soldiers from Noroît contingent.

Nsabimana Hassan was in the same group of Interahamwe as Jean-Baptiste Dushimimana. He said that he had been trained at Gabiro by Rwandan and French soldiers. He was taught how to assemble and dismantle a gun and how to shoot. In the mornings, they would run from Gabiro to Kabarore. During the shooting exercises, the French soldiers gave them marks. They would draw a man’s figure and show them where they should aim. Marks were given according to the part of the body shot at. Nsabimana Hassan explained that French soldiers brought them food in a helicopter with Colonel Nkundiye. After one month and a half of training, they were sent back to their respective residential areas. Like the preceding witness, he was among Interahamwe who were put at the disposal of President Habyarimana’s relative, Séraphin Twahirwa.

Mulindankiko Marine was also a member of the same group of Interahamwe as the two preceding witnesses, who were under the orders of Séraphin Twahirwa. He explained that he had been trained in the building belonging to Kabuga in Kigali and at Gabiro camp. At Gabiro, they were under warrant officer Matabaro and two French soldiers. “During the shooting sessions, French soldiers gave us marks. They taught us how to use GP revolvers. We would shoot at a helmet hung on a stick. During the morning running exercises, they would come with us”.

Ngarambe Pierre Célestin was an Interahamwe who was trained for two weeks at Gabiro camp towards the end of 1993, with the assistance of French soldiers.

“When we arrived at Gabiro camp, we were introduced to Colonel Nkundiye who was the camp commander. We were shown instructors. The French would come with Ngirumpatse Mathieu in a helicopter. The French brought us ammunitions because we were not using those from the camp. They taught us to shoot at targets. They would draw a human head at which we would shoot. At other times, it would be the drawing of a cross. The French would give us marks and prizes according to our performance. They would give us alcohol. Depending on the marks obtained, we were promised a bottle of banana beer. We would train in the morning and in the afternoon, the French and Mathieu Ngirumpatse would give us lessons. They would tell us that what was important was to know well who the enemy was, that the enemy was the Tutsi. They would tell us that something was going to happen and that when that time comes, we should start by killing our Tutsi neighbours. When we heard the word kill, some of us started deserting”.

Ndindabahizi Emmanuel was a soldier in a company called Huye by the end of 1992. In that year, this company was based in Mutara region. Its members were stationed in the high mountains near Uganda. As for the French, they stayed at Gabiro. These were members of DAMI, who gave us training, taught fighting without arms and military regulations.

“I took part in these training courses. What I noticed was that they recruited young men trained by the French, among others. But when they were through with the training, they went back home. Their training seemed like military training, but they were taught mainly to use traditional weapons. They had clubs, and they learnt how to throw a knife. The training lasted between two to three months, after which they went back home. To tell the truth, we did not know why they were being trained, sometimes we thought that they would join the army but at the end of the training, they went back home still dressed in civilian clothes”.

Ndindabahizi explained that although his unit was staying far from Gabiro camp, he was able to see everything because their company’s office was inside Gabiro camp where he used to go regularly, either escorting the vehicle which brought supplies, or to have a bath because there was no water in the mountains. In his free time, he used to come there with others for a rest. When he was in the camp, he saw training sessions conducted by French soldiers for civilians, particularly during morning running exercises called “petit matinal”.

Ndindabahizi knew a person called Muyisere Christophe, who was trained at Gabiro camp by French soldiers. He lived in the former Taba commune. After his training as Interahamwe, he went to train Interahamwe in his commune. During one training session, he was shot and lost his leg.

“There were other people who were trained by French soldiers whose names I did not know butwhom I had become familiar with while at Gabiro. We thought they would become soldiers. But later, I saw them during the war [during the genocide] at check points in Nyamirambo, [a residential area of Kigali] and we greeted one another. Subsequently, I saw them again at check points, but this time they carried weapons”.

Kaburame Jean Damascène was a corporal in the second Muvumba battalion based at Gabiro camp in 1992. The witness maintained that in that camp, he saw French soldiers from DAMI train Interahamwe. At the end of the training, they would give clothes and arms. These Interahamwe had to fight the enemy, and they were told that the enemy was the Tutsi in general. The French soldiers trained them essentially in dismantling and reassembling guns and in shooting. “I saw this with my own eyes; how the French trained Interahamwe and then gave them weapons. When the instructors left, Interahamwe came to tell us that we had to fight the enemy”.

2.2.2. Nyakinama University Campus

DAMI soldiers started living at Nyakinama University on 29th March 1991 . Colonel Ndamage Martin maintained that he had seen more than forty DAMI soldiers staying at Nyakinama University under the command of Colonel Chollet .

Simugomwa Fidèle’s evidence mainly touched the region of Kibuye where he comes from. Simugomwa Fidèle mentioned the fact that when he was working at Nyakinama University, he personally saw French soldiers training civilians in 1991. He also explained that this was done under the civilian self-defence programme .

Bisengimana Elisée , a Member of Parliament told the Commission that between 1990 and 1991, he was a student at the National University of Rwanda, part of which had been moved to Nyakinama in Ruhengeri prefecture. A section of the University premises was occupied by French soldiers who trained Rwandan soldiers. This training took place in the football field of the campus as well as in the classrooms. Because of this, the students followed closely the training activities given by the French soldiers. The Rwandan soldiers who were being trained were all dressed in uniforms. But besides these soldiers in uniform, we could see people dressed in civilian clothes being trained from the football field. These people did not stay long and were quickly replaced by other groups in civilian clothes. The students were told that these were new recruits, but Bisengimana had the impression that these were peasants from the surrounding areas who were trained in a rudimentary manner.

Bisengimana explained also that French soldiers attended the meetings with local authorities. Nyakimana University was not too far from the communal office. These meetings were regularly held and involved some prefectural and communal authorities, civilians including University professors and students, and all of them were Hutus close to MRND. French soldiers too attended. Bisengimana related these meetings to the unhealthy climate which started to appear at the University. Hutu students originating from the north of the country started forming groups which were claiming that they did not want Tutsis and Hutus originating from Nduga (centre and south of the country) to attend the University. In 1991, the climate of hostility became so oppressive that all Tutsi and Hutu students from the centre and south of the country escaped on foot at night. Bisengimana felt that French soldiers were partly responsible for the development of these ethnic and regionalised tensions because they attended those meetings. On the night of the flight of the students, they did nothing to calm things down.

Ndabakenga Gérard whom we have already mentioned in a previous testimony, was also a student at Nyakinama University between 1991 and 1993. During the summer holidays of 1992, French soldiers came and occupied University dormitories. He found them there when he came back from holidays to prepare for September examinations. The students lived in blocs A, B and C, and the French soldiers occupied bloc D.

« The civilians who were trained on the University football field in broad daylight were peasants who were taught the use of weapons or other military practices, like taking somebody with hands tied behind his back or how to kill…And when the peasants had finished learning how to dismantle and reassemble a gun and taking people with hands tied, they went directly to the field to practise what they had just been taught. There was a firing range in a place called Muko. We used to hear gun shots. [...] We knew some among the recruits…Fungaroho, one Mihati and another called Makamba. [...] Makamba worked at the University and he was in charge of the photcopying machine. You understand that I knew him well. Mihati ran a bar not far from the campus. This is where we used to go if we did not want to drink from the University canteen. The young Fungaroho worked in Mihati’s bar. That is why we knew them because we used to meet them during those drinking sprees. [...] We could tell from the clothes who was a soldier and who was not. Soldiers wore uniforms while civilians wore folded up trousers, and this showed that they were civilians”.

2.2.3. Gako camp

According to MIP, Gako camp was the training venue for Rwandan soldiers by DAMI soldiers . It is in Bugesera region, south of the city of Kigali. During the first week of March 1992, Gako was the scene of one of the biggest massacres in the period preceding the genocide proper. Interahamwe who were trained locally and professional Interahamwe from Kigali were among those who carried out these massacres. A number of witnesses maintained that French soldiers living in Gako camp trained also Interahamwe militia.

Second Lieutenant Tuyisenge Jean de Dieu who was also an official of the central intelligence services was sent to Gako camp to teach for a week during the last week of June 1993.

“The French played a very important role because they were among those who trained the people who were sent to kill. There was a group called ‘TURIHOSE’ [meaning we are everywhere] composed of Interahamwe and impuzamigambi. Impuzamigambi were CDR youth. This was the group which those who were not ethnically mixed could join, a group which had been trained to carry out special actions. [... ] At that time, the French were training the members of ‘TURIHOSE’ at Kibugabuga. What I am saying is that I saw them, even if I do not recall their names. There was a Frenchman who was working with a second lieutenant called Toussaint who was one of CRAP leaders. [...] I knew him well. We had been at school together”.

Munyaneza Bernard became a soldier in 1992. Although he was Tutsi, he had managed to join the army. After the formation of the transitional government in 1992 headed by the opposition, a number of soldiers were recruited from the centre and the south of the country without discrimination. Munyaneza was taken to Bugesera on 23rd June 1992 where he spent three months:

“In Bugesera, at Kibugabuga, we were taught how to shoot. There, we found French soldiers who were training Interahamwe. In July, these Interahamwe and the French soldiers went to kill people in Kanzenze; they killed many Tutsis. After they had left, the local people continued killing. Soldiers from Gako went to stop the massacres and came back with spears, clubs, machetes and billhooks. When the French left with Interahamwe, I saw them because in order to go from Kibugabuga to Kanzenze, one had to pass by Gako camp, and we did not live inside the camp. We slept outside the camp in tents pitched in the bush. I had a cousin called Nkurunziza Stanislas who was a corporal, and he lived in Gako. He came often to discuss with me. He would tell me that Tutsis were going to disappear because the French were training Interahamwe in Bigogwe, Nyungwe and Gabiro”.

Murejuru Claude lived in Bugesera and often went to water his cows near Gako camp:

“You see, Interahamwe from Bicumbi and Bugesera were trained in Ruyenzi. They were trained by the French and Rwandan soldiers. These things were known by everybody and did not require much investigation. They trained them in groups of 10, with three French soldiers. I never went to the place where the training was done because I could not. But they used to pass in front of me. In addition, I had a neighbour, a young man called Kayinamura, who participated in the training. [...] They trained during the day and went home in the evening. Most of them were young men aged between 18 and 25, and men who were still strong, about 30 or 35 years old. I saw them often. They stopped training in 1993.”

Seromba Pierre Célestin lived in Bugesera. He was jailed in Gako camp in February 1992 like many Tutsis in the region, allegedly because he was an accomplice of RPF. Outside the camp, he saw French soldiers train Interahamwe. Since he was made to go and fetch water and do the cleaning, he often went out. Moreover, French soldiers interrogated him. According to him, French soldiers trained young men from three communes: Ngenda, Kanzenze and Gashora.

2.2.4. Mukamira camp

Nturanyenabo Jean-Paul joined the army in 1989 and finished his training in the Butare Non-Commissioned Officers College in 1991. In February 1992, he was transferred to Mukamira camp in Ruhengeri prefecture. While there, French instructors from DAMI trained him in the use of 81 and 105 mm mortars.

“There was another DAMI company responsible for training civilians. These civilians were taught how to behave with peasants, how to use light weapons, how to strangle somebody, how to fight without weapons, and many other things such as the use of knives, machetes and other traditional weapons. I had the opportunity of knowing some of those civilians. There was a certain Mabuye who worked with Bralirwa .You can find him in Gisenyi. There was also another civilian whose name I do not remember. We called him Perusi. You can find him in Ruhengeri, he is notoriously known for the acts he committed during the genocide and by which he distinguished himself. There was a man called Nisengwe Orose, I knew him. Another was called Muhimana Jean Damascène, we came from the same commune. I saw these people. We, we were in our section where we were trained in the use of the arms I have just mentioned, but I used to go and visit them. They told me that they had come within the framework of political parties. These were young men who were being trained to form the group ‘TURIHOSE’. They were being trained to defend themselves. They were taught that the enemy was the Tutsis living inside the country and that when time came; they had to know how to fight. At the end of their training, they finished before us, they were sent back to their respective communes. After the crash of the President’s plane, they were the ones who manned check points armed with machetes, firearms, knives. Time had come to fight the Tutsis and they started cutting them to pieces. It is for this reason that we saw civilians who were employed by companies like Bralirwa or elsewhere immediately take up firearms. People were wondering where these people had learnt to use such weapons, but they had been taught this well before”.

Ntuyenabo explained that in Mukamira camp, soldiers and civilians were trained quite separately, but these civilians were so sufficiently near that the soldiers were able to recognise them during their respective training.

Nisengwe Orose confirmed having met the witness mentioned above during his training as Interahamwe in Mukamira camp. He was a peasant who played in the football team of his commune, Kayove. Important personalities came to his commune to see the local authorities. At the end of their meeting, an announcement was made, asking strong young men to register themselves to go and learn how to use firearms in order to defend the country. Candidates were selected at the sector level.

Nisengwe was recruited by the counsellor of his sector, Ngirumpatse Louis. Selected young men started learning the use of weapons in commune Kayove at Bugabo stadium. Arms had been brought by Nsengiyumva Anatole. The trainees were then driven to Gisenyi military camp in town, and then to Umuganda stadium. They were very many: six hundred young men, according to Nisengwe, who came from more or less all over Gisenyi prefecture, and they continued learning the use of weapons. After that, they were sent to different areas of the country to continue their training as Interahamwe.

Nisengwe was sent to Mukamira camp in March 1992 where he met French soldiers who supervised their training. Their training in shooting continued, but they also learnt fighting without weapons, killing without being seen, using a knife. They were taught ideological lessons from which they were made to understand that Tutsis were enemies of Hutus. At the end of the training at Mukamira, he was given a ‘TURIHOSE’ card, and the group was then sent again to Umuganda stadium in Gisenyi town. There, they were divided in smaller groups, some of them were sent to Kigali, others like Nisengwe returned to their respective communes where they set up check points during the genocide.

Muhimana Jean Damascène was a peasant. In 1993, he and other young men from different areas in the region were trained under the direct supervision of French soldiers. He arrived at Mukamira camp in August or September 1993. The training took three to four weeks. He was with about 200 other young men who appeared to have been selected because of their build and their physical strength. Most of them were dressed in civilian clothes; others had either an old pair of trousers or a military jacket which they had obtained by their own means. All of them had to become Interahamwe. They were accommodated in the camp.

Since they were many, they formed smaller groups, platoons of about 30 men. Each platoon had a Rwandan instructor from the Rwandan Armed Forces. His instructor was called Habyarimana, a corporal. In the morning, Rwandan instructors started by going to get instructions in the office of a French captain. These French soldiers gave out weapons to theses instructors every morning. There were three other French soldiers whose role was to supervise the Rwandan instructors.

The French captain was in command of the training of soldiers and civilians. Muhimana explained that this French captain monitored closely the training of his group. His class learnt how to use a Kalashnikov, an R4 gun and a 60mm mortar. They were taught also how to fight without weapons. In the evening after the meal, they would go into a big hangar where they were given lessons, particularly on the history of the country, by a Rwandan sergeant. He taught them what was “the Tutsi ideology” and their cruelty. In the evening, French soldiers would pass to see them in the hangar during study, or when they were practising traditional dances for pastime.

On completion of their training in Mukamira camp, they were given a card on which was written « TURIHOSE ». They were then sent to Gisenyi camp where they continued their training at Umuganda stadium.

“TURIHOSE » was a group of elite Interahamwe, men who had been well trained and who were mainly from Gisenyi prefecture, birth place of President Habyarimana. To be admitted to this group, a genealogical investigation was carried out first to ensure that the candidate had no Tutsi blood.

The second part of the history of this « TURIHOSE » group with French soldiers during the genocide will be expanded later in this document.

2.2.5 Bigogwe camp

Bigogwe military camp housed the commando training centre. It was in the north of the country, in a region where lived Tutsis whose name Bagogwe was derived from the name of this region. This Tutsi population was victim of many waves of massacres between October 1990 and January 1993 before the genocide. Members of DAMI carried out training activities in this region.

Nsekanabo Twayibu , a former Interahamwe, maintained that he was trained by French soldiers in Bigogwe and Nyakinama camps:

“We were recruited in 1992 while we were attending political meetings. Some of us were sent to Bigogwe military camp. We were told that we were going to become soldiers. We were trained for two days by instructor Minani and Corporal Jeff, both of them Rwandans. They told us that it was not them who would train us but French soldiers. In fact on the second day, eight Frenchmen came. They called the man who was in command of the camp, sergeant major Gatsimbanyi. I do not know where he lives today. They discussed in French. They started by dividing us in groups and told us then to go to bed. We woke up a 0300 hours, and it is from then that we started being trained by the French. Among the things we were taught, there were: killing a big number of people in a little time without using weapons, the use of a thin rope, a knife, and a bayonet. When they were training us, they had their faces smeared with something resembling shoe polish so that it was not possible to know that they were whites. We then went into the forest which was across Bigogwe camp to learn how to shoot. We were a group of 200 young men from different communes of Gisenyi. There were eight Frenchmen. At the end of our training, we were sent to our communes of origin and were asked to go and train young men in our communes. Then in 1993, we went to Nyakinama University campus. We were about 1000 young men. Our training took two months. During all this time, the French who were training us would ask us insistently whether there were any Tutsis among us. They would ask our Rwandan instructors who in turn would ask us the question. They told us that we were “CRAP”, I would say, a group of killers, trained to kill without weapons. In Nyakibanda, they told that the people we were fighting were Tutsis who wanted to introduce the English language in Rwanda. They asked us if we would accept it and we would say no. They said that we should fight them. At the end of our training, they asked us if we knew who the enemy was and we all answered that we did. They told us that those who knew who the enemy was should stand aside, and they gave us a dagger and a grenade. But these were given only to those who were members of the “CRAP” group. They told us that we should find the enemy and that he was living with us. We boarded ONATRACOM buses which took us to where we had come from. This was around 2100 hours, one evening in 1993. We in turn trained Interahamwe and CDR”.

Mbarushimana Juma was also a former Interahamwe. He explained that when he and others went to Bigogwe camp, they were a group of about fifty young men. They were trained for a period of 15 days by Captain Bizumuremyi, assisted by two French soldiers.

Ntirenganya Adbumalk was a motorcycle taxi driver in Gisenyi town. He first received a paramilitary training at Umuganda stadium in Gisenyi town. He was then sent to Bigogwe camp where he too was trained by instructor Captain Bizumuremyi and a French soldier called Francisco: “We were taught how to find the enemy; we were told that the enemy was the Tutsi. They told us to locate the enemy so that when the war started, we would be able to identify him”.

Nshogozabahizi Emmanuel was a peasant. After the introduction of multiparty politics, he joined MRND and later became Interahamwe. He received military training in Bigogwe camp by the French. His group was taught how to fight without weapons and the history of Rwanda. They were taught who the enemy was, who had attacked the country from Uganda, and his accomplices. His training lasted three months, after which he and his comrades were sent to Mukamira camp where they were taught the use of heavy weapons, but without going deep. After the training, they went back home.

Bigogwe camp housed a Belgian military contingent who trained Rwandan paratroopers. One Belgian soldier who exceptionally did not want his name revealed, told the Commission that he had personally seen French soldiers train civilians in Bigogwe camp . The French had also an arms store which, according to the witness, were distributed to soldiers and Interahamwe who carried out massacres of Tutsis near the Mudende Adventist University.

Finally, the president of Interahamwe in Giticyinyoni sector on the gates of Kigali when one comes from the north and the south of the country, Joseph Setiba , told the Commission that at one time, there was a mass mobilisation of Interahamwe who were to be sent for training. A meeting had been organised at the seat of MRND by Mutsinzi, the permanent coordinator of Interahamwe. He had invited all the section presidents in order to set a training schedule for the best Interahamwe of Kigali. They were asked to make a list of the most able and most trustworthy so that they may be sent for training. Three sessions were to be organised for rank Interahamwe and a last session for sector presidents. One class was sent to Gabiro camp and, according to Setiba, it is possible it had from 700 to 800 Interahamwe. Another of about 250 men was sent to Bigogwe camp. Training in these two camps lasted more than two months. Among the Interahamwe he had sent from his sector, some came back before the end of the training. Those who had been sent to Gabiro as well as those sent to Bigogwe said that white men dressed in civilian clothes used to come to the field to supervise the training.

All the witnesses, except one, who were former Interahamwe or members of the civilian defence force who maintained that they were trained by French soldiers, and whose names have been mentioned here, have pleaded guilty for their part in the 1994 genocide. For the record, we should indicate that among these, some Interahamwe from Gisenyi prefecture met also French soldiers during the genocide in special circumstances which will be explained later in the document.
2.3. Additional information

Some witnesses indentified French instructors as soldiers from DAMI. All the military camps in which these soldiers worked as identified by the Fact-finding Mission were places where Interahamwe were trained by French soldiers .

Witnesses who were examined by the Commission explained clearly that there was no possible confusion between Interahamwe militia in training and possible recruits of the Rwandan Armed Forces, for the simple reason that the former were always dressed in civilian clothes and the latter always in military uniform. In the training camps, the two were clearly separate in terms of space and were not given the same type of training. This was indicated by Thiery Prungnaud, gendarme and member of the elite corps of GIGN who, in 1992, was in Rwanda training the security response team of the Presidential Guard within the framework of the French military cooperation. Below is an extract of his interview with the French journalist, Laure de Vulpain on the public radio, France Culture.

Extract of Thierry Prungnaud’s interview by Laure de Vulpain on France Culture on 22nd April 2005


[…]
Thierry Prungnaud: There were also training sessions of civilian mercenaries during the training sessions which I conducted with my trainees, where I saw French soldiers train Rwandan civilian militia in shooting. Well, this was done several times, but the only time I saw them, there were perhaps about thirty militia being trained in shooting in Akagera park.

Laure de Vulpain: This was quite an isolated place…

Thierry Prungnaud: Exactly, yes, this was even prohibited. It was a place which was out of bounds for soldiers and tourists

Laure de Vulpain: You are categorical; the French were training militia in 1992?

Thierry Prungnaud: Yes, I am categorical!

Laure de Vulpain: You saw them with your own eyes, and you do not have any other proof?

Thierry Prungnaud: No, I saw them, that is all. I can’t say more.

Laure de Vulpain: Were the militia already in existence at that time?

Thierry Prungnaud: Apparently, yes, since these were civilians who had been trained.
Therefore, these were bound to be the militia. The soldiers were all in fatigues. These were civilians.

Laure de Vulpain: Those French soldiers, who were they? From which branch of the armed services?

Thierry Prungnaud: I think from 1st RPIMA since this was the unit which was there. It was therefore they who trained them. [...]




While refuting that French soldiers trained Interahamwe, Colonel Etienne Joubert, head of DAMI-Panda from 23rd December 1992 to 18th May 1993, ruled out too the presence of new Rwandan Armed Forces recruits in Gabiro camp. “All the Rwandans who went through this camp were therefore soldiers who had already been trained or, one would say, who were specialists, and in no way were they recruits among whom militia could have “discreetly” sneaked into. In Gabiro, DAMI men did not train but exclusively upgraded Rwandan Armed Forces soldiers ”.

Without revealing the identity of Interahamwe’s instructors, the preliminary report of the UN Experts Commission on the violations of international laws, including acts of genocide in Rwanda, confirmed in paragraph 51, that Interahamwe were trained in Gabiro camp. “Subsequently, a training camp for Hutu militia (Interahamwe) was set up in Mutara. Each training took three days and included indoctrination of 300 men in ethnic hatred against the Tutsi minority. The training sessions included also learning the methods of mass massacres ”.

Finally, the implication of French soldiers in the training of Interahamwe and the existence of death squads which prevailed at that time were revealed for the first time by a reformed leader of Interahamwe called Janvier Africa in the following words:

« At the beginning of 1992, we carried out our first massacre. We were about 70 men who were sent to Ruhengeri to kill Tutsis of the Bagogwe clan. We killed nearly 10 000 people in one month from our base in Mukamira military camp. French soldiers taught us how to capture our victims and tie them. This was done at one base in the centre of Kigali. This is where we tortured people and where the French military authorities had their headquarters... [...] In that camp, I saw the French teach Interahamwe how to throw a knife and assemble guns. We were trained by the French – one French commander – during several weeks in a row, four months of training in total between February 1991 and January 1992 .

Janvier Africa was jailed. Augustin Iyamuremye, former head of intelligence in the Prime Minister’s office from June 1992 to April 1994 and at that time member of PSD opposition party, told the Commission how French soldiers working in the Criminal Investigation and Documentation Centre prevented him from interrogating Janvier Africa. At the time when Iyamuremye was appointed to the intelligence services, the question of the death squads was the main topic in the press. When he wanted to interview Janvier Africa who was in jail in Kigali central prison, he contacted an official in the Ministry of Justice who was working in that prison called Justin Niyongira. On the agreed day, Mr Iyamuremye went to the prison where he was told by his friend Niyongira that the French gendarmes had just taken Janvier Africa away. He felt that that was not due to unforessen chance: “This shows that those French who were working in the Criminal Investigation and Documentation Centre were very much informed and that they monitored what we were doing and that, if necessary, they would not hesitate to prevent it ”.

2.3.1 In 1992-1993, Interahamwe committed acts of genocide

Testimonies received show the systematic character of Interahamwe training by French soldiers between the beginning of 1992 and end of 1993. On one hand, this training comprised of different methods of killing using bullets, knives and traditional weapons and even bare hands. On the other hand, they included ideological methods of identifying ethnic Tutsis and particularly civilian Tutsis. “In time, it’s the armed militia especially those of MRND who took on the main role on the scene as executioners. That is how there were collective killings like assassinations of individuals.”

From these massacres in Bugesera, during the first week of March 1992, about 300 deaths were registered and Interahamwe played the biggest role. During the months of April, May and June, the Belgian Ambassador Swinnen sent a cable to Brussels in which he identified 3 principle groups of killers in Bugesera constituting:

“A commando unit recruited from among the students of the National School of Gendarmerie in Ruhengeri, who had been trained for this purpose (…); an "Interahamwe” militia group recruited from outside Bugesera, who had been trained for weeks in various military camps; another bigger group of "Interahamwe” from the MRND recruited locally, given the task of plundering, arson and acting as guides. The presence of this group made it possible to bring about confusion and make the unwary observer think that some kind of riot was going on.”

The Belgian lawyer Eric Gillet, a member of the Brussels bar and the executive committee of the FIDH, in a hearing before the French Parliamentary Inquiry (MIP) “gave details of the methods used at the time of the massacres in Bugesera in March 1992. They served as a precursor to the genocide of 1994 ‘because it was obvious four months before their outbreak that the victims had been identified beforehand, justification given for the killings, attacks against individuals, distribution of propaganda leaflets, use of radio to announce false threats from Tutsis to murder Hutus.’ M. Eric Gillet also stressed that, then as in 1994, ‘the representatives of local government (burgomasters and préfets), the army and the gendarmerie as well as Interahamwe militia from the MRND youth groups under the supervision of the party’ participated in the massacres.”

At the time, the ambassador of France, George Martres publicly denied the massacres had taken place and dismissed them as "rumours". He had also refused to join the diplomatic representatives of the OECD countries in a delegation to president Habyarimana to express their concern regarding the new wave of violence. Later, before the French Parliamentary Inquiry (MIP) ambassador Martres admitted that a member of the embassy who had gone up country to check on the situation confirmed that the massacres had taken place. On the same occasion, “he acknowledged that he might have referred to the massacres as “rumours” “at a time before they were confirmed.”

In his diplomatic telegram of 9th March 1992 entitled "The events in Bugesera", the French ambassador presented the facts as a spontaneous attack by Hutu peasants against Tutsi peasants, whose animosity had been revived by the propaganda of PL Party which was attracting many Tutsis. In a second telegram on 11th March, he explained that “the interethnic troubles in Bugesera” could not be contained by the overwhelmed local authorities “with hardly any authority over the people”. The purpose of this telegram was especially intended to explain the killing, the day before, of an Italian nun working in the area, by a Rwandan gendarme. “Whether she was a victim of misunderstanding according to the official version or of premeditated murder as rumour had it, the nun concerned was known for her firm stand against the highly controversial burgomaster of the commune. In addition, her statements on RFI had been rather embarrassing and undoubtedly unwelcome.”

In her telephone interview with RFI, Antonia Locatelli had tried in vain to denounce organised massacres, which contradicted the official version of spontaneous violence by local people. Ambassador Martres, undoubtedly trying to tone down the indignation caused by his attitude of direct support to the authorities, ended his telegram by proposing that a symbolic humanitarian gesture should be made to the survivors of the massacres by quick distribution of food, drugs and blankets by the soldiers of Opération Noroît.

But how could the French embassy in Kigali, whose staff were closely following all the main political events in Rwanda, be completely unaware of what was going on, while at the same time it was well-known that there were French officers working with the Criminal Investigation Department?

On 22nd November 1992, Leon Mugesera, a long time faithful follower of President Habyarimana, made an inflammatory speech in which “he urged the Interahamwe to kill Tutsis and political opponents. The following day, the surrounding communes of Giciye, Kayove, Kibilira and others were flaring up again.” These killings, which went on until the end of January 1993, were actually carried out mainly by the Interahamwe, and took at least 137 lives. A summary report from the Intelligence service in the Office of the President indicates that police investigators from CRCD in Kigali went there to help the gendarmes in the investigations. This confirms the statements of the witness gendarme, who worked with the French in the CRCD, asserting to the Commission that French gendarmes went to the north to inquire into the killings towards the end of 1993.

These two waves of killings, the one in Bugesera at the beginning of March 1992, and that targeting the Bagogwe Tutsis in the north between the end of November 1992 and the end of January 1993, took place at the time French soldiers were training Interahamwe. In March 1993, the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry raised the question whether the killings from October 1990 to January 1993 can legally be described as genocide. Noting that the figures cited in the report for the number of people killed could be challenged by some lawyers as being lower than the legal threshold required, the International Commission of Inquiry concluded that “whatever the legal arguments, the reality was tragically identical to genocide. (…)” Five months later, in August 1993, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission, Waly Bacre Ndiaye, analysed the same events and confirmed that the description of genocide as stipulated by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide could be applied to the cases studied.

Extract from the Special Rapporteur’s report of the UN Humans Rights Commission, Mission to Rwanda from 8th to 17th April 1993

78. The question whether the massacres described above may be termed genocide has been often raised. It is not for the Special Rapporteur to pass judgment at this stage, but an initial reply may be put forward. Rwanda acceded to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in April 1975. Article II of the Convention reads:
“In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intention to destroy , in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, such as:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group ;”(…)

79. The cases of inter-communal violence brought to the Special Rapporteur’s attention indicate very clearly that the victims of the attacks, Tutsis in the overwhelming majority of cases, have been targeted solely because of their membership of a certain ethnic group, and for no other objective reason. Article II, paragraphs (a) and (b), might therefore be considered to apply to these cases.

Source: Blue Book, document 20.


Through the press, the reports of human rights organisations and investigations carried out by the French gendarmes working within the CRCD, the French Army was perfectly well informed that the Interahamwe it had trained were guilty of massacres and killings which, in 1993, could be described as acts of genocide.




2.3.2. Intensification of the training of the Interahamwe in preparation of the genocide of 1994

Towards the end of 1993, the training of the Interahamwe was intensified, with the participation of French soldiers. It should be remembered that they did not officially leave the country until 15th December 1993.

Not only was the training intensified, but it also focussed on providing further training to hard-core Interahamwe, particularly in the camps of Mukamira, Bigogwe and Gabiro. The witness Nsekanabo Twayibu, after training in the Bigogwe camp in 1993, received further training at the university campus of Nyakinama. The Interahamwe Jean Damascène Muhimana, after receiving three months training, got further training from the French in September 1993. As Jean-Baptiste Dushimimana, a hard-core Interahamwe, explained above, he had learnt that, at the end of 1993, when his group from Gatenga Sector in Kicukiro District (Kigali City), was training at the Gabiro camp, another group of Interahamwe from Muhima Sector in Kigali had just completed its training. The Interahamwe leader, Joseph SETIBA, told the Commission that by the end of 1993, about 1,000 Interahamwe had been trained in Gabiro and Bigogwe, with the participation of French soldiers. General Dallaire estimated that there were at least 3,000 Interahamwe in Kigali City at the beginning of 1994. The historian René Lemarchand estimated at 30,000 the number of Interahamwe in the whole country during the genocide .

The rise in power of the Interahamwe movement, in numbers, "skills" and aggressiveness at the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994, is regarded as one of the factors indicating the process of planning the genocide of April-July 1994. In a hearing by the Belgian Senate, the former public prosecutor, François-Xavier Nsanzuwera, explained that: "From January 1994, everyone felt that the war was going to resume because the Interahamwe movement was becoming increasingly more powerful. (…)”. Again, within the context of the Belgian senate inquiry, René Degni-Segui, former Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission and author of the first preliminary report officially describing as genocide the massacres which began in April 1994, said his report had found four indicators showing the genocide had been planned. The second indicator reads as follows: "- the distribution of weapons from arms depots; moreover, the Interahamwe militia were trained;”

This intensification of the training of militia with the participation of French soldiers took place between January 1993 and March 1994, at the time when extremist circles imported 581.000 machetes, double the quantity imported in previous years. The main importer was Félicien Kabuga, who is considered to have been the financial sponsor of the genocide. He is currently sought after by the ICTR.

With regard to events at the end of 1993, the humans rights activist, Alison des Forges, told the Belgian senators: "Between August and the end of 1993, the Interahamwe bought a lot of machetes in Kigali. A businessman and big financier of the extremist RTLM radio sponsored the importation of 25 tons of machetes. It is thus clear that there was already a plan to start the war again, this time targeting civilians.”

What should be retained as the truth?

From February 1992 French soldiers, probably elements of the DAMI, participated in the launch of the "civil defence" program whose purpose was to train a civilian militia with the objectives of preparing them to kill Tutsi civilians in their locality. At the same time, they also started training fulltime Interahamwe, especially the members of the elite group "TURIHOSE". The training of the Interahamwe with the active participation of French soldiers was systematic. It was carried out in all the military camps where the elements of the DAMI worked, and it seems to have been continuous from the beginning of 1992 until the end of 1993, the time the French troops left Rwanda.

This training had two components: 1) the first consisted of training in various methods of killing, with firearms, bayonets or knives and without weapons; 2) the second consisted of indoctrinating the militia to ethnic hatred and psychologically preparing them to kill Tutsi civilians in their neighbourhoods. The testimonies collected by the Commission could not determine clearly whether the French soldiers responsible for training the militia were informed of the ideological content of the training. Some witnesses assert they were, but there is no irrefutable evidence. Taking into consideration the number of groups trained in the five main places mentioned above, it can be realised that the French soldiers took part in the training of thousands of Interahamwe.

From February 1992, the Interahamwe played a dominant role in the massacres, killings and murders perpetrated in the country, particularly in Bugesera at the beginning of March 1992, and in the north of the country from the end of November 1992 to the end of January 1993. These massacres were described, in March 1993 and August 1993, as acts of genocide by various human rights organisations. In spite of that, the French soldiers continued to train the militia and took part in the intensification of their training towards the end of 1993. It appears therefore that this intensification in the training of Interahamwe is one of the factors in the preparations of the genocide of April-July 1994.

The French soldiers share some responsibility in the killings and massacres described as acts of genocide committed by the Interahamwe between March 1992 and December 1993. They supported the Interahamwe institution in full knowledge of what it stood for in terms of logistics, training, and supportive follow-up. The nature of the training, the type of trainees as well as the continuation of the training in spite of repeated massacres committed by these Interahamwe show that they were not unaware of how the training they provided was being put to use. It can therefore be objectively concluded that the French soldiers have a share of responsibility in the preparation of the 1994 genocide since they contributed to the intensification of the training of the Interahamwe who were the spearhead. Finally, it can be objectively concluded that the French soldiers have a share of responsibility in the massacres committed during the genocide itself since a number of the Interahamwe had been trained by them.

This is all the more convincing since the nature of the acts committed during the genocide is not basically different from those committed in Bugesera and the north of the country between March 1992 and January 1993, at the time when the French Army was continuing to train the Interahamwe. There was not, at the time, any direct evidence to prove that the French soldiers knew that the training they were giving the Interahamwe, in particular after the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreements of the 4th August 1993, was intended for committing the genocide that began in April 1994. At the end of 1993, while the French soldiers were taking part in the intensification of the training of the Interahamwe whose numbers were then in thousands, one has the right to wonder about the reasons for such intensification. The question is all the more disconcerting since the French military authorities knew the nature of these Interahamwe militia. What type of combat or war did the French then think they were training them for?

3. Criminal Investigation Department

3.1. The action of the French gendarmes in the centre for criminal investigation and documentation (CRCD)

French military aid extended to the criminal documentation and Research centre for criminal investigation and documentation, the gendarmerie department responsible for criminal investigations (CRCD). French military co-operation had deployed 4 instructors in this institution and put Lieutenant Colonel Robardey, in charge of this unit, which had already been operating in Rwanda since September 1990. The French instructors took control of the institution and protected the criminal acts of the regime through misinformation or silence, whether the acts were ethnic massacres or some acts of terrorism. The final question is whether they computerised the central database without knowing that it would be used to index the Tutsis and political opponents?

This institution, commonly known under the name of "criminology", but whose official designation before the arrival of the French instructors was "central database", had a very bad reputation. Routinely, even before the political and military crisis of October 1990, its agents used torture during interrogation of the people arrested. The day after the sham attack on Kigali City, on the night of 4th to 5th October 1990, many people were arrested and there were a lot of persistent rumours that they were tortured in this institution.

The CRCD consisted of about thirty Rwandan gendarmes. Its task was to carry out investigations into serious criminal activities and keep records of people arrested, suspected or wanted.

In June 1992, at the request of the Minister for Defence, James Gasana, and with the support of the French ambassador Martens, it was decided that a DAMI (Département d’Assistance Militaire et Instruction) be created in the Criminal Investigation Department (DAMI-PJ). Initially, it was for fighting against terrorism and armed robbery because of the many attacks perpetrated at the time, evidenced by explosion of mines and grenades in public places.

The setting up of the DAMI-PJ in June 1992 followed closely the creation of political parties in opposition to the transitional government led by a Prime Minister from the MDR party. One of the tasks that the new government had given itself was to abolish the practice of torture, especially within "criminology". The start of French technical aid to this institution was to correspond with abandonment of the practice of torture. The department was renamed Centre for Criminal Investigation and Documentation (Centre de Recherche Criminelle et de Documentation, CRCD). It would seem that this was done on the initiative of the French counterpart.

In June 1992, the Minister for Defence informed the Prime Minister of the arrival of four French co-operants gendarmes, come to set up a “Criminal Research Unit". The newcomers were: Major Colliere, the Regimental Sergeant Major Nicolas, the Regimental Sergeant Major Colle and regimental sergeant major Salvy. These four gendarmes were placed under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Michel Robardey, technical adviser in charge of judicial police issues at the Rwandan gendarmerie headquarters. Robardey had been working since the second half of 1990 and left officially in 1993. The four newly arrived gendarmes had an office in the buildings of the CRCD.

Officially, the four French instructors were to carry out three types of activities: training their gendarmes colleagues in the techniques of judicial police work and professional ethics, carrying out investigations on terrorist attacks, as well as the computerisation of the central database.

3.1.1. Training in techniques and professional ethics of Criminal Investigation

According to reports probably written by the French instructors, various courses were offered, like the professional ethics of the gendarme, observations and findings, hearings, arrests and questioning, the right to use arms, etc. Written procedure manuals were produced and training in criminal procedures was given to Rwandan prosecution officers.

3.1.2. Conduct of investigation

The French instructors did not confine themselves to instruction of their Rwandan colleagues. They replaced them by taking the dominant share in the various criminal investigations: criminal acts, attacks using anti-personnel mines or grenades, murders and massacres. This was to such an extent that informed observers like General Rwarakabije, former G3 at the gendarmerie headquarters, or Senator Augustin Iyamuremye, who was at the time head of the Intelligence service in The Prime Minister’s Office between June 1992 and April 1994, told the Commission that the French instructors were in fact directing the CRCD.

According to a gendarme who was trained and worked closely with them, the French gendarmes made an active and systematic collection of information. They very often went in the field and set up significant networks of informers in various Rwandan circles. As they did not have a family or housing equipped for cooking, these gendarmes would often get themselves invited to dine with Rwandan families, even relatively modest ones, but in general well placed in various networks: government officials, journalists, soldiers etc.... Thus, during the third wave of massacres of the Bagogwe in the prefecture of Gisenyi, between the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993, they had gone in the field to carry out investigations. In general, in the event of attacks, they quickly got to the scene.

An incident involving the French instructors was widely talked about in February 1993 and could have cost a Rwandan his life. French soldiers had their photograph taken, manning artillery pieces in the bush. The photographs seemed to show that they were activating mortars. These soldiers gave the negative to "Photolab" studio in Kigali to develop them. A few days later, the newspaper "Le Flambeau", which constantly criticised the regime, published the photographs stressing that they were proof of direct participation of French soldiers in the fighting. A few days later, a Rwandan lieutenant from the CRCD came looking for the people who worked at the "Photolab" in order to take them for questioning, but not before inquiring about their ethnic origin. Thus, Japhet Rudasingwa and Anne Marie Byukusenge were taken along to the CRCD.

After questioning Byukusenge for 30 minutes, it was Rudasingwa’s turn to enter the office of major Colliere. The major asked him whether he could speak French and he answered in the affirmative. After checking the ethnic origin indicated on the identity card, Colliere took him by the throat and shook him violently, took out his gun and hit him on the temple, ordering him to say the truth because, he said, it was a serious issue involving the president of the Republic and France. Rudasingwa swore by all the gods that he did not have anything to do with the publication of the photographs. He was taken to the cells of the nearby gendarmerie station in Muhima, where he spent a day and a night. His fellow prisoners, after hearing the reasons for his arrest told him that he was among those who were going to be taken away at dawn, without further specific explanation.

Among his fellow prisoners, there was a young man called Rasta who had lived in Burundi. Very early in the morning, Rasta was taken away by the gendarmes. The fellow prisoners of Rudasingwa then told him that he had better make his plight known to the opposition parties, or else he would leave like Rasta without any hope of return. During the morning, a representative of the international Red Cross, alerted by his friends outside, came personally to check on what had happened to him. In the following days, opposition newspapers wrote about the matter and the intervention of the Red Cross. Rudasingwa was released soon thereafter and he stressed that he owed his life to the intervention of the Red Cross.

Within the same context, major Colliere went to the offices of "Le Flambeau" newspaper with four other French soldiers, heavily armed. The journalists, who, for security reasons, always worked with the main door locked, did not let them in at once. They first called the RPF members of the Neutral Military Observer Group of the Organisation of African Unity who were in town. Once inside the office, major Colliere began to threaten the editor of the newspaper, Adrien Rangira, but the officers of the RPF arrived soon and the French soldiers had to withdraw.

With regard to the investigations of terrorist attacks, according to the former head of the intelligence service in The Prime Minister’s Office, Senator Augustin Iyamuremye, the French gendarmes of the CRCD systematically sought to put the blame on the RPF. They wrote a report analyzing the various acts of terrorism perpetrated between February 1991 and May 1993. Of the 53 cases recorded and analysed, only two indicated that “the suspected people were Tutsis living outside the country.” Nevertheless, this led the writers of the report to conclude that "evidence points categorically at the RPF as the sponsor of these attacks.”

On 14th September 1992, under the aegis of the Prime Minister, it was decided that an ad hoc committee formed by the National Security Council be set up. This committee included the head of the intelligence service in the Prime Minister’s Office, Augustin Iyamuremye, the Prosecutor General at the Kigali Court of Appeal, Mr. Alphonse Marie Nkubito, as well as Major Venant Hategekimana from the Directorate of External Security at the Ministry of Defence. At the end of its work concerning the terrorist attacks, the Committee arrived at a conclusion different from that of the French. Referring to the report of the French gendarmes at the CRCD, it concluded that its investigations had not been able to identify with certainty the perpetrators of the attacks and their motives.

When the intelligence services in the Prime Minister’s Office called upon the CRCD for identification of the traces of explosives, grenades or mines, the French gendarmes put hindrances to this request for collaboration, treating those who made it as partisans of the RPF. Moreover, when the French of the CRCD arrived first on the scene of attacks, they removed all the signs of evidence. On the other hand, in cases where the intelligence service in the Prime Minister’s Office had evidence indicating that an act had been carried out by government security forces, the French gendarmes preferred to accuse the RPF.

Senator Iyamuremye reported before the Commission of a case in the prefecture of Gikongoro, where people called upon his services in connection with gendarmes who had given mines to peasants in order to trap Minister Nzamurambaho, the head of the opposition party, PSD. Agents in his service went to Gikongoro, and, thanks to their informers, succeeded in defusing the mines in question. They brought them back to Kigali, and took them to the CRCD for identification. The French gendarmes never made a reply to their request. The peasant who had revealed the plot was imprisoned in Butare. The gendarme accused of being the instigator took him out of prison and made him disappear.

A gendarme who worked with the French instructors confirmed the above incident. He reported that at a checkpoint on the road from the prefecture of Byumba, a soldier, native of Gisenyi and cousin to one of the big personalities in the regime, was arrested with ten antipersonnel mines in his possession. He was coming from the war front and was on leave, going to Kigali. The gendarmes arrested him and took him to CRCD. His arrival at the CRCD offices caused some commotion and the gendarmes rushed to the office where he was to see Major Colliere, who soon arrived and sent them all away, chiding them. After that, he was locked up in conversation with the soldier in question, obviously making it a point to stop the other gendarmes from dealing with the matter.

3.1.3. The computerisation of the central database

Various data banks of the CRCD existed in the form of hardbound cards. In his letter to the Prime Minister on 27th June 1992, the Minister for Defence, James Gasana, announced the setting up of the research unit, stating that computerisation of the CRCD was among the tasks of the French instructors.

As soon as this unit was created, the French gendarmes computerised the various files of the CRCD. The files created included a file on all people who had ever been arrested and questioned by any gendarmerie unit in the country. Another file was on all wanted people and those to be put under surveillance (PRAS), and another for stolen property as well as one on informers. They also created other data files: people who had ever been prosecuted for narcotics offences, stolen vehicles, arms and ammunition hidden or stolen by deserters. The French gendarmes proposed that a radio station and a direct telephone line be installed near the computers so that the gendarmes could consult any file by radio or telephone and receive a response in good time. They also proposed a 24-hour service to receive and respond to requests at any time.

3.1.4. Was the computerisation of the central database used for making lists of the people to be killed?

The strategic importance attached to computerising the files of the CRCD, particularly the file of wanted people and those to be put under surveillance (PRAS), can be seen through the following exchange of letters.

In an undated note to the chief of staff of the national gendarmerie, Colonel Augustin Ndidiliyimana, Lieutenant Colonel Michel Robardey wrote:
`
“I have the honour to bring to your attention the project to computerise the files of wanted people and those to be put under surveillance (PRAS.) It was developed by the military assistance and instruction unit at the CRCD, in accordance with your directives transmitted by note in reference. This computer file is from now on operational and the personnel likely to use it have been trained. It will now be possible to gain time by quick access to information without having to go laboriously through a filing system of carton cards whose usefulness is not always assured. It allows direct and operational radio exchanges with all the units in the field so that queries receive an immediate answer. All it needs to be put into operation is your approval.”

To this note, Colonel Ndidiliyimana replied by letter on 28th October 1992 with the title “Computerisation of the file of wanted people”. The letter continued:

“With reference to the letter of 14th October 1992 of Lt-Col. Robardey informing me that the Computer file is operational and awaiting my approval to start using it, I hereby give my assent. 2/I ask nevertheless that the personnel of the judicial police and detachments exploit this tool to the maximum.”


TThe time before April 1994 was characterised by systematic suspicion of Tutsis and the opposition, ethnic massacres and political killings. This led, during the first days of the genocide, to the use of pre-established hit lists of political opponents and prominent Tutsis and their families. There is reason to wonder whether the computerised lists at the CRCD were not put to such use. General Jean Varret, head of the military co-operation mission from October 1990 to April 1993, provided the beginning of an answer. It should be recalled that this mission was under the supervision of the Ministry of Co-operation which was in charge of technical military assistants (ATM) and personnel of the military technical assistance teams (DAMI). It is General Varret, therefore, who had initiated DAMI-PJ in the CRCD.

He explained to the parliamentary Inquiry that after the offensive of February 1993, he had heard rumours according to which the DAMI-Panda had exceeded its training mission. General Varret stated that at a meeting in Kigali, he had reminded the DAMI that he was “determined to take disciplinary action against any acts that exceeded the strict definition of the mission”. Soon after, his minister, having bean cheated by other people, “had informed him that his instructions had been erroneous and that he had been relieved of the command of the DAMI.”

With regard to the actions of the French instructors in the CRCD, it is worthwhile to quote an extract of the exchange between General Varret and the MP Bernard Cazeneuve during his hearing before the Parliamentary Inquiry.

Extract from the hearing of General Varret before MIP


General Jean Varret recalled that (…) after various killings, the gendarmerie, with the support of the ambassador, had asked for the training of judicial police officers (OPJ), in order to be able to carry out effectively investigations within the country. He specified that he had sent only two gendarmes because he had realised that these investigations were used to track down Tutsis, those Colonel Rwagafirita [the predecessor of Ndindiliyimana at the post of chief of staff of the gendarmerie] called “the fifth column”. This training activity thus failed.

Mr. Bernard Cazeneuve wondered whether it was to be understood that the wish of the Rwanda government to train judicial police officers was in fact motivated by the desire to put Tutsis on file.

General Jean Varret confirmed that it was actually what he thought, and that it made him slow down co-operation with the Rwandan gendarmerie, which was kept at a superficial level.



The statements of General Varret are not exactly true on two points: first, DAMI-PJ did not have 2 French gendarmes but 4, without counting Lieutenant colonel Robardey. Secondly, collaboration between DAMI-PJ and the CRCD was not superficial, and the computerisation of the database went on well. As General Varret had already been sidelined with regard to instructions to be given to the DAMI, perhaps the head of the assistance mission and military attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Galinié, and Lieutenant-Colonel Robardey, had decided that it was not good to give him an update on the issue.

The interest the chief of staff, Ndindiriyimana, had for the computerisation of the file of wanted people and those to be put under surveillance must be considered in the light of his lack of interest in the file of people with a criminal record. If account is taken of the feeling expressed by General Varret regarding the purpose of this project, one must wonder whether this project controlled by the French gendarmes did not contribute to the production of lists of people to be killed, which constituted one of the main factors in preparing the genocide. The possibility that the CRCD file was used for compiling those lists cannot be excluded. This file, fed with information from all the units of the gendarmerie, involved tens of thousands of operatives whose organisation was conceived to build a central database. Its computerisation was of great operational importance. The combination of these two factors could not be found in other Rwandan institutions at that time.

On the other hand, what was certain was the advantage that the presence of the French gendarmes within CRCD offered to the French side in gathering information. The two privileged witnesses referred to above agree that these gendarmes were very well informed. A Rwandan gendarme who worked with them explained to the Commission that these French gendarmes wrote daily reports that were sent outside of CRCD. The former head of intelligence services in the Prime Minister’s Office corroborated this information, which had been reported to him by a gendarme informer.

The existence of this facility makes it possible to conclude in a convincing way that between June 1992 and the end of 1993; French authorities were at least well informed on what was happening in the country. They must also have been especially well informed on ethnic massacres orchestrated by government agents, such as those at the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993 in the north of the country, the terrorist attacks and the political assassinations. Instead of using the information collected by the instructors of DAMI-PJ to restrain the criminal actions of the Rwandan regime, the French used it to protect the regime and propagate misinformation. Finally, the French gendarmes contributed willingly to the production of a computerised list of political and ethnic suspects who would be massacred during the genocide.

4. Acts of violence on roadblocks

With the outbreak of war on 1st October 1990, Rwanda government declared a state of siege and took several measures restricting the exercise of public freedoms. Some of these measures were very repressive while others could be seen as being security measures. On the main road axes leading to the capital and in the main towns of prefectures, roadblocks were set up with the aim of seeking out possible infiltrators or accomplices of the RPF. The Commission collected a number of testimonies showing the humiliation and violence undergone by Tutsis at these roadblocks, sometimes committed directly by the French, more often by Rwandans in full view or knowledge of the French. Some people arrested at roadblocks manned by the French were reported missing; others were taken to military camps and killed. The alleged acts were mainly committed during the period 1990-1993.

4.1. Ethnic segregation and arbitrary arrests

Dr. Jean-Hervé Bradol, former head of programmes at Médecins sans Frontières – France (Doctors without Borders) stated before MIP that he had been “particularly shocked by French soldiers taking up police functions in the country, especially at road checkpoints at the northern exit of Kigali ". He saw these soldiers “either carrying out checks themselves, or observing from their sentry post their Rwandan colleagues doing it".

Major General Paul Rwarakabije reported that the French manned a roadblock at the entry to the gendarmerie camp at Mount Jali. The camp served as a barracks for gendarmes trained by the French. At this roadblock, Tutsis could not pass without being insulted or molested:

“In 1993, the French soldiers had a position at Mount Jali in the gendarmerie camp for the Mobile Intervention Group, which they trained in road security techniques. I remember holding in my hands a report by the camp commander on the screening and arrests carried out at this roadblock by French soldiers. It was in 1993, at the time of the capture of Ruhengeri. The report pointed out that if someone was a Hutu, they let him pass, and when it was a Tutsi, they kept him, abused and insulted him in such humiliating terms: “you stupid Tutsi, cockroach!'”, etc. Tutsis underwent very tight questioning there. I even think that the Rwandan gendarmes sometimes beat them up.”

On several occasions, MP Elisé Bisengimana saw the French checking identity cards on roadblocks and retaining Tutsis for questioning: “What was visible is that when one was Hutu, they let him pass without a problem, and if he was Tutsi, he was retained at the spot and had to give further explanations”. Yvonne Mutimura supported this, saying that when she was passing the roadblock at Shyorongi with her sister they were arrested by French soldiers who made ethnic, aggressive and insulting remarks: They told us: “Show us your papers”. One of us asked: “But why are you checking us? This is none of your business; it is a Rwandan matter and no concern of the French.” They answered: “Ladies, we are sorry, but we must check you to see who the enemy is”. Again, one of us asked them: “When you see our cards, how do you tell who the enemy is?” They said: “We know very well that Tutsis are the enemies.”

Other witnesses added that people belonging to the Hutu ethnic group who looked like Tutsis could not easily cross the roadblocks manned by French soldiers. Such was the case of Ambassador Amri Sued Ismaïl, at that time Director General in charge of State Protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who witnessed on several occasions the physical and verbal assault meted out to Tutsis by French soldiers who manned the roadblocks between Kigali and Ruhengeri:

"I went to Ruhengeri almost every week with my wife. More than once, I was stopped by French soldiers at the roadblock in Shyorongi. When they saw my wife, one of them asked his colleague who had taken her identity card: “Is she a Hutu or a Tutsi?” Before even looking at her identity card, the other answered: "It is obvious that she is a Tutsi!”
They did this so often that I cannot tell you exactly the number of times that I lived through it. I also witnessed a scene where they had made people sit on the ground at a roadblock they controlled in Nyirangarama. They were insulting them enthusiastically".

Such misfortunes did not spare expatriates who transported Tutsis in their vehicles. Michel Campion testified thus:

“One day, I gave a ride to a Tutsi student. On arriving at the bridge over the Nyabarongo River, he was checked by a French soldier who asked him for his identity card. When the soldier discovered that he was Tutsi, he told him: “Get out of the car and go sit with your brothers over there at the edge of the road.” There were approximately twelve boys and girls, apparently Tutsis, who had been detained by the French soldiers. I stepped in and told these soldiers: "Listen, really I do not understand your position; it is not for you to do that. The Rwandan gendarmes should carry out these checks. Where do you believe yourselves to be? Is this a French overseas territory?” I said: "You are in an independent state and you come to screen citizens in their own country?” I added: “I will not move from here, and this boy will not leave this vehicle. I asked them to call the officer in charge. They brought a second lieutenant who, after listening to my protest told me that was not my business. I answered him that it was my business because I had a passenger they wanted to get out of my car. In the end, the second lieutenant told me: "Liisten, go on, just leave…!”

At some roadblocks, the French were alone, while at others, they worked with Rwandan gendarmes or soldiers. The crossing of the roadblocks theoretically required not only a valid identity card, but also a movement permit from the burgomaster of the commune of origin. Legally, this permit was supposed to be delivered to any Rwandan citizen, without ethnic distinction. In fact, some burgomasters refused to deliver this document to Tutsis, which resulted in confining them to their homes, without the possibility of exercising their right to travel.

The examination of the official reports of arrests after October 1990 shows that people were arrested without charge or evidence to support the alleged charges. As an example, of the 80 people arrested and held at the brigade of Nyamirambo between the 1st and the 18th of October 1990, 31 were held on identity card issues, 20 for complicity with the enemy with the charge: “Denounced by the public”; 13 did not have any charges. One practically found the same reasons in most files presented by the brigades of Gikondo and Nyarugenge.

At the entry to Kigali, the main roadblocks manned by the French were placed at Shyorongi, Giticyinyoni, Nyabarongo Bridge, Nyabugogo, Kabuye, Karuruma, Nyacyonga, Kabuga, Remera and Kanombe. If the geographical location of each one of these places is considered, it can be seen that the roadblocks at Shyorongi and Giticyinyoni were for controlling the people who came from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. That on the Nyabarongo Bridge controlled people coming from Cyangugu, Gikongoro, Butare, Gitarama and Kibuye; those at Nyacyonga, Nyabugogo, Kabuye and Karuruma controlled people coming from Byumba; those of Kabuga and Remera (Giporoso) aimed at controlling the people coming from Umutara and Kibungo.

All the entry points to the capital were therefore closely supervised. Within Kigali City, witnesses said that the French manned roadblocks in Kiyovu (residential area), Kanombe airport and Gikondo in the direction of Rebero, where meetings of MRND executives and those close to the regime were frequently held. French soldiers kept the roadblock to ensure the security of these dignitaries.

One Setiba, a former leader of the Interahamwe in the prefecture of Kigali rural, confirmed to the Commission that some Tutsis, who were screened and arrested at the roadblocks manned jointly by French and Rwandan soldiers and militia, were taken to an unknown destination. The witness was involved in taking away some people from the roadblock in Shyorongi. He lived in this sector and as a head of the local militia; he was frequently at this roadblock. He stated that the French were very active in the screening of civilians who would later be taken to an unknown destination: “The French manned a roadblock located at Shyorongi, in Kanyinya sector. They asked for identity cards from all passengers. Those who were recognised as Tutsis were taken to tents for questioning. Afterwards, they were taken to Kigali and onwards to a destination I do not know”

Cyprien Katarega, an ex-militiaman imprisoned for genocide at the central prison in Kigali, gave an identical account in connection with what occurred at the roadblock in Shyorongi at the same period:

"In 1992, I gave a lift to two people, who were known to my boss. On arrival at Shyorongi in Kanyinya sector, there was a roadblock manned by four Rwandan gendarmes and two French soldiers. They stopped us and asked for our identity cards. They said they suspected my two passengers of being accomplices of the RPF (Inkotanyi). They chided me for having taken them in my vehicle. A Rwandan gendarme and a French soldier led us to the communal office in Shyorongi and put us in the detention room. Towards 1500 hrs, they released me. When I arrived at Rushashi at my place of work, I reported the incident to my head. He went at once to the commune of Shyorongi to see what had happened to them. The two people had disappeared and those who had arrested them were not willing to tell him where they had been taken ".

Charles Bugirimfura, former Para-commando in Kanombe from 1982 to 1994 reintegrated in the Rwandan Defence Forces until his demobilisation in 2002, testified before the Commission that he knew of people arrested on other roadblocks where there were French soldiers. Bugirimfura worked with the French at the roadblocks in his capacity as a soldier:

“When the Tutsis we detained at the roadblocks reached a significant number, the French and Rwandan soldiers made them climb into military vehicles and took them to the regional stadium in Nyamirambo. I took part in this kind of operation in October and November 1990. I do not know what happened to those people because, after handing them over, I immediately went back to the roadblocks for another load. One day, we arrested Tutsi girls. The French and Rwandan soldiers decided to take them away to their camp at Kanombe. I did not get to know what happened to these girls afterwards.”

During the screening carried out at roadblocks, even when they presented all the required papers, Tutsis had difficulty in crossing the roadblocks without getting arrested, insulted or beaten up. This must be what made the special correspondent of Le Monde newspaper note that there seemed to be “an offence of identity” whereby people who carried an identity card with the mention Tutsi were more suspect than those whose identity was Hutu or Twa.

4.2. Disappearance of arrested people

Various testimonies reported that the French soldiers had an important role in checking identity cards at roadblocks, an activity often accompanied by acts of violence and even of disappearances. Because of the difficulty in proving cases of disappearance, the Commission retained only testimonies of witnesses who were relatives, friends or who had any other kind of relationship that put them in a position to say that after screening and detention at the roadblocks, such and such a person was never seen again by family, close relatives, friends and acquaintances.

In the Rwandan context with strong social bonds, it would be almost impossible for people to disappear without trace for the rest of their life. It is, therefore, more likely that the people who were arrested at roadblocks and were never seen again by their families can be considered as having disappeared. Testimonies collected show various cases of disappearance in the years 1990-1993.

Vital Mucanda claims to have lost his close relatives on two roadblocks manned by French soldiers, one in Shyorongi, the other near Rulindo at a place called “Ku Bashinwa” [Chinese Place] on the Kigali-Ruhengeri road:

“The French had a roadblock at Kanyinya (Shyorongi), another in Rulindo (Chinese Place). When they found a Tutsi, they detained him/her. A good example is that of my two cousins Ngangure Gaëtan and Uwibambe Dative, and my aunt Mukasine Immaculée. Together, we were on our way from Bugesera, to visit relatives in the North. Mukasine and Uwibambe were arrested and held by the French at Kanyinya, while Ngangure was arrested and held in Rulindo, ‘Ku Bashinwa’ (Chinese Place). We never saw them again. I survived those French soldiers only because I had a card showing I was a member of the Interahamwe.”

Similar testimonies exist for other roadblocks too. Emmanuel Nshogozabahizi, a former member of the PSD party, who later joined the Interahamwe militia in 1993, told the Commission that he lost his first cousin, a Tutsi, who had been arrested at a roadblock manned by the French in Mukamira on the Ruhengeri-Gisenyi road:

“In 1992, I was in a minibus on the way from Kigali with my cousin Mudenge Jean-Baptiste who worked with the Brewery at Kicukiro. On arriving at Mukamira, towards 19h00, the French stopped the minibus and asked us for our identity cards. Noting that my cousin was Tutsi, they made him get off and detained him. I have not seen him ever since. Yet I had immediately started searching for him, and my membership to the Interahamwe enabled me to go anywhere, which means that if he had stayed alive, I would certainly have found him. I have never known his fate”

The active participation of the French in the screening of Tutsis and the supposed accomplices of the RPF at the roadblocks, followed by disappearances, is also underlined by the former head of intelligence services in the Prime Minister’s Office, Senator Augustin Iyamuremye. He stated before the Commission: “At the roadblocks, the people who were caught without their identity cards and were described as Inkotanyi, disappeared. The French and Rwandan soldiers collaborated in this kind of operation. At Giticyinyoni, they worked together. I do not think they let go anybody they arrested under the charge of being an Inkotanyi.”



4.3. Physical intimidations and violence

In addition to screening, detention and transportation of detainees to known or unknown destinations, several testimonies revealed that at the roadblocks there were often acts of intimidation, harassment, physical violence, ill treatment and torture of civilians, mainly Tutsis.

Bernard Munyaneza, a former soldier of the FAR from1992 to 1994 and of RDF [ Rwandan Defence Forces] from 1994 to 2002, reported to the Commission having seen French soldiers checking identity cards and committing acts of violence against Tutsis at two roadblocks, one in Kisenga, near Rushaki (ex-prefecture of Byumba), the other in Shyorongi. “The French carried out unworthy acts. I knew an old lady who lived in Rulindo. In February 1993, she came across French soldiers. When they discovered that she was Tutsi, they kicked her so much so that she no longer could walk.”

Emmanuel Nkuliyingoma worked in Gisenyi after being transferred from Kigali. In 1992, he was detained and underwent ill treatment by French and Rwandan soldiers for three days at the Shyorongi roadblock. He also saw a Tutsi girl, named Brigitte Umulisa, who underwent the same treatment at the same roadblock:

“French soldiers and Rwandan gendarmes asked us for our identity cards. They noticed that I had two residence permits, one for Kigali and another for Gisenyi. They held me, saying that this was proof that I was an Inyenzi. They started to torture me. First, they placed beer bottle tops on the ground and forced me to lie down on them, on my belly, and to put my two elbows on the bottle tops. They then gave me blows. Afterwards, they made me get up and ordered us (me and Brigitte) to dig a large hole. When we finished, they forced us to lie down and put our arms in the hole. They refilled the hole to our elbows. We spent three nights there in that position, and they beat us as often and as hard as they pleased.”

Marcel Karangwa, a resident of Rugarika in Kamonyi District, was a victim of assault at the Nyabarongo roadblock, and reported it as follows:

“On October 15, 1990, I went to Kigali. On arriving at the Nyabarongo roadblock, I found French and Zaïrian soldiers who were stopping vehicles. After checking my identity card and discovering that I was Tutsi, the French made me get off the vehicle with my luggage. They gave me kicks all over my body, but the blow that hurt me the most was that which they gave me in the lower belly. I was also wounded at the knee. Then, they subjected me to a long interrogation requiring to know the reasons for my journey to Kigali. They prevented me from continuing and forced me to go back to Gitarama. They kept all my belongings, including my identity papers. There were three Frenchmen and two Zaïrians.”

Twayibu Nsekanabo, an ex-Interahamwe militiaman imprisoned in Gisenyi for genocide, reported a scene of violence at the roadblock in Shyorongi:

“In 1993, I was in a minibus which was going to Kigali. In Shyorongi, the French stopped us and asked us for our identity papers. French and Rwandan soldiers were doing the checking together. A Rwandan gendarme found among us a young man who had an identity card marked Tutsi and showed it to the French. One of them took the young man to their tents on the lower side of the road. We then heard screams which made us think that he was undergoing violent beating. We left without him reappearing.”

4.4. Sexual assault and rape

Testimonies from various sources give a report of physical assault and rape undergone by Tutsi girls arrested at the roadblocks, in particular at those set up around the capital.

Emmanuel Nkuliyingoma stated that he was sexually abused by French soldiers at the Shyorongi roadblock. He was forced to have sexual intercourse with a girl they had just raped. Both had been arrested at the roadblock:

“The French stripped us. They then took along the girl in their tent. On her return, she was crying and told me that they had raped her in turns. The following day, they obliged her to lie down and ordered me to have sexual intercourse with her. Sometime later, they made me lie down in my turn and forced the girl to go on top of me.”

Herman Afrika, a former Interahamwe imprisoned in Kigali for genocide, explained that he was in Kigali in 1990 and saw French soldiers engaged in acts of physical assault and rape of girls detained at the roadblocks they controlled:

“During the war in 1990, the French were guarding Kanombe airport. These French soldiers used to beat up Tutsis whom Rwandans brought to them after rounding them up during searches for accomplices of the RPF. They took the pretty girls and raped them in their tents. The screening was primarily carried out at two roadblocks that they controlled in Kigali. One was in Remera, at a place called Giporoso and the other was at a place called Cumi Na Kabiri (12 Kilometres).”

Yvonne Mutimura testified to having seen French soldiers in a drunken state engaged in collective rape in public:

“The Nyacyonga roadblock in Kabuye was the most scandalous; sometimes French soldiers were more than ten, drinking beer. They were drunk all the time. And when they were drunk, they were engaged in raping […] there were girls who were raped by the French soldiers. I saw that in Kabuye, Kacyiru, (approximately 6 km from Kigali airport and next to Hotel Chez Lando, whose owner was once a Minister for Social Affairs […] One evening, on my way home from there with friends, we saw French soldiers raping girls on the road. The girls were screaming. The soldiers were in uniform and no one could do anything about it. The Rwandan soldiers could not be called upon to help because they were allies of the French”

Lucien Nibaseke also gave an account of rapes committed by the French in the following terms:

“The French had a place at Giheka cya Batsinda, near Kagugu on the outskirts of Kigali. They had built their tents in the wood belonging to my paternal uncle, Kagoyire Philibert. They gave money to the Interahamwe who brought them beautiful Tutsi girls by force, whom they raped. Among the girls raped like that, I can remember those from Mi’s household in Batsinda, who were stopped and raped on their return from Sunday mass at Kabuye. They were caught by Interahamwe in this forest, who delivered them to the French soldiers. The French took them to their tents and raped them. They came back in tears, and people who were around were mocking them.”

Jean de Dieu Tuyisenge, a former gendarme warrant officer in the FAR and ex intelligence agent of the Habyarimana regime testified to having seen French soldiers raping a girl called Julienne whom they had detained at the Giticyinyoni roadblock:

“The French detained her after discovering that she was Tutsi. I was there. They led her to a disused garage near the roadblock. Sometime after, they returned with her. She was weeping. Finally, I learnt from her friends that the French soldiers had raped her. She was then taken to the detention centre by a gendarmerie vehicle. I do not know what followed.”

Wellars Kayiranga told the Commission of a rape case committed by French soldiers on a young girl of 10 or 11 years:

“In 1992, the French had four roadblocks on the Kigali-Byumba road. One of them was in Karuruma near REDEMI next to the home of Rurindababisha John. The French raped there a very young girl whose father was Ruzindaza Jean-Baptiste. They raped her in turns until her legs could no longer return to their normal position. The young girl was a primary school pupil in fourth grade. Her father was head of a garage at the Kabuye sugar refinery.”

Justin Rutareka, a resident of Kinyinya, also gave an account of acts of rape by French soldiers:

“I remember seeing French soldiers setting up camp near the sugar factory in Kabuye on 25/01/1993. These soldiers raped the girls inside the tents where they lived. I personally know three girls who were victims of these acts: Mukak, Muka and Mukam. I still remember that Mukak was even, one day violently beaten up by a French soldier. I learned that the reason for this violence was the fact that her rapist had contracted a sexually transmitted disease. That day, I met her in the trading centre weeping and she told me what had happened to her.”

Bela Mu, another resident of Kinyinya, was sexually assaulted by French soldiers stationed at Nyacyonga in 1993. When she was giving her testimony to the Commission, her memories seemed to put her in a state of both anger and anguish:

"I lived near a place where the French had set up their tents. One of them had completely taken me as his wife against my will. He did to me as he pleased. He raped me whenever he wanted. Sometimes he penetrated me; sometimes he subjected me to acts of fellatio or sodomy. Sometimes he took me to his comrades in their tents where they kept me for days without letting me go out. Whoever wanted forced me to sleep with him. They should come and see the state they put me in. They did so much evil to me. I will never forget that. Could you imagine forced fellatio? It was the first time that I went through that and I still get shivers when I think of it. You have not done well to remind me of it.”

During her testimony, Bela Mu told the Commission that the French raped other girls and that they worked with Interahamwe who brought the girls to them:

“I am not the only one who was raped by French soldiers at that time. There were others who suffered the same fate as me, but many are now dead. I remember one of them who was my neighbour. She was called Mukak. She had become like their wife. The French used to send an Interahamwe by the name of Muriro to look for girls for them. Muriro brought the girls by force. He was a very fearsome Interahamwe and he killed many people during the genocide. He is today in prison.”

She added that the French took stimulants to make the act last: “In the evening, a little before forcing me to have sexual intercourse, these French swallowed products which transformed them enormously. They became very energetic, as if doped and hardly ever reached orgasm. Once, they contaminated me with a disease and gave me drugs. When I took them, I became almost blind; It is only recently that I recovered the will to go on living.”

The rape committed by French soldiers at the same place and the same time are recounted by another witness, Béa Muk who reported them as follows:

"In 1993, the French soldiers had set up their tents in the wood of my brother-in-law, Kagoyire Philbert. They caught the girls in broad daylight and took them to their tents. I have friends who were raped in this way. One of them was called Mukak, the other was Ha, and finally Muka. Unfortunately, they were killed during the genocide, except Mukak who died a few years after the genocide. These French soldiers collaborated with Interahamwe such as Nsabimana and Simpunga; it is these two who brought girls to the soldiers, to be raped. The first one is in prison for genocide and the other one died.”
4.5. Participation and assistance in the killings

The Commission sought to know some more about some people arrested on the roadblocks and some who were reported missing. It appears that these people were led to various places: in military camps of Kanombe, Kigali, Gako, Bigogwe, Mukamira and Gabiro; others still were taken to the various gendarmerie brigade posts for interrogation followed by imprisonment; others were brought in the cellars of the criminology department directed by the French or to the central Intelligence Service based at the presidency of the Republic. According to information provided by the senator, Augustin Iyamuremye, and by Jean de Dieu Tuyisenge, they were tortured there under the orders of Captain Simbikangwa Pascal. At these various places of detention, the arrested people often underwent interrogation under cruel and degrading conditions, sometimes followed by killings committed by Rwandans within sight of the French. The French were also directly involved in killings of civilians.
4.5.1 In military camps and other places in Kigali

In most of the military camps where acts of violence were committed, the French advisers and instructors were present supervising and training Rwandan soldiers within the framework of military co-operation. In 1993, in the gendarmerie camp at Jali, French instructors who trained the anti-riot unit of the gendarmerie took part in night operations of hunting for Tutsis and, according to witnesses, killed people caught in these raids, accusing them of being accomplices of RPF. François Nsengayire, former gendarme, having lived in this military camp, attests to having been eyewitness of this type of acts committed by the French:

"I lived with the French at Jali from 1993 until our escape from Rwanda in July 1994. Among the French was an adjutant called Philippe and another regimental sergeant major called Roy. They were our instructors. After the RPF attack on Ruhengeri in February 1993, a French unit of the 8th RPIMA arrived in Rwanda as reinforcement and had its positions near the primary school of Jali. I was assigned to them as their interpreter. Their mission was to teach the Rwandan soldiers the techniques of fighting infiltration and the methods of identification and pointing out of unwanted people. The object of this training was due to the fact that RPF, which was not far from Kigali, had to be identified and the people who entered town located so as to identify possible infiltrators into the capital. The practical part of this training was done on the inhabitants of Jali and Rubingo who were accustomed to going to the market of Kigali at dawn to sell their goods. The French arrested these people and sorted out Tutsis, following the instructions given to them by colonel Ndindiriyimana according to which, to recognise Tutsis, it was necessary to refer to their size, which is in general slim. The Frenchman who directed this unit was a black who was called Bob, a borrowed name because the French never revealed their true names to us. They had set up a roadblock near the camp. They checked all the passers-by. They held those who were identified in a makeshift shelter. After that, they executed them and transported the corpses towards a place I do not know."

François Nsengayire also attests to having been witness to killing by the French of a group of twelve Tutsis, to avenge three of their colleagues who died in the engagements against RPA in February 1993. Ten of them were taken out from among the displaced persons who were in Mbogo, while two others were caught near Jali:

“When RPA took ETO Tumba and Rulindo, we left in reinforcement with the French. We were with a unit of field artillery of the 8th RPIMA who used canons of 105 mm and 122 mm. These were positioned in Shyorongi at a place called Kanyinya, and I was with the French in an advance party and we were in the eucalyptus woods at Mbogo near the home of Kimaranzara. We fired on the ETO Tumba to dislodge RPA. There was violent exchange of fire. Three French soldiers were mortally wounded. Two others were seriously wounded. Their comrades were very angry. On arrival in Mbogo trading centre, they found war displaced people who had taken shelter in a school. They entered and took ten Tutsis. They brought them to Jali. On arrival there, near the football field, they took two other Tutsis and put them with the other group. They entered the camp and discussed with a Rwandan captain named Bizumuremyi who was very cruel. They told him that they had lost three of their comrades; they had also caught some of the Inkotanyi who had infiltrated among war displaced people. Bizumuremyi and the French took these people to their headquarters and shot them. I do not know exactly where they put the corpses, but I believe that they went to bury them in the military camp at Kanombe. Out of curiosity, I asked them where they had taken the bodies and they replied that it was none of my business ".

The Commission endeavoured to check the consistency of this testimony but was not able to find witnesses confirming or nullifying the statements of Nsengayire François.

Murders of Tutsi civilians were also reported in the military camp of Kanombe. They were committed by Rwandan soldiers in the presence of French instructors who were providing training to the various units in this big barracks.

Vianney Mudahunga, a former Para commando from 1987 to 1994 and member of CRAP, testified that "during the time from 1991 to 1992, many civilians suspected of being Inkotanyi were taken to the Kanombe Camp by soldiers. They were locked up in the dungeon of the camp and subjected to interrogation. They underwent a lot of maltreatment; some were killed, others disappeare ".

Charles Bugirimfura, a former soldier in Kanombe, also testified about people who were killed and buried in a common grave in Kanombe camp after having been arrested at roadblocks, particularly that of Nyacyonga, where he worked with the French: “The Rwandan soldiers, in complicity with the French, suspected any Tutsi to provide information or funds to RPF. Between 1991 and 1993, the French were involved in large-scale detention of Tutsis. Among those who were detained, some were killed. Some were buried in a mass grave inside the military camp at Kanombe ".

The witness gave the names of two victims; one was killed directly by the French at Kanombe and the other was killed while they watched, after his arrest in his residence:

“I remember a Rwandan ex-captain named Karanganwa, native of Runyinya, who had been wrongfully dismissed from the army. He was arrested at a roadblock near the airport, and then killed at the military camp of Kanombe, by the French with the help of a Rwandan adjutant called Gasutamo. I also know a certain Munyakayanza who was arrested at his place in the Kanombe area. He was also brought to our military camp and killed by Rwandan Para commandos, in the presence of the French without them doing anything. He was buried in the same wood. In short, there were many people killed in this way; I cannot remember all the cases ".

A different witness, Tatien Sibomana, a former Para commando from 1976 to 1994, confirmed the murder of Munyakayanza by the people cited by his ex-comrade, Charles Bugirimfura. He added that he, too, remembered the murder of an agronomist whose name he could not remember, but who worked in the military camp of Kanombe as a civilian. In addition to the cases cited, Tatien Sibomana testified that between 1990 and 1994, many unidentified civilians who were killed in Kanombe camp at the place appointed as ‘the ammunition dump’ and that the French instructors who lived in this camp knew that these murders were committed by soldiers they trained. Charles Bugirimfura specified that these killings were committed by Para commandos of the CRAP unit, created, supervised and trained by the French. Samuel Kayombya, a former member of the CRAP, confirmed these facts before the Commission by testifying that between 1991 and 1993, civilians were brought to the Kanombe camp, killed and buried in the wood located in this camp.

These testimonies are essentially corroborated by investigations carried out by Amnesty International in 1991, by the international Commission of enquiry of 1993 and Rwandan human rights associations. Amnesty International indicated it had "information concerning the death of several former prisoners shortly after their release at the end of February 1991." It specified that "two people who had been arrested in the aftermath of the October 1990 attack and then released on February 27th, 1991, had been re-arrested by members of the national gendarmerie at Kanombe Military Camp, shortly after their release. One was Munyakazi Jean, a driver at the military camp at Kanombe (…) and Niyonzima Apollinaire, an agronomist. These two people were killed thereafter by those who had arrested them and buried clandestinely in the firing range of Kanombe military camp ".

These killings and murders continued for the period 1992-1993. Indeed, the international Commission of Inquiry noted in January 1993 that: "Some people had been arrested by soldiers and at least a score of them were killed. It is known from a sure source that corpses were dumped by soldiers at the Kigali General Hospital. [… ] Eight bodies were buried in a mass grave on Saturday February 13th, 1993, and eleven others on Monday February 15th, 1993, at the cemetery of Nyamirambo in Kigali. Other bodies were buried in the military camps of Kigali".

In February of the same year, five major Rwandan human rights associations denounced these killings of civilians by soldiers:

“Our Associations have learned that the so-called rebels are taken to Camp Kigali, tortured, then killed by the soldiers […] and thereafter dumped at the mortuary of the Kigali General Hospital before being buried by prisoners in mass graves in the cemetery of Nyamirambo. It is soldiers who dump them at the hospital and go away, without explaining the circumstances of their death ".
4.5.2. In the other prefectures

Cases of killing people arrested at roadblocks, in which the French were involved in one way or another, were not were not restricted to Kigali. They were reported also in the prefectures of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Byumba and Kigali rural, especially in places near military positions, or in military camps where French instructors lived.

Information from several sources gave the military camp in Byumba the reputation of being a death camp. According to the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (ICE) of 1993, a group of eighteen people was brought there by the burgomaster of Murambi, Jean-Baptiste Gatete, and none of them left the camp alive. Major Pierre Ngira who commanded the military zone of Byumba from 1983 to 1991 admitted to the ICE “that he personally ordered that these people be put in a hole which had been dug in the military camp for construction of public toilets ".

Various people confirmed that French soldiers controlled a roadblock at the entry of the Byumba military camp and that Tutsis arrested there were taken inside the camp where they were held, then killed. The Commission could not establish with certainty whether the French soldiers themselves carried out these killings or stood by while they were taking place.

Apollinaire Nsengiyumva, a former prosecutor in Byumba from 1990 to 1991, testified before the Commission that he had carried out arrests of Tutsis on the orders of the Byumba prefecture authorities and intelligence service, but was unaware of the lot reserved for them. The former prosecutor does not dismiss any assumption, including that of the killings, but justifies the uncertainty of his testimony by the fact that he was only one small link in a chain and, according to him, did not have any control on the final fate of the people that he arrested. A similar account was given by Jean-Marie Vianney Mugemana, the Minister of Interior Affairs at the time these events took place. However, he told the Commission he did not know anything about killings committed directly by the French in Byumba.

Other witnesses remember, however, what happened in Byumba, as Anaclet Butera, one of the prominent Tutsis, who was arrested in early October 1990 by prosecutor Nsengiyumva. He testified before the Commission that he spent nearly two months in detention under extremely hard conditions, and that throughout his detention, he saw soldiers coming to screen people on lists after which they took them to the military camp of Byumba where they killed them.

Jean Damascène Kaburame, ex-FAR from 1990-1994, claims to have seen French soldiers manning a roadblock in the centre of Ngarama trading centre:

“In 1990, I was a soldier in the 2nd battalion Muvumba. The French installed a roadblock in Ngarama trading centre. We controlled this roadblock with them. They checked the identity cards of all passengers. When they saw the name Tutsi, the person was put aside, and when the number of arrests became large, they were put on army trucks and taken, inter alia, to the Byumba military camp

This testimony is corroborated by that of Twagirayezu, another inhabitant of Byumba, who claims to have been a witness of checks and arrests carried out by French soldiers at a roadblock they had placed near the office of the prosecutor in Byumba, at the entry of the military camp, shortly after the attack and capture of the town by the RPF: "The French were stationed there with Rwandan soldiers. They asked us to produce our employment and identity cards. Tutsis were detained there, and then taken to the Byumba military camp. I do not know what happened to them, but I think that they were killed because their close relatives never saw them again ”.

Identity checks on the roadblocks followed by detention and killing, also took place in the military camp of Gako, Bugesera, in 1992, at a time when Tutsis in the area were victims of massacres. Jean-Claude Murejuru testified that he narrowly escaped death at a roadblock controlled by French soldiers. To earn a living, he used to sell milk, which made him frequent the communes of Kanzenze, Ngenda and Gashora, which formed the sub-district of Kanazi in Bugesera. On arrival near the Gako camp on the path where civilians usually passed, French soldiers who controlled the roadblock arrested him and handed him over to the Rwandan soldiers for the only reason that he was Tutsi. He would have been killed and was only saved by a Rwandan soldier who recognised him and organised his escape:

"A Rwandan soldier and a French soldier controlled the roadblock at Gako. The Rwandan was used as interpreter to the French. This latter asked me for my identity card. When he saw that I was Tutsi, he exclaimed `Tutsi'! Immediately, the Rwandan soldier asked me to show my card for participation in compulsory Community work ` Umuganda ', as well as a receipt showing my contribution in support of FAR. The French soldier read the documents. When he saw the mention "Umuganda", he misinterpreted it to mean "Umugande " and at once ordered that I be taken to the dungeon inside the military camp. I implored the Rwandan soldier to explain the difference between the two words to the French one because I was innocent, but he ignored me. Near the dungeon, I came across a Rwandan soldier named Alphonse Ngenzamaguru, who was a childhood friend. He approached me and I explained my problem to him. He told me that he was going to help me, but that I was to have patience. I was locked up in the dungeon. Many civilians had bee locked up there for a few days. They told me that each day; the soldiers came to take away those who were to be killed. Towards 1630 hrs, I was able escape the fate reserved for the others. [……. ] When I again saw Alphonse Ngenzamaguru at his place a few days later during his leave, he told me that I had been lucky because all my fellow prisoners were killed after my escape. I would like to stress that at this roadblock in Gako, it was the French soldiers who stopped and questioned civilians, and decided on their detention. Rwandan soldiers intervened only when the arrested person did not speak French. The French sorted people by looking at the faces initially, then their identity cards. They put them in Indian file and selected those to be detained on the basis of these criteria”

Another testimony threw some light on the degree of participation of the French in the crimes committed at the roadblocks. Immaculée Cattier, whose maiden name was Mpinganzima, had been imprisoned in Gisenyi at the outbreak of war in October 1990, and had just been released,. Having nowhere to go, she sought shelter with Canadian missionaries who proposed to accompany her to Kigali. On arrival at Ruhengeri, she was stopped at a roadblock manned by the French who delivered Tutsis to the Interahamwe militia:

"(…) some of the soldiers there were French and they also asked for identity cards from Rwandans. The cards indicated the ethnic identity of the holders. Tutsis were made to get out of the vehicles and the French soldiers handed them over to the militia who cut them with machetes and threw them in a ditch at the edge of the asphalted main road. [… ] I saw a Tutsi who had been made to leave a car a little further on from ours. After checking his identity card, a French soldier and a Rwandan officer delivered him to the militia who immediately began, in front of these cars, to strike him with their machetes and all kinds of weapons that they had, like Ntampongano (clubs), and threw him into the ditch afterwards. When I saw that, I looked in the drain and saw some bodies there lying still, without a sound ". (…)

5. Acts of violence away from the roadblocks

The testimonies collected by the Commission show that the roadblocks were not the only places where the French soldiers committed acts of violence. In their everyday life, civilians suffered physical and sexual assault from French soldiers, in public and in private, and these acts often targeted Tutsis because of their ethnic origin. Often, the French military hierarchy was informed and consistently acted to protect the soldiers involved. There are many instances illustrating these facts.
5.1. Ethnically based physical or verbal violence

Various acts of violence committed by French soldiers were reported to the Commission in various areas of the country. Silas Ndagijimana was a direct victim of a brutal assault committed by French soldiers, near Pfunda tea factory. This was during the persecution of the Bagogwe in Gaseke commune. The latter had taken refuge in the neighbouring commune of Kayove after the massacre against them in the aftermath of the attack on Ruhengeri by RPF in January 1991. The burgomaster sent them to the prefecture office in Gisenyi. On the road opposite the tea factory, they met Rwandan and French soldiers going to Ruhengeri to give support to FAR who were trying to take back the town from RPF. The Rwandans and the French made them get out of the vehicle and violently beat them. Silas Ndagijimana testified as follows:

“A young boy was ordered out of the vehicle by the French. A French soldier caught him by the arm and gave him a kick in the low belly. This blow caused gave him health problems that he never recovered from. He urinated blood and pus and later died. Another young person was struck on the head by a French soldier with the butt of a rifle. Since then, the victim has suffered from permanent mental disorder. He is sick for the rest of his life. As for me, a French soldier gave me three bayonet blows on the thigh. Here are the scars. ".

Again in Gisenyi, in the Kanama commune at a place called Mahoko, the witness Jean-Baptiste Nzitabakuze saw French soldiers present at the killing of a civilian by militia who were accusing him of being an Inkotanyi:

"I saw French soldiers at Kanama at the market of Mahoko. Hutu peasants brought a Tutsi civilian they had caught in Gishwati. The French asked what happened and got the explanation that that the peasants had caught a Tutsi suspect. They filmed the scene. Suddenly, somebody took a club and struck the person on the head. Another poured gasoline on the victim and set him on fire. He burnt to death in front of everyone. The French filmed the whole scene and went away. There were also Rwandan gendarmes present. It was the burgomaster of Kanama, named Marius, who came later to make arrangements for his burial ".

Gerard Ndabakenga, a former student at the national University of Rwanda, at Nyakinama campus, testified to acts of racism, ethnic segregation and violence committed by French soldiers during their stay on this campus:

"I saw the French at Nyakinama in 1992. As lectures had been suspended due to holidays and the war, we were only a few students staying in the campus halls of residence. The French were lodged in ‘Home D’ . We lived next to them and could see what they were doing, whether it was day or night. They trained the Interahamwe in the football field. When they were lined up in the corridor of their hall, we could see them. [… ] The French got along well with the war displaced people: the Bakiga from Byumba and Ruhengeri, who were regarded as the only pure Hutus, treating the others as Banyanduga They had taught the French to distinguish Hutu from Tutsi according to morphological criteria. [… ] A certain familiarity had been established between these ‘pure’ Hutus and the French soldiers, to the extent that sometimes the soldiers bought drinks for the students. Among the students, one who had a nose or teeth considered characteristic of Tutsis was not allowed to sit near them. The French said such a student was ‘an enemy of the country’, while the Hutu students would try to assure them that ‘he is not an enemy he is a true citizen’. [… ] Before the war, the students were all in an association called ``Assemblée Générale des Etudiants de l’Université du Rwanda’ (AGEUNR). However, between 1992 and1993, they split into two camps: the Bakiga and Hutus known as pure because they could be traced by history or relationship to the former Parmehutu party , and the remaining Hutus’ claim to this quality was disputable or doubtful. Those of the first group, financially supported by the prefecture authorities and the French, broke away from the other students. [… ] One evening, after receiving our monthly allowance, we went to have a good time at the campus canteen. Then, in a drunken state, two French soldiers arrived one of whom was a sergeant, with a FAR captain from Ruhengeri, the businessman Gaston, also of Ruhengeri, and the burgomaster [mayor] of Nyakinama. The French sergeant walked around the canteen while saying: ‘this campus shelters many enemies of the country. Why?’ He was addressing the question to the burgomaster. The latter answered: ‘they have been able to infiltrate because they certainly corrupted the civil servants who grant bursaries’. […] This dialogue between the French sergeant and the burgomaster, in front of the Rwandan captain, threw the room into disorder. Tempers were heated up and the soldiers insisted that Tutsi students go out, saying they did not want to share anything with ‘cockroaches’. They ordered the barman to stop serving the enemies of the country. When some students tried to protest, the French sergeant drew his revolver and shot into the canteen ceiling. At the first shot, most of us left running. They stayed alone. "

Michel Campion, the owner of Ibis hotel in Butare, witnessed a clash between French soldiers and Tutsi students from the National University of Rwanda in 1992, during which the soldiers violently beat up the students and damaged hotel furniture:

"In 1992, there was a rather active military presence in Butare at the army cadet academy in which there were between 100 and 120 permanently stationed French soldiers who were there to intensify the training of soldiers who were going to war. And I can give you the actual number of those people because they ate regularly at Ibis Hotel. One day, a brawl erupted in the establishment. The Tutsi students had been very upset by this French military presence that permanently occupied the outdoor tables; they were no longer able to come and have a glass of beer with ease.

One day, there was an American who gave them a little encouragement to confront the French soldiers and a scuffle erupted. It was so violent that they practically turned the entire out door café up side down […] I walked out to try and calm the people down, but imagine a situation where100 muscular soldiers are pounding students! I overheard one of them literally say: Finally, one will be rid of the Tutsis. In fact, the poor fellows, I found them lying in the garden. Some had broken arms; others had taken blows to the head. It had lasted five to ten minutes. The soldiers then got into their trucks and returned to their army cadet academy. I never again considered them as my customers ".

In his testimony, Michel Campion stated that the following day the French defence attaché came with their Ambassador to investigate the incident. They paid for all the damage and insistently urged the owner not to divulge the information.

Michel Campion’s testimony was confirmed by two official documents, one was a Rwandan intelligence report, the other a record of the minutes of a Butare Prefecture security committee meeting. The first document contains interrogations regarding the real motives of the French military presence in Butare. The document specifies that the local administrative authorities were not aware of this presence and implicitly reveals the strategy of French persons responsible for this cover-up.

Another witness named Yves Rurangirwa reported to the Commission that he was victim to insults and death threats from French soldiers claiming that a Tutsi was not permitted to frequent an establishment like “Kigali Night” which belonged to Jean-Pierre Habyarimana, the son of the president.

Acts of this nature had reached such a point that, in February 1993, a Rwandan newspaper did not hesitate to use the headline: “Interahamwe z'Abafaransa zikwiye kwamaganwa [the French Interahamwe should be condemned]".

5.2. Rape and sexual assault

Various testimonies acknowledged repeated incidents of the involvement of French soldiers in acts of rape and violent sexual assault towards Rwandan girls and women and that these violent acts often targeted specifically Tutsis. In one of these cases the violent acts led to the death of the victim. On the night of 6th February 1993, a young Tutsi girl named Jeanne Mukarusine, aged 20 years at the time, was sexually assaulted very violently by French soldiers of Opération Noroît who were guarding Kanombe airport.

The French soldiers caught the girl leaving a nightclub, «Kigali Night” which belonged to the son of the former Rwandan President. They demanded that she leave with them and she refused. The French soldiers then forced her into their car and began striking her and tearing her clothes off using bonnets. They violently inserted their fingers and a knife into her genitals then smeared the blood that flowed from her genitals on her face.

When they reached Remera Guest House, which belonged to Murindahabi where she was staying, the French soldiers threw her out on to the ground, naked and in critical condition. The police, led by Lieutenant Mugabo of Remera police station, were alerted by a security guard of the neighbouring house and came to investigate the incident. They then took the bleeding victim to Kigali Central Hospital where she was admitted for an entire week. The medical examination revealed a severe wound as deep as her uterus as well as several other body lesions.

Before her discharge from the hospital, Lieutenant Mugabo along with French military officers approached her and explained to her that they did not wish this matter to become public in Kigali. They then offered her five hundred thousand Rwandan Francs and ordered her to remain silent about what she had endured and to leave Kigali and return to her native village in Mugusa (Butare). She was not to make any complaint or reveal the incident to journalists or human rights associations. Lieutenant Mugabo extracted a statement from her and she was given the money and ordered to leave Kigali immediately. The girl returned to her home village on 14th of February 1993.

Investigations conducted by the Commission revealed that Jeanne Mukarusine finally died in Butare of the wounds she had sustained and the damage to her genital organs. Her death was reported to the Commission by a witness named Daphrose Mukarwego, the spouse of Mulindahabi, the owner of the Guest House in which the victim was living:

“Our night watchman told me that on the morning of the incident, Jeanne had suffered a violent assault by French soldiers stationed at Kanombe airport and that she had ended up in Kigali Central Hospital. He explained to me that the soldiers were drunk and very violent. I asked one of the victim’s friends named Daria to go and inform her family. She left and returned with the victim’s brother. The police and the French threatened them and offered them money to remain silent and return to their village. They had no choice but to accept in the interest of self-preservation. A few days after her return, Jeanne died of her wounds.”

Gerard Ndabakenga, whose testimony has already been partly cited above, stated that he witnessed French soldiers raping two Tutsi students. According to his words the soldiers were staying at Nyakinama University campus in 1992 and their daily activity consisted in giving Hutu Power militia firearms training. During evenings and on their days off, they shared beer with extremist Hutu students in the university canteen and even with Ruhengeri authorities who were known to be the radicals of the regime. They refused to associate with Tutsis or even Hutus from the Southern or the central parts and they raped two Tutsi students within the campus compound.

“Two Tutsi students named Ber and Y, who originated from Kibuye were there for their supplementary exams and were raped by French soldiers inside the campus. They were betrayed to these French soldiers by Hutu extremist students, originating from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri in collusion with others from Byumba who were referred to as `war displaced'. The two girls were headed to the restaurant and passed through the corridor in front of the rooms of the French soldiers. This was the only possible exit they had. The French soldiers surrounded them and forced them into their rooms. We could hear them cry but no one among us could dare go to their rescue. It was Muramutsa, my friend and a friend of Yvonne, who revealed to us that Yvonne had confided to her about these rapes. She told him the French soldiers had terrorized and threatened them with violence if they mounted any resistance” .

5.3 Support and assistance in perpetration of violent acts

From 1990, French soldiers assisted in the perpetration of violent acts carried out by Rwandan militia against Rwandan civilians or watched without intervening. A Belgian journalist, Jean - Pierre Martin, was witness to this:

"It was in November of 1990 when I first met the French soldiers. What surprised me most was in addition to the brutality used in suppressing the minority of the population. The French army was not only complacent but even participative. On three occasions, I witnessed French soldiers stand by as raids and assault were being mounted on Rwandan citizens. That was at the roundabout next to the military head quarters, it also occurred near Chez Lando, and at the large roundabout at the centre of Kigali. These brutalities toward Rwandan citizens and these raids on people who were being mounted onto jeeps or trucks all happened in the presence of French soldiers"

Jean-Pierre Martin specified that the minority group of which he spoke were Tutsi civilians, and that the French soldiers did not only watch passively, but seemed to be directly participating in the organisation and implementation of these violent acts:

"One got the clear impression that it was the French who organized the entire operation that made the laws and controlled the operations where these raids were carried out in Kigali. I remember two cases in which two people were beaten with the rifle butt of a FAR soldier right beside French soldiers. One simply had to question the attitude of these soldiers who were obviously not reacting".

In the same report, Jean-Pierre Martin continued, saying: "I also have images in my memory that I will never forget, in one particular incident, there was a pregnant woman who was being torn apart 100 m in front of me. There was a jeep with two French soldiers who were laughing, just 50 m away from where this was happening. It was two Belgian soldiers passing who went to disperse the killers ".

Jean de Dieu Rucamayida, who was formerly in charge of the branch of the French Cultural Centre in Ruhengeri, was arrested on October 2, 1990. He was held and accused of being an RPF spy. In Ruhengeri, he was interrogated by Lt-Colonel Jean-Marie Vianney Nzapfakumunsi who was the head of the national police academy, and Captain Michel Caillaud, a French instructor at the same academy. Rucamayida reported to the Commission that he was tortured by these two officers:

I was taken into Nzapfakumunsi’s office, who was with Captain Caillaud. He wanted to recover the keys to the Cultural Centre and I refused to give them up to him. Nzapfakumunsi gave the order to a Rwandan corporal to bind my hands to the chair and handcuff me. Captain Caillaud then started brutality interrogating me about my supposed connections with RPF. When he was not satisfied with my answers, he gestured to Nzapfakumunsi who in turn ordered the Rwandan corporal to strike me. The corporal obeyed their orders and struck me hard on the chest and shoulders ".

Since his escape from Rwanda in 1994, Lt-Colonel Nzapfakumunsi lives in exile in France where he has the benefits of political asylum despite attempts by French human rights organisations that alerted the French Office for the protection of refugees and stateless people (ORPFA) in 1997, regarding the criminal past of this former police officer.

6. Violent interrogation of RPF prisoners of war

Several testimonies received by the Commission pointed out that RPF Prisoners of war were subjected to interrogation with torture, ill treatments and execution, especially at Kigali military camps. Some executions were carried out in the presence and with the participation of the French; others were carried out in their absence but witnesses state that the French were aware of their existence and seemed to condone them. Bodies of executed victims were often driven to Kanombe Military Camp to be buried there.

6.1 Threats and ill treatments

Former RPF prisoners of war reported that interrogations carried out by French soldiers were often associated with threats, verbal harassment and physical violence. Sometimes, these threats and violent acts were carried out against soldiers who were still minors who deserved a special treatment adapted to their age. Francis Bazimya was 14 years old at the time he was captured on the frontline at the end of 1990 in Nyakayaga, and then held at Kigali military camp and at the central prison. He was interrogated with intimidation by Lt-Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, the head of FAR military intelligence in the presence of a French soldier:

"Nsengiyumva interrogated me in his office regarding the number of RPF soldiers, the types of weapons we used, names and ranks of our military officers, etc. There was a French officer present during this interrogation. Nsengiyumva insulted me calling me a little cockroach and intimidated me so as to provide him with answers regarding the organisation of the RPF. When they were not satisfied with my answer even when it was true, Nsengiyumva ordered his bodyguards to strike me, and they did. The French soldier was watching without reacting ".

Pelagie Mutibagirwa, aged 20 at the time of her capture, also went through an identical experience to that of Francis Bazimya. She was captured in Gabiro at the end of 1990 and was driven to Kigali camp where she was interrogated by Rwandan and white soldiers:

"During my detention at Kigali Camp, I was beaten with sticks and rifle butts along with my fellow-prisoners until some of them, whom I met again later, had become crippled. I spent over one week there. My interrogation was carried out by a Rwandan officer with a white soldier in uniform by his side. The Rwandan soldier interrogated me and translated to the white soldier what I said. They exchanged words between them after which the Rwandan soldier resumed his questions or made me repeat what I had just said. Before starting my interrogation, they intimidated me by threatening me with death if I did not tell them the whole truth. When I did not give the answer they wished to hear about the RPF, or when I remained silent to think, they insulted me ".

Jean-Paul Gasore, an RPA mechanical engineer, was captured on the frontline on 28th November, 1990 at Nyawera, in the former district of Rukara while manning a reconnaissance position. After his capture, he was driven to Akagera hotel, then to the military headquarters of FAR in Kigali camp. He was interrogated on several occasions by Lt-Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, the head of military intelligence alongside French officers:

"The very first time I saw French soldiers was at the banks of Lake Ihema after my capture. The Rwandan and French soldiers interrogated me there, then at Akagera hotel. The second day, I was transferred to the military headquarters of the Rwandan army and handed over to Lt-Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva. He sat beside a French officer and a Rwandan gendarme with the rank of Commander. They interrogated me about the number of RPF soldiers, their sources of funds, their operational capacity, the types of weapons they used, particularly anti-aircraft weapons, the origin of these weapons, the types of communication equipment, the names and ranks of highranking officers, the sources of logistic and food supplies, etc. I refused to answer these questions. Nsengiyumva then ordered the Rwandan soldiers to strike me. They bound my arms behind my back then they violently hit me with clubs and sticks. They alternated the blows with electrocution with wires attached to various parts of my body to make me suffer. The French officer observed what occurred while discussing with Nsengiyumva ".

Jean-Paul Gasore stated to the Commission that his interrogation by the French continued for one week at Kigali camp then at the central prison where he was held until July 17th, 1992. In prison, the same French officer came to conduct further interrogations along with a Rwandan lady gendarme who was an interpreter. For one week two other French soldiers in uniform came one after the other to conduct interrogations while carefully taking notes. In January 1991, when RPF took over Ruhengeri, a French officer returned to the prison to question Gasore: “he asked me very precise questions about the type of military training of RPA troops and the locations where they received training in guerrilla warfare”. After getting exhausted by these repeated interrogations, Gasore took advantage of an opportunity involving CICR workers who were passing through the prison and he made his complaints to them. The head warden informed the French about it and they did not return any more.

Paul Rugenera, who was the supervising head of Kigali central prison at the time of the alleged incident, acknowledged having seen four French soldiers in 1991 conducting interrogation of RPF prisoners of war, including Gasore, in the office of the head warden. Paul Rugenera stressed that these prisoners were in a delicate state of health particularly due to serious wounds suffered since their capture and that they received no medical care from the prison authorities. The French did not seem concerned with it, they were more interested in the information they sought to obtain.

Ananie Habimana, another former RPF prisoner of war, stated that she was interrogated by French and Rwandan soldiers and suffered violent acts: "I was captured in February of 1991 and was driven to the district office of Kinigi. Rwandan soldiers were stationed there with the French. White soldiers photographed and interrogated me. Colonels Ndindiriyimana and Nsengiyumva took part in it. They asked me questions regarding the positions of our troops, our organisation, the types and the origin of our weapons, etc. I was then transferred to Ruhengeri central prison, where I was beaten ".

After one day of incarceration in Ruhengeri prison, the witness was transferred to Kigali camp, where the interrogation continued with the participation of the French:

"The white soldiers spoke with the Rwandan soldiers and decided to send me to Kigali. They forced me to lie in the back of a pick-up and put two 50Kg bags filled with potatoes over me. At Mukungwa bridge, they stopped and the soldiers told the curious peasants who were watching that I was an inyenzi and gave an old lady a stick to strike me with. She struck me hard and drew blood. I arrived at Kigali Camp on the 18th, still bound at the hands and feet. I spent the night there. The following day, Ndindiriyimana and Nsengiyumva arrived and interrogated me. After about one week, two French soldiers in uniform also came to interrogate me. They asked me questions about my personal history, the place I was captured, the real reasons why the RPF had began an armed struggle, the origin of our weapons and ammunition supplies, the types of weapons and vehicles we used, etc. They interrogated me in the presence of a Rwandan translator. After one week, the same French soldiers returned. They brought a weapon with them and asked me whether RPF had this type of weapon. I swore that RPF had no such weapon and that it rather had to be a weapon of FAR. They told me I lied and that they would forcefully make me admit that RPF possessed the weapon ".

The Commission also interviewed Rwandan witnesses and expatriates who had information about interrogation of RPF prisoners of war. The commission gathered accounts from former FAR soldiers who explained the severity of the ill treatments suffered by these prisoners. Jean-Paul Nturanyenabo, formally a second lieutenant in FAR from 1989 to 1994, trained at Bigogwe as an instructor by the French in April 1991, stated that he witnessed and participated in acts of torture in the operational sector of Ruhengeri:

"We captured RPF soldiers at Butaro, toward the end of 1991. We drove them to Mubona camp. The French photographed them and we locked them up in a cell at the camp. We then presented them to Colonel Bizimungu who interrogated them along with some French soldiers who were stationed at the camp or others from Mukamira ".

The witness continued to explain that the RPF prisoners of war were presented to Colonel Augustin Bizimungu and the French soldiers after a torture session inflicted upon them by the ex-FAR soldiers who had captured them on the frontline and the guards of the military camp who had received these prisoners: " Often, before presenting them to Bizimungu, we had fun practicing violent acts on them". In response to the question regarding whether the French were aware or had reason to believe that the prisoners of war were being subjected to acts of torture, the witness responded categorically:

"Of course the French were aware of our actions. They were screaming as we tortured them and their cell was not far away from the office where Bizimungu worked with the French. Besides, when we brought them for interrogation, the French and Rwandan soldiers who questioned them could obviously see the degradation of their physical state. They received violent beatings. In most cases their injuries were visible to the naked eye.”

In order to clarify the nature of the torture inflicted on prisoners of war, Nturanyenabo gave the following precise details:

"I remember an RPF corporal who refused to speak during the interrogation conducted by Bizimungu and a French officer. Bizimungu was very irritated and ordered us to deprive him of food until he agreed to speak. Four days elapsed and he still had not spoken a single word despite the deprivation of food. He was clearly in a state of physical weakness. The French officer and Bizimungu had the soldier brought from his cell and tried to question him but with no success".

As for the manner of interrogation and the exact role of the French, the witness added that: “it is Bizimungu who translated the answers of the prisoners of war to the French who in turn communicated questions for him to ask". So as to force them to speak "they were forced to endure various ill treatments and acts of torture like denying them access to toilets, keeping them in the cold because the weather was very cold in Ruhengeri, preventing them from washing their clothes, striking hands and feet… the French were aware of all that.”

These various testimonies of Rwandans are corroborated by Lawyer Eric Gillet, who carried out a mission of work in Rwanda from 12th to August 20th, 1991 within the framework of the "Project of legal aid with the Rwandan political prisoners". He collected information attesting to the participation of the French in the interrogation of RPF prisoners. The most important testimony that it reported is that of "Major " Jean Bosco Nyiligira, who announces that RPF prisoners had been questioned continuously for several days during the first week of August 1991, by French military officers in uniform. These interrogations had initially proceeded within the Rwandan Army Headquarters in the Kigali camp, then in administrative pavilions of the central prison of Kigali.

Lawyer Gillet gave a testimony about Nyiligira in which he said: "I met Nyiligira Jean Bosco at Kigali central prison on Monday August 19th […] He was interrogated in March [1991] by the prosecutor, then again by several French officers two weeks before our conversation. He was visibly very unhappy. The interrogations were prolonged in three two-hour sessions, conducted over three days.”

Jean Bosco Nyiligira revealed that he was imprisoned along with 17 other RPF members in Kigali central prison, and that they were all interrogated in the same way by French officers. During his investigations, Eric Gillet managed to gather other testimonies corroborating Nyiligira’s account: “the participation of French officers in interrogation was later confirmed to me by a university student in Kigali who saw them himself while visiting the convicts on a Friday in January. He told me the interrogation site was guarded by French soldiers. All the RPF prisoners were questioned in this manner.”

Nyiligira and several of his companions endured interrogation in a very delicate state of health; they had untreated wounds that they had sustained during their capture.

Documents analysed by the Commission indicate that senior French Army executives present in Rwanda received regular feedback from their Rwandan counterparts about results of these interrogations. A document of the Rwandan military headquarters of October 30th, 1990 indicating the minutes of a meeting chaired by Colonel Serubuga, head of the joint military headquarters of FAR, in which three French officers took part, Cdt Caille, Cdt Refalo and Capt. Rodriguez, pointed out that results of an interrogation of an RPF prisoner of war had been delivered to them. The same type of information was delivered to the French in a meeting held on 1st November, 1990, held at the military headquarters conference room and chaired by Lt-Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva. Two French officers participated, Capt. Rodriguez and Second Lt. Jacquemin. It is stated in this document that "the G2 EM AR informed the participants of the existing situation in the combat zone based on information provided by our forces on the frontline as well as by captured prisoners ".

6.2 Execution of prisoners of war

RPF prisoners of war were executed by Rwandan soldiers in view and with the knowledge of the French, and in one specific case, the French soldiers directly took part in the execution of prisoners.

Francis Bazimya described an execution process in which the French took part:

"One day, the soldiers who were guarding us took four prisoners around 1000 hrs. They dressed them in military uniform and began to strike them violently. We watched the scene through small holes that were in the walls of our cell. Throughout this gruesome scene, four French soldiers assisted in the process. They were in uniform, with pistols and bayonets on the belts of their trousers. They surrounded the area in which the torture was being committed and supervised what was happening. One of the victims tried to flee but a French soldier caught him and handed him back to the Rwandan soldiers. They intensified the beating until the boy fell to the ground and could no longer rise up at all. The scene lasted a long time. They kept striking them then resting under a nearby shade where they could watch their victims after which they resumed their work. The last victim died at around 1300 hrs. The killers performed their acts with a form of sadism that I found quite rare. For example, I saw one soldier trampling a victim who was in agony saying: `` poor cockroach, lets see if you will resurrect ! ".

Jean-Paul Gasore, a fellow prisoner of Francis Bazimya, confirms the account of Bizimana while giving a more general description about the level of knowledge the French soldiers had, regarding these executions:

"RPF soldiers were executed at Kigali camp, in the place called `Guard corps '. Some were killed during the day while others were killed at night; we watched this through holes in the wall of our cell, and we heard their cries. The French witnessed the execution of a group of prisoners killed during the day. Often some prisoners were killed by the Rwandan soldiers after the French had left. Army trucks transported their bodies to Kanombe camp around 0600 hrs in the morning. I believe the French were aware of this. Since they took part in our interrogations and in registering in the military intelligence files, how is it that in the morning after they returned to Kigali camp they could no longer find some of us, but they did not ask anything? Couldn’t these French soldiers see that there were some prisoners missing among us? ”

Pelagie Mutibagirwa also reported the beatings she suffered during her period of captivity:

"I was beaten violently but luckily I survived. Some of my fellow prisoners were killed. They used to take some of us and leave others; I am not aware of their reasons for this. The French soldiers who came to see us had to be aware of what was happening. They came so frequently to Kigali camp that they could possibly not know what their Rwandan counterparts were doing ".

Ananie Habimana added:

"Where I was held at Kigali camp, people accused of wanting to join RPF were killed. I am not saying that it was the French who killed them directly, but they knew about it. I remember one case of a young boy who was killed on the day devoted to FAR. He belonged to a group of young people who had been arrested in Kibungo prefecture. I learned that they were killed in Kanombe. These acts were committed regularly at Kigali military camp. The soldiers killed people, then put them in sacs and transported them in trucks to a destination that I did not know. I later on learned that they were buried in a pit at Kanombe military camp ".

Jean-Paul Nturanyenabo reported the execution of prisoners of war at Mubona camp in Ruhengeri:

"Certain RPF soldiers imprisoned in Ruhengeri who had been interrogated by the French were killed by Lt Niyonsenga Pascal in full view of everyone. Neither the French nor Bizimungu bothered to inquire about the reason for these killings. Their silence leads me to believe that they were not bothered but certainly aware and even condoned the acts of Lt Niyonsenga. "

7. Support for a policy of mass murder

Towards the end of the 1980s, and especially after the start of the war, the regime’s criminal inclinations were as clear as day, they were marked by massacres that were instigated by high government officials over the radio. Reports that originated from French diplomats stationed in Rwanda, the Rwandan civil society and international non-governmental organisations, pointed out with ample clarity to the regime’s criminal nature and worries about its genocidaire inclinations.

Between 1990 and at the onset of the genocide of Tutsis in April 1994, many massacres occurred at various locations in Rwanda, often with the complicity of the authorities and the army: Kibilira (October 1990), Bigogwe (February 1991), Bugesera (March 1992), Kibuye (August 1992), Shyorongi (December 1992), Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Kibuye (December-January 1993), Mbogo (March 1993) and in many other areas of the country. Documents of the old Rwandan administration regarding these massacres consulted by the Commission showed that the Rwandan authorities estimated the count of human victims and amount of property damage caused by these massacres, which clearly proves that they were not unaware of the perpetration of these acts.

A document of the Minister of Internal affairs and Community Development of 17/07/1991 relating to the massacres committed in the prefectures of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Byumba and Kibungo between January and June of 1991, stated the count of victims: 1481 dead, 302 disabled, 633 widowed and 2274 orphaned. Another document of 6th July 1991 relating to a massacre in Bigogwe in 1991 in the prefectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi indicated a record of 286 people killed in Ruhengeri prefecture and 86 people killed in Gisenyi. They included the names of the victims, their villages, sectors and districts of residence.

The repeated massacres were condemned in many internal and international reports, including the reports of French diplomats and their defence attaché based in Kigali. However, the attitude that prevailed in Paris was one of silence regarding the genocide ideology of the Rwandan regime on one hand, and the serious human rights abuses that were being committed on the other. Whenever the French authorities issued statements regarding the subject of these massacres, they either minimised their severity, or defended the regime that was orchestrating them. The following table illustrates a summery of the extent of these massacres committed between October 1990 and January 1994.





















Tableau 1: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED IN RWANDA BETWEEN OCTOBER 1990 AND JANUARY 1994

Events Facts Date Place Presumed perpetrators Source




Massacres in Mutara and Byumba regions
in October 1990 300 Tutsi civilians killed, men, women and children
October 1990 Mutara region FAR, militia Amnesty International (A.I.) Report, May 1992
18 Tutsi civilians brought from Murambi by Gatete

7th October 1990 Byumba military camp FAR International Commission of Inquiry, (ICE) p.57
150 RPF prisoners of war October - November 1990 Commune Ryabega
(Byumba) FAR ICE, p.61
Between 500 and 1000 civilians from the Hima clan

8th October 1990 Mutara
(Byumba) FAR ICE, p.62



Massacres of Bagogwe in October 1990 352 civilians killed, 345 Tutsis and 7 Hutus
October 1990 Commune Kibirira
(Gisenyi) Local authorities, militia SRS Ngororero II
20 Tutsi civilians killed
October 1990 Cummune Satinsyi
(Gisenyi) Local authorities, militia SRS Ngororero II
120 Tutsi civilians killed
October 1990 Commune Kibirira
(Gisenyi) Local authorities, militia, government agents ICE, p.21
160 Tutsi civilians killed

October 1990 Ngororero Sub-district
(Gisenyi) FAR and Militia, with encouragement from local authorities AI Doc. I








Massacre of Bagogwe, end of January to February 1991 14 Tutsi civilians killed, members of 4 families 23rd January 1991 Commune Kanama
(Gisenyi) Securiry forces and local militia AI Doc. I
Between 500 and 1000 Tutsi civilians killed, men, women and children of the Bagogwe 23rd January – mid-February 1991 Commune Kinigi
(Ruhengeri) Local authorities, FRA and armed vigilantes AI Letter to Nsanzimana
2 Tutsi brothers killed, with their 2 uncles 25th January1991 – 2 February 1991 Commune headquarters, Busogo
(Ruhengeri) Local government officials and FAR AI Letter to Nsanzimana
30 Tutsi civilians killed 23rd January – mid-February 1991 Commune Nkuli
(Ruhengeri) Militia and forest guards of the Volcanoes National Park AI Letter to Nsanzimana
14 Tutsi civilians killed, members of one family 4th February 1991 Kanama, Buzizi Sector, Kibuye village Soldiers from Gisenyi military camp AI Letter to Nsanzimana
370 Tutsi civilians killed January – March 1991 Kibirira, Gisenyi Local authorities, FAR, Hutu militia IMBAGA newspaper
372 Tutsi civilians killed January – July 1991 Prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri Not specified Rwandan Ministry of Internal Affairs (Document dated 6 July1991)
Compilation of a list of victims of massacres in northern and eastern regions, January – June 1991 1481 civilians killed January – June 1991 Prefectures of Byumba, Kibungo, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi Not specified Rwandan Ministry of Internal Affairs (Document dated 17/07/1991)
.

Massacres in Bugesera, March 1992 52 persons killed Between 5th and 17th March 1992 Kanzenze Not specified MININTER
64 persons killed Between 5th and 17th March 1992 Gashora
(Kigali rural) Not specified Idem
36 persons killed Between 5th and 17th March 1992 Ngenda
(Kigali rural) Not specified Idem
62 persons killed March – May 1992 Kanzenze Militia Kigali Prefecture Commission
84 persons killed March - May 1992 Gashora Militia Kigali Commission
36 persons killed March - May 1992 Ngenda Militia Kigali Commission
300 Tutsi civilians killed, men, women and children Beginning of March 1992 Commune Kanzenze (Kigali rural) FAR, Militia AI Letter to Nsanzimana
300 persons of Tutsi origin killed March 1992 Bugesera Local authorities, FAR, Militia Rwanda Rushya Newspaper
Massacres in Kibuye, July – August 1992 85 persons killed July - August 1992 Commune Gishyita and Rwamatamu
(Kibuye) Local authorities, FAR, Militia ADL
Massacre of Bagogwe, end of 1992, beginning of 1993 137 persons killed on the basis of their ethnic origin End 1992 – beginning 1993 Gisenyi Prefecture (Communes not specified) Local authorities, FAR, Militia SRS Gisenyi


130 Tutsi civilians killed January – February 1993 Satinsyi (74)
Ramba (55)
Kibirira (1)
Gisenyi Prefecture Local authorities, militia SRS Ngororero II
Compilation of the number of victims 1481 civilians killed January – June 1991 Prefectures of Byumba, Kibungo, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi Unspecified Rwandan Ministry of Internal Affairs (Document dated 17/07/1991)
Compilation of the number of victims 2000 Tutsis killed 1st October 1990 to mid-mars 1993 Gisenyi, Bugesera, Ruhengeri, Byumba Local authorities, FAR, militia ICE, p.48
Compilation of the number of victims 2300 civilians killed October 1990 – end of 1993 Various communes in Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Kibuye, Kigali, Byumba, Kibungo Local authorities, FAR, militia Amnesty International


.



According to local and international human rights associations, UN institutions and the press, these massacres were not spontaneous but rather a political and security strategy of the regime. Information about these massacres spread very quickly. In addition, the local and international opinion, more particularly the diplomatic community in Kigali, was well informed about it. The possibility of genocide against the Tutsi minority was mentioned quite early, and more specifically in internal French diplomatic telegrams and reports. Knowledge of the possibility of a genocide was illustrated in the first reports published in 1990 and increased during the entire period preceding the ultimate genocide of April - July 1994.

7.1. The Internal French Reports

During the first days of the conflict in October 1990, the Defence attaché stationed in Kigali, Colonel Jacques Galinié, sent several messages to his superiors in France, requesting increased military support for the Rwandan army , but also mentioning the possibility of a genocide against Tutsis.

In a telegram of October 15, 1990, Colonel Galinié wrote: “Certain Tutsis (…) are of the opinion that there is reason to expect the occurrence of a genocide if the European forces (French and Belgian) are withdrawn too early and do not prevent it simply by their presence.” Other military dispatches protected by defence confidentiality that were accessed by Patrick De Saint-Exupéry show that France knew about the risk of mass massacres against Tutsis that occurred in October 1990. The first of these messages announced that “Despite the uncertainties and due to nervousness, repression was going on in Kigali. Very many suspects were arrested, imprisoned, interrogated and sometimes shot. The population that was now at risk of food shortages readily denounced the victims. Aggravation of this hunting could escalate into a slaughter.”

The second dispatch pointed out that “Hutu peasants mobilized by the single party intensified their search for Tutsi suspects in the hills. Massacres were mentioned in the Kibirira area [sic!], twenty kilometres North-West of Gitarama. The already mentioned risk of generalised confrontation could therefore become a reality.” The last dispatch reported that “there was a possibility of serious violence against internal Tutsi populations that would either be spontaneous or directly encouraged by most radical of the regime who were playing their end game.”

The correspondence of Ambassador Martres gives a similar account and also mentions the risk of genocide. In a letter of October 15th, 1990, sent to the Foreign Minister and to the Chief of Staff, particularly President Mitterrand, George Martens wrote that: "the Rwandan population of Tutsi origin believes that the military campaign had failed on the psychological front. They still counted on a military victory, thanks to the support in men and resources from the Diaspora. The military victory, even partial, would enable them to escape the genocide". George Martres confirmed this information before the MIP by declaring that in 1990, "the genocide was already foreseeable by this period (…). Certain Hutus even had the audacity to insinuate it. Colonel Serubuga, Assistant Head of the military of the Rwandan army had been delighted by the RPF attack, which would be used to justify the massacre of Tutsis. The Tutsis were constantly fearful about genocide.”

7.2. Reports of Non-Governmental Organisations

In May 1992, Amnesty International made an assessment of the human rights situation between 1990 and 1992. It stated that "representatives of the Rwandan government as well as members of the security forces belonging to the Hutu ethnic majority continue to condone and to commit human rights violations directed primarily against the Tutsi minority with impunity.” Among the most serious cases, Amnesty reported “the extra-judicial execution of 1000 Tutsis; the generalized application of torture and other forms of ill treatment suffered by prisoners; tens of disappearances; and the imprisonment of over 8000 people among whom most were political prisoners and the majority of imprisonments had no indictment or process.”

In March 1993, an international Commission of enquiry into human rights violations in Rwanda since 1st October, 1990, consisting of four non-governmental human rights organisations, conducted field enquiries on the ground from 7th to 21st January 1993. It published its report on 7th March, 1993, that drafted the assessment of human rights violations in Rwanda and revealed the mechanisms of a system of massacre of civilians based on ethnicity. It pointed out the implication of the highest government authorities in the preparation and implementation of these massacres and emphasized the existing risk of a genocide against Tutsis. Among the implicated persons, the Commission named President Habyarimana and his spouse, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Jean Marie Vianney Mugemana, the Minister of Labour, Joseph Nzirorera, Colonel Elie Sagatwa and the Mayor of Ruhengeri, Charles Nzabagerageza.

This report was widely publicised by the media, and several governments used it to draw conclusions about their relations with Rwanda. In the evening of 28th January, 1993, Jean Carbonare, head of the Commission, was invited by a reporter named Bruno Masure to France 2 television news upon his return from Rwanda and he broke into tears on live television condemning “the magnitude and systematisation of the massacres of civilians” which had nothing to do with “ethnic conflicts” but rather involved “an organized policy” in which “the level of power implicated in this genocide, this crime against humanity was strikingly high – we emphasise these words.” The inquiry of Jean Carbonare was marked by images of a mass grave of human bones found by the investigators in Mutura (Gisenyi) and Kinigi (Ruhengeri).

Jean Carbonare was received in Rwanda by Ambassador Martres to whom he gave a detailed description of the gravity of the facts uncovered by the Commission he had headed. After that discussion Martres addressed a letter to Bruno Delaye which illustrated that he was well aware of the gravity of human rights violations that prevailed in Rwanda, without expressing any desire to force the Rwandan regime to put an end to it:

"Mr Carbonare […] informed me of the results obtained so far by this mission […] They collected an impressive amount of information on the massacres that occurred since the beginning of the war in October 1990 and more particularly on those of Bagogwe (a group of ethnic Tutsis) after the attack on Ruhengeri in January 1991. Regarding the facts, the report […] only adds horror to the already known horror. […] The massacres were instigated by President Habyarimana himself during a meeting with his close collaborators. […] During this meeting, the operation was planned with the order to proceed to a systematic genocide, if necessary by using the pretext of the military campaign and by implicating the local population in the killings with the obvious purpose of rendering them more determined in the fight against the enemy ethnic group ".

7.3 Reports by the Rwandan civil society

On February 24th, 1993, five major Rwandan human rights associations wrote a letter to President François Mitterrand reporting an “Ongoing cycle of violence in the country” organized under the orders of “death squads” composed of “about fifteen people, with important positions and with close ties to the President” from "his party, the MRND ". In their report of the situation, these associations specified that the criminals perceived "the reinforcement of the French contingent as support for their partisan cause".

They were indignant at the fact that the report of the International Commission of inquiry of 1993 had triggered no consideration among the French authorities, and found it “surprising at the very least that French officials considered the testimony of Jean Carbonare on France 2 to be an exaggeration ". They concluded their letter by asking President Mitterrand not to continue supporting a “shameless villain of a fighter", and "to use all the possible means […] to thwart the bloodthirsty regime of President Habyarimana, executed by his organising group of death squads, members of his party, MRND, and its ally, CDR [… ].”

An identical alarm was also expressed by the main Rwandan opposition political parties in a “Letter to the President of the Republic regarding the security problem” of May 24, 1993, with copies sent to all the diplomatic missions and consulates stationed in Kigali. In this correspondence, the party signatories condemned the increasing political assassinations and “other wretched crimes that shamed Rwanda before all other Nations and plunged the Rwandan people into desolation and despair” in which the Rwandan regime was implicated.

[XXPANTHAXX]

7.4. UN Reports

During this same period, reports from international organisations and those from UNAMIR corroborated the facts revealed in other reports and affirmed with no ambiguity that the regime was implicated in the organisation of the massacres. In addition, a special reporter of the human rights Commission, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, conducted a mission in Rwanda in April 1993 to disclose human rights violations in the country.

In his report, he stated that the aforementioned violations were especially carried out by the militia and squads organized by the MRND and CDR parties, often trained by the local authorities and by members of the army or gendarmerie. As already mentioned above, the report clearly indicated the massacres in question

7.5 The repeated perpetrations of massacres and the reinforcement of French military support

Despite the grave extent of the massacres towards the Tutsi minority perpetrated between October 1990 and March 1993 and the fear of an actual genocide mentioned by various observers, including French officials, France still continued to provide unconditional military support to the regime that orchestrated them, in particular by increasing its supply of weapons and ammunition, and by providing reinforcements of troops each time the Rwandan army failed to contain offensives of the RPA. It is illustrated in the following graph.
































In order to analyse these two graphs, one can begin with the specific tasks of the two army contingents. There was first the offensive intention of the DAMI reinforcements that came to support combat capacity of FAR and, in at least two cases, fought side by side with them in June 1992 and February 1993. Then, Noroît contingents came to support and control strategic positions like Kigali city and the airport.

The numbers of Noroît were increased with each significant offensive of the RPF then stabilised or decreased when the offensives ended. On the other hand, the numbers of Noroît were affected by the occurrence of massacres.

The numbers of DAMI were constantly increased almost over the entire period. They increased each time there was an RPF offensive and did not decrease. There was an exception at the end of 1992 when there was a decrease in their numbers. But it should be noted that this decrease was not caused by the massacres of Gisenyi in December 1992 because they had began before. Moreover, there was no documentary evidence indicating that there was a decrease in the number of DAMI troops due to massacres. Generally speaking, there was an increase in the numbers of DAMI troops over the entire period despite the massacres.

However, there was an evident change in dynamics regarding the relation between the massacres and the RPA offences. Whereas the first two great massacre incidents (October 1990 and January-March 1991) closely followed two significant RPA offences, the other two great massacre incidents (Bugesera in March 1992 and Gisenyi in December 92-March 1993) occurred in the absence of any RPA offences.

There were four repeated co-occurrences between French reinforcements and military intervention and the massacres that occurred just before, during or just after massacres expressing French military support that was in no way influenced by these mass crimes. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the repetition of the massacres was not completely independent of this military support that was renewed regardless of the massacres. Regarding this relation between military reinforcements, the massacres and its consequences before the genocide, Gerard Prunier wrote that: “This blind engagement would have catastrophic consequences because, as the situation worsened, the Rwandan government would believe that, no matter what they did [it is not we who underline], they could always count on the French. And nothing contradicted this.” It would not be unlikely to believe that by underlining “no matter what it did”, Prunier was referring to April-July 1994 genocide.

8. Diplomatic support for the Rwandan regime

In the course of the disputed context of the French military intervention in Rwanda and because of the nature of the Habyarimana regime and the internal war launched by RPF, France had to accompany its intervention with vigorous diplomatic action. They did, throughout the three years that their intervention lasted. In the bilateral regional African and international scene, they did not hesitate to represent Rwanda so as to defend it. The main strategy of this French diplomatic action was to give the impression that they were seeking a negotiated resolution to the crisis even as a mediator between the Rwandan warring parties while secretly supporting its ally, Habyarimana. The French diplomacy was mainly directed toward four axes: a Belgian and an African axis at the beginning of the war, when France believed that it alone could manage to convince that axis; a Western alliance when the conflict proved to be complex, an axis centred on the Arusha negotiations and other peace talks; and finally, an international axis when it became obvious that the UN was the last resort.

8.1. Actions alongside Belgium and African States

At the very beginning of the war, the French believed that they were able to coordinate their action with Belgium presuming that this would be judicious so as to ensure the success of its diplomacy in favour of Rwanda. The intention was to initiate “preliminary contact with Belgium so that our attitude is not perceived as an affront or an aim to oust Brussels.” But they underestimated the complexity of the coalition that Belgium had built with most of the government as well as the general awareness that the Belgians attached towards events that occurred in their former colonies. The Belgian intervention of October 1990 in favor of the Habyarimana regime under the context of massacres and other serious human rights violations caused protests in Belgium.

The debate occurred in Belgium, hardly one month after the landing deployment of the Belgian troops on Rwandan soil, and pushed the government to make the decision to withdraw them by 1st November 1990. This reversal was embarrassing for France.

Faced with the risk of insulation, especially if Belgium pushed for a discussion regarding this issue within the European Community, the president’s advisor, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, proposed that they shift the attention of the matter towards the regional countries. “It would perhaps be necessary to organise a mission headed by Mr. Pelletier in the regional countries (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda) in order to express our support for the initiation of regional dialogue to allow us to reach ‘an African’ resolution to the conflict. President Museveni is already petitioning for it as well as Rwanda”

"In any event,” added Claude Arnaud, French Ambassador responsible for the mission to the president of the Republic, “it is through regional dialogue (and not the twelve the Belgians seem to have opted for) that the Rwandan problem will be resolved. Tanzania is less involved than Uganda, Burundi, or Zaire and would undoubtedly be the most reasonable mediator given that the Secretary-General of the OAU is himself Tanzanian.”

It was for this reason that from the 6th to the 9th of November 1990, the Minister for Co-operation and Development, Jacques Pelletier, headed a mission in the regional countries in which Jean-Christophe Mitterrand participated, an adviser of the President of the Republic. This approach of meetings between the regional Heads of State (who were functioning in the context of the OAU) and French diplomats organised a regional conference focused on the refugee problem, planned for the 7th to the 15th of February 1991. The regional countries (Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire) were most concerned because they hosted the largest majority of Rwandan refugees.

In a letter addressed to the minister of State for Foreign Affairs, it was proposed that France should ensure that the European Community puts pressure on the various regional Heads of State such that each one is delegated with a particular task to contribute to the success of the conference on Rwandan refugees.

In preparation of this conference, Paul Dijoud and General Huchon went to the region and to Rwanda where they met President Habyarimana on 19th July, 1991. The trip of the French emissary to Rwanda was followed by a meeting organized on 14th August, 1991 in Paris between the Rwandan and Ugandan Foreign Affairs Ministers with Paul Dijoud and Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, who also received Paul Kagame on 21st September, 1991 as a representative of the RPF. These meetings were the subject of a report delivered to the Ambassadors of France to Uganda and Rwanda.

The French mediators had agreed that RPF could no longer be shielded off if they were to clear the controversy surrounding French policy in Rwanda but RPF remained convinced that they still represented President Habyarimana. First of all there was the incident in which the French, through Mrs. Catherine Boivineau, refused to receive Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe, the RPF chairperson in the delegation under the pretext that he belonged to the Habyarimana government before going into exile and rallying with the RPF. Kanyarengwe was a Hutu from the north like Habyarimana and the attitude of the French was interpreted to be in alliance with the principals of Habyarimana who preferred ethnic polarization between Hutus and Tutsis.

In order to tackle the refugee problem, Paul Dijoud proposed that the world must come together to solve it, but the French diplomats adopted the course of the Rwandan authorities and sought to dissuade RPF from pursuing political claims, but rather to accept a “humane” return to the country. Addressing representatives of RPF he said “how can RPF change from a military movement into a civilian organisation? It would be necessary to find civilian occupations for RPF soldiers because their integration into the Rwandan army would pose a difficult problem." Then he continued to say, “can places be found for you in the interim government? There are three things that prevent the Rwandan authorities from doing that: i) the Rwandan people are against you; ii) the opposition parties are against you; iii) and it is not in your interest to get integrated because you would be a minority and your resolutions would never be adopted.”

It was in this light that Paul Dijoud suggested that Rwandan passports be distributed to refugees in order to “show them his determination to solve their problems and restore their confidence in the Government.”

During all of 1991 and part of the following year, it was France that oversaw the diplomatic process surrounding the Rwandan conflict. During this period, they also exercised control over the Uganda Rwandan borders to assess the degree of Uganda’s involvement in the conflict; this role was carried out by the “French Observers Mission” (MOF) which was mentioned above.

8.2. Partiality in the peace talks

During the various phases of the conflict and the reconciliation efforts between the parties, France wanted to play the role of either direct mediation between the Rwandan government and RPF or take part in the negotiations as an observer like the other African and Western countries especially as part of the Arusha peace talks. In these two roles, they were supposed to show impartiality. To the contrary they instead used this opportunity to extend their unconditional support to the Habyarimana regime.

In an account given by minister Casimir Bizimungu to president Habyarimana relating to the process of a tripartite meeting between Rwanda, Uganda and the RPF that had taken place in Paris under the auspices of France on 14th August, 1991 revealed that before the aforementioned meeting, Paul Dijoud held a secret meeting with minister Bizimungu and “conceded to him that France which is considered to be a friend and ally of Rwanda in the war must also contribute to the stability of its diplomatic position”

Minister Bizimungu stated that during this meeting, Paul Dijoud: “said to the Inkotanyi that the French military presence in Rwanda would not allow for their military victory [RPF]. He made it clear to them that their military escapade was doomed to fail. While accepting the fact that the Inkotanyi were capable of doing damage, he still ruled out the possibility that they would seize power in Kigali. […] France explained to them that they obviously could not win the elections since they were a small minority […]. And that they must consequently agree to be ordinary citizens.”

As soon as the meeting was concluded, Paul Dijoud secretly met again with minister Bizimungu to offer him a guarantee of French support in the war Rwanda was engaged in against the RPF. In his own words, Minister Bizimungu stated that: “Mr Dijoud wished to meet me after the departure of the Ugandan delegation to reassure me of the unconditional French support to Rwanda.” In concluding his report, Minister Bizimungu said that he was “persuaded of the determination of France that was considered a friend and ally. Mr Dijoud had offered reassurance of France’s availability to support us to effectively face this aggression […]. My meeting with Mr Dijoud also convinced me that France […] was behind us.”

The role played by France in these reconciliation initiatives was also evident through the violent and aggressive behaviour expressed by French officials toward RPF leaders. In January 1992, France invited an RPF delegation to Paris for a meeting with representatives of the Rwandan government. The delegation included the military head of RPF, at the time, Paul Kagame, his adviser Emmanuel Ndahiro, and other RPF leaders, Patrick Mazimpaka, Jacques Bihozagara and Aloysie Inyumba.

The day before this meeting, the RPF delegation was subjected to an intimidation attempt. They were accommodated at the Hilton hotel when they realised at some point that Emmanuel Ndahiro was missing. They looked for him in vain until dawn when a police patrol arrived accompanying him in handcuffs. The police officers ransacked and rummaged through the rooms of the members of the delegation, then arrested Paul Kagame and Emmanuel Ndahiro and placed them in police custody in a Paris jail from 0700 to 1800 hrs.

After the French side offered their apologies, the delegation was received by various persons, in particular Paul Dijoud, then Jean-Christophe Mitterrand and Catherine Boivineau in charge of human rights and humanitarian affaires. During their discussion, Paul Dijoud endeavoured to make it clear to the RPF delegation that they were to give up their armed struggle and political ambitions.

In response to the resolve of the RPF delegation, Paul Dijoud was irritated and mentioned the following words: "if you do not end this war, if you continue and seize power in the country, you will not find your brothers and your families, because they will all have been massacred.”

On another occasion in a meeting between the Rwandan government and RPF organized in Paris from the 23rd to 25th of October 1991, Paul Dijoud, who had returned from Kigali where he had been received by President Habyarimana, made remarks that RPF understood to be an expression of partiality from the French government:

“A movement such as the RPF can hold negotiations with the Government, but you must keep in mind that you are not on equal footing, since the Rwandan government exists; it is legally recognized internationally and exercises all the responsibilities of a government. You on the other hand are not a state. [… ] You must give up this spirit of revenge: that is no longer practiced in modern world where all problems are resolved through democracy. [… ] When a Government agrees to hold talks with a movement such as yours, it is proof that it practises democracy. [… ] The issue here is not to determine whether Mr. Habyarimana is good or bad. You must recognize that he is the head of State and it is necessary to negotiate with him; and that the war will lead you nowhere, it is causing problems for Uganda and is ruining your country” .(source?)

8.3. Contribution to the ethnic radicalisation of the conflict

As mentioned in earlier parts of the text, we saw that the French military and political actions in Rwanda were characterized by systematic hostility towards Tutsis, and that in the most serious cases it involved the training of Interahamwe militia mobilised for the killing of Tutsis, the killing of Tutsis committed by the French soldiers themselves or the great tolerance toward the policy of massacres of civilian Tutsis. The question posed by the Commission was to clarify whether these were overflows or errors originating from the fight against the politico-military RPF movement or if it was about adoption of the ethnic and racist point of view of the Habyarimana regime that had obviously opted for an ethnic war.

8.3.1. Justification of ethnic based speech

The recordings of various declarations and standpoints of French political and military leaders between October 1990 and December 1993 and even after the events indicate a primarily ethnic character of the conflict.

From the beginning of the war, Ambassador Martres described the conflict through an ethnic point of view:

“The worsening of military engagement on the ground shows […] that the war is radicalised and that the ideological and clan differences have been erased by the traditional opposition between the two ethnic groups of Rwanda: on one side there are the Tutsis who seek to recover the power they lost 30 years ago through armed force, and on the other side are the Hutus who fight to preserve their freedom. The Tutsis in the interior secretly wish for this armed struggle to succeed but they realise that in the event of failure, it would only have succeeded in delaying the distant hope of a day when Rwanda will experience harmony between the races. In this context, one must admit that the Western media continues to be manipulated by a Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Diaspora with proof of the fact that all the official anti-government statements addressed to this embassy from various countries are signed by the members of this ethnic group.”

He described the conflict as primarily consisting of a confrontation on one side comprising Tutsis outside, RPF soldiers, the refugees and Tutsis of the interior. However, for the latter, he had to make a presumption that “deep in their heart” they wished for the victory of the RPF though none of them had confessed it to him. On the other hand, he put all the Hutus in the same political camp based on ethnicity. By doing this, he completely ignored the rising challenge to the regime among some Hutu circles.

This black and white perception could be attributed to the shock effect caused by the RPF attack on October 1st 1990. Although this perception only lasted the very first days, thereafter, president Habyarimana took advantage of the occasion to imprison not only known Tutsis but also Hutus who opposed him. Thus, more than thirty-three intellectuals of mainly Hutu ethnicity who had written an open letter to president Habyarimana in September 1990 to assert political pluralism were victims to this wave of random arrests. In addition, many Hutus who were regarded as guilty of moderation by the regime and those originating from different regions from that of the president’s clan were also victims to that blind repression. From that moment, while taking account of the ethnic dimension of the conflict, many analysts were also able to discern a fundamentally political problem. It was for this reason that all the actions of the political opposition were mainly focused on effecting the introduction of the multiparty system in the months that followed. In fact, the political or ethnic perception of the conflict constituted one of the major political stakes in the conflict, and France, by adopting the ethnic point of view, took sides with the camp of President Habyarimana who had refused the change.

However, that simple ethnic point of view was likely to endorse the theory of a war that was of a primarily internal nature between groups of the same country. Nevertheless, according to the standpoint of the regime, as pointed out in a letter by the French political and military leaders, which interpreted the conflict as an external Ugandan aggression before anything else. The aggressors were not simply presented as Rwandan Tutsis but rather as representatives of a trans-regional Tutsi-Hima ethnic group. Four months after the onset of the conflict, shortly after the RPF offensive on Ruhengeri, Ambassador Martres gave an account of a discussion he had had with President Habyarimana during which the latter explained to him about the complexity of the conflict:

“I admit that on one hand the problem was mostly dominated by its ethnic considerations since almost all the aggressors belong to a Tutsi-Hima group of the Great Lakes region in which President Museveni is. I realised that it mainly resulted from the conquest of power by the Hutu majority in 1959 that was called into question by a rival ethnic group that is a minority in Rwanda but powerful in the region.”

The justification of the ethnic speech of the political leaders was based on the fact that Tutsis were a very small minority as expressed here by the Minister for Cooperation from May 1988 to May 1991, Jacques Pelletier. “In 1988, when I arrived at Monsieur Avenue, Rwanda was not a priority of the Ministry; its reputation was rather good. It had a peasant-president who had been in power for fifteen years. He was from the Hutu ethnic group that was a large majority of over 80%, the country was said to be a little like the Switzerland of Africa […]."

Hubert Vedrine, the former secretary-general of the Elysée, who was in direct collaboration with President Mitterrand, raised the same idea before the Mission of Information: "President Habyarimana had managed to alleviate the Hutu/Tutsi problem, and had a good reputation in the international community. There was no question of letting a government of this kind be overthrown by a minority faction supported by a neighbouring country. That would have awakened old antagonisms and led to new massacres.”

However, this ethnic-based democracy was challenged by a large part of the Rwandan political community, particularly by members of Hutu opposition parties who refused to accept that President Habyarimana was the "legitimate representative of the Hutus" and instead criticised the politics and the governance of the country. This led to “an ethnic clarification”, especially on account of the efforts of the French political and diplomatic leaders in creating the "Hutu power" coalition.

Based on this ethnic democratisation, the French political leaders had a "racial essentialism" inherited from 19th century anthropology and history of the races that considered two groups of the same population that had lived under the same economic, social, cultural and political conditions for centuries as fundamentally different. This essentialism was expressed through many Declarations. It was very clearly asserted by Robert Galley, another former minister of Co-operation (1976-81) and who, for a period, was the chairperson of "Parliament Franco-Rwandan friendship group" which was influential in the France-Rwandan relations during the 1990-1993 period:

"In this country, there is an aristocracy and slaves. There has been a regime of this kind in Rwanda for centuries. This Tutsi aristocracy left many souvenirs among the Rwandan population. The German colonialists found it convenient, when they arrived, to consolidate the Tutsi administration over the Hutus. It was the same for the Belgians when they took over the mandate. Until the beginning of the 1960s, Tutsi administration dominated the country with the image of the feudal power that reigned in Europe during the year 1,000. During 1962, a referendum took place in Rwanda. It involved one huge Hutu majority that became aware of their potential. The Tutsis then left for Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi. A movement of immigrants was created, which led to the creation of the RPF. This also presented the opportunity of a minority of intelligent people with great potential to establish a Diaspora in the United States, Belgium and in Canada. These networks were the source of considerable contributions in funds that were used to finance the RPF later."

Further down, Robert Galley concludes his judgment thus: “The success of the Tutsis in the United States, in Europe and in Rwanda shows that they are a people of extreme intelligence and pride. They are good and disciplined warriors who have nothing in common with the hordes of the poor Bantu. I do not mean to say that there were no suitable people in the Rwandan army (or even in the Zaïrian army during the Kolwezi event, but they were a precious few). But the quality of Bantu soldiers was no match for the Tutsi soldiers who came from abroad. I might have overstressed a little. I realise that all this business requires more restrained terms.”

This essentialist vision was expressed once again before MIP by Paul Dijoud, who considered himself directly in charge of the Rwandan situation: “The failure to obtain peace can ultimately be attributed to the RPF, a movement predominantly comprising Tutsis, an intelligent and ambitious Nilotic people inhabiting deep Africa.”

8.3.2. Support to ethnic radicalism

The French political leaders and diplomatic representatives not only adopted the anti-Tutsi ethnic hostility of the Habyarimana regime, they even sought to worsen it. It was with this intention that they offered their support to the very extremist party, the Coalition for the defence of the republic (CDR) on one hand, and on the other hand, they encouraged the Hutu political opposition forces to join president Habyarimana and form a coalition to carry out the ethnic war led by the regime.

The CDR was created in March 1992. It was a “Radical and racist Hutu party, [That] was at the right-hand side of the MRND, that it accused as well as the regime of their supposed “softness” towards the RPF and its democratic ibyitso (accomplices)" From its beginnings, the CDR advocated for a total ethnic war whose target would be all Tutsis and the Hutu opposition, traitors to the Hutu cause, according to them. The CDR militia “impuzamugambi.” were along side the Interahamwe, at the forefront of the genocide.

On August 20th 1992, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, leader and ideologist of the CDR sent a petition to François Mitterrand thanking France for its political and military contribution to Rwanda. President Mitterrand delegated Bruno Delaye with the task of offering a response in which he expressed the president’s satisfaction in Jean Bosco Barayagwiza in these terms: “the President of the Republic, Mr. François MITTERRAND, took interest in your open letter of 20th August 1992 accompanied with 700 signatures of Rwandan citizens, in which you thank France for her support in the democratic process underway in Rwanda and the French Army for its co-operation with the Rwandan army. The President asked me to convey his thanks to you as I am doing presently.”

Due to the extremist position of the CDR, the RPF had refused to accept its participation in the power sharing protocol for the future broad based transition government that was to result from the peace accords. This refusal was particularly justified by the fact that its declared political program and its asserted schemes did not allow the CDR to be considered as compliant with the protocol relating to the rule of law signed on 18th August 1992 between the Rwandan Government and the RPF, stipulating in article 8 that “both parties resolutely reject and commit themselves to fight against: - political ideologies based on ethnicity, region of origin, religion and intolerance that substitute national interests with ethnic, regional, religious or personal interests.”

After the inauguration of the multi-party system in June 1991, the internal opposition succeeded in persuading president Habyarimana to head the transition government, under Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye of the MDR. The priorities of this government, formed in April 1992, included engagement of peace negotiations with the RPF. On the negotiation table in Arusha, the positions of the internal opposition were often closer to those supported by the RPF than those supported by the presidential party. The extremist Hutus condemned the standpoint of the political opposition as weakening their ethnic group. This state of affairs irritated the French political and diplomatic leaders who were completely allied with president Habyarimana’s positions.

After the setbacks encountered by the FAR during the generalized offensive of the RPF of 8th February 1993, that forced France to renew strong military intervention, the latter seemed to opt for ethnic radicalisation of the conflict. Three weeks after this offensive, the French Minister of Co-operation and the Development, Marcel Debarge went to Kigali on the 28th of February 1993 to push the opposition political parties to “make a common front” with president Habyarimana against the RPF. A note of Dominique Pin to President Mitterrand relating to the course of this visit said this: “After the clear and severe warnings from Mr. Debarge (urgency to arrive at political compromise and present a united front against the RPF in near future (…), the President and the opposition have agreed to collaborate and define a common position that will be defended by the Prime Minister during his meeting with the Head of the RPF in Dar-es -Salaam on 3rd March; a meeting that could allow for the resumption of the Arusha negotiations [ emphasis not ours].”

In a more anecdotal note, witnesses reported facts that demonstrated the hostility towards Tutsis among French political and diplomatic hierarchies. The “Common front” demanded by Mr. Debarge, was instituted against the Tutsis by all French diplomatic representatives in Rwanda.

Ambassador, Amri Sued explained that he had known well the two French ambassadors to Rwanda during the period under question, George Martres and Jean-Michel Marlaud, and that he noticed the same attitude in both of them.

“I was often invited to official and private ceremonies and regularly sat next to Martens or Marlaud during the meal. One could never finish the meal before the discussions turned back to the subject of the Tutsis as people to be excluded, as bad people. They often said these things. Marlaud painted a more savage anti-Tutsis hatred picture than Martens, and it was said that he came from the DGSE, a French security service. Old Martens was more discrete, more diplomatic. But he too, did not hide the fact that the Tutsi were "bad", a term he used with ease. They expressed their hostility toward the Tutsis openly and publicly, with no restraint even while some Tutsis were present like my former colleague, old Gashumba.”

A former worker in the French embassy in Rwanda who preferred anonymity revealed to the Commission the existence of segregation practices within the local personnel that was expressed by favouritism of Hutus over Tutsis. This discrimination began to be implemented at the end of 1991 after the press publication of an official correspondence from the French embassy stated that Lt Col. Chollet had been appointed advisor of the Rwandan army head of staff, Lt. Colonel Serubuga, with very wide attributions in the command of the army. The French embassy suspected its Tutsi employees to have been behind the leak of the document and started to harass them to cause them to resign.

These statements could lead to the conclusion that the French political leaders who were in charge of managing the Rwandan situation had largely adopted ethnic hostility targeting the Tutsis generally. Therefore, as we have seen, the French representatives supported the ethnic war of the Habyarimana regime against the Tutsis, albeit at arm’s length, by largely sharing its ideological principles.

8.4. Attempts to implicate western powers

After having strongly increased its military engagement between June and October 1992, France also attempted to implicate its European counterparts in the Rwandan conflict but with little success.

Due to this fact, French diplomacy became more active and offensive in 1993. They were mainly aiming to obtain strong support from the Western powers. On 15th January 1993, President Mitterrand addressed a letter to President Bill Clinton reporting the concern for preservation of stability in Rwanda by promoting negotiations between the warring parties whose solution would be the holding of free elections in the near future. The main objective of the correspondence was to mobilise funds. The French president announced a contribution of up to 10 million FF from his country and expressed the wish that other countries join the effort. On 19th January, another letter of the same content as that addressed to Clinton was sent to Chancellor Kohl, to Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, to Adolf Ogi, President of the Swiss Confederation and to Jean-Luc Dehaene, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Belgium.

In fact, Germany and the United States, like France, had the position of observers at the negotiations that were underway in Arusha since the middle of 1992. These negotiations were led by a transition government that circumstances had forced president Habyarimana to set up. However, the Prime Minister of this government and president Habyarimana did not share the same political standpoint, while the RPF army was manifesting a significant increase in might, since June 1992, and particularly during the time of its general offensive of February.

On 9th February 1993, France announced that it was sending 150 additional troops and on February 12th Bruno Delaye and the director of African Affairs at the Quay d’ Orsay, Jean-Marc De La Sablière, left for Kigali and Kampala. Upon return from this mission, Bruno Delaye gave a report on the position and differences in opinion between the president and his Prime Minister, and explained that the differences between the two men reflected “the cleavage between Hutus of the North and Hutus of the South” Further down in the note, he explained the negative consequences of this situation: “it offers pretext for the RPF which does not cease making points on the military and political level in addition to the military support of Uganda, the Belgian sympathy for Tutsis, an excellent propaganda system that focuses on the heinous crimes committed by the extremist Hutus and the generous complicity of the Anglo-Saxon world.”

The note of Bruno Delaye described a distressing situation for France and proposed a more determined engagement at the side of the Kigali regime:

“the situation remains extremely delicate for us: Our indirect strategy of support to the Rwandan armed forces has come to a limit. (We should accelerate the supplies of ammunitions and materials). Their degree of motivation is too imbalanced (due to the differences between Hutus of the North and Hutus of the South) to calmly consider stabilisation of their military forces. In the event that the frontline is penetrated, we would have no choice but to evacuate Kigali (the official mission of our two infantry companies is to protect expatriates), unless we actually engaged in the war. Our international isolation (The Belgians, English and Americans do not like Habyarimana) must lead us to put even greater effort on the diplomatic offensive [underlined in the text ] in order to gather the diplomatic support needed to implement the results –theoretically – obtained by this mission to Kigali and Kampala. This effort was engaged at the Quay of Orsay.”

February 19th 1993, General Quesnot also addressed President Mitterrand in a note summarizing the discussion that he held with the Rwandan president and confirmed the essential elements of B. Delaye’s analysis. In this note, he explained that following the RPF offensive of the RPF of 8th February, 1993, France had three options:1) "evacuation of nationals in the coming days if the RPF maintains its intention to seize the capital [… ]; 2) the immediate deployment of at least two infantry companies in Kigali [… ] This action would not solve the basic problems but would help buy time;
3) Deployment of a more significant army contingent to prevent the RPF from seizing Kigali and to make the available Rwandan units to at least resume their positions at the former cease-fire line. [… ] However, this would effectively mean direct implication.”

According to another note of Dominique Pin and General Quesnot summarising the restricted session of the Security Council meeting on Rwanda on February 24th 1993, direct or indirect involvement could not be taken for granted. “This option is technically possible, but it can be considered only if we have irrefutable evidence of direct Ugandan military intervention, which is currently not the case.” This observation gives reason to believe that the various inspections conducted by the French Mission of Observers (MOF) was not able to establish any indisputable proof of a direct invasion or aggression from Uganda in the various reports and declarations of French officials.

Given the very restricted room for decisive French military action for diplomatic reasons, the Rwandan government was obliged to request the UN to deploy observers along the border between Uganda and Rwanda.

8.5. Attempt at manipulating the UN

The idea of using the UN to cover the French military intervention in Rwanda dates back to February-March 1993, a few weeks after the offensive of the RPF and significant strengthening of the French military intervention. At the beginning of March 1993, President Mitterrand recommended that the matter be put before the UN. “This issue should be tabled at the UN. It is unbelievable that a country should attack another and get away with it; we do not have to tolerate this kind of thing. It is urgent to make the UN react.”

President Mitterrand knew he could count on the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, to obtain a UN endorsement of` French military intervention in Rwanda because he owed much to France and Rwanda : “The decision of Boutros Ghali is urgent: if our soldiers are transformed into UN troops, it will change the picture. But we should not go it alone. We could take part in a UN force with a thousand men. It is necessary to inform Mérimée [French ambassador to the UN] in time and make haste to set up the system. If there is no response from the United Nations a new closed session will be required.”

On 5th March 1993, France proposed a draft Resolution in the UN for the deployment of a joint UN-OAU force to supervise a demilitarised zone. On 12th March 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 812 as a result of the French proposal. In another note ,General Quesnot specified what France expected from this resolution:

“At the diplomatic level, the priority will be given to the putting in place of UN observers on the Rwanda-Uganda border (point 3 of Resolution 812 of the Security Council) in order to reduce Uganda’s military support to the RPF forces. A French delegation has gone today to New York to prepare the setting up of this observer force.”

The UN force for cease-fire observation and the control of the Rwanda-Uganda border was eventually set up, but it largely escaped the control of France and its command was entrusted to the Canadian General Dallaire.

The French position started to become problematic, if not faltering. In fact, in 1993, the political and military situation developed considerably against France’s principal ally, president Habyarimana. He could no longer exercise the absolute power he had before the war : The show of military force by the RPF and the gain in influence of the unarmed opposition inside the country forced him to accept the setting up of a transitional government. As noted by various French officials, the head of this transitional government, Dismas Nsengiyaremye, was on a political line quite different from that of the President. It was the Ministers in the Nsengiyaremye government, especially the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who conducted all the negotiations at that time – especially with effect from 10th August, 1992 –which led to the signature of agreements on the rule of law, power sharing among all the political forces, and peace.

The peace agreement, which was thought to be decisive, was signed on 4th August 1993 in Arusha between President Habyarimana and the Rwanda Patriotic Front, recommending the setting up of a more inclusive broad based transitional government and the deployment of a UN peace keeping force. However, the RPF made the withdrawal of French troops from Rwanda a precondition for signing the peace agreement; it was also firmly opposed to the inclusion of French soldiers in the future UN Mission in Rwanda, supposed to guarantee the implementation of the Arusha Peace Accords. With the departure of the main body of French troops from Rwanda on 15th December 1993, it meant in fact the removal of the whole military, political and diplomatic machinery that had supported President Habyarimana in his policy of ethnic massacres and refusal of change. In this context, President Habyarimana and his entourage, who had not given up their policy of refusal, had to find a way of continuing the war by other means, in other words, by genocide.













PART II: FRANCE’S INVOLVEMENT DURING THE GENOCIDE


I France’s involvement during the genocide, before Opération Turquoise

On the evening of 6th April 1994, around 20.30 hrs, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down while landing at Kanombe (Kigali) airport. It was on its way back from Dar-es-Salaam where the president had gone for an ultimate summit devoted to the Rwandan crisis. Among the plane’s occupants, none survived. From that very evening, the soldiers of the presidential guard, the paratroopers’ battalion and the reconnaissance as well as the Interahamwe militia erected barriers on all main roads and in several districts of the capital, and the killings began. The following day, in the course of the day, the country learnt that the Prime Minister of the transitional government and many of her ministers had been assassinated, and massacres spread throughout the country, targeting mainly Tutsis, but also Hutu opponents. Thus, the predicted genocide began. It is in this context that France decided once again to send a military contingent to Rwanda. This military intervention that lasted from 9th to 12th April 1994 was given the code name Opération Amaryllis.

1. Official justifications of Opération Amaryllis

The main justification given for the operation was the evacuation of French nationals and other foreigners. The operation took place as the campaign of massacres of Tutsis became more and more systematic in Kigali and spread very quickly to the interior of the country, but France decided officially and publicly not to do anything to stop the massacres.

1.1. Protection of the French, European nationals, and other foreigners

The decision to evacuate French and other expatriates living in Rwanda was not taken immediately after the assassination of President Habyarimana, on the 6th of April when nor on the following day the campaign of massacres started in Kigali, and not even before the afternoon of 8th April. Political and military leaders analysed the situation first, in order to be able to react at the opportune moment. By so doing, they gave priority to reinforcing FAR’s capacity to get the upper hand in the war with the RPF.

On 7th April, Bruno Delaye observed in the minutes of a meeting of the “crisis cell” set up in the Elysée: “For the time being our nationals are not threatened and no evacuation is planned.”

General Quesnot was of the same opinion: “For the time being, French nationals (450 in Kigali) don’t seem to be threatened. Some isolated families have been sheltered near the Embassy.” President Mitterrand’s special chief of staff seems to prioritise the theory according to which “the Rwandan armed forces are capable of holding the town by containing the RPF battalion of eight hundred men and some infiltrated elements”, without however, excluding the fact that the Rwandan army may be “incapable of holding the north of the country from where a new RPF offensive could come with strong logistic support from Uganda”.

In spite of the decision not to evacuate immediately, preparatory measures were taken, including the setting up of plans to protect and evacuate French and Belgian nationals in collaboration with the Belgian battalion working within the UNAMIR. Furthermore, two battalions and a health unit were put on alert in Bangui, Libreville and Ndjamena. Considering the history of the French action in Rwanda, the attitude of wait and see advocated by the various French officials was accompanied by the wish not to put France in the limelight. “Matignon and the Quai d’Orsay would like, in this new Rwandan crisis which risks being more murderous, France not to be on the front line and limit our action to interventions at the UN so that the United nations mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) may fulfil its security mission in Kigali (which it has not actually done to-date)”.

The decision to evacuate was taken when on the 8th, towards 1900 hours, Ambassador Malraux informed the Quai d’Orsay that “the security (of) foreigners was under threat and justified their evacuation.” This request was made due to the news of the assassination of the French gendarme, Didot and his wife. The death of his colleague, Mayer, would be known later. These French gendarmes secretly listened to communications. Ambassador Marlaud thought that they were assassinated by the RPF, but a number of facts contradict this assertion.

The simple evacuation of the French nationals and foreigners was not the only planned option. A rift arose between the Office of the President of the Republic and the government consisting of the opposition of the right during this period of cohabitation. “[The special chief of staff of President Mitterrand, General Quesnot] Refusing to resign himself to the new “massacres and counter massacres,”, he recommended a more ambitious intervention by the French army so as to protect and evacuate the foreign community, stabilise the FAR, restore order in Kigali, and come between the belligerents in such a way as to stop the offensive of the Rwanda Patriotic Front.” The option of direct support to the FAR is quickly turned down especially by Prime Minister E. Balladur and to a certain extent the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Juppé. It was not necessary to plunge back “into the Rwandan mess” nor “interfere in Rwandan political game”.

The operation was to be restricted to the evacuation of French nationals and foreigners have well have the closed relative of President Habyarimana, goal have we will see later one, it also supplied FAR with ammunitions and left behind it soldiers to continues supporting FAR involved in the genocide. Finally, in spite of France’s significant capacity to influence the army and the political leaders organising the systematic massacre of the Tutsi population, and the presence of a sizeable armed force for five days at the beginning of the genocide, France chose not to intervene while the massacres were going on.

1.2 The proclamation of the decision of non-intervention in the ongoing massacres

On 10th April, Opération Amaryllis consisted of 464 elite soldiers, the collaboration between the French troops and the FAR was excellent. The French instructors of the FAR elite units most involved in the killings were still present in Kigali. The French Ambassador encouraged the strong man at the time, Colonel Bagosora, to take control of the situation. Ambassador Marlaud gave shelter to most politicians of the Habyarimana regime, but also to a big number of those who belonged to the new interim government, the formation of which he was consulted on. This shows the decisive influence, which France had over the politico-military process at the very beginning of the genocide and over the men who organized it. Moreover, France decided to do absolutely nothing to halt the massacres.

At no time, according to facts or retrospectively, did Ambassador Marlaud mention any positive influence that France had on the politico-military process at the very beginning of the genocide and on the people who organized it.

With regard to military intervention, the failure to act when faced with the massacres is laid down in the order of Opération Amaryllis from 8th April 1994, which stipulates that: “the French detachment will adopt a discreet attitude and neutral behaviour towards the Rwandan factions”. Ministers Alain Juppé and Michel Roussin who undertook to explain the reasons behind Opération Amaryllis stated unambiguously France’s refusal to try to stop the massacres. On 11th April Michel Roussin explained the limits of the French intervention: “For France, it is not a question of intervening militarily in Rwanda. It is clear that our mission is of a humanitarian nature whose aim is to repatriate our nationals and their families”. On the same day, Alain Juppé was more explicit in his rejection of an intervention directed at stopping the massacres: “Can France keep order in the whole world? Does she have the means and responsibility to stop, on the whole planet, people from killing each other?”

This refusal by the right-wing government to intervene to stop the massacres in progress can easily be explained by the wish to distance itself from Mitterrand’s management of the Rwandan problem, but it is also based on an ethnic and tribal view of Africa in general and of Rwanda in particular. Thus, in private, Prime Minister Balladur may have said: “They have always killed each other like that! Why do you want it to stop?”
On the part of the French Presidency, we observed, through General Quesnot, the proposal of an armed action to stop the massacres is coupled with a French military support to ensure the FAR’s victory over the RPF. This option is shared by Colonel Bach, head of the Amaryllis specialized detachment, who thinks that it was still possible to reverse the military situation and avoid the FAR defeat, moreover involved in the massacres. “There was no sign at that time of an imminent RPF victory; the FAR were fighting back effectively […]. Indeed, it would have required very few things (some French military advisers) to witness a reversal of the situation. June 1992 and June 1993 could have been “re-enacted” in April 1994” .

On the 13th of April, that is to say a week after the beginning of the massacres, when they had reached a level of exceptional intensity and the interim government’s role as organizer of these massacres was well known, President Mitterrand was worried of the latter’s fate: “It would be surprising if Habyarimana’s government did not find a safe place where it can hold on for some time”. Under those conditions it is not surprising that France did not try in any way to stop the massacres during Operation Amaryllis.

2. The facts blamed on France

2.1 Political support to the organizers of the genocide

After Habyarimana’s death and the start of the genocide, France offered political support to the interim government in order to facilitate its acceptance by other States and international organisations. This support manifested itself especially in the political advices given to the leaders of the massacres during the formation of the interim government, the privileged evacuation of Hutu extremists and the abandonment of the Tutsi employees of the international organisations in Rwanda. The French forces deployed in Rwanda in April 1994 did not try to check the murderous fury of the soldiers and militia who massacred civilians in front of their eyes.

2.1.1 Involvement in the training of the interim government

From the morning of 7th April 1994, many dignitaries of the Habyarimana regime among whom there were partisans of the extermination of Tutsis gathered in the French embassy where they were accommodated with their families. There were about a hundred Rwandans, remembers Joseph Ngarambe, who arrived there on 10th April. As the table below shows, those who gathered there had, at first sight, few reasons to fear for their security, because they were part of the very close circle of the Presidential party and the Hutu power in most cases. Most of them played an active role in the genocide and are today being pursued by the judiciary, either on trial at the ICTR or sentenced by this jurisdiction, or targeted by complaints at international jurisdictions of other States:

Name and surname Post previously
occupied Post during the genocide Political affiliation Current legal status
Justin Mugenzi Minister of Commerce Minister of Commerce PL power On trial at the ICTR
Pauline Nyiramasubuko Minister in charge of family affairs Minister in charge of family affairs MRND On trial at the ICTR
Ferdinand Nahimana Director of ORINFOR Director of RTLM MRND Sentenced to life imprisonment by the ICTR
Augustin Ngirabatware Minister of Planning Minister of Planning MRND On the run, wanted by the ICTR
Félicien Kabuga Business man Business man MRND Wanted by the ICTR
André Ntagerura Minister of transport Minister of transport MRND Tried and acquitted by the ICTR
Daniel Mbangura Minister of Higher Education Minister of Higher Education MRND Whereabouts unknown
Gaspard Ruhumuliza Minister of Environment PDC power Lives in Switzerland
Casmir Bizimungu Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of Foreign Affairs MRND On trial at the ICTR
Callixte Nzabonimana Minister of Youth Minister of Youth MRND On the run, wanted by the ICTR
Jérôme Bicamumpaka Lawyer Minister of Foreign Affairs MDR power On trial at the ICTR
Séraphin Rwabukumba Business man Business man MRND Subject to a complaint in Belgium
Joseph Nzirorera Minister of Public Works Secretary General of MRND MRND On trial at the ICTR
Mathieu Ngirumpatse National Chairman of MRND Chairman of MRND MRND On trial at the ICTR
Prosper Mugiraneza Minister of Public Service Minister of Public Service MDR power On trial at the ICTR
George Ruggiu RTLM moderator Member of Hutu power Pleaded guilty and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment by the ICTR
Protais Zigiranyirazo Prefect of Ruhengeri MRND On trial at the ICTR
Eliézer Niyitegeka Minister of Information MDR power Sentenced to life imprisonment by the ICTR
Straton Nsabumukunzi Minister of Agriculture PSD power Whereabouts unknown
Silvestre Nsanzimana Ex-Prime Minister MRND Died in exile in Belgium
Pasteur Musabe Director of BACAR Director of BACAR, shareholder of RTLM MRND Died in Cameroon

During their stay at the French embassy in Kigali, they contributed in forming the ministerial cabinet of the so-called interim government that organized and supervised the execution of the genocide. A number of these personalities who took refuge in the French embassy would be part of the interim government as can be seen on this table. Colonel Bagosora was in charge of the formation of the interim government, with the collaboration of the leaders of the “power” parties or the power factions of the opposition parties. A cousin to President Habyarimana’s wife, Bagosora received his training at the War College in Paris, where he obtained a certificate of higher military studies. He was successively deputy commander of the Kigali Higher Military Academy and commander of the important Kanombe military camp, from 1988 to 1992, in which the French officers and instructors were operating, before his appointment to the post of Director of Cabinet in the Ministry of Defence in 1992. He was retired from the army on 23rd September 1993, but continued to exercise his functions of Director of cabinet until his departure from Rwanda in July 1994. He is one of the main organizers of the civil self-defence programme during which distributions of arms were carried out to civilian Hutus who had undergone military training, sometimes provided by French soldiers. According to Filip Reyntjens, it is Bagosora who gave the orders, from the Ministry of defence, of massacres to the Presidential Guard, the reconnaissance battalion and the paratrooper battalion with which he had a direct and private radio connection. This was in the night of 6th to 7th April 1994, between 0200 hrs and 0700 hrs in the morning. Today he is on trial at the ICTR as organizer of the genocide.

The French ambassador, Jean-Philippe Marlaud, got personally involved, at Bagosora’s side, in the formation of the interim government, to the extent of suggesting some people who could be called upon to be part of it. Since 7th April, according to Ambassador Marlaud’s declarations at the MIP, who was in the company of Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin, he had “approached Colonel Bagosora, the Director of Cabinet in the Ministry of defence, while the latter was on a trip in Cameroon. He had told him that it was necessary to resume control of the situation and that the Rwandan armed forces needed to cooperate with UNAMIR, but that warning did not prove useful and the situation continued to deteriorate.”

Colonel Bagosora’s radically anti-Tutsi tendencies and against moderate opposition political parties were common knowledge. Thus, in June 1992, when the new coalition government led by the former opposition removed from office the former chiefs of staff of the army and the gendarmerie because of their extremist political positions, President Habyarimana had tried to have Bagosora appointed to the post of chief of staff of the FAR, but the parties of the former opposition refused by virtue of his extremist political orientations. It is the very same Bagosora who, after participating in part of the negotiations of the Arusha Agreement had, on the 8 January 1993, “openly expressed his opposition to the concessions made by the government representative, Boniface Ngulinzira, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the extent of leaving the negotiations. Colonel Bagosora left Arusha and declared that he was returning to Rwanda to prepare the Apocalypse”. This declaration, widely relayed in the Rwandan press, was very shocking at the time.

The adjustment that constituted Ambassador Marlaud and Colonel Maurin’s approach to ask Bagosora to take “control of the situation” is well expressed by the former Prime Minister of the interim government, Jean Kambanda, during his interrogation of the 26 September 1997 by two ICTR investigators. To the question of knowing if Colonel Bagosora had encountered any opposition from the highest military officers to his intention of taking control of the military crisis committee that was constituted during the meeting of 7th April at the army headquarters, Kambanda replied: “– Jean Kambanda: Yes to his project of taking over power […] And he was rather advised to ask for the opinion of the French ambassador.”

The support given by Ambassador Marlaud to the one who is today considered as the main organizer of the genocide and the protection given to the most radically extremist members of the Hutu power who took refuge in the embassy differs strongly from the way the French diplomat treated the case of the Prime Minister in office, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. She represented the legitimate political authority as the head of government. She was, at the legal level, the person authorized to secure the vacancy of power. But she had perhaps the disadvantage, in the eyes of the French ambassador, of being opposed to the Hutu power. Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana had intervened on the morning of 7th April on RFI by launching a very strong call for peace and the stop of violence. When she tried to go to the studios of the national radio, the FAR prevented her from reaching Radio Rwanda to send a message to the nation. By that radio broadcast intervention on the morning of 7th April, when several opposition personalities had already been assassinated, France knew that the Rwandan Prime Minister was alive and in danger of death. Yet, between the Prime Minister’s residence and the French embassy, there was a distance not exceeding 500 m! She was executed very near her home between 11.00 a.m. and 12.00 noon. She could have been saved if the French ambassador had wanted it.

Interviewed by the MIP, Marlaud in fact acknowledged having held meetings with political officials who constituted the interim government:

“The morning of 8th April had been marked by […] the arrival of several ministers at the Embassy. They then held a meeting during which they fixed three thrusts: to replace the dead or disappeared ministers or officials, try to take once again control of the Presidential guard in order to stop the massacres, and finally to reaffirm their commitment to the Arusha Agreement. However, they refused to appoint Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu Prime Minister in the place of Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana”.

Concluding on Marlaud’s hearing, the MIP wrote: “Towards 2000 hours [8th April], the embassy was informed of the appointment of the President of the Republic and an interim Government. The composition of this government was apparently in accordance with the Arusha Agreement since it provided for the allocation of the portfolios between political parties”.

Ambassador Marlaud distorts the truth. Because the interim government brought together only representatives of the member parties of the Hutu power delegation as well as dissident Hutu power factions of the opposition parties. This Hutu Power coalition was, since the end of the year 1993, radically against the Arusha Agreement and advocated the massacre of Tutsis and Hutu political officials and Tutsis loyal to the Arusha peace process. The formation of the interim government, an essential stage in the achievement of the genocidaire programme, had required first of all the assassination of the political leaders opposed to the Hutu power coalition, among them the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who, according to the constitution, was supposed to assume power, by virtue of the disappearance of the Head of State. Some rare non-Hutu power political leaders had managed to hide. Thus, the formation of the interim government is a clear manifestation of the blow against the Arusha Agreement and the political stage necessary for the commission of the genocide. After contributing to its formation, Ambassador Marlaud tried to recognize the government that organized the genocide, four years later.

After the formation of this government, Ambassador Marlaud worked on getting diplomatic support for it from European partners. During the afternoon of 8th April, he telephoned his Belgian counterpart, Johan Swinnen, and gave him a list of the chosen ministers and requested him to give his support, by giving the reason that the government had been put in place to prevent a military coup d’état. According to F. Reyntjens, quoted by Linda Melvern , the Belgian ambassador “reacts with reservation,” by thinking that “the tendency is too much ‘power’. He expresses the point of view that such a government seems least concerned with the real political requirements. Marlaud says that he is satisfied. Especially since he thinks that the formation of a government will make it possible to prevent the coup d’état that he fears”.

We can ask ourselves about the reasons that led ambassador Marlaud to isolate General Marcel Gatsinzi, the army chief of staff who represented the lawful military authority. Why France collaborated with Bagosora, retired from the army and well known for his extremist positions, by leaving aside the chief of staff in charge of national security issues and maintenance of order, who had been appointed since 6th in the evening by his peers of the army.

2.1.2 The targeted evacuations

Some days after the triggering off of the genocide, France deployed Opération Amaryllis in Rwanda, with the official mission of evacuating French nationals and foreigners. Thus, Amaryllis evacuated the French and other Westerners, sometimes with their dogs, but abandoned hundreds of thousands of Rwandans in danger of certain death, including Tutsi employees of the embassy and other French services established in Rwanda. She left behind officials of non-European international organisations who had taken refuge at the UNAMIR at the official technical school de Kicukiro, but was concerned with evacuating as a matter of priority the most virulent Hutu extremists.

a) Protection of Hutu power extremists

The main Rwandan people evacuated by France were those close to power, with priority given to the late president’s widow, Agathe Kanziga, first of all on board a Transall of the French army to Bangui with twelve members of her family, in particular her brother Protais Zigiranyirazo, her sister Catherine Mukamusoni, her first cousin Séraphin Rwabukumba and Alphonse Ntilivamunda, President Habyarimana’s son-in-law. At that time, Agathe Kanziga and those other people, with the exception of Catherine Mukamusoni, are known for being extremists who, from 1992, organized around a group of killers consisting of civilians and soldiers, called “Zero network” or “Madam’s clan” which coordinated the massacres and political assassinations during the years preceding the genocide. Mrs. Habyarimana’s criminal role was recognized by the Commission for refugees’ appeal in its decision of dismissal of 15th February 2007, which states as follows:

“The result of the preliminary investigation is that […] it is possible to establish the existence of a first circle of power […] called akazu, in which the predominant role played by the claimant was conspicuous; that this first circle of the akazu included people coming mostly from the interested person’s province of origin and that of her late husband, that the hard core of the same circle consisted of Mrs. Agathe KANZIGA Habyarimana’s widow, her brother Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO, her first cousin Séraphin RWABUKUMBA and her cousin, Colonel Elie SAGATWA, and that this “small akazu” held the real power since the 1973 coup d’état especially in the appointment of leaders, soldiers and magistrates to the main posts as well as in redistributing state property, which favoured members of the akazu from the provinces of the north-west of Rwanda, from where came these members; that is why the claimant, without having an official post, exercised a de facto authority on the affairs of state; that she had necessarily found herself at the heart of the regime that had become guilty of the crimes perpetrated between 1973 and 1994, especially assassinations of political opponents after the 1973 coup d’état and the planning of the Rwandan genocide that took place, in its greatest proportion, between 6th April and 17th July 1994”.

President Habyarimana’s widow did not at all hide her commitment in favour of the ongoing massacres in Rwanda. François Mitterand’s declaration during an audience granted to a delegation of Doctors without Borders, on 14th June 1994, shows it quite well: “She is possessed, if she could, she would continue calling for massacres on French radios. She is very difficult to control”.

The role played by Agathe Kanziga in the policy of massacres was common knowledge and French decision makers knew it. From these documents from the French President’s Office it is obvious that the evacuation of the Rwandan presidential family and other dignitaries of the Rwandan regime was explicitly organized by the French President. A note from Bruno Delaye shows “President Habyarimana’s family. It is for the time being under protection of the Presidential guard. If it wishes, it will be received at our ambassador’s residence, in accordance with your instructions”. Another note from General Quesnot specifies: “The situation led to recommending strongly to our nationals to leave the country. The first plane with about forty French people on board and, in accordance with your instructions, twelve members of President Habyarimana’s close family left Kigali on Saturday late afternoon”.

Agathe Kanziga and her close relatives arrived in France on 17th April 1994 and settled first of all in a hotel in Paris at the expense of the French Government, then moved to a family flat, with France meeting all the expenses for the suite of furniture. They were received by the representatives of the Quai d’Orsay who allocated to them a subsistence allowance charged on a special account for urgent actions in favour of Rwandan refugees. Interrogated on the merits of that favour, the Minister of Cooperation, Michel Roussin rose up against those who criticized him: “We had good relations with a lawfully elected president and we picked up his family which requested for our assistance”. He added: “It is strange, to say the least, to blame France for acting that way: other countries deemed it appropriate to abandon the leaders with whom they had normal relations until then. Doing the same would have condemned them to death. Our traditions are different.”

Interviewed by the MIP, Alain Juppé denied the reality of the selective nature of the evacuations: “Those decisions to evacuate were taken on the spot between the French embassy, and our ambassador who was on the ground, Mr. Marlaud, and the officers of Amaryllis according to what was feasible in the town that had fallen prey to massacres and where many areas were totally inaccessible. The detail might seem insignificant but the telephone had been disconnected. We were able to evacuate the people who were at the embassy and in the assembly areas – and I say it here until I get proof to the contrary – whether they were French, foreigners of all nationalities, the Hutu or Tutsi Rwandans. The embassy staff were saved irrespective of their origin. And I find it extremely serious to affirm without concrete proof that there might have been screening at the French embassy between Hutus and Tutsis at the time of evacuation. I would like to affirm the contrary – on the basis of the information I have – provided that those who support this argument support it with proof. But I would like to say that it is really extremely serious when people assert things of this nature.”

It is proper to clarify that the telephone was disconnected in Kigali during the Operation Amaryllis. During this period, the Tutsi former employees of French institutions used it and communicated with their French employers, as we shall see further down. The country’s main telephone exchange was removed from the Hôtel des Mille Collines and was under surveillance of the French soldiers. It allowed exchanges between Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin and the FAR headquarters , and it is on this same exchange, on 2nd May 1994, that Bruno Delaye talked to the boss of the FAR, General Bizimungu, to stop him from executing the refugees in that hotel. Finally, during Amaryllis, French troops could go wherever they pleased, almost everywhere in Kigali, except the small area occupied by the RPF battalion stationed inside Parliament and its surroundings by virtue of the Arusha Agreement.

b) Screening and abandonment of people in mortal danger

During Amaryllis, Rwandans who worked in French institutions in Rwanda were all abandoned. Michel Cuingnet, head of the French civilian cooperation mission in Rwanda in 1994, remembers that “the local staff of the cooperation Mission, most of them Tutsis, were practically all massacred, some of them under his eyes; with regard to the other staff of the different French diplomatic services, considering the events and the distance between the buildings, he doesn’t know if they were able to be evacuated.” Venuste Kayijamahe and Charles Rubagumya, at the time employees of the French Cultural Centre in Kigali, affirm effectively having contacted Michel Cuingnet and other French officials to be saved and they each received no answer.

Venuste Kayijamahe testifies:

“In February 1994, I had been threatened with death by the militia at my home in Gikondo and I had moved to the French cultural centre. I had put my five children in families in town. On 6th April in the morning, the director of the Centre, Anne Cros, called me and asked me to find accommodation outside. As soon as the massacres started in the night of 6th to 7th, I tried to reach the areas where my children were. I asked Anne for help on phone on 8th April. She replied that she could not do anything for me, that there were not enough French soldiers, that they had left since Noroît and that those who were there were too busy. She hung up. In the afternoon, Anne Cros came to the Centre escorted by a dozen French soldiers to pack dossiers. I begged her to authorize those soldiers to accompany me so that I could go to retrieve my children who were not far from the Centre. She replied that she could not do anything about it. I called the French embassy several times to ask for help. As soon as I said that it was Venuste, the agent hung up. I was blamed for having accorded interviews to the RFI to describe my predicament. On 9th April in the afternoon, I received a telephone call from Michel Cuingnet by surprise, who told me that he was sending me 57 soldiers. He told me to warn the guards so that they could open the doors quickly because the soldiers would not stay long. I asked Michel Cuingnet to help me to go and retrieve my children. He told me to discuss with them when they were there and he hung up. After their arrival at the Centre, I talked to the superior with a rank of major and made my request. He replied that he would not evacuate Rwandans. I told him that M. Cuingnet had authorized me to go and retrieve my children. The soldier told me that he didn’t give a damn about me, and that in any case, they would not evacuate Rwandans. On the 11th of April, a French soldier told me that they were about to go. I beseeched him once again to take us either to France, or to another country, or to the CND, or to the UNAMIR. He told me that it was the Embassy that decided everything, that he had no order to evacuate us. On 12th April, they went and left us behind.”

Charles Rubagumya reports the same experience:

“On 7th April, I called the French Cultural Centre to ask for help. On the line I had one of my immediate bosses who replied that I had to manage on my own. During the following days, I called several times without being listened to. On 11th April, I bribed a Rwandan soldier who accompanied me to the Cultural Centre. It was guarded by several French soldiers. I showed them my service card and I entered. Inside, I met Venuste Kayijamahe. There was also one of his friends, three other workers and a woman accompanied by her children whom I had pretended was my family. They were all Tutsis. The French told us that they were going away the following day and that they would not carry us with them, that our evacuation was not part of their mandate. It was unthinkable for us. The following day, they packed their luggage without telling us anything. One of my colleagues contacted the wife of Ambassador Marlaud to ask her to intervene for us. She replied that the French were not evacuating Rwandans. Immediately, the French soldiers took their vehicles and took away all their foodstuffs without leaving anything behind for us. I threw myself in one of their convoys. They threw me on the ground. We begged a group of them who at least accepted to drop us at the St. Expery School where the Belgian nationals were gathered. We remained there. When the Belgian soldiers came to evacuate their nationals, they took all those who were there, without any distinction. They took us to Nairobi and I managed to get a visa and I went to Europe.”

Apart from abandoning the local Tutsi personnel, Amaryllis refused to evacuate Rwandans who had married foreigners, those who cohabited with the French or with Europeans of other nationalities. Nor did Amaryllis evacuate Rwandan defenders of human rights who had requested them, such as the prosecutor François Nsanzuwera, and political opposition personalities like the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boniface Ngulinzira, hated by the champions of Hutu power for his main role on the peace negotiations, whereas he begged the French soldiers at ETO on 11th April.

Colette Braeckman, who was there, mentions the French soldiers’ complaisant attitude in these terms. “I witnessed some harrowing scenes at the Kanombe airport where the French left behind Tutsi partners of expatriates who begged them to take them along with them. Unlike the Belgians who managed to ex-filtrate some Tutsis in a small number, the French embarked only on expatriates. They separated mixed couples.” A journalist of the daily Le Monde also present remembers the case of a Russian woman married to a Tutsi who was forced to abandon her husband, the French soldiers allowing her in extremis the only right to take her three half-caste children.

Some Rwandans managed to slip into lorries carrying the expatriates, but at the airport, the French soldiers carried out screening on the basis of the pre-established lists. They turned back those who were rejected, and handed them over de facto to the Rwandan soldiers and militia who had erected roadblocks at the entry to the airport who massacred them there and then. Jean Loup Denblyden, a reserve colonel who participated in the Silver Back operation as a Belgian liaison officer with the French detachment affirms: “during Amaryllis, French soldiers screened the Tutsis before the Kanombe airport and pushed them back towards the roadblocks”. There was a screening and the people who were rejected, were pushed back to the roadblock. The French said to those who were rejected: we are not taking you, and pushed them back towards the roadblock which was exactly at the entry to the present parking”.

On realizing the seriousness of the facts, Mr. Denblyden informed the French military officers and UNAMIR, and received as an answer not to interfere with issues that didn’t concern Belgians:

“I climbed the stairs where Colonel Poncet was, who commanded the Opération Amaryllis, and told him my problem. He shrugged his shoulders, Colonel Morin who was from UNAMIR and was beside him asked me not to interfere. I immediately contacted General Romeo and the operation officer […] I told them my problem as I thought it was my duty to do so […] A French non-commissioned officer intervened by telling me that Belgians were not concerned, and that it was a French problem. It was on the third day of Amaryllis”. Finally, M. Denblyden noticed that people had been killed near that roadblock: “I climbed above the airport on the platform, and I went to see if from above where I was I could see the roadblock, and there I saw bodies strewn at the right side of the airport, lower down.”

Jean-Pierre Martin, a Belgian journalist, reports that French soldiers took pleasure in watching the massacres of civilians near Kanombe Airport:

“It is true that in 1994 I saw images that remain in my memory and that I would never forget especially that pregnant woman that they disembowelled a 100 m in front of me and there was a jeep and two French soldiers who were laughing. Who were laughing 50 m from where it was happening. And finally it is the two Belgian soldiers with whom we were that routed the Interahamwe or the killers. (…) It was at the exit from the airport when you turn to the road that leads to town, once you have passed the depression and you climb towards the stadium, it happened there. I was in the depression, moving from a jeep of Belgian soldiers which came to my rescue because they were afraid; and we witnessed that scene where a pregnant woman was disembowelled, and between me, the jeep of Belgian soldiers and that killing, there was a jeep of French soldiers busy laughing, who didn’t move, who watched the scene as if it was in a cinema.”

The perpetration of massacres at Kanombe Airport in front of the complacent French soldiers was also narrated by the France 2 special envoy, Philippe Boisserie, who reported it in the televised news of 11th April 1994 at 1300hrs:

“I was at the airport producing a topic, and late morning, a Canadian female colleague (…) came back in a state of shock, because effectively, what had happened was what I narrated in sequence: at the time when the French convoy was coming back, there was a massacre that took place under my eyes. We therefore decided to shoot on the spot. We knew that was not far from the airport, but we were all the same taking a risk. We asked to be allowed to go there and a car, always driven by the French soldiers, escorted us. We were able to see that there had been a massacre. It was a daily affair and it happened under the eyes of French soldiers without any reaction on their part.”

Colette Braeckman remembers also that French soldiers displayed an indifferent attitude towards the massacres:

“During all those days, it was very dangerous for Belgians to move freely in Kigali. I only made one trip to town with Belgian soldiers who were going to look for expatriates. From a lorry in which we were, I saw the scene of Kigali town, bodies that were strewn on the streets, lorries of the refuse department that were passing by and picking up corpses and remains. Some journalist colleagues who were accompanying the French soldiers told me that the latter did not engage in soul-searching. They all had helmets with music, and when they arrived at roadblocks where people were being killed, they increased the volume of the music so as not to hear the shouts of the people who were massacred under their eyes. Afterwards, they would ask that they open the way and would pass very quickly to pick expatriates”.

According to statements made to journalists by a French soldier who sought anonymity, the order not to stop massacres was given by Admiral Lanxade and/or General Christian Quesnot: “Before going to Rwanda, I passed by to take orders from Lanxade, then instructions at the EMP (special Headquarters of the president of the Republic)” Jacques Morel thinks that these words came from Colonel Henri Poncet who commanded the Amaryllis in as much as, in his capacity of leader of the operation, he was the most likely to receive those orders at such a high hierarchy level. But as we saw above, it was an assumed political decision.

c) Rescue of the Saint Agathe orphanage and of the leader of the killers of Masaka

The second selective evacuation carried out by the French in April 1994 concerns the St. Agathe in the area of Masaka, near Kigali. This institution sponsored by the spouse of the head of state, was run by the Saint Vincent Palotti Sisters and had the specialty of receiving orphans of the FAR soldiers killed in combat. The superior of the orphanage, Sister Edita, from Poland, was given the responsibility to find adoptive families in Europe, especially France. She was evacuated by the French and did not want to return to Rwanda after 1994.

According to various testimonies, at the St. Agathe orphanage there was ethnic discrimination against the Tutsi or Hutu personnel that distanced themselves from extremism. The children who were living there in April 1994 and about thirty adults called “accompanying adults” were evacuated by the French on 10th April 1994, the Tutsi staff that worked there and the members of their families were selected then killed on the orders of Paul Kanyamihigo who was a driver at the orphanage. Coming from Gisenyi, Kanyamihigo was an active member of the CDR, notoriously known at Masaka, and immediately after the fall of the plane, he directed attacks against the Tutsis. He and his family were evacuated by the French, as well as the family of a CDR extremist, Justin Twiringiyimana who was a watchman at the orphanage. It is Kanyamihigo who showed to the French the people to evacuate or leave behind on the basis of a pre-established list according to ethnic criteria. Testimonies emphasize Paul Kanyamihigo’s extremism, his participation in the persecution of the Tutsi staff of the orphanage since October 1990, his collaboration with the intelligence services of the Presidency, his involvement in the massacre of the Tutsis since 7th April. At the time of evacuation, Paul Kanyamihigo collaborated closely with French officials in the scanning of people to be evacuated according to a pre-established or indications provided by the latter or by officials of the orphanage, especially the director, Sister Editha. Witnesses affirm also that people were proposed by Kanyamihigo himself, and all of them were CDR extremists.

Upon their arrival in Paris, the people evacuated from the orphanage were first of all accommodated at the reception centre for asylum seekers of Créteil in the region of Paris, then taken to Olivet in the south of Orléans where, for two and a half years, they were accommodated in a property put at their disposal by the general Council of Loiret. Thereafter, they were entrusted to reception families by the Children’s Directorate. Since then, Rwanda tried to bring them back, a group of children were repatriated, and another one was adopted by French families , without a possibility of finding them again.

Even if we cannot blame France for having evacuated orphans at that particularly troubled time, the political and social context surrounding that orphanage did not make it a priority. Since that orphanage had sent a number of children for adoption in France, it was known by the French embassy’s services. There were other orphanages in Kigali and the rest of Rwanda, some run by religious people. The choice to have children adopted in the orphanage belonging to Agathe Habyarimana, essentially sheltering orphans of soldiers, was certainly unknown to the political and social Hutu power sphere of influence in which he worked. Since the list of evacuations had been prepared personally by ambassador Marlaud, the choice of this orphanage falls in direct line with the ambassador’s political options. The politically and, in the final analysis, ethnically discriminatory nature becomes clearer when you consider the fate of the orphanage of Marc Vaiter whose number of children were directly threatened.

The second question arising from the evacuation of the Agathe Habyarimana orphanage concerns the number of accompanying adults, which seems to have been higher than that of the employees of the orphanage. According to André Guichaoua, France evacuated “94 children from the St. Agathe orphanage, […], accompanied by 34 people”. Observers think that heir number was reviewed upwards by those who carried out the evacuation, so as to be able to infiltrate the people close to the regime with the intention of putting them out of danger, in the prospect of bringing them back to power after hopefully neutralizing the RPF.

Indeed, the inquiry carried out on the ground by the journalists of the of the broadcast “The Right to know” in 1995 showed that the number of people at the orphanage was not more than twenty people, a figure confirmed at the Commission by witnesses Emmanuel Hategekimana, Esperance Mukakarangwa, Alphonse Ntamuhanga and Yacine Musenge, all of them residents of Masaka.

Other testimonies specify that in general the French hid the identity of the people embarked in their planes, and this may confirm the hypothesis of hiding the identity of some Rwandans whom they were evacuating. According to journalist Jean-Pierre Martin, a witness of the progress of the Amaryllis, « It was not allowed to film the people who were boarding the French planes, and generally it was rather done in the evenings. » In view of the agreement of the stories in relation to the number of workers at the orphanage, and considering the indications showing that the number of adults evacuated was bigger than that of the people who were working in the orphanage, we cannot rule out the possibility that the French evacuated, with full knowledge of the facts, people who did not belong to the staff of the orphanage, for one reason or another.

d) Abandonment of the Marc Vaiter orphanage

Whereas they went ahead with the evacuation of the Agatha Kanziga orphanage, the French soldiers refused the same help to the forty children of another orphanage that was under the care of a French citizen, Marc Vaiter. That orphanage was situated in the centre of Kigali town, as opposed to Masaka situated at about twenty kilometres from the capital. Moreover, the Marc Vaiter orphanage was situated in an area exposed to exchanges of fire and to attacks by militias. Most of the children under the care of Marc Vaiter were orphans of AIDS whom he had recovered from the Kigali Hospital Centre. He also accommodated children threatened with genocide, whom people of goodwill entrusted to him.

The facts took place on 11th April 1994. Two French soldiers accompanied by Dr. Jean-Marie Milleliri, a military doctor who worked in Kigali at the AIDS Project financed by the French cooperation, came to the orphanage and spoke to Marc Vaiter telling him that they were coming to repatriate him. Marc Vaiter demanded to go with the children. They refused and preferred to go away. The person concerned narrated the incident like this: “Milleliri spoke to me first: Marc, we must go. Order from the French embassy. We have come to fetch you. […] Milleliri explains to me France and Belgium sent troops, to organize the evacuation of expatriates. No time to waste. We must leave as soon as possible. […] I must find the means to take the children. […] Most of them are Tutsis, that is to say victims targeted for killings. They must be able to come with me. Milleliri tosses his head, upset: we don’t have the necessary transport”.




3. Diplomatic support

The diplomatic support provided by France during the formation of the interim government doubled with the diplomatic support whose aim was to restore the latter’s image and facilitate its acceptance at the UN. The personalities involved in perpetration of the killings, under President Theodore Sindikubwabo’s leadership, remained in contact with government and with General Quesnot.

3.1 Collaboration with the interim government

France was the only country to collaborate with the interim government, although the latter’s role in the organisation and perpetration of the genocide was well established. On 27th April 1994, that is to say three weeks after the triggering of the genocide, two emissaries of that government, Jerome Bicamumpaka and Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, were received in Paris at the Elysee and Matignon, whereas the United States and Belgium had refused them visas. They held discussions with high ranking French leaders, notably the Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Alain Juppe and Bruno Delaye, head of the African desk in the Office of the President of the Republic . Barayagwiza, at the time director of political and administration affairs in the Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a radical Hutu extremist, a member of the leadership committee of the CDR and a founding member the RTLM, the instrument of genocide propaganda. As for Jerome Bicamumpaka, he was a member of MDR power, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the interim government. He was an extremist who would not hesitate to air remarks full of hatred against Tutsis at the Security Council to justify perpetration of the genocide. During their stay in Paris, Bicamumpaka and Barayagwiza went to the Rwandan embassy in France, dismissed Ambassador Jean-Marie Ndagijimana whom they blamed for not belonging to Hutu power, and changed the locks of the doors of the embassy to deny him access. They replaced him with the Chargé d’Affaires, Martin Ukobizaba, considered as more of an extremist than Ambassador Ndagijimana.

According to organisations for the defence of human rights, the reason given by the French authorities for receiving the two envoys of the interim government with full honours was that it was necessary to “remain in contact with all the parties in the conflict”, and to finally declare that it was a question of a “private visit”.
Interviewed by Daniel Jacoby, president of FIDH, on the merits of meeting with that delegation, Bruno Delaye answered him that “it was better to talk to them rather than not” and added later on: “With Africa it is not possible not to soil your hands . It seems therefore that “at that precise time, the French authorities knew perfectly well with whom they were doing business.’’ and that they were ready to give them and the interim government political support through such visits. In July 1994, Edouard Balladour denied the truth of those visits by declaring: “We received none of those people in France.”

3.2 Contact with the President of the interim government

On 4th May 1994, General Quesnot granted a telephone interview to the head of the genocide government, Théodore Sindikubwabo, during which the latter thanked his French counterpart, François Mitterrand, for all that he “did for Rwanda and the reception that was accorded in Paris to the delegation led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs ”. The day after the capture of the Kanombe military camp by the RPF, on 21st May 1994, President Sindikubwabo resumed contact with France by addressing a letter to François Mitterrand in which he expressed to him the “feelings of gratitude for the moral, diplomatic and material support that he offered to the Rwandan regime “since 1990 to-date’ He did not mention the ongoing genocide, merely talking about the ‘inter-ethnic massacres” whose only culprit would be the RPF and whose “military advances are likely to rekindle the fire and plunge the country back into a more serious crisis than the previous one”. The letter ended on a specific request to President Mitterrand to “provide once again” to the interim government “both material and diplomatic support” without which ‘our aggressors are likely to accomplish their plans which are well known to you”

On receiving this letter, General Quesnot immediately wrote an accompanying note forwarding Théodore Sindikubwabo’s request to President Mitterrand in which he wrote that “the attainment of power in the region by a minority whose intentions and organisation are not without analogy to the system of the Khmer Rouge is a token of regional instability whose consequences were not anticipated by those, including France, whose complicity and complacency are obvious .”

It is proper to recall that Mr. Sindikubwabo, with whom General Quesnot enjoyed close relationships during the genocide, was not only the leader of a government of killers, but he was also the instigator of the genocide in his native prefecture of Butare. He is also the one who, on 19th April 1994, even when the region was calm, went to the scene, removed the only Tutsi Préfet in Rwanda, Jean Baptiste Habyarimana, from his office and had him killed, and incited the Hutu population to start the “work”, in other words to massacre the Tutsis, and Hutus who still dared oppose the accomplishment of the genocide.



3.3 Protection of the interim government at the Security Council

During the genocide, the French authorities were haunted by the fear that “if the RPF gets a military victory on the ground”, it will want “to impose the minority law of the Tutsi clan ." In order to block this enemy that the RPF was, France worked in such a way as to promote inaction at the Security Council in the face of the genocide. The French diplomatic support was seen most strongly on the 21st of April 1994, during the debates on the vote of resolution 921 meant to describe legally the ongoing massacres. The French Ambassador did a lot of lobbying with the Member States of the Council to oppose the Security Council’s use of the expression “genocide” to refer to the killings that the Tutsis were being subjected to. In the terms of the final solution, the Security Council followed the opinion of the French representative and confined itself on deploring a situation of “violence” and of “senseless carnage” without pointing out neither the perpetrators nor the genocide nature of the ongoing massacres.

An internal note in relation to a discussion that took place on 2nd May 1994 between President Mitterrand and his Minister of Defence, François Léotard, states specifically: “At the United Nations, France had to oppose a partisan condemnation of the only actions committed by the Government forces ”. In other words, a month after the beginning of the genocide, France put this crime on an equal footing with the so-called reprehensible acts committed by the RPF combatants. In short, during the months of April-May until 16th June 1994, the date on which France requested for an intervention mandate in Rwanda with the powers assigned by chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, she pursued her UN diplomacy by insisting on the ceasefire before stopping the massacres and used the word “genocide” only when she wanted to begin Turquoise. And even on that occasion, the French Ambassador made it known that it is “Rwanda’s population” as a whole that was the victim of the genocide and the Tutsis targeted as an ethnic group was not mentioned . In this respect, she did not act differently from the other members of the Security Council, with the only difference that this attitude of passiveness was, partly, the fruit of France’s work behind the scenes.

However, we cannot explain France’s diplomatic game at the Security Council without taking into consideration the attitude and manipulations orchestrated by Boutros-Ghali as we saw in the general introduction in the part related to the action of the international community.

3.4 Collusion with the UN Secretary General and his Representative in Rwanda

Boutros-Ghali’s action of protecting the interim government during the genocide can be explained for two reasons: his sympathy for the interim government heir to the Habyarimana regime or his alliance with France. Boutros-Boutros Ghali enjoyed close relationships with the Habyarimana regime, he intervened on two occasions so that his country, Egypt, authorize sales of arms to Rwanda. This intercession was especially carried out on 16th October 1990 at the end of an interview between Boutros-Boutros Ghali and the Rwandan Ambassador in Egypt, Célestin Kabanda, which culminated in an agreement of the sale of arms to the tune of 23 million US dollars.
An identical intervention took place in December 1990 in which Rwanda received from Egypt a sale of arms to the tune of 5.889 million US dollars, whereas the authorized Egyptian institutions had refused the sale because of the situation of war. A letter from the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the attention of President Habyarimana narrates Boutros-Boutros Ghali active role in these terms: “Our Ambassador praises the personal intervention of Minister Boutros-Boutros Ghali with his Defence colleague for the realization of our recent request to the Egyptian Government and in connection with the acquisition of the military equipment that enabled us to face up to the war imposed on us since October 1990 by the assailants from Uganda. That is why I have just sent a messenger [sic] to thank Minister Boutros-Boutros Ghali for his everlasting support.

However, it seems difficult to explain the protective attitude of Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary General, by loyalty to the friendship that once bound him to Rwanda. It seems more likely that that attitude was rather dictated by the allegiance binding him to France to which he owed his appointment to the leadership of the UN.

In the conduct of her pro-Rwanda diplomacy, France could rely also on Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, the special representative of the UN Secretary General in Rwanda. A former Minister of Foreign Affairs and ex-Ambassador in Paris, France, Booh-Booh was very close to the French and well disposed towards Habyarimana’s close circle . As he admits it himself, his appointment as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Rwanda was an agreed affair between the Cameroonian President, Paul Biya, and Boutros Ghali. During his stay in Rwanda, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh showed affinities with the Hutu extremist parties and often received advice from the French Ambassador Jean-Michel Marlaud .

In the discharge of his mission, Booh-Booh and his political adviser, Mamadou Kane, both distrusted General Dallaire, they displayed real hostility towards him and their attitude was characterized by the dispatch of reports that painted a false picture of the reality on the ground and clearly contradicted those of General Dallaire. Those reports were used to Rwanda’s benefit by France, which intensified in vain efforts to get Dallaire’s dismissal, especially by forwarding a request to that effect to the Canadian government.

In his reports to the UN, Dallaire often makes us understand that the UNAMIR’s direct intervention was necessary to protect the civilian populations, whereas Booh-Booh never mentioned that possibility and preferred to insist on the priority of a ceasefire, while exonerating the interim government from its liabilities in the ongoing massacres, and this was also France’s position. The submission of Booh-Booh’s reports to the Security Council and the concealment of Dallaire’s have already been mentioned in the general introduction as well as the effects of the combined action of these two men, namely the false presentation at the Security Council level of the reality of the genocide on the ground, and the overwhelming observation by the President of the Security Council during the month of April 1994, the New Zealander Colin Keating who did not hesitate to affirm later on that with better information, the Council would have acted in a noticeably different manner.

4. French military support during the genocide

A number of testimonies and official French declarations allow us to say that French military support was continuous from October 1990, during the entire period of the genocide until July 1994, the date of its official stop. This support during the genocide manifested itself in direct contacts between the highest-ranking Rwandan military leaders with their French counterparts, in the continuous presence of French soldiers beside the FAR and in the large supplies of arms but especially ammunitions.

4.1 Presence of French soldiers in Rwanda during the genocide

Before tackling the genocide period itself, it is necessary to mention the contradictions with regard to the number of technical military Assistants left behind in Rwanda after the official departure of the French troops on 15th December 1993. The MIP, in its report, shows that only 24 French AMT remained in Rwanda . But on 30th May 1994, Michel Roussin, then Minister of Cooperation, acknowledges on RFI that there were between 40 and 70 remaining.

Many testimonies mention the return of a number of French soldiers previously based in Rwanda towards the month of February 1994 or their continued presence, whereas they were supposed to have left. The Belgian journalist, Colette Braeckman, spent several weeks at a stretch between the beginning of 1994 and the end of March. She stated to the Commission that during that stay several people, Rwandans as well as expatriates, asserted to her that they had recognized French soldiers who were supposed to have left in December 1993, dressed in civilian clothes. When they were questioned, some of those soldiers explained that they had come back to Rwanda on a short mission. Colonel Walter Balis, a UNAMIR liaison officer, also heard by the Commission, reported that “the UNAMIR intelligence unit led by Captain Claysse indicated the presence of French soldiers dressed in civilian clothes who had returned to Rwanda after December 1993. Personally, I met one of them at the Meridien hotel.” During his two day stay at the UN headquarters in New York, on the 28th and 29th of March 1994, General Dallaire learns that France tried to have him replaced at the head of the UNAMIR because, it would seem, she had not liked the references that he had made in his reports on the presence of French officers within the Presidential Guard, then strongly associated with Interahamwe. Yet, according to MIP, in August 1992, France had brought to an end the presence of French instructors in that unit, by virtue of the accusations of its involvement in the “killings”

Finally, at the time of the attack on the Presidential plane and the triggering of the genocide, on 6th April 1994, French officers were at the heart of FAR’s military unit and seemed to enjoy the trust of the latter during those troubled times. Referring to the possibility according to which French soldiers may have been aware of the preparations of the genocide, General Dallaire explains that “The French supervised the units of the Rwandan army like the Presidential Guard and were present in the headquarters. They were well informed there was something afoot that could lead to wide scale massacres .

Lieutenant Colonel Maurin at the time was adviser to FAR’s Chief of Staff, while Damy, the colonel in the gendarmerie, was adviser to the Chief of the gendarmerie, General Augustin Ndindiriyimana . The three main units of FAR involved in the triggering of the massacres of political leaders and the genocide are the Presidential Guard, the paratrooper’s battalion and reconnaissance battalion. On 6th April these units were in radio link – in parallel network – with Colonel Bagosora presumed to be the architect of the genocide. It might be through this secret chain of command that “the lighting” of the “killing machine” may have been made. The paratrooper and reconnaissance battalions were based in Kanombe Camp adjacent to the presidential residence. In that same camp lived Captain de Saint Quentin as well as four French non-commissioned officers with their families. De Saint Quentin was technical adviser of the paratrooper battalion and instructor of the airborne troops. Whereas UNAMIR had been forbidden access to the place of the crash of the presidential plane, de Saint Quentin and two non-commissioned officers arrived at the scene some minutes after the fall of the plane.

Officially, French military presence in Rwanda came to an end with the departure of the last units that had come to carry out Opération Amaryllis of evacuating the French and foreigners from 9th to 14th April 1994. In the framework of this operation, a COS detachment was kept in Kigali and put under the command of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Among the points listing his mission, we read “to lead any aerial support operation”, “ex-filtrate himself if necessary”. The MIP comments on this initiative are as follows:

“On the basis of this personalized address and considering the situation that didn’t stop deteriorating, Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin would decide the repatriation of the entire COS detachment and the last AMT on 14th April. However, if that had not been the case, we would have legitimately questioned the principle of keeping the COS in Kigali, whereas we no longer had a diplomatic representation. Especially, it is proper to wonder about the mission consisting in directing any aerial operation for which you don’t see whom it would have benefited, if not the FAR.”

This information makes us realize that a direct military support to FAR was considered by the Chief of Staff of the French army, on 12th April, that is to say six days after the beginning of the massacres of the Tutsis, when the latter had reached their cruising speed and taken on a systematic character. Various reports show that the French army remained present during the entire period of the genocide. The monthly “Raids” wrote that if almost all the French paratroopers had re-embarked on 14th April, “only some units of the special forces would have stayed ‘in small numbers’ to account for the events to the headquarters of the land forces .”

General Laforge, commander of Opération Turquoise, confirmed this presence of the French soldiers in Kigali during the period preceding the deployment of the said operation. Deploring the poverty of the intelligence that the Opération Turquoise had at its disposal, he states: “This proves that there were not many people in Rwanda. Apart from those who were locked up in Kigali – but these did not know much and they did not have the right to go for a drive right or left – all the people knew nothing and that was a big problem. ”

Rwandans met French soldiers during the genocide. A major of the gendarmerie narrates that he was in charge of the Kacyiru camp and the buildings housing the ministries in the same area. At that time, he was facing units of the RPA camped on the opposite hill, at Gacuririo. It is the location of those units, just opposite his forces, that enabled him to ascertain that his meetings with the French soldiers took place after 14th April, the date of their official departure.

“At one time, I received two men who were obviously French, accompanied by a Rwandan soldier. Although they were in civilian clothes, they were undeniably soldiers, by virtue of their gait. I was in the building housing the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the fourth floor. They told me that they had been sent by the commander in chief of the gendarmerie and they asked me to show them through the window our positions and those of the Inkotanyi. I showed them and they looked with binoculars. I had showed them an Inkotanyi’s machine gun on the opposite hill, and they asked me if it was not possible to reach them with Milan missiles. After that they went away.”

Deputy Emmanuel Mwumvaneza narrates the circumstances under which he met French soldiers in the east of the country once again, while he was preparing to cross the Tanzanian border intending to seek refuge in that country. He explains that he saw those soldiers during the genocide and before Opération Turquoise.

“Frenchmen, I saw some again in Kiyanza in the prefecture of Kibungo when we were heading towards Tanzania. […] They were busy sensitising Habyarimana’s soldiers (the FAR); they were telling them: the war is over, let’s go! We are going to leave, leave your arms! Don’t be afraid and wait for other arms. We will try to reorganize ourselves and it won’t be long before you come back. Don’t worry! And if you have a problem of clothing, come to an agreement with your brothers so that they lend you theirs and try no to be noticed.”

Apart from this discrete and exceptional presence of French soldiers in Kigali and the east of the country, that is to say in the areas about to fall under the control of the RPF, farther to the west, the region conquered last by the RPA where the FAR had deployed a longer resistance, people point to a presence of a different nature. Some testimonies indicate that French soldiers participated in battles against RPA, much before Opération Turquoise.

Patrick de Saint-Exupery reported a testimony according to which “The French are fighting beside the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) in the region of Butare during mid-May.” Interrogated, a French soldier did not deny the allegation: “It is possible. They are perhaps mercenaries. ” This presence of French soldiers fighting beside the FAR in the region of Butare was also mentioned by Jacques Collet, a Belgian photo-journalist of Rwandan origin. Mr. Collet stayed several times in Rwanda during the genocide. After a first trip to Rwanda, he had gone back to Belgium and wanted to return but by passing through Burundi and joining RPF and going with them to the region of Butare. In Belgium, while he was planning his new stay in Rwanda with a French colleague, the latter, also a journalist, had good contacts in the French army. According to Jacques Collet “he rang a French officer who strictly advised him against coming to Rwanda and more so to Butare because there are still French troops who are fighting beside FAR and they are hard-pressed because the RPF is advancing quite fast but they absolutely don’t want people to know that the French are there. Therefore, you, as journalists, will be their first targets. You will get killed as soon as they see you, with artillery if need be.”

The Commission was able to get in touch with Collet’s French colleague, who confirmed all in all the latter’s remarks.

Jean-Paul Nturanyenabo who was a sergeant in FAR explained to the Commission that a DAMI unit stationed at Mukamira had not left in December 1993 and had stayed until the RPA overran the town of Ruhengeri.

“In 1994, some French soldiers remained at Mukamira, but clandestinely. They were almost 4 platoons. […] Towards May, they brought their heavy weapons to the frontline of Maya in Nkumba commune of Ruhengeri prefecture. There were 120 and 105 canons but only 105 canons were used. It is on a small football ground of Maya that the French operated those weapons to shoot on the RPF positions found in Parc National des Volcans. Afterwards, those weapons were kept at the military camp and the French returned to Mukamira. […] Before the capture of Ruhengeri [15th July 1994], those French soldiers based at Mukamira camp went to settle in the Gisenyi military camp with their heavy weaponry.”

The settlement of Opération Turquoise in the town of Gisenyi, where the interim government was established, and its incursion into the Mukamira camp, are reported by different sources. Human Rights watch writes:

“(…) a detachment of 200 elite soldiers entered Rwanda through the north-east at Gisenyi and started carrying out reconnaissance in the region. (…) they established camps in Gisenyi, ready to protect the town that housed the genocide government. Then the troops moved towards the east, at about 25 kilometres, to Mukamira, a military camp where the French had already trained Rwandan soldiers. They were next to Bigogwe, where Barril was supposed to carry out his training programme, and was in a good position to advance on Ruhengeri, at about twenty kilometres, which was besieged by the RPF.”

An official document quoted by MIP confirms the incursion by Opération Turquoise up to Mukamira: “On 30th June, General Germanos sent a directive for the 1st July 1994 to the Commander of the Turquoise forces, which specifies to the French forces that they must continue the reconnaissance missions with the aim of showing their presence: - to the north, by keeping the present deployment up to Mukamira; (…)”

Colonel Rosier, commander of the COS detachment of Opération Turquoise, in his end of mission report indicates in a very concise way that between 24th and 30th June, “still alone in the area, the detachment carried out some extraction missions in the region of Gisenyi.”

Olivier Lanotte, who seemed to have good French military sources, made the following comment on this COS incursion towards the Mukamira camp. He began by referring to the Rosier report. He wrote:

“However, this report does not give any precision on the identity of the people evacuated by the French army on that occasion. We cannot find any more details in the press that didn’t cover the ongoing operations in the region of Gisenyi-Mukamira-Ruhengeri. As for the report of the information Mission, the latter is totally silent on the breakthrough by the Special Forces up to the Mukamira military camp. When you know the care with which France tried to ‘give media coverage to’ her humanitarian operations in favour of Tutsi survivors, especially at Nyarushishi and at Bisesero, it is most unlikely that these people ex-filtered by the COS in the region of Gisenyi-Mukamira-Ruhengeri, a stronghold of the Habyarimana regime, were Tutsi survivors or simple missionaries. Especially since ‘all the ex-filtered people who had disembarked from the helicopters of the COS in Goma were Whites.’”

We could add here that Mukamira camp is located between the town of Ruhengeri and that of Gisenyi, which is situated at the extreme west of the country, at the border with Zaïre. This means that the region surrounding the town of Ruhengeri constituted a strategic bolt that prevented the RPF troops from advancing on Mukamira or Gisenyi. And it is only on 15th July that the town of Ruhengeri fell into RPF hands. In fact, simple individuals, French, Rwandans or other allies of the government troops did not need any special extraction mission, because the entire region was until then firmly under the control of FAR. The distances are not long, going to the West, that is to say to the Zaïrean border, following the tarmac road from Ruhengeri to the Mukamira camp there are 20 kilometres, between the Mukamira camp and the town of Gisenyi, situated at the border with Zaïre, there are only 40 kilometres. It is certain that the COS extraction mission of Mukamira camp rather concerned the French heavy weapons, especially the 105 mm mortars as is shown in Jean-Paul Nturanyenabo’s testimony. These heavy weapons that could be located by the RPF troops overhanging the region were more delicate to remove, they could have been the target of attack. Those mortars were brought by Colonel Rosier in June 1992, but always remained under guard of the French soldiers.

4.2 High level contact between FAR officers and French officers

FAR commanders kept contact with French officers in charge of the Rwandan dossier. Among those that were finally revealed to the public, the most emblematic was that of General Huchon with Lieutenant-Colonel Rwabalinda. On 9th May 1994, General Huchon received Lieutenant-Colonel Ephrem Rwabalinda, adviser of the FAR Chief of Staff, from 03 pm to 05 pm, who went on a working mission of five days to Paris. In his mission report, Rwabalinda mentioned among “the priorities” tackled by him and his interlocutor:

“- the support of Rwanda by France at the level of international policy;
the physical presence of the French soldiers in Rwanda […] for assistance in the framework of cooperation;
the indirect use of regular or non-regular troops; […]”

In the remaining part of his report, Rwabalinda indicates that General Huchon had undertaken to supply 105 mm ammunitions, ammunitions for individual weapons, as well as transmission equipment to facilitate the secret communications between him and General Bizimungu, commander in chief of FAR:

“A secure telephone line enabling General Bizimungu and General HUCHON to talk without being heard (cryptophony) by a third party was brought to Kigali. Seventeen small sets with 7 frequencies were also sent to facilitate communication between the units of Kigali town. They are waiting for shipping at Ostende. It is urgent to prepare an area under FAR control where the landing operations can be done in total security. The Kanombe runway was found convenient on condition of filling up the possible holes and ward off the spies moving around the airport.”

Rwabalinda returned to Kigali equipped with a satellite telephone meant to serve the Chief of Staff of FAR for his travel in the field.

In his report, Rwabalinda added that France was ready to continue her support to FAR, but Huchon advised Rwanda to carry out a lot of international sensitisation work to improve its image to foreigners and make the RPF responsible for the massacres:

“(…) General HUCHON clearly made me understand that the French soldiers had their hands and legs tied to make any intervention in our favour because of the opinion of the media that only the RPF seems to be in charge of. If nothing is done to restore the country’s image abroad, Rwanda’s military and political leaders will be held responsible for the massacres committed in Rwanda. He talked about this issue several times.”

This advice given by General Huchon to Ephrem Rwabalinda was taken seriously by the Rwandan host, since in the conclusions of his mission report, he noted: “To be more careful about the country’s image abroad constitutes one of the priorities NOT TO BE lost sight of. The communication equipment that I bring should help us get out of isolation vis-à-vis foreigners.” And he revealed that France was already in the process of giving support to the interim government and its armed forces: “the military house of cooperation is preparing acts of assistance in our favour”.

Rwabalinda’s report is dated 16th May in Gitarama where the interim government was, at the time. On 18th May, RTLM, the voice of Habimana Kantano, informed his listeners of the resumption of French aid as well as the advice for discretion in the massacres:

“Good news for Rwandans. News is really getting good. France has started helping us again, with an additional important assistance, with promises to increase it. Only that, for this good news to continue reaching us, they request us that there should be no more human corpses visible on the road, and also that there should be no people killing others while others watch laughing without reporting them to the authorities.”

There are grounds to beleive that the information of the resumption of French military support came from Rwabalinda and that the message requesting to hide the killings constituted the implementation of the advice given by General Huchon to the latter.

4.3 Delivery of arms and ammunitions during the genocide and their use

According to several sources of information, some of which are official, France supplied arms to the Government of Rwanda on several occasions while the latter committed genocide. Since the act has been widely documented, in this part we try to present the main facts reported by several available sources in a synthetic way. Here we propose to document the issue further by tackling the use that was made of those arms through the testimony of a group of Interahamwe who offloaded them from French planes at Goma airport, accompanied them to Rwanda and had some delivered to them.

Deliveries of arms by France during the genocide violated international and French embargoes. So, the deliveries of arms were prohibited by the Arusha Agreement signed on 4th August 1993 as well as by the agreement on the arms free zone established in Kigali town and in the vicinity, signed under the auspices of the United Nations on 22nd December 1993. Finally, on 17th May 1994, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 918 which decreed an arms embargo to Rwanda. The same text instituted a committee charged by the aforementioned Council with the responsibility to supervise observation of that embargo by States.

During his hearing at the MIP, the former French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur revealed that on 8th April 1994 his government decided “not to supply arms to Rwanda, under any form”. On one hand, there is no trace of that decision, on the other, a number of official declarations allow us to question its effective implementation. Thus, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Alain Juppé, during the same hearing explained that that measure “had been confirmed on 2nd April by CIEEMG, and on 5th May by the Prime Minister’s office, in accordance with the decision of the restricted committee of 3rd May 1994”.

The same Alain Juppé, during an interview with Philippe Birberson, then President of Doctors without Borders, France, in response to a question on arms delivery replied, on 12th June 1994: “listen, all that is very confused, as a matter of fact there were agreements of cooperation and defence with the government, there are perhaps remainders but with regard to services, I can tell you that since the end of May there certainly has been no more arms delivery to the Habyarimana regime”. But at the same time, he said while looking at the other side of Seine, therefore towards the Elysée: “but what may happen there, I don’t know”.

In his inquiry published in January 1998, Patrick de Saint-Exupéry reported the remarks of a high ranking officer who declared to him that “he had given the order to interrupt arms supplies before the beginning of Opération Turquoise” that started on 23rd June 1994.

Finally, President Mitterrand made it known that the deliveries of arms by France continued during the genocide. Interrogated by Bernard Debré, he seems to have replied: “You think,” he said “that the world woke up on 7th April, in the morning, saying: Today, the genocide begins? This notion of genocide became obvious only several weeks after 6th April 1994.”

The first information that mentioned deliveries of arms to the government by France appears at the very beginning of the genocide during Opération Amaryllis that came to evacuate French nationals and foreigners. The Belgian Colonel Luc Marshal, commander of the Kigali sector in the UNAMIR framework, who was the source of this information and confirmed it to the newspaper Le Monde in the following terms:

“On 8th [April 1994], we were informed, he assures, that French planes landed the following day towards 6 o’clock. In fact, they came at 03:45 am. Obviously, there was coordination between the French and the Rwandans. The vehicles that were obstructing the runway were withdrawn during the night. I, personally, wasn’t at the airport, but I had observers of fifteen different nationalities. They were soldiers, and they knew what they were saying. Some were definite: boxes of ammunitions – probably 5 tons – were offloaded from a plane and transported by vehicles of the Rwandan army to its Kanombe camp that served as support to the Presidential guard.”

Then, the information mentioning the supply of arms by France during the genocide focuses on the airport of Goma, a small Zairian town situated at least five kilometres from the Rwandan border. Here is the main information relating to the problem:

Philippe Jehanne, former secret services agent in the office of the Minister of Cooperation, declared on 19th May 1994 to Gérard Prunier: “We deliver ammunitions to FAR passing through Goma. But of course we shall deny it, if you quote me in the press.”

“In May, more than a month after the start of the massacres and even as 10,000 people had been killed in Gisenyi [very near Goma], the French let land an arms cargo in Goma in Zaïre. Whereas the smell of corpses heaped in a mass grave overwhelmed the airport, the arms intended for the murderers were heaped up on the runway. The French Consul in Goma said that he was not in a position to intervene: it involved the application of a private contract, entered before the interdiction of arms sales to Rwanda.”

On 31st May 1994, the newspaper L’Humanité mentioned a letter of 25th May from the Rwandan Embassy in Cairo to the Rwandan Minister of Defence, Augustin Bizimana, that announces arms deliveries to FAR by France via Zaïre to whom they are falsely addressed.

On 4th June 1994, Stephen Smith reports that a Boeing 707 delivered arms paid for by France at the Goma airport, on five occasions.

“Finally, since the beginning of the Rwandan tragedy, Goma airport was the rear base of the government of the neighbouring country, Rwanda. It is here that the genocide perpetrators were supplied with arms in particular, until ten days ago. Since the defeat of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) in Kigali, on Sunday 22nd May, “the special flights” to Goma indeed stopped. Previously, on five occasions, a Boeing 707 with registration numbers carefully erased had landed three times during the day and during the night. Its cargo: “every time some 18 tons of arms and ammunitions, ‘of Serbian origin’, according to some people, in cases marked ‘Bulgaria’, according to others. At least once, witnesses affirm having identified South African pilots. In spite of the proliferation of details and contradictory versions, all the sources on the ground – including well-placed French expatriates – express their ‘certainty’ that those arms deliveries were ‘paid for by France’. Nobody is in a position to support this assertion with material evidence.”

A letter of 16th June 1994 from the Continent indicated that: “On 21st June 1994 […] A few days earlier, Colonel Dominique Bon, the military attaché at the French Embassy in Kinshasa, more or less acknowledged that the arms deliveries to ex-FAR did not stop and that they passed through Goma airport, and it is particularly embarrassing since the airport was supposed to be used for humanitarian intervention.”

The Human Rights Watch organisation that carried out an inquiry on the